On Aug 17, 2011, at 10:30 AM, Arlo Bensinger wrote:
> [Horse]
> And if this 'autonomous individual self ' is illusory then the conventional
> way of looking at free will is also illusory.
>
> [Arlo]
> The way I see it, "free will" is intellectual pattern we use in an attempt to
> describe experience. Like "polar coordinates", it can be useful or not, and
> should be evaluated by how valuable a description it provides (is it
> pragmatically useful? or something like that).
>
> As such, I think the "free will/determinism" patterns are far less useful
> (valuable) than "agency/structuration", also intellectual patterns we use to
> describe experience. Both are, of course, analogies, like "Cartiesian" versus
> "Polar" they are attempts to map experience.
>
> The question I ask is, what is valuable about describing experience using
> "free will"? And can a better description (agency, for example) be more
> useful.
Marsha had written to Ian:
Yes, but Ms. Albahari's investigation is whether the 'sense of self' does, in
fact, reflect a real 'self'. A far more important investigation consider that
RMP rejects an autonomous self.
>
> [Ian responded]
> Marsha, I don't call that rejection, but a warning as to the illusory nature
> of the autonomous individual self.
> [Arlo]
> I'm going to take exception to the term "illusory" and suggest instead that
> the concept of "self" has staying power because it is pragmatically valuable.
> It is an "illusion" only in response to the idea that it is some existential
> existant (is that redundant?). You sign your posts "Marsha" for a reason.
> From within a MOQ, a "self" is not an illusion OR an existant, it is a
> pattern of value, and should be evaluated as such.
Marsha:
Yes, I sign my posts 'Marsha' because it is a useful label. But my
investigation is into no-self (anatta). As far as I am concern the 'sense of
self' is real enough, but it does not reflect a real 'self'. RMP used the word
'illusion'.
"The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says this
“autonomous individual” is an illusion."
(RMP, Copleston)
> So the "existential self" would be an illusion fostered by a concept such as
> "free will". And that's one reason why I think "free will" is not as valuable
> as term as "agency" (keeping in mind that "agency", like "free will" is also
> an intellectual pattern of value).
Marsha:
I agree 'free will', 'agency' and 'self' are intellectual static patterns of
value, yet I am still interested in examining the strong 'sense of self' I
experience and how it relates to a real self. I want more than just RMP's
words or the Buddha's, for that matter, I want to see for myself (as best I
can).
> "Agency", I hold, is a term that we can use to describe the range of
> potential responses any pattern has to its environment. It can apply to rocks
> (very, very, very little agency) and dogs (a greater range of agency) and
> humans (the greatest range of agency within a MOQ view). Whereas "free will"
> is a term that makes sense only (really) on the "human" or "self" scale,
> "agency" can apply across the MOQ hierarchy in a quite sensible way.
Marsha
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