[Marsha]
RMP has called an autonomous self is an illusion..
[Arlo]
Right, Marsha, he qualified by "autonomous", right? What he is saying is
that there are no existential existants, there are only patterns of
value. This includes the "self", just as it includes objects. I think
you could reword this, and Pirsig would agree, "the autonomous rock is
an illusion".
What is the "illusion" here is the primacy of subjects and objects, no?
What sense does it make to say, within a MOQ, that one pattern of value
is an "illusion"? What would this even mean? If all patterns are
patterns of value, how can one be an "illusion" and another be "real"?
What I am saying is that "real" and "illusion" only mean anything from
within the S/O context.
[Marsha]
And in Lila's Child he states that the MoQ "denies any existence of a
“self” that is independent of inorganic, biological, social or
intellectual patterns. There is no “self” that contains these patterns."
[Arlo]
Right, well this is just restating his hierarchy; everything is a
pattern of value (of or within these four levels) except DQ. So there is
no "self" that is apart from that. Right. So the "self" is a pattern of
value. That was what I said in my first reply.
And, just as the human body (a biological pattern) is not independent of
the carbon atoms (inorganic patterns) from which it forms, the "self"
pattern also is not independent of the levels from which it forms.
[Marsha]
At least that is how I understand it. I'm not sure how far apart are our
views.
[Arlo]
I guess where they diverge is over the idea of "illusion", no? While I
agree the "autonomous self" is an "illusion", I think the "self" pattern
of value is neither real nor illusory but experientially valuable, and
as such I ask instead when/how such concepts are pragmatically useful
and in what context.
This is, I argue, just like asking if "Cartesian" coordinates are an
"illusion" and "Polar" coordinates "real". Ask, instead, which one
provides real empirical value in the context its being drawn upon.
I think I used this example before, but here it is again. Asking whether
or not my motorcycle is "real" in some existential sense, or just an
illusion (in contrast to being an existential existant), is to stay
stuck in the world of SOM. What I ask is how the stability of that
pattern of value improves my empirical activity. This was the point, I
believe, Pirsig made about the atomic bombs. What good does it do to say
that the bombs that exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "illusions"?
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
