Hi Ron, On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 7:40 PM, X Acto <[email protected]> wrote: > Steve: > If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the > individual "making choices" is a figure of speech about a figure of > speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that > the individual possesses or does not possess "free will." We literally > are our value choices. Quality has Lila. The question in the MOQ is > not about whether the individual possesses free will but whether > values themselves are free. Pirsig's answer is that DQ is the free > sort. SQ is the non-free sort. Talking about a person choosing one > thing or another has no metaphysical reality in the MOQ. It is just a > figure of speech. > > > Ron: > Everything is "just" a figure of speech Steve, The point remains that you > maintain that it is meaningless > to discuss "free will" in the MoQ, when, everything in the MoQ is a figure of > speech(what else could > it be).
Steve: I don't think talk about free will is meaningless in the MOQ. What becomes meaningless in the MOQ (in the sense that the question gets dissolved rather than answered) is the question of whether we _have_ free will. We should certainly talk about free will just as we talk about other such SOM Platypi that the MOQ completely dissolves. "Is the locus of control for human behavior internal or external to the will?" is one more version of "Is the Quality in the subject or the object?" The answer isn't one or the other or some wishy-washy "kinda both." The answer is that such questions are based on premises rejected by the MOQ. When we reject the underlying SOM premise, we stop asking such questions. Ron: The topic then remains about the "meaning" of the figure of speech called "free will" of which > Pirsig addresses: > > "But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing > freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels." which is all Dave is > saying . Steve: I posted that quote months ago and am well aware of it. I posted it originally because I think it punches up just how different Pirsig's conception of freedom is compared with the traditional formulation of the question in terms of free will versus determinism. The idea of "having" it makes no literal sense in the MOQ since freedom is associated with DQ which is no one's possession. Pirsig is saying that if you want to slip into SOM formulations and talk about "having" free will, then keep in mind that this is the sort of things that rocks "have" rather than being what separates humans from animals. It is certainly not the logical and necessary basis for moral responsibility like the traditional view of free will. In the MOQ morals go all the way down. They aren't posited as needing a basis but rather ARE the basis of everything. Ron: > He also says this about the value of talking about "the individual": > > "it is impossible to get rid of them. There is really no need to. Like > 'substance' they can be used as long as it is remembered that they are terms > for collections of patterns and not some independent primary reality of their > own". (LILA, p158)" Steve: Right, there is no need to get rid of the term "the individual" but as Pirsig describes what that means in MOQ terms it stops being important to ask whether this "collection of patterns" _has_ free will. The individual doesn't have values, the values have the individual and it is Value that is distinguished as free (DQ) or constrained (sq). Ron: > One then has to ask exactly what you mean when you require that these figures > of speech have a "metaphysical reality" because when we are talking about > meaning in the MoQ, It seems that we are definitly NOT talking about any sort > of "metaphysical reality" we are talking about the usefulness of concepts, > the values of certain types of values. Steve: In my opinion free will ceases to be a useful concept for describing experience once we embrace MOQ terms. Worse, I think that the way dmb uses the term he is slipping a bunch of SOM BS in the backdoor of the MOQ (e,g,, when he says that accepting that humans have free will is necessary for thinking that humans can be held morally responsible for their actions). I think what he is doing is no better than the attempts of others to slip God into the MOQ. "Free will" is no more meaningless than "God" in the MOQ, but both are rejected as bad explanations of experience (as is determinism for that matter). Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
