Hello Steve,
On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 7:40 PM, X Acto <[email protected]> wrote:
> Steve:
> If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the
> individual "making choices" is a figure of speech about a figure of
> speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that
> the individual possesses or does not possess "free will." We literally
> are our value choices. Quality has Lila. The question in the MOQ is
> not about whether the individual possesses free will but whether
> values themselves are free. Pirsig's answer is that DQ is the free
> sort. SQ is the non-free sort. Talking about a person choosing one
> thing or another has no metaphysical reality in the MOQ. It is just a
> figure of speech.
>
>
> Ron:
> Everything is "just" a figure of speech Steve, The point remains that you
> maintain that it is meaningless
> to discuss "free will" in the MoQ, when, everything in the MoQ is a figure of
> speech(what else could
> it be).
Steve:
I don't think talk about free will is meaningless in the MOQ. What
becomes meaningless in the MOQ (in the sense that the question gets
dissolved rather than answered) is the question of whether we _have_
free will. We should certainly talk about free will just as we talk
about other such SOM Platypi that the MOQ completely dissolves. "Is
the locus of control for human behavior internal or external to the
will?" is one more version of "Is the Quality in the subject or the
object?" The answer isn't one or the other or some wishy-washy "kinda
both." The answer is that such questions are based on premises
rejected by the MOQ. When we reject the underlying SOM premise, we
stop asking such questions.
Ron replies:
Again, It's the either/or distinction which is dissolved and rejected not the
concepts themselves
on both accounts, which is where the crux of the dispute lies. It most
certainly then
IS a "wishy-washy" both, its only wishy washy when trying to frame it into
a rigid system of conception. Free will is following Dynamic Quality keep in
mind.
It is associated with natural selection and I think you are striking at the
most important
point with the question you put to Arlo:
"What experiences could ever distinguish between a will that is
determined versus one that is free? Isn't this a distinction without a
difference in pragmatic terms? "
It is a huge distinction in Pragmatic terms, it is the ability to respond to
Dynamic Quality
it is the ability to adapt and change with environment it is the ability to
make choices
that evolve an organism toward greater complexity, and in these terms it is the
very
definition of "moral responability" within a MoQ.
Steve:
The theory of free will predicts
reality to be exactly as it is. So does the theory of determinism".
Ron replies:
Now indeed statements like this are a slip back into the either/or conception
of theory when
Pirsig suggests that there is no longer any need to link the two. As stated
below.
Ron:
The topic then remains about the "meaning" of the figure of speech
called "free will" of which
> Pirsig addresses:
>
> "But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing
> freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels." which is all Dave is
> saying .
Steve:
I posted that quote months ago and am well aware of it. I posted it
originally because I think it punches up just how different Pirsig's
conception of freedom is compared with the traditional formulation of
the question in terms of free will versus determinism. The idea of
"having" it makes no literal sense in the MOQ since freedom is
associated with DQ which is no one's possession. Pirsig is saying that
if you want to slip into SOM formulations and talk about "having" free
will, then keep in mind that this is the sort of things that rocks
"have" rather than being what separates humans from animals. It is
certainly not the logical and necessary basis for moral responsibility
like the traditional view of free will. In the MOQ morals go all the
way down. They aren't posited as needing a basis but rather ARE the
basis of everything.
Ron replies:
Again you are placing alot of emphasis on a figure of speech that has little
impact in the face of
that quote below previously stated:
Ron:
> He also says this about the value of talking about "the individual":
>
> "it is impossible to get rid of them. There is really no need to. Like
> 'substance' they can be used as long as it is remembered that they are terms
> for collections of patterns and not some independent primary reality of their
> own". (LILA, p158)"
Steve:
Right, there is no need to get rid of the term "the individual" but as
Pirsig describes what that means in MOQ terms it stops being important
to ask whether this "collection of patterns" _has_ free will. The
individual doesn't have values, the values have the individual and it
is Value that is distinguished as free (DQ) or constrained (sq).
Ron replies:
In the similar fashon, the term "having" may be used as long as one keeps in
mind that it is the value
of responding to Dynamic Quality we are talking about, the ability to adapt,
change and evolve when
we talk about an individuals having free will and moral responsibility. It
actually expands the old
rigid conceptions not reject them in a rhetorical move to solve the issue by
using differnt terms, things
just get more confusing when the aim is greater clarity.
Ron:
> One then has to ask exactly what you mean when you require that these figures
> of speech have a "metaphysical reality" because when we are talking about
> meaning in the MoQ, It seems that we are definitly NOT talking about any sort
> of "metaphysical reality" we are talking about the usefulness of concepts,
> the values of certain types of values.
Steve:
In my opinion free will ceases to be a useful concept for describing
experience once we embrace MOQ terms. Worse, I think that the way dmb
uses the term he is slipping a bunch of SOM BS in the backdoor of the
MOQ (e,g,, when he says that accepting that humans have free will is
necessary for thinking that humans can be held morally responsible for
their actions). I think what he is doing is no better than the
attempts of others to slip God into the MOQ. "Free will" is no more
meaningless than "God" in the MOQ, but both are rejected as bad
explanations of experience (as is determinism for that matter).
Ron replies:
When Dave says that accepting free will is necessary for moral responsibility
he is framing the idea in MoQ context. Because free will {DQ} the ability to
change
and evolve is moral responsibility, because the consequences are to risk poor
quality
and death, to not exist. Adhere to the static, stick to the conservative, and
one risks
being left behind. We see it manifest in every facett of life from politics to
staying competitive
in the job market.
It has very "real" Pragmatic consequences in experience.
thnx Steve
..
..
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