List, JAS JAS wrote: > even a "first-time" sign token is an instance of a sign type because its > (definitely significant) form is capable of repetition in subsequent sign > tokens, and the same is true of natural signs. In fact, anything that we can > describe using words, which as sign tokens are always instances of sign > types, must likewise be either a general itself or an instantiation of a > general. Only an entirely unique sign token would not be an instance of a > sign type--something brute, unrepeatable, and indescribable; pure 2ns, with > no 3ns whatsoever, which of course is impossible for anything involved in > semiosis.
I find this a strange outline, because, it is asserting that all triads/signs include 3ns or general habits, ie,enabling reproduction of that type. But I note that of Peirce’s ten sign classes within semeiosis, , four have no 3ns involved: the Qualisign, the Iconic Sinsign, the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, and the Dicent Sinsign. Aren’t these ‘involved in semeiosis’? Furthermore, using Robert Marty’s laltice model it can be shown tha there is an ‘accretive path’ from the sign lacking 3ns, to the inclusion of 3ns, suggesting that the matter/mind of the world is capable of knowledge acquisition and the generation of entirely new forms of matter/mind, where as Marty points out, one sees a ‘process of growth or enlargement by a gradual categorical build up”..Of course this is also briefly outlined by Peirce in 1.413- the emergence of the universe, JAS’s outline, if I understand him correctly, rejects any such evolutionary buildup and instead, posits an a priori Habit/3ns already existent in any novel emergent Sign.Where did this general law come from? Is there some kind of a priori bank filled with Platonic Forms waiting to be called upon? Or-Is it purely a mutant randomness with no interaction with its environmental realities? Or is the answer to the emergence of new signs a mater of semiosic informational dynamics, with a novel instance emerging in interaction with its environment, and when enough of these reach a critical threshold of commonality - 3ns becomes operative within their format. These are two very different approaches to the question of How Does Novelty Emerge within Semiosis. Edwina > On Nov 6, 2025, at 8:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gary R., List: > > I changed the subject line to reflect the narrower focus of this discussion. > > I agree with you and those other scholars that even a "first-time" sign token > is an instance of a sign type because its (definitely significant) form is > capable of repetition in subsequent sign tokens, and the same is true of > natural signs. In fact, anything that we can describe using words, which as > sign tokens are always instances of sign types, must likewise be either a > general itself or an instantiation of a general. Only an entirely unique sign > token would not be an instance of a sign type--something brute, unrepeatable, > and indescribable; pure 2ns, with no 3ns whatsoever, which of course is > impossible for anything involved in semiosis. > > In a communicational context, there can be a disconnect between the intention > of the utterer, which pertains to the object of the sign, and the > understanding of the interpreter, which pertains to its interpretant. Put > simply, the utterer can be unsuccessful in conveying his/her intention in the > sign's immediate interpretant, resulting in an unexpected dynamical > interpretant; everyone has experienced this. In your example, the sender > wanted to utter an instance of the sign whose type in English is "hide," but > the receiver interpreted it as an instance of the sign whose type in English > is "run." Did the receiver misinterpret, or did the sender misspeak (using > his/her hands)? > > Who can say, since there was no pre-established definition of that particular > gesture, corresponding to its immediate interpretant? Although like every > sign token, it was an instance of a sign type, that type had not yet been > associated by both parties with any sign in itself, such that it was capable > of being translated into "hide," "run," or some other English word. The > sender presumably thought something equivalent to "hide," which he/she > translated into a certain hand signal; but when the interpreter saw it, > he/she instead thought something equivalent to "run." > > I do not know how to answer your concluding question, "how wide should we > consider 'type' and 'law' to be in Peirce's semiotic?" What does "wide" mean > in this context? By contrast, what would "narrow" mean? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Wed, Nov 5, 2025 at 8:14 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Jon, List, >> >> Is it possible that any of these -- a unique (first time) hand signal, or a >> lightning flash, or a hiccup -- is an example of a token that is not an >> instance of a type? >> >> Some Peirce scholars, including Joe Ransdell (but also Short, Liszka, and >> Parker), wondered about 'first-time' or 'natural' signs that at "first >> blush" (as Joe would say) look type-less. But, as I recall, these scholars, >> each and all, concluded that such (e.g., 'natural signs') function under >> some generality: a natural law, a habit, or an 'interpretive >> generalization', even if that interpretation were formed on the spot (and >> even, say, if that first time unique hand signal were misinterpreted to mean >> 'run' when the signaler meant 'hide'.) >> >> So my own answer to the question would be that there really isn't a >> sign-token that isn’t, in some way, an instance of a type. >> >> But then another question arises: how wide should we consider 'type' and >> 'law' to be in Peirce's semiotic? >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . 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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
