Edwina, Koichiro, lists,
What you say makes sense, Edwina. The wave function would seem not quite
so meaningful if there were no definite quantitative outcomes. The wave
function gives probabilities for definite outcomes (that's part of the
point of unitarity, the probabilities of alternate definite outcomes sum
to unity) at a given stage of its time evolution. I haven't read
anything on quantum indeterminacy in biology that was E-Z enough for me
to follow, but I've seen some claims at least.
On a side note, it's occurred to me that Peirce's idea of absolute
chance may be not too much in conflict with the idea of the
deterministic time evolution of the wave function in the following
sense. Peirce allows (I forget what terminology he used) for destiny, or
necessity in the sense of destiny, to arise from probabilities in large
numbers of things, a la the Law of Large Numbers. Now, the probabilities
given by the wave function, despite its 'apriorism' (as I've sometimes
seen it called), reflect what would be the result of indefinitely many
trials - a very large number indeed. That the wave function, for its
part, as a potentiality, would evolve deterministically in time, then,
could make sense even in terms of Peirce's tychism (absolute chance).
Best, Ben
On 11/9/2014 11:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Ben, you wrote:
"the 'realist' assumption that particles have determinate quantitative
values in all measurable respects prior to a given act of measurement.
I tend to chalk such phenomena up as a potential validation of
Peirce's realism about modalities (such as possibility) and absolute
chance, although I don't understand the physics well enough to make a
serious argument. A related question is, is Peirce's idea of absolute
chance consistent with the idea of the deterministic continuous time
evolution of the wave function (from which probabilities are
calculated)? I don't know. "
The 'realist' assumption - understanding realism as the existence of
general laws - would, to my understanding of semiosis, suggest that
the organization of matter as it moves from potentiality (the wave
function) to actuality of morphological existence mean that _within
these laws_ , matter will organize in 'determinate quantiative
values'. But which quantitative organizational mode takes precedence
can be an issue of 'absolute chance'.
I think in the physico-chemical realm, there are limited chance
possibilities - after all, since this realm is the basis of life, a
chaotic physico-chemical realm would be disastrous. But in the
biological realm, chance emerges within potentiality (wave
function) as a vital, if not key agent, in the ability to diversify,
network and expand the ability of organized matter to prevent energy
dissipation.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Udell
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Sunday, November 09, 2014 10:45 AM
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7407] Re: Natural Propositions
Koihiro, lists,
With this one I would get more out of my depth than usual. It gets
into the question known as that of Bertlmann's socks, about which I
read many years ago and was left shaking my head. Anyway, from what
little I understand, the experimentally shown violation of Bell's
inequalities conflicts with (classical physical) local _/realism/ _,
not with locality by itself without the 'realist' assumption that
particles have determinate quantitative values in all measurable
respects prior to a given act of measurement. I tend to chalk such
phenomena up as a potential validation of Peirce's realism about
modalities (such as possibility) and absolute chance, although I
don't understand the physics well enough to make a serious argument.
A related question is, is Peirce's idea of absolute chance consistent
with the idea of the deterministic continuous time evolution of the
wave function (from which probabilities are calculated)? I don't know.
Best, Ben
On 11/8/2014 7:24 PM, Koichiro Matsuno wrote:
At 1:40 AM 11/09/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:
In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a matter not
merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of reaction,
resistance, interaction, like so many natural measurements. This is
congenial to the QM view of things as becoming determinate through
interaction with the environment, the 'observer', the 'measurer', etc.
In a related context, John Bell (1964) said:
"In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to
determine the results of individual measurements, without changing
the statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the
setting of the one measuring device can influence the reading of
another instrument, however remote."
The violation of Bell’s inequality in QM reveals the failure of
Einstein locality or local realism strictly on the experimental
ground. I am not well acquainted with how Peirce or Peirceans would
have responded to this observation.
Koichuro
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