Ben- agreed. The wave has to have a function, so to speak. I think that it's to offer choice within the actual world. The classical idea of matter is that there is no choice; every that 'is', already 'is' so to speak; it's just that our inadequate senses can't observe it, but, by gosh, it's there.
But the notion of potentiality or probability (yes, yes, I know they aren't the same) introduces the capacity for novelty. Total novelty, constrained of course by what is already actual. I think the wave function operates not as many large numbers (for that's post wave function) but as a 'vast exploratory networking informational search engine' of what is actually 'out there' in the local time and space; it comes up with several probable solutions to the existential realities in that local time and space. All of them would function. Which one becomes actualized - is chance. And this new actualization in its turn requires adaptation from other actualities in that local time and space. Within the biological realm - I think this 'informational sensing' plays a vital role in the development of diversity and novelty and constant adaptation. [That's also why I don't think we should deplore extinction; nature abhors a vacuum and is always developing new morphologies.] I think this production of novelty is almost non-existent in the physico-chemical realm for the simple reason that 'matter' can't afford such dynamism in the most basic realm. Imagine what our planet would be like if its most basic components, eg, hydrogen, oxygen, would no longer replicate as such but would simply cease to exist and some other molecule would emerge. Science fiction TV drama? Agreed; destiny or necessity, or the laws of Thirdness, would emerge within large numbers whose very actualization would inhibit the power of smaller 'niche' populations. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Benjamin Udell To: [email protected] ; [email protected] Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 12:16 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:7414] Re: Natural Propositions Edwina, Koichiro, lists, What you say makes sense, Edwina. The wave function would seem not quite so meaningful if there were no definite quantitative outcomes. The wave function gives probabilities for definite outcomes (that's part of the point of unitarity, the probabilities of alternate definite outcomes sum to unity) at a given stage of its time evolution. I haven't read anything on quantum indeterminacy in biology that was E-Z enough for me to follow, but I've seen some claims at least. On a side note, it's occurred to me that Peirce's idea of absolute chance may be not too much in conflict with the idea of the deterministic time evolution of the wave function in the following sense. Peirce allows (I forget what terminology he used) for destiny, or necessity in the sense of destiny, to arise from probabilities in large numbers of things, a la the Law of Large Numbers. Now, the probabilities given by the wave function, despite its 'apriorism' (as I've sometimes seen it called), reflect what would be the result of indefinitely many trials - a very large number indeed. That the wave function, for its part, as a potentiality, would evolve deterministically in time, then, could make sense even in terms of Peirce's tychism (absolute chance). Best, Ben On 11/9/2014 11:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Ben, you wrote: "the 'realist' assumption that particles have determinate quantitative values in all measurable respects prior to a given act of measurement. I tend to chalk such phenomena up as a potential validation of Peirce's realism about modalities (such as possibility) and absolute chance, although I don't understand the physics well enough to make a serious argument. A related question is, is Peirce's idea of absolute chance consistent with the idea of the deterministic continuous time evolution of the wave function (from which probabilities are calculated)? I don't know. " The 'realist' assumption - understanding realism as the existence of general laws - would, to my understanding of semiosis, suggest that the organization of matter as it moves from potentiality (the wave function) to actuality of morphological existence mean that within these laws , matter will organize in 'determinate quantiative values'. But which quantitative organizational mode takes precedence can be an issue of 'absolute chance'. I think in the physico-chemical realm, there are limited chance possibilities - after all, since this realm is the basis of life, a chaotic physico-chemical realm would be disastrous. But in the biological realm, chance emerges within potentiality (wave function) as a vital, if not key agent, in the ability to diversify, network and expand the ability of organized matter to prevent energy dissipation. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Benjamin Udell To: [email protected] ; [email protected] Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 10:45 AM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7407] Re: Natural Propositions Koihiro, lists, With this one I would get more out of my depth than usual. It gets into the question known as that of Bertlmann's socks, about which I read many years ago and was left shaking my head. Anyway, from what little I understand, the experimentally shown violation of Bell's inequalities conflicts with (classical physical) local _realism _, not with locality by itself without the 'realist' assumption that particles have determinate quantitative values in all measurable respects prior to a given act of measurement. I tend to chalk such phenomena up as a potential validation of Peirce's realism about modalities (such as possibility) and absolute chance, although I don't understand the physics well enough to make a serious argument. A related question is, is Peirce's idea of absolute chance consistent with the idea of the deterministic continuous time evolution of the wave function (from which probabilities are calculated)? I don't know. Best, Ben On 11/8/2014 7:24 PM, Koichiro Matsuno wrote: At 1:40 AM 11/09/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote: In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a matter not merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of reaction, resistance, interaction, like so many natural measurements. This is congenial to the QM view of things as becoming determinate through interaction with the environment, the 'observer', the 'measurer', etc. In a related context, John Bell (1964) said: "In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to determine the results of individual measurements, without changing the statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of the one measuring device can influence the reading of another instrument, however remote." The violation of Bell’s inequality in QM reveals the failure of Einstein locality or local realism strictly on the experimental ground. I am not well acquainted with how Peirce or Peirceans would have responded to this observation. Koichuro
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