On 11/9/2014 1:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Ben- agreed. The wave has to have a function, so to speak. I think
that it's to offer choice within the actual world. The classical idea
of matter is that there is no choice; every that 'is', already 'is' so
to speak; it's just that our inadequate senses can't observe it, but,
by gosh, it's there.
But the notion of potentiality or probability (yes, yes, I know they
aren't the same) introduces the capacity for novelty. Total novelty,
constrained of course by what is already actual. I think the wave
function operates not as many large numbers (for that's post wave
function) but as a 'vast exploratory networking informational search
engine' of what is actually 'out there' in the local time and space;
it comes up with several probable solutions to the existential
realities in that local time and space. All of them would function.
Which one becomes actualized - is chance. And this new actualization
in its turn requires adaptation from other actualities in that local
time and space. Within the biological realm - I think this
'informational sensing' plays a vital role in the development of
diversity and novelty and constant adaptation. [That's also why I
don't think we should deplore extinction; nature abhors a vacuum and
is always developing new morphologies.]
I think this production of novelty is almost non-existent in the
physico-chemical realm for the simple reason that 'matter' can't
afford such dynamism in the most basic realm. Imagine what our planet
would be like if its most basic components, eg, hydrogen, oxygen,
would no longer replicate as such but would simply cease to exist and
some other molecule would emerge. Science fiction TV drama?
Agreed; destiny or necessity, or the laws of Thirdness, would emerge
within large numbers whose very actualization would inhibit the power
of smaller 'niche' populations.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Udell
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Sunday, November 09, 2014 12:16 PM
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:7414] Re: Natural Propositions
Edwina, Koichiro, lists,
What you say makes sense, Edwina. The wave function would seem not
quite so meaningful if there were no definite quantitative outcomes.
The wave function gives probabilities for definite outcomes (that's
part of the point of unitarity, the probabilities of alternate
definite outcomes sum to unity) at a given stage of its time
evolution. I haven't read anything on quantum indeterminacy in
biology that was E-Z enough for me to follow, but I've seen some
claims at least.
On a side note, it's occurred to me that Peirce's idea of absolute
chance may be not too much in conflict with the idea of the
deterministic time evolution of the wave function in the following
sense. Peirce allows (I forget what terminology he used) for destiny,
or necessity in the sense of destiny, to arise from probabilities in
large numbers of things, a la the Law of Large Numbers. Now, the
probabilities given by the wave function, despite its 'apriorism' (as
I've sometimes seen it called), reflect what would be the result of
indefinitely many trials - a very large number indeed. That the wave
function, for its part, as a potentiality, would evolve
deterministically in time, then, could make sense even in terms of
Peirce's tychism (absolute chance).
Best, Ben
On 11/9/2014 11:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Ben, you wrote:
"the 'realist' assumption that particles have determinate
quantitative values in all measurable respects prior to a given act
of measurement. I tend to chalk such phenomena up as a potential
validation of Peirce's realism about modalities (such as
possibility) and absolute chance, although I don't understand the
physics well enough to make a serious argument. A related question
is, is Peirce's idea of absolute chance consistent with the idea of
the deterministic continuous time evolution of the wave function
(from which probabilities are calculated)? I don't know. "
The 'realist' assumption - understanding realism as the existence of
general laws - would, to my understanding of semiosis, suggest that
the organization of matter as it moves from potentiality (the wave
function) to actuality of morphological existence mean that _within
these laws_ , matter will organize in 'determinate quantiative
values'. But which quantitative organizational mode takes precedence
can be an issue of 'absolute chance'.
I think in the physico-chemical realm, there are limited chance
possibilities - after all, since this realm is the basis of life, a
chaotic physico-chemical realm would be disastrous. But in the
biological realm, chance emerges within potentiality (wave
function) as a vital, if not key agent, in the ability to diversify,
network and expand the ability of organized matter to prevent energy
dissipation.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Udell
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Sunday, November 09, 2014 10:45 AM
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7407] Re: Natural Propositions
Koihiro, lists,
With this one I would get more out of my depth than usual. It gets
into the question known as that of Bertlmann's socks, about which I
read many years ago and was left shaking my head. Anyway, from what
little I understand, the experimentally shown violation of Bell's
inequalities conflicts with (classical physical) local _/realism/
_, not with locality by itself without the 'realist' assumption
that particles have determinate quantitative values in all
measurable respects prior to a given act of measurement. I tend to
chalk such phenomena up as a potential validation of Peirce's
realism about modalities (such as possibility) and absolute chance,
although I don't understand the physics well enough to make a
serious argument. A related question is, is Peirce's idea of
absolute chance consistent with the idea of the deterministic
continuous time evolution of the wave function (from which
probabilities are calculated)? I don't know.
Best, Ben
On 11/8/2014 7:24 PM, Koichiro Matsuno wrote:
At 1:40 AM 11/09/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:
In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a matter not
merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of
reaction, resistance, interaction, like so many natural
measurements. This is congenial to the QM view of things as
becoming determinate through interaction with the environment, the
'observer', the 'measurer', etc.
In a related context, John Bell (1964) said:
"In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to
determine the results of individual measurements, without changing
the statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the
setting of the one measuring device can influence the reading of
another instrument, however remote."
The violation of Bell’s inequality in QM reveals the failure of
Einstein locality or local realism strictly on the experimental
ground. I am not well acquainted with how Peirce or Peirceans
would have responded to this observation.
Koichuro
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