Ben: >From John Polkinghorne's "Quantum Theory, A Very Short Introduction" OUP, >2002, citing Richard Feynman:
"I think I can safely say that no one understands quantum mechanics" If one views QM from the perspective of representamen, then one sees easily that a deep conundrum exists in the the basic qualities of the symbol systems invoked. The suggested "Natural Propositions" for QM do not cohere. Cheers Jerry On Nov 12, 2014, at 9:57 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Edwina, lists, > The wave function seems to incorporate all kinds of feasible and extremal > possibilities (even before one calculates the probabilities). Penrose said > somewhere that a wave function takes into account even such 'impossibles' as > inverted light cones, and how far does that accounting reach? It makes the > wave function sound like the closest thing to a home for pure math in nature. > Anyway, from what I've understood in my reading, all the impossibles and > hardly-feasibles strongly tend to cancel one another out in the extremization > of the action in the (quasi-)classical limit of quantum phenomena (or does > that cancellation depend on the entailed probabilities?). An abductive > exploration of that realm of the possible (and the impossible or at least > vanishingly possible), an information-sensitive exploration that sometimes > adopts one or another solution for trial that would not otherwise be adopted > (since, as you say, the material/chemical level is not a science fiction TV > drama), would then seem to involve something like or reminiscent of a local > or temporary non-extremization of the action, but I don't know how that would > work or even what I'm talking about at this point; still I'd think that it > should no more involve a real violation of extremization of action (a.k.a. > law of least action) or any conservation laws, than an organism's > externalization of entropy involves a real violation of the 2nd law of > thermodynamics (not that you suggested otherwise; I'm kind of thinking aloud > here). > Best, Ben > On 11/9/2014 1:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > >> Ben- agreed. The wave has to have a function, so to speak. I think that it's >> to offer choice within the actual world. The classical idea of matter is >> that there is no choice; every that 'is', already 'is' so to speak; it's >> just that our inadequate senses can't observe it, but, by gosh, it's there. >> >> But the notion of potentiality or probability (yes, yes, I know they aren't >> the same) introduces the capacity for novelty. Total novelty, constrained of >> course by what is already actual. I think the wave function operates not as >> many large numbers (for that's post wave function) but as a 'vast >> exploratory networking informational search engine' of what is actually 'out >> there' in the local time and space; it comes up with several probable >> solutions to the existential realities in that local time and space. All of >> them would function. Which one becomes actualized - is chance. And this new >> actualization in its turn requires adaptation from other actualities in that >> local time and space. Within the biological realm - I think this >> 'informational sensing' plays a vital role in the development of diversity >> and novelty and constant adaptation. [That's also why I don't think we >> should deplore extinction; nature abhors a vacuum and is always developing >> new morphologies.] >> >> I think this production of novelty is almost non-existent in the >> physico-chemical realm for the simple reason that 'matter' can't afford such >> dynamism in the most basic realm. Imagine what our planet would be like if >> its most basic components, eg, hydrogen, oxygen, would no longer replicate >> as such but would simply cease to exist and some other molecule would >> emerge. Science fiction TV drama? >> >> Agreed; destiny or necessity, or the laws of Thirdness, would emerge within >> large numbers whose very actualization would inhibit the power of smaller >> 'niche' populations. >> >> Edwina >> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: Benjamin Udell >>> To: [email protected] ; [email protected] >>> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 12:16 PM >>> Subject: [biosemiotics:7414] Re: Natural Propositions >>> >>> Edwina, Koichiro, lists, >>> >>> What you say makes sense, Edwina. The wave function would seem not quite so >>> meaningful if there were no definite quantitative outcomes. The >>> wave function gives probabilities for definite outcomes (that's part of the >>> point of unitarity, the probabilities of alternate definite >>> outcomes sum to unity) at a given stage of its time evolution. I haven't >>> read anything on quantum indeterminacy in biology that was E-Z enough for >>> me to follow, but I've seen some claims at least. >>> >>> On a side note, it's occurred to me that Peirce's idea of absolute chance >>> may be not too much in conflict with the idea of the >>> deterministic time evolution of the wave function in the following sense. >>> Peirce allows (I forget what terminology he used) for destiny, or necessity >>> in the sense of destiny, to arise from probabilities in large numbers of >>> things, a la the Law of Large Numbers. Now, the probabilities given by the >>> wave function, despite its 'apriorism' (as I've sometimes seen it called), >>> reflect what would be the result of indefinitely many trials - a very large >>> number indeed. That the wave function, for its part, as a potentiality, >>> would evolve deterministically in time, then, could make sense even in >>> terms of Peirce's tychism (absolute chance). >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> >>> On 11/9/2014 11:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: >>> >>>> Ben, you wrote: >>>> >>>> "the 'realist' assumption that particles have determinate quantitative >>>> values in all measurable respects prior to a given act of measurement. I >>>> tend to chalk such phenomena up as a potential validation of Peirce's >>>> realism about modalities (such as possibility) and absolute chance, >>>> although I don't understand the physics well enough to make a serious >>>> argument. A related question is, is Peirce's idea of absolute chance >>>> consistent with the idea of the deterministic continuous time evolution of >>>> the wave function (from which probabilities are calculated)? I don't know. >>>> " >>>> >>>> The 'realist' assumption - understanding realism as the existence of >>>> general laws - would, to my understanding of semiosis, suggest that the >>>> organization of matter as it moves from potentiality (the wave function) >>>> to actuality of morphological existence mean that within these laws , >>>> matter will organize in 'determinate quantiative values'. But which >>>> quantitative organizational mode takes precedence can be an issue of >>>> 'absolute chance'. >>>> >>>> I think in the physico-chemical realm, there are limited chance >>>> possibilities - after all, since this realm is the basis of life, a >>>> chaotic physico-chemical realm would be disastrous. But in the biological >>>> realm, chance emerges within potentiality (wave function) as a vital, if >>>> not key agent, in the ability to diversify, network and expand the ability >>>> of organized matter to prevent energy dissipation. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>> From: Benjamin Udell >>>>> To: [email protected] ; [email protected] >>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 10:45 AM >>>>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7407] Re: Natural Propositions >>>>> >>>>> Koihiro, lists, >>>>> >>>>> With this one I would get more out of my depth than usual. It gets into >>>>> the question known as that of Bertlmann's socks, about which I read many >>>>> years ago and was left shaking my head. Anyway, from what little I >>>>> understand, the experimentally shown violation of Bell's inequalities >>>>> conflicts with (classical physical) local _realism _, not with locality >>>>> by itself without the 'realist' assumption that particles have >>>>> determinate quantitative values in all measurable respects prior to a >>>>> given act of measurement. I tend to chalk such phenomena up as a >>>>> potential validation of Peirce's realism about modalities (such as >>>>> possibility) and absolute chance, although I don't understand the physics >>>>> well enough to make a serious argument. A related question is, is >>>>> Peirce's idea of absolute chance consistent with the idea of the >>>>> deterministic continuous time evolution of the wave function (from which >>>>> probabilities are calculated)? I don't know. >>>>> >>>>> Best, Ben >>>>> >>>>> On 11/8/2014 7:24 PM, Koichiro Matsuno wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> At 1:40 AM 11/09/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a matter not >>>>>> merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of reaction, >>>>>> resistance, interaction, like so many natural measurements. This is >>>>>> congenial to the QM view of things as becoming determinate through >>>>>> interaction with the environment, the 'observer', the 'measurer', etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> In a related context, John Bell (1964) said: >>>>>> >>>>>> "In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to >>>>>> determine the results of individual measurements, without changing the >>>>>> statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting >>>>>> of the one measuring device can influence the reading of another >>>>>> instrument, however remote." >>>>>> >>>>>> The violation of Bell’s inequality in QM reveals the failure of >>>>>> Einstein locality or local realism strictly on the experimental ground. >>>>>> I am not well acquainted with how Peirce or Peirceans would have >>>>>> responded to this observation. >>>>>> >>>>>> Koichuro >>>>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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