> On Jun 28, 2016, at 4:56 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > I think, your posts have made the problem of the term "average" clear. Am I > right with understanding it like: "Average" usually suggests a completed > statistical calculation, and statistics is mathematics, therefore exact > logic. But in our context, "average" is not meant for an exact, but an > "imperfect" general, so in our case it is about fuzzy logic with the > remainder (and so the general) being not something clearly defined or known, > but being some sort of suggestion of collusion/agreement, due to change, and > itself subject of the communication- not articulated with terms, but conveyed > by their connotations ? Connotations though donot stick to terms, but rather > are a function of how much the communication partners, esp. the recipient, > know about the history of terms, or whatever they have had internalized along > with them each time they have heard, read, or thought them before.
That’s how I understand it. I confess I have some trouble relating the coenoscopic and idioscopic senses (as Peirce terms them) If I have Peirce right then the term cenoscopic (which he picks up from Bentham) is common experience and presumably by association common but vague terminology. Idioscopy is more technical in language and focuses in on new phenomena. The problem is the it would seem common experience need not use loose or vague terms. Likewise common experience often leads to things like folk physics and folk psychology which aren’t just vague but often error ridden. (Which leads us to discount them and turn to science for the topics) Given that I’m still not quite sure what to make of “average.” It’s fine to talk about it as “common experience” (Peirce) or everydayness (Heidegger). But what does that get us ultimately?
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