> On Jun 30, 2016, at 10:19 AM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > > [BU] On averageness as a background needed to make communication (and > informative difference) possible, you wrote, > > >[CG] At which point the term “average” has become rather distorted. > > [BU] I think that you're getting to the point where you might as well be > talking simply about generality. >
It’s different from generality though, although clearly it is tied to generality. Again though I think it’s one of those phenomena so close to us it’s hard to get words right for it. But you’re right once you get down to the person and their future self as in internal communication it’s basically just become generality. In larger groups though I think the difference is worth keeping in mind. > [BU] Note that at one point he calls the immediate object a kind of "image or > notion." Peirce had already come to define an image as kind of hypoicon, an > icon without an attached index, or as considered apart from an attached > index. I think that Peirce is saying in your quote of him not that the > immediate object needs an indexical _component_ but instead that the > experience of blueness cannot be conveyed by any sign or signs alone without > an experience of blueness, and also that the experience of the Sun's > actuality cannot be conveyed by any sign or signs alone without an experience > of the Sun's actuality. All the icons, indices, and symbols will not > experientially acquaint you with the Sun, which you yourself need to pick out > and acquaint yourself with; the signs can help you do that but they can't do > it for you. > Hmm. Perhaps, although isn’t that wrapped up in the fact that indexes are always communicated via icons and the index part we get at only with a gap we cross? (Typically via abduction) That is it seems to me indexes are always indirect in experience and function via the recognition of what’s missing. > I suspect that Peirce grasped the potential amount of complication in the > process, but he was doing a phaneroscopic analysis (that's why, for example, > he calls the immediate object an object rather than a sign). But he's also > focusing on the phaneroscopy of a theorist's viewpoint in explaining > semiosis, wherein the immediate object seems a consequence of an interaction > between the mind and something beyond, so I think that you're right there. Right. So much depends upon what kind of analysis one is doing. This is why I think people sometimes get confused. There’s a big difference between a logical analysis and a phenomenological analysis. (I really don’t like Peirce’s neologism) In particular how indexes get analyzed is quite different. > [BU] But then Harvard put MS 831 online, and almost a year ago I transcribed > it and posted the transcription at > Arisbehttp://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm > <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm> . Thanks. I don’t think I’d read that in its fulness. Kind of interesting given how computers developed. The machines in the late 19th century were so primitive yet at the same time open up so much in people’s thinking. It’s worth considering that passage, particularly that on page 9, to contemporary discussions of deeping learning with neural nets or genetic algorithms. While Peirce wasn’t quite there, it’s interesting how far he got given the technology of his time.
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