Helmut, list: You said, " If the members of a sect all agree, that the earth is a disc with a snake around, saying, that this is the truth for them, would be a parody of "truth", I think."
But that is only the members who investigate that you know about. That is not the one that is ultimately fated to be agreed upon by all who investigate, which means all future investigators, too. So, the notion of truth implied here is all who investigate with all the capabilities that group would have, now, in the past, and in the future. Best, Jerry R On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > I think, what is (being), as far as I have understood it from this thread, > is about "all who investigate", as a subject is a being, when it has a > predicate added. So, one person or one observer, maybe one impersonal sign > recipient, a molecule or a particle, can be "all who investigate", like an > electron saying "ouch, this photon has really hit me", so any sufferer of > any interaction may be sufficient to make something be. So "being" seems to > be a quite boiled-down concept. "Truth" on the other hand is a concept, > that should not be boiled down like that in my opinion. If the members of a > sect all agree, that the earth is a disc with a snake around, saying, that > this is the truth for them, would be a parody of "truth", I think. This has > to do with systems, I guess: "common sense", and "truth for them" is > restricted (constrained) to certain (social) systems (communities). But > "truth", I guess, is a universal term, so the system in which truth occurs, > is the universe (our one). That does not mean, that there might not be > another universe, in which there is an earth that is a disc with a snake > around. Truth in this universal sense is not a product of perfect > statistics or final interpretants, but the earth was a ball already before > there were any interpreters. So approaching a truth is not constructing it, > but reconstructing or investigating it. so, while "being" and "reality" is > constructed, I think, "truth" is not. But common sense suggests, that > nothing is but for a reason, so either truth is constructed by God , or it > has always been there, is the timeless, reasonless, though necessary > (contradiction?) nature of nature, or whatever. > Best, > Helmut > > 29. Juni 2016 um 01:59 Uhr > "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com> > > If you're talking about common, you shouldn't ignore Socrates and Plato. > > To ask the "what is..." question is to do common sense. > > Consider the following, however: > > "Only everybody can know the truth". ~Goethe (kinda) > "The opinion which is fated > <http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html#note2> to be ultimately agreed > to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object > represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain > reality." ~Peirce (for real). > > So, what's common sense is different for "everybody" and "all who > investigate" and even "ultimately all who investigate". So, when you > approach a group we accuse of exercising "common sense", then are they > *everybody*, all who investigate or *ultimately all who investigate*? > > There is also the additional complication of those who are vulgar, vulgar > only for now and the learned/philosophers. But this is how things are. > > Best, > Jerry Rhee > > On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 6:54 PM, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Jun 28, 2016, at 4:56 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >> I think, your posts have made the problem of the term "average" clear. Am >> I right with understanding it like: "Average" usually suggests a completed >> statistical calculation, and statistics is mathematics, therefore exact >> logic. But in our context, "average" is not meant for an exact, but an >> "imperfect" general, so in our case it is about fuzzy logic with the >> remainder (and so the general) being not something clearly defined or >> known, but being some sort of suggestion of collusion/agreement, due to >> change, and itself subject of the communication- not articulated with >> terms, but conveyed by their connotations ? Connotations though donot stick >> to terms, but rather are a function of how much the communication partners, >> esp. the recipient, know about the history of terms, or whatever they have >> had internalized along with them each time they have heard, read, or >> thought them before. >> >> >> That’s how I understand it. >> >> I confess I have some trouble relating the coenoscopic and idioscopic >> senses (as Peirce terms them) If I have Peirce right then the term >> cenoscopic (which he picks up from Bentham) is common experience and >> presumably by association common but vague terminology. Idioscopy is more >> technical in language and focuses in on new phenomena. >> >> The problem is the it would seem common experience need not use loose or >> vague terms. Likewise common experience often leads to things like folk >> physics and folk psychology which aren’t just vague but often error ridden. >> (Which leads us to discount them and turn to science for the topics) >> >> Given that I’m still not quite sure what to make of “average.” It’s fine >> to talk about it as “common experience” (Peirce) or everydayness >> (Heidegger). But what does that get us ultimately? >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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