Hi all, I would appreciate any comments and corrections. Please be harsh and friendly:
Copula is the Holy Spirit or, copula is the network that connects the subject with the predicate in unity in the form of a symbol that gives meaning/understanding. That would make the subject God and Ground. That would make the predicate Jesus and Correlate. But Jesus is not God. He is the Word. And the Word was God. So, we have: *BEING (Jesus, predicate)* Quality (Reference to a Ground), Relation (Reference to a Correlate), Representation (Reference to an Interpretant), *SUBSTANCE (God, subject)* and *What is. (Jesus, predicate, Second, Indices, Reference to Imm. Object)* Quale—that which refers to a ground, Relate—that which refers to ground and correlate, Representamen—that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant. *It. (God, subject, First, Likenesses, Icons, Reference to Ground)* _______ "This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it. This passage from the many to the one is numerical." ~Peirce, On a New List of Categories one, two, three...CP 5.189...C, A, B...God, Jesus, Holy Spirit... "This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on... I extend logic to embrace all the necessary principles of semeiotic, and I recognize a logic of icons, and a logic of indices, as well as a logic of symbols …it is generally said that the three normative sciences are logic, ethics, and esthetics, being the three doctrines that distinguish good and bad.” ~ Peirce “…Thus philosophy (logic, ethics, esthetics) as the study of the Ought or the norms became separated from science as the study of the Is.” ~Leo Strauss, The City and Man Therefore, this would make *Is* not *It* but related. But then, how do we know a good *Is* from a bad *Is*? What’s Beautiful? Is the more conscious adoption of a proposition in the form of CP 5.189 really necessary to reduce the content of consciousness to unity? Thanks, Jerry Rhee On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 1:09 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Jun 30, 2016, at 10:19 AM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > > [BU] On averageness as a background needed to make communication (and > informative difference) possible, you wrote, > > >[CG] At which point the term “average” has become rather distorted. > > [BU] I think that you're getting to the point where you might as well be > talking simply about generality. > > > It’s different from generality though, although clearly it is tied to > generality. Again though I think it’s one of those phenomena so close to us > it’s hard to get words right for it. But you’re right once you get down to > the person and their future self as in internal communication it’s > basically just become generality. In larger groups though I think the > difference is worth keeping in mind. > > [BU] Note that at one point he calls the immediate object a kind of "image > or notion." Peirce had already come to define an image as kind of hypoicon, > an icon without an attached index, or as considered apart from an attached > index. I think that Peirce is saying in your quote of him not that the > immediate object needs an indexical _*component*_ but instead that the > experience of blueness cannot be conveyed by *any* sign or signs alone > without an experience of blueness, and also that the experience of the > Sun's actuality cannot be conveyed by *any* sign or signs alone without > an experience of the Sun's actuality. All the icons, indices, and symbols > will not experientially acquaint you with the Sun, which you yourself need > to pick out and acquaint yourself with; the signs can help you do that but > they can't do it for you. > > > Hmm. Perhaps, although isn’t that wrapped up in the fact that indexes are > always communicated via icons and the index part we get at only with a gap > we cross? (Typically via abduction) That is it seems to me indexes are > always indirect in experience and function via the recognition of what’s > missing. > > I suspect that Peirce grasped the potential amount of complication in the > process, but he was doing a phaneroscopic analysis (that's why, for > example, he calls the immediate object an object rather than a sign). But > he's also focusing on the phaneroscopy of a theorist's viewpoint in > explaining semiosis, wherein the immediate object seems a consequence of an > interaction between the mind and something beyond, so I think that you're > right there. > > > Right. So much depends upon what kind of analysis one is doing. This is > why I think people sometimes get confused. There’s a big difference between > a logical analysis and a phenomenological analysis. (I really don’t like > Peirce’s neologism) In particular how indexes get analyzed is quite > different. > > [BU] But then Harvard put MS 831 online, and almost a year ago I > transcribed it and posted the transcription at Arisbe > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm . > > > Thanks. I don’t think I’d read that in its fulness. > > Kind of interesting given how computers developed. The machines in the > late 19th century were so primitive yet at the same time open up so much in > people’s thinking. It’s worth considering that passage, particularly that > on page 9, to contemporary discussions of deeping learning with neural nets > or genetic algorithms. While Peirce wasn’t quite there, it’s interesting > how far he got given the technology of his time. > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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