> On Nov 3, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > CG: As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the > historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical > ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments > beyond where Peirce took them). > > I agree, and I have tried to stick to the first issue in these discussions. > > CG: As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor a charitable reading doesn’t > guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable readings transform a > philosopher’s arguments into something other than they intended in order to > make it function better. I tend to think that while we must read with a > hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic of suspicion. > Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful eliminating > them without justification. > > I agree with this, as well, although it is probably quite evident by now that > when in doubt I am inclined to err on the side of charity. I would not be > surprised if there is an argument to be made that Peirce's cosmological views > significantly changed sometime between 1888 and 1908; the problem is that no > one has even tried to make that case yet. I might still disagree--again, > like Parker, I see the later writings as continuous with the earlier ones, > reflecting further development and clarification of Peirce's ideas--but I > could then at least recognize it as a defensible position, unlike "no > comment."
I confess I tend to favor keeping open a plurality of readings. Likewise when it seems the strength of argument is weaker (as is especially the case with metaphysical arguments) I think we have to acknowledge that. We might say something is the best reading yet still a weak one. This is important in some places such as say Higher Criticism where frankly the data out of which arguments are made is quite weak. (I bring that up given your quote about Peirce and Higher Criticism this morning) So to me erring on the side of charity is problematic if it reduces the number of defensible readings too much. (Keeping defensible somewhat vague since that’s usually a matter of debate in any particular set of readings) I think there is an argument that Peirce’s cosmology changed between 1888 and 1908. His adoption of modal realism during the later 1890’s is the clearest part of that. I think that a pretty significant change to his cosmology. But despite thinking that even if he didn’t adopt a full throated modal realism I think elements of it are in the logic of his arguments well before 1895-6. That is if we take many of his arguments as carefully vague in key parts then the adoption modal realism can help determine them. An other way of putting my concern here really is in taking Peirce’s logic of vagueness seriously when considering charity. My experience especially with people in the analytic tradition such as Davidson is that they don’t pay sufficient attention to these elements of vagueness in terms of meaning and intentionality. This becomes important when part of a reading/argument is tied to reference to real things where we can peel back the vagueness. So any author in their intents because they can refer can have the meaning of their arguments be fuller than their understanding of their arguments. Again this is due to the nature of reference and vagueness. I think this is pretty important relative to Peirce’s fundamental ontology and cosmology. I was actually critical for a long time of some elements of Kelly Parker’s argument that I’ve since rethought due to this logic of vagueness. A good example might be his appeal in the early Peirce (the pre-1880 writings) to Kant’s categories and Being and Substance being the unthinkable limits of the categories. I initially thought it was inappropriate to take those early writings and tie them to later writings. Now I’m not so sure and think Kant informs Peirce quite a bit more than I was willing to concede.
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