Dear list: What gets lost in all this is the ultimate aim of this conversation for all who investigate. So, what is it?
I don't suspect that it is to bring us to *gether*. It is not to promote growth of concrete reasonableness, for how can you love what you cannot trust? Best, Jerry R On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 2:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, Clark, List: > > ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the > term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of > habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him > to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a > causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state. > > > No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I take > "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than > randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could > ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but > you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad > thing! > > ET: But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing' > in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of > the categories can be applicable to it. > > > In 1905, Peirce stated that Firstness and Secondness together were "pure > nothing" in the absence of Thirdness, and even attributed this view to his > considerably earlier (1891-1893) series of articles in *The Monist*. > > CSP: Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and > synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early > volumes of *The Monist* ever been written, it would have appeared how, > with thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that > *continuity > is an indispensable element of reality*, and that continuity is simply > what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like > generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the > essence of thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an > extra-intelligent reader might discern that *the theory of those > cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than > feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where > those two elements were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing*. > Now, the motive for alluding to that theory just here is, that in this way > one can put in a strong light a position which the pragmaticist holds and > must hold, whether that cosmological theory be ultimately sustained or > exploded, namely, that *the third category--the category of thought, > representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness > as such--is an essential ingredient of reality*, yet does not by itself > constitute reality, since this category (which in that cosmology appears as > the element of habit) can have no concrete being without action, as a > separate object on which to work its government, just as action cannot > exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act. (CP 5.436, > EP 2.345, emphasis added) > > > He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very > first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments > about it that are relevant to this discussion. > > CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all > experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my > original hypothesis,) developments out of *utterly causeless > determinations of single events*, under a certain universal tendency > toward habit-forming ... But during the long years which have elapsed since > the hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed > that *faulty features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] > my attention by others and have struck me in my own meditations*. Dr. > Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so much *evolutionary *as > it was *emanational*; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that *there > must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not arise > according to my hypothesis*; while I myself was most struck by the > difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed to > make all laws develope from single events; since an event already supposes > Time. (R 842, emphasis added) > > > This passage provides clear evidence that Peirce did, in fact, come to > find certain "features of the original hypothesis" to be "faulty," not only > because of feedback from others, but also due to his "own meditations" in > the interim. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> 1) Clark - yes, thank you for your comment on my comment: >> >> ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence >> and evolution of matter/mind ... >> >> Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term of >> 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit. >> Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such >> conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a *causal >> force* - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state. >> >> 2) But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing' >> in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of >> the categories can be applicable to it. >> >> Firstness is a mode of organization of matter/mind that is novel, >> spontaneous - and thus, has no habits. BUT, it is not 'nothing', for >> otherwise matter would never evolve its new habits. Matter only evolves >> these new habits when Firstness introduces a novel form [which is not >> 'nothing' but a novel form] ..and this novel form can then persist within >> its taking on of habits/Thirdness. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> >> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 2:28 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >> Cosmology) >> >> >> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually >> agree with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a >> process theology perspective. Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or >> necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God >> as First Cause in the specific sense of *Ens necessarium*, since he said >> so explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the >> associated manuscript drafts. >> >> >> It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as >> opposed to epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to >> significantly change the meaning of both causation and *ens necessarium*. >> Especially relative to how most thought even in the 19th century. >> >> >> ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence >> and evolution of matter/mind ... >> >> >> I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or >> Firstness, when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute >> reaction or Secondness--it is *pure nothing* in the absence of >> continuity or Thirdness. >> >> >> I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s >> semiotic realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even >> monads of process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking >> what ‘agent’ means. >> >> Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something >> different from how you may be taking her. >> >> I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics >> and ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of >> ‘smaller’ bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
