Clark, List: All good points, thanks.
Jon On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:15 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > On Nov 3, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > CG: As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the > historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical > ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending > arguments beyond where Peirce took them). > > > I agree, and I have tried to stick to the first issue in these discussions. > > CG: As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor a charitable reading > doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable readings transform a > philosopher’s arguments into something other than they intended in order to > make it function better. I tend to think that while we must read with a > hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic of suspicion. > Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful > eliminating them without justification. > > > I agree with this, as well, although it is probably quite evident by now > that when in doubt I am inclined to err on the side of charity. I would > not be surprised if there is an argument to be made that Peirce's > cosmological views significantly *changed* sometime between 1888 and > 1908; the problem is that no one has even tried to make that case yet. I > might still disagree--again, like Parker, I see the later writings as > *continuous *with the earlier ones, reflecting further development and > clarification of Peirce's ideas--but I could then at least recognize it as a > *defensible *position, unlike "no comment." > > I confess I tend to favor keeping open a plurality of readings. Likewise > when it seems the strength of argument is weaker (as is especially the case > with metaphysical arguments) I think we have to acknowledge that. We might > say something is the best reading yet still a weak one. This is important > in some places such as say Higher Criticism where frankly the data out of > which arguments are made is quite weak. (I bring that up given your quote > about Peirce and Higher Criticism this morning) > > So to me erring on the side of charity is problematic if it reduces the > number of defensible readings too much. (Keeping defensible somewhat vague > since that’s usually a matter of debate in any particular set of readings) > > I think there is an argument that Peirce’s cosmology changed between 1888 > and 1908. His adoption of modal realism during the later 1890’s is the > clearest part of that. I think that a pretty significant change to his > cosmology. But despite thinking that even if he didn’t adopt a full > throated modal realism I think elements of it are in the logic of his > arguments well before 1895-6. That is if we take many of his arguments as > carefully vague in key parts then the adoption modal realism can help > determine them. > > An other way of putting my concern here really is in taking Peirce’s logic > of vagueness seriously when considering charity. My experience especially > with people in the analytic tradition such as Davidson is that they don’t > pay sufficient attention to these elements of vagueness in terms of meaning > and intentionality. This becomes important when part of a reading/argument > is tied to reference to real things where we can peel back the vagueness. > So any author in their intents because they can refer can have the meaning > of their arguments be fuller than their understanding of their arguments. > Again this is due to the nature of reference and vagueness. > > I think this is pretty important relative to Peirce’s fundamental ontology > and cosmology. I was actually critical for a long time of some elements of > Kelly Parker’s argument that I’ve since rethought due to this logic of > vagueness. A good example might be his appeal in the early Peirce (the > pre-1880 writings) to Kant’s categories and Being and Substance being the > unthinkable limits of the categories. I initially thought it was > inappropriate to take those early writings and tie them to later writings. > Now I’m not so sure and think Kant informs Peirce quite a bit more than I > was willing to concede. >
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