Edwina, Clark, List: ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad thing! ET: But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing' in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of the categories can be applicable to it. In 1905, Peirce stated that Firstness and Secondness together were "pure nothing" in the absence of Thirdness, and even attributed this view to his considerably earlier (1891-1893) series of articles in *The Monist*. CSP: Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early volumes of *The Monist* ever been written, it would have appeared how, with thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that *continuity is an indispensable element of reality*, and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an extra-intelligent reader might discern that *the theory of those cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where those two elements were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing*. Now, the motive for alluding to that theory just here is, that in this way one can put in a strong light a position which the pragmaticist holds and must hold, whether that cosmological theory be ultimately sustained or exploded, namely, that *the third category--the category of thought, representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as such--is an essential ingredient of reality*, yet does not by itself constitute reality, since this category (which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit) can have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act. (CP 5.436, EP 2.345, emphasis added) He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments about it that are relevant to this discussion. CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my original hypothesis,) developments out of *utterly causeless determinations of single events*, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that *faulty features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and have struck me in my own meditations*. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so much *evolutionary *as it was *emanational*; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that *there must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis*; while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added) This passage provides clear evidence that Peirce did, in fact, come to find certain "features of the original hypothesis" to be "faulty," not only because of feedback from others, but also due to his "own meditations" in the interim. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > 1) Clark - yes, thank you for your comment on my comment: > > ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence > and evolution of matter/mind ... > > Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term of > 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit. > Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such > conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a *causal > force* - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state. > > 2) But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing' > in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of > the categories can be applicable to it. > > Firstness is a mode of organization of matter/mind that is novel, > spontaneous - and thus, has no habits. BUT, it is not 'nothing', for > otherwise matter would never evolve its new habits. Matter only evolves > these new habits when Firstness introduces a novel form [which is not > 'nothing' but a novel form] ..and this novel form can then persist within > its taking on of habits/Thirdness. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> > *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 2:28 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology) > > > On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree > with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a > process theology perspective. Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or > necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God > as First Cause in the specific sense of *Ens necessarium*, since he said > so explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the > associated manuscript drafts. > > > It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as > opposed to epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to > significantly change the meaning of both causation and *ens necessarium*. > Especially relative to how most thought even in the 19th century. > > > ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence > and evolution of matter/mind ... > > > I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness, > when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or > Secondness--it is *pure nothing* in the absence of continuity or > Thirdness. > > > I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s > semiotic realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even > monads of process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking > what ‘agent’ means. > > Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something > different from how you may be taking her. > > I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics > and ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of > ‘smaller’ bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. > >
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