> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree > with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a process > theology perspective. Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or > necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God > as First Cause in the specific sense of Ens necessarium, since he said so > explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the associated > manuscript drafts.
It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as opposed to epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to significantly change the meaning of both causation and ens necessarium. Especially relative to how most thought even in the 19th century. > > ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and > evolution of matter/mind ... > > I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness, > when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or > Secondness--it is pure nothing in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s semiotic realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even monads of process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking what ‘agent’ means. Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something different from how you may be taking her. I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics and ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of ‘smaller’ bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness.
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