Jon, Edwina, list:
I would like to recommend a method to help you clarify your meaning. To ascertain the meaning of your current intellectual conception, one should consider what practical consequences might result from the truth of that conception—and the sum of these consequences constitute the entire meaning of that conception. That is, I recommend a method of reflexion which is guided by constantly holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes, whether these ends be of the nature and uses of action or of thought. Here it is: Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings *you* conceive the object of *your* conception to have: then the general mental habit that consists in the production of these effects is the whole meaning of *your* concept. Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, *we* conceive the object of *our* conception to have. Then, *our* conception of these effects is the whole of *our *conception of the object. Note that in these three lines one finds, “conceivably,” “conceive,” “conception,” “conception,” “*conception*.” Now I find there are many people who detect the authorship of my unsigned screeds; and I doubt not that one of the marks of my style by which they do so is my inordinate reluctance to repeat a word. This employment five times over of derivates of concipere must then have had a purpose. So now…that settles it, eh? Let us do well and fare well. Best, Jerry R On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Clark, list: > > Agreed, that the term of 'god' in Peirce, at least in my interpretation, > is more akin to the god-in-process 'theology' [or I prefer > Nature-in-process'] rather than a priori determinism or First Cause. I > would expect Jon S to disagree. > > The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and > evolution of matter/mind - and of Thirdness as a process of habit formation > - and of complexity of interactions within the triadic semiosic network > can't be overlooked. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> > *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:26 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology) > > > On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of > 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this > 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang > Thirdness. > > But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we > are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal > beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching > for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs. > > > I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I > think there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an > ur-continuity. Again Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for > Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly > he means something different from the first cause of Duns Scotus or > Aristotle due to the place of chance in his ontology. As we’ve discussed > over the past weeks his creator is more akin to the God in process theology > or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza. > > > On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot > interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier > writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as > * metaphoric*, with his earlier writings. > > > I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine > when we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable > with most of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t > see the contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t > quite understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge. > > As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic > ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones > (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments > beyond where Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic > aspects of Peirce a little harder to accept and the arguments certainly > weaker than his main doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for > Peirce having held them are quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve. > > On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"? It is not a > "sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate, > well-established, and widely endorsed method of interpretation. Per > Wikipedia, "In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires > interpreting a speaker's statements to be rational and, in the case of any > argument, considering its best, strongest possible interpretation." As > Donald Davidson put it, "We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of > others when we interpret in a way that optimises agreement." So we assume > that "A Neglected Argument," for example, is *fully consistent* with > *everything > else* that Peirce wrote--unless and until the evidence *compels* us to > conclude otherwise. > > > I think we have to be careful here. As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s > razor a charitable reading doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often > charitable readings transform a philosopher’s arguments into something > other than they intended in order to make it function better. I tend to > think that while we must read with a hermeneutics of charity we must also > read with a hermeneutic of suspicion. Typically multiple readings are > possible and we should be careful eliminating them without justification. > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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