> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> 
> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang 
> Thirdness.
>  
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we are 
> moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
> about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
> 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.

I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I think 
there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an ur-continuity. Again 
Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce 
speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly he means something different 
from the first cause of Duns Scotus or Aristotle due to the place of chance in 
his ontology. As we’ve discussed over the past weeks his creator is more akin 
to the God in process theology or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.


> On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> 
> My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot 
> interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier 
> writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as 
> metaphoric, with his earlier writings.

I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine when 
we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable with most 
of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t see the 
contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t quite 
understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.

As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic ones 
(what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones (whether 
particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments beyond where 
Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic aspects of Peirce a 
little harder to accept and the arguments certainly weaker than his main 
doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for Peirce having held them are 
quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve.

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a 
> "sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate, well-established, 
> and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per Wikipedia, "In philosophy 
> and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires interpreting a speaker's 
> statements to be rational and, in the case of any argument, considering its 
> best, strongest possible interpretation."  As Donald Davidson put it, "We 
> make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a 
> way that optimises agreement."  So we assume that "A Neglected Argument," for 
> example, is fully consistent with everything else that Peirce wrote--unless 
> and until the evidence compels us to conclude otherwise.


I think we have to be careful here. As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor 
a charitable reading doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable 
readings transform a philosopher’s arguments into something other than they 
intended in order to make it function better. I tend to think that while we 
must read with a hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic 
of suspicion. Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful 
eliminating them without justification.

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