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}Jon - I continue to disagree with your reading of  both passages.

        I do not agree that as you write, "Form is 1ns (characters or
qualities signified by the Sign), ". I consider that Firstness is the
immediate unmediated experience of the Sign, not something signified
by it [which adds meaning].

        Nor do I consider that the NEM passage  [I'll leave it to you to
copy it] - means what you read by it. I interpret Peirce's reference
to "Form is quality, suchness....' as a reference to the holistic
wholeness of the object.  He specifically says that this 'suchness is
"not in being felt' [which thereby denies that it is a State of
Firstness because Firstness is feeling]...Instead, he says. several
times, that  "it is general" [which makes it Thirdness]. I can
understand how you arrive at this conclusion, but this description of
the categories deeply contradicts his other outlines of those

        I've already outlined the terms to 'fill in the blanks'; they are
the terms Peirce uses. 

        I don't see how semiosis ends when a habit is changed. When a
biological species changes its composition/habits, semiosis functions
in the new species.

        I'm unsure of the reason for your focus on quasi-mind, and how it
differs from 'Mind'.

 On Tue 13/02/18  3:32 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt
 Edwina, List:
 What you quoted from EP 2:304 is at the bottom of the page, where
Peirce contrasts theory (from a Sign of an Object as Matter to
Interpretants as Form to perceiving Entelechy) with practice (from a
Sign of a character as Form to Interpretants as Matter to producing
Entelechy).  For example, scientists study things and develop
theories to explain them (theory), while engineers conceive ideas and
design artifacts to embody them (practice).  The meaning of the key
Aristotelian terms  in this context is spelled out in the previous
 CSP:  But so far as the "Truth" is merely the object of a sign, it
is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In addition
however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete
signifies characters, or qualities ... Every sign signifies the
"Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form  of the universe that
it signifies ... Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or
entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the
word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be
quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may
have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form
signified by it.
 Form is 1ns (characters or qualities signified by the Sign), Matter
is 2ns (objects  denoted by the Sign), and Entelechy is 3ns (Matter
and Form united by the Sign).  Even if you are not convinced about
this passage, it is absolutely undeniable that this is how Peirce
aligns the terms with the Categories in NEM 4:292-300.  Nevertheless,
I continue to acknowledge that he uses "form" differently elsewhere,
including places where it is associated with 3ns.  However, I am
still wondering what contrasting terms you would put in the blanks to
label the Categories as _____, _____, and Form. 
 I do appreciate you answering my other three questions, though. 
Regarding (a), Peirce said that a Habit-change is not a Sign and thus
does not have a subsequent Interpretant, so it seems to me that
semiosis terminates at that point.  Regarding (b), I am still not
seeing a good reason to treat chemical breakdown as triadic rather
than dyadic, since it seems to me that the physical processes
involved can all be explained in terms of the latter kind of action. 
Regarding (c), I am not defining a Quasi-mind as a "thing," but as a
bundle of habits, which is precisely how Peirce characterized a 
substance (CP 1.414, EP 2:279; 1887-8); he also once described a man
as "a bundle of habits" with "the unity of self-consciousness" that
"must be given as a centre for the habits" (CP 6.228; 1898), which
sounds very much like the concept of Quasi-mind that I am exploring.
 Thanks again,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran [1] - [2] 
 On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon - in reply

        1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:

        'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this to its matter, to successive interpretants
embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a
direct perception  of the entelechy.....setting out from a sign
signifying a character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as
its form, to successive interpretants realizing more and more
precisely its matter hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct
effort, producing the entelchy'.

        [Note: My underlinings are italics in the original]. 

         I don't see 'form' as Firstness in this selection from Peirce.

         Instead, I read the first part as a semiosic process, moving from a
direct indexical experience of an object, to a concept of its
Form/Type/ reach a Final Interpretant ]Entelechy]

        I read the second example as a semiosic process, moving from a
symbolic experience [idea], to a concept of its Form/Type/
figuring out its matter [2ndness] reach the final Interpretant

        a] I read 5.476 and EP 2.418 as a change in the nature of the
habits; i.e., a change in the nature of 3rdness.

        b] The breakdown of the chemical composition of a rock is triadic,
where the habits holding together the molecules of the rock , in
interaction with external molecules [eg, oxygen of the air, water,
heat from the sun], become weaker and as such these molecules are
free of the habits. This is not dyadic or mechanical, for the rock
doesn't break into 'bits' - the habits lose their power to organize
the molecules into a rock. 

        c] No - I find your use of quasi-mind problematic. You seem to be
defining a 'thing-in-itself'; i.e., any form of matter with the
capacity for self-organization and interaction with other 'things'. 


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