Edwina, List:

What you quoted from EP 2:304 is at the bottom of the page, where Peirce
contrasts theory (from a Sign of an Object as Matter to Interpretants as
Form to *perceiving *Entelechy) with practice (from a Sign of a character
as Form to Interpretants as Matter to *producing* Entelechy).  For example,
scientists study things and develop theories to explain them (theory),
while engineers conceive ideas and design artifacts to embody them
(practice).  The meaning of the key Aristotelian terms *in this context* is
spelled out in the previous paragraph.

CSP:  But so far as the "Truth" is merely the *object *of a sign, it is
merely the Aristotelian *Matter *of it that is so. In addition however
to *denoting
*objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or
qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the
Aristotelian *Form* of the universe that it signifies ... Aristotle gropes
for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in
making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the
ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such
identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the
very form signified by it.

Form is 1ns (characters or qualities *signified *by the Sign), Matter is
2ns (objects *denoted *by the Sign), and Entelechy is 3ns (Matter and
Form *united
*by the Sign).  Even if you are not convinced about *this *passage, it is
absolutely undeniable that this is how Peirce aligns the terms with the
Categories in NEM 4:292-300.  Nevertheless, I continue to acknowledge that
he uses "form" differently elsewhere, including places where it is
associated with 3ns.  However, I am still wondering what contrasting terms
you would put in the blanks to label the Categories as _____, _____, and

I do appreciate you answering my other three questions, though.  Regarding
(a), Peirce said that a Habit-change is *not *a Sign and thus *does not*
have a subsequent Interpretant, so it seems to me that semiosis terminates
at that point.  Regarding (b), I am still not seeing a good reason to treat
chemical breakdown as triadic rather than dyadic, since it seems to me that
the physical processes involved can all be explained in terms of the latter
kind of action.  Regarding (c), I am not defining a Quasi-mind as a
"thing," but as a bundle of habits, which is precisely how Peirce
characterized a *substance *(CP 1.414, EP 2:279; 1887-8); he also once
described a *man *as "a bundle of habits" with "the unity of
self-consciousness" that "must be given as a centre for the habits" (CP
6.228; 1898), which sounds very much like the concept of Quasi-mind that I
am exploring.

Thanks again,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>

> Jon - in reply
> 1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:
> 'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
> passing from this to its matter, to successive interpretants embodying
> more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a direct
> perception of the entelechy.....setting out from a sign signifying a
> character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as its form, to
> successive interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter
> hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct effort, producing the
> entelchy'.
> [Note: My underlinings are italics in the original].
>  I don't see 'form' as Firstness in this selection from Peirce.
>  Instead, I read the first part as a semiosic process, moving from a
> direct indexical experience of an object, to a concept of its
> Form/Type/3rdness...to reach a Final Interpretant ]Entelechy]
> I read the second example as a semiosic process, moving from a symbolic
> experience [idea], to a concept of its Form/Type/3rdness..to figuring out
> its matter [2ndness]...to reach the final Interpretant [entelechy].
> a] I read 5.476 and EP 2.418 as a change in the nature of the habits;
> i.e., a change in the nature of 3rdness.
> b] The breakdown of the chemical composition of a rock is triadic, where
> the habits holding together the molecules of the rock , in interaction with
> external molecules [eg, oxygen of the air, water, heat from the sun],
> become weaker and as such these molecules are free of the habits. This is
> not dyadic or mechanical, for the rock doesn't break into 'bits' - the
> habits lose their power to organize the molecules into a rock.
> c] No - I find your use of quasi-mind problematic. You seem to be defining
> a 'thing-in-itself'; i.e., any form of matter with the capacity for
> self-organization and interaction with other 'things'.
> Edwina
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