BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list
I'd also like some clarification and discussion of the 'quasi-mind'.
I have a very different interpretation than that of JAS, who seems, to
me at least, to assign the term of a 'quasi-mind' to a non-symbolic
user - whereas, in the 4.551 selection, the term seems to me, at
least to refer to an act of connection of two Minds, such that they
are in an almost closed dialogic interaction.
However, I'll leave it to others to start up this thread.
Edwina
On Fri 16/02/18 3:13 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Jon, list,
You wrote:
JAS: Hence we seem to be converging at last on classifying the
girl's scream as a genuine Sign, both for her and for the mother, at
least from a certain point of view. However, I am still not sure
whether to treat it as a Replica of one Sign or of two different
Signs. Ironically, it would have to be the latter if it were a
natural/degenerate Sign for the child and a genuine Sign for the
mother. On the other hand, I am reminded of Peirce's notion that two
Quasi-minds are "welded" when the same Sign is uttered by one and
interpreted by the other (CP 4.551; 1906). Presumably the resolution
still depends on whether the Sign has the same Dynamic Object for both
of them--the girl's pain, for example.
I think it might be wise to leave it at this for now. I
definitely see the child's and the mother's Signs as two Signs since,
again, I see two different Dynamic Objects. But for now I haven't
anything to add beyond what I've already written, so I'm content to
know that our thinking was able to 'converge', as you wrote, to the
extent that it has (is that convergence an example of Quasi-mind?)
Speaking of which, I also just reread the Commens Dictionary entries
on Quasi-mind and still think we could benefit from a discussion of
that concept, especially as I'm seeing the notion, "welded in the
Sign" as it appears in one of the entries somewhat differently than
you seem to be interpreting it. It seems to me more closely connected
to the notion of "dialogic" than what you've been proposing in
analyzing "The Child Learns a Lesson" case.
Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may
further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover,
signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a
Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one
mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the
Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a
fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every
logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. 1906 |
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551 at
Commens.
I should hasten to add that, although I see it as a potentially
important inquiry, I would rather postpone that discussion of
Quasi-mind as well. Of course if you care to comment on this now,
or even begin a new thread, please do. But for now, I'll let whatever
you have to say stand with no response and hope to join in later.
JAS: Thanks for your patience in working through all of this
with me. Should we revisit the vase scenario next? :-)
Thanks for your patience in return. I would actually at some point
like to revisit the vase scenario but, again, not just now. I like
the way we "kept at" the child/mother case, even imagining that if I
had your, shall we say, 'probing fortitude', that we might be able to
resolve at least some of those issues on which we have not yet come
to full agreement on. In any event, engaging in dialogue with you is
always stimulating, challenging, and well worth the time and effort
put into it. In a word, it always felt like a joint 'inquiry' and not
mere 'debate', and with both of us willing to modify our views in the
light of the other's thinking.
What I'd like to turn to soon is Peirce's late (1907) manuscript,
given the title, "Pragmatism" by the Essential Peirce editors (EP
2:398-434 ). But that could be, I think, a major inquiry, one
which, perhaps early in March, I'd like to introduce in a way which
might hopefully encourage additional participation in our forum. I've
been thinking about this for some time now and drafting notes to
myself, excepting passages and ideas from "Pragmatism" in preparation
for beginning a discussion.
So, for now, especially as I'm occupied with other matters needing
my attention, I'll drop off the list for at least the rest of the
week, perhaps longer, and try to find time to re-read "Pragmatism."
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690 [1]
On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary R., List:
I was about to send an addendum to my previous post when I received
your reply--for which I am grateful, because it prompted me to hold
off a bit and reconsider a couple of things. I agree that we make a
good team in this discussion, given our opposing proclivities for
abstract vs. concrete analysis.
As you mentioned in a side note, "it is clear that animals change
their habits as a consequence of natural signs." This is just
another way of saying that non-human animals are bundles of
Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., reacting
substances) that are capable of learning by experience, and thus
qualify as Quasi-minds--which is precisely why I prefer to employ
this more general term, rather than referring only to (presumably
human) Minds. Hence my first new hypothesis-- any action that
involves a Quasi-mind as either its utterer or its interpreter is
semiosic; i.e., Sign-action.
Peirce stated that "all natural signs" are of the nature of an
Index (CP 3.361; 1885); characterized both the Icon and the Index as
"degenerate signs" (EP 2:306-307; 1904); defined "natural signs" as
those "having no utterer," such that they "depend upon a physical
connection between the sign and that of which it is the sign" (EP
2:406; 1907); and similarly contrasted "a natural sign, which has no
party to the dialogue as its author," with "an uttered sign,"
stating that "this division turns upon the question of whether or not
the sign uttered is a sign of a sign as its Object" (CP 8.348, EP
2:484; 1909). Therefore, it seems that only a Symbol is a genuine
Sign. Every Symbol is a Necessitant in itself (Legisign/Type), and
has Dynamic and Immediate Objects that are likewise Necessitants
(Collective and Copulative), which is what I take Peirce to mean by
"a sign of a sign as its Object." Furthermore, a Symbol can only
act as a Sign of its Object when there is an interpreter--a
Quasi-mind with a Habit of Interpretation that will understand it as
such (cf. EP 2:461; 1911). By contrast, every natural/degenerate
Sign is an Existent in itself (Sinsign) and in its relation to its
Object (Index), which is likewise Existent (Concretive and
Designative). This all seems consistent with my second new
hypothesis--only a Sign that has Quasi-minds as both its utterer and
its intepreter is genuine.
Now, your point about "Aie!" being a distinctively French
exclamation of pain is valid and relevant. To me, this particular
Dynamic Interpretant of an internal Sign is the result of a Habit of
Interpretation that the child has acquired by virtue of previous
Final Interpretants, presumably produced by Signs that she has heard
from others. The question, then, is whether that internal
Sign--note, not the external scream--is intentionally uttered by the
child as a Quasi-mind, such that it is a genuine Sign; or the
involuntary result of a series of dyadic events, such that it is a
natural/degenerate Sign. I suspect you are right that there are
elements of both at work, and it is probably not worth the trouble to
attempt disentangling them any further. Similarly, it is quite
plausible that the posited Habit-change only occurs after subsequent
reiterations in the girl's "inner world," rather than as a direct and
sudden consequence of this one incident in the "outer world"; we are
speculating either way.
Hence we seem to be converging at last on classifying the girl's
scream as a genuine Sign, both for her and for the mother, at least
from a certain point of view. However, I am still not sure whether
to treat it as a Replica of one Sign or of two different Signs.
Ironically, it would have to be the latter if it were a
natural/degenerate Sign for the child and a genuine Sign for the
mother. On the other hand, I am reminded of Peirce's notion that two
Quasi-minds are "welded" when the same Sign is uttered by one and
interpreted by the other (CP 4.551; 1906). Presumably the resolution
still depends on whether the Sign has the same Dynamic Object for both
of them--the girl's pain, for example.
Thanks for your patience in working through all of this with me.
Should we revisit the vase scenario next? :-)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 1:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon S, list,
You wrote:
JAS: In your original presentation of this thought experiment, the
child was a toddler and did not scream "Maman" or any other
recognizable word, but simply "Aie!" As such, I took it to be an
involuntary reflex, such as any of us likely would exclaim when
surprised by pain, although as an English-speaker I would presumably
be more inclined to say something like "Ouch!" or perhaps another
four-letter expression. Frankly, I find it implausible that the
first thing to come out of someone's mouth--especially such a young
one--upon touching a hot burner would be "Maman."
While I do not think that it's "implausible that the first thing to
come out of [a young child's] mouth [depending on her emotional
closeness to her mother as I suggested earlier]. . .upon touching a
hot burner would be "Maman," I originally offered the French "Aie!"
to suggest that there was already something semiotic underlying the
child's cry. At the moment I am willing to imagine that there is
both "an involuntary reflex" and something semiotic happening.
JAS: Be that as it may, further contemplation of this example
already led me to settle on new tentative answers to my own
questions, and I discovered your reply upon coming online to post
them. Your points below are well-taken, especially once again
correctly diagnosing my affinity for the abstract over the concrete,
a fault that I am unlikely ever to escape completely.
My own affinity for the concrete over the abstract--the opposite of
yours--might yet prove fruitful in our analysis.
JAS: I now agree that what happens within the child is Sign-action,
not dyadic action/reaction, even if I retain the assumption--which
you understandably find dubious--that the steps from finger contact
to vocal chord vibration constitute a series of dynamical causes and
effects. The reason is because of the potential (and perhaps
probable) Habit-change that I posited--the girl is capable of
learning by experience, and hence acquiring the new habit of not
touching stove burners as the Final Interpretant of this particular
Sign. My new hypothesis is that any action involving a Mind (or
Quasi-mind) as either utterer or interpreter is irreducibly semiosic.
So we "now agree that what happens within the child is Sign-action,
not dyadic action/reaction." ( I now agree that what happens within
the child is Sign-action, not dyadic action/reaction, even if I
retain the assumption--which you understandably find dubious--that
the steps from finger contact to vocal chord vibration constitute a
series of dynamical causes and effects.) As suggested above I have
as well come around to your assumption that there is as well "a
series of dynamical causes and effect."
As for habit change, you seem to be suggesting that your reason for
emphasizing the dynamical causes and effect is that the child will
have learned by experience. But is her learning--her habit change--
merely the result of her having had that first painful experience?
Won't she 'rehearse' it as having had the meaning that it had for
her, has for her as she acquires a new habit? Now you may say that
this 'rehearsal' is all after the fact, but I believe it that it is
continuous with that initial semiosis, "that [which] happens within
the child," which "Sign-action" is "not dyadic action/reaction."
JAS: I also agree that if the child screams "Maman" it is a genuine
Sign for the mother, as any word must be. That would make the girl
its utterer, since she would be intentionally producing it. However,
if the scream is something truly involuntary, like I take "Aie!" to
be, I am still inclined to view it as a natural/degenerate Sign. My
other new hypothesis is that only a Sign that has Minds (or
Quasi-minds) as both its utterer and its interpreter--which may be
two temporally sequential versions of the same Mind (or
Quasi-mind)--is genuine, the kind that exists in Replicas.
But I thought we had agreed "that what happens within the child is
Sign-action, not dyadic action/reaction." Are you hedging on this in
suggesting that the child's cry would only be a genuine Sign if she
cried out "Maman" or some replicable Sign? Also, as I've been
implying, isn't there something not natural in the child employing
the French form of "Aie!" (as opposed to, say, "Ouch!")? And as I
argued above, isn't whatever there is of authentic semiosis happening
within the child continuous with what will become her habit change?
(And that change doesn't happen instantaneously in my opinion, but
will take some--even if only a little--further thought, again
continuous with whatever semiosis happened within the child.
Also, as a side note, it is clear that animals change their habits
as a consequence of natural signs. But that's another topic.
You had earlier suggested that there was but one sign for both the
child and the mother. This you said would almost certainly result in
their respective habit changes. I wrote:
GR. . . these will be very different habits: not touching flames in
the future for the child; not leaving the child alone in the kitchen
in the future for the mother. Again, this stark difference in
habit-change strongly suggests to me two different signs, not one.
Earlier you were questioning if what were happening in the child was
semiosis at all (JAS: is this really an example of Sign-action at all?
) But more recently you've been arguing that it is a degenerate Sign.
Now you've written "that what happens within the child is
Sign-action, not dyadic action/reaction;" but are you saying that
only if the child cried something like "Maman!" and not "Aie!"
(which, again, I find tinged with something not natural but
influenced by the language she speaks, viz., French)? Am I wrong to
assume that in any case that you agree that the child's Sign (genuine
or degenerate) and the mother's Sign are two, not one?
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690 [6]
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