Jon S, Gary F, list, I've just discarded the greater part of a draft of a response to Gary F which I was formulating as you, Jon, say much better than I would have, and you include more pertinent analysis than I was considering in this matter. So for now I will only note that I fully concur with your analysis.
Gary F wrote: Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote (from the *Syllabus*) which I think could throw some light on the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s definition of the *rheme*: [[ A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]] That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction, because dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational signs,” *are* interpreted as affording information, while rhemes are *not*. The crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a sign must have an *actual* object, i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, extension as well as intension. The reason that a rheme is *not* interpreted as affording information is that it is not interpreted as directing attention to an actual object, as a dicisign is, by definition. You completely ignore here that Peirce writes that a Rheme will perhaps "afford some information." Again, as I, Jon S and, I think, Jeff have argued *contra* your assertion above (that "a sign must have an *actual* object"), Rhemes may offer *possible* information about the DO which later *may be* interpreted. Rhemes much less frequently than not, it seems to me, are parts of dicisigns . (In reading one of Edwina's recent posts, I thought that for biosemiosis that the Rheme is probably never found apart from a dicisign .) Still, at least for Anthroposemiotics, the information which they* might* afford as rheme is real enough and will possibly--even probably--be of considerable significance when the rheme or term finds its place in a proposition. Indeed, because of the rheme's vague connotations (if that's the right word) the pertinent information that it contains will *not* be clear until it is included in a proposition. But that doesn't mean that there is *no* information in the Rheme whatsover, and a close reading of the snippet we're discussing strongly suggests that there *is* information perhaps *to be* interpreted later. In my view, the reason that the rheme is not *interpreted* as affording information is principally because that information is vague until it is contextualized (typically for Anthroposemiotics, in a proposition). My example of the quite varied *possible* information that the rheme '-is a book' holds suggests that vagueness, I believe. To assert, as you have, that it offers *no* information, is not supported by the Peirce quote. And while I earlier had some little doubts concerning the language you used, Jon, to express this basic description of a Sign (one question remains: see below), I have come to a greater appreciation of your expression of what a Sign does. JAS: ". . . a Sign *denotes* its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), *signifies* some of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object--and *determines* its Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)." That little remaining doubt: Peirce says that the Object (within the sign, the Immediate Object) *determines* the Representamen which, in turn, *determines* the Interpretant. In the quotation above you omit the Representamen in your analysis. This would seem to conflate the IO and the R (which may be the case as in consideration of triadic semiosis we are not discussing three units any more than we are in a discussion of the flow of Time such that we absolutely separate Past/Present/Future). But would you explain why the Representamen is not included in your formulation whatsoever? Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 3:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > GF: The real question for inquiry, in my view, is *What is an immediate > object?* > > > In simplest terms, the IO is "the Object as the Sign itself represents it" > (CP 4.536; 1906). Therefore, if a Sign does not have an IO, then it does > not represent its Object *at all*--which is clearly absurd, since a Sign > is *defined *as something that represents its Object. > > GF: The crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a sign > must have an *actual *object, i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, > extension as well as intension. > > > But the Dynamic Object of a Dicisign/Pheme need not be actual (Existent), > it can also be general (Necessitant); and the Dynamic Object of a > Rheme/Seme need not be Possible, it can also be actual (e.g., a proper > name) or general (e.g., a common noun). So the difference between a > Dicisign/Pheme and a Rheme/Seme is not *solely *to be found in the nature > of the Dynamic (or Immediate) Object, since the only difference in that > regard is that a Rheme/Seme *can *have a Dynamic and/or Immediate Object > that is *merely *Possible. > > The issue, or at least a key aspect of it, seems to be whether the depth > of a Sign belongs to its Object or to its Interpretant. You (and > Bellucci) apparently ascribe only the breadth to the Object and the depth > to the Interpretant. My view is that breadth (Matter) and depth (Form) > are two different aspects of the Object, while information as their product > belongs to the Interpretant--i.e., the two dimensions are *only *brought > together in and by the Sign (Entelechy). > > I see this as evident in Peirce's concept of the continuous predicate--the > purely logical relation that is left over when everything that fills its > blanks is "thrown into the subject." This is the end of analysis precisely > because it fully isolates the components of the Object (both subjects and > predicates) from the Interpretant that brings them together in a certain > way. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 8:13 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R, list, >> >> To clarify: I do think a debate over whether “every sign has an immediate >> object” or “only dicisigns have immediate objects” is pointless, for >> reasons I’ve already given regarding the importance of context, but mostly >> because taking either side in the debate presupposes a fixed opinion about >> *what >> an immediate object is*. The real question for inquiry, in my view, is *What >> is an immediate object?* — taking that to be a technical term, and an >> important one, in Peircean semiotic. As Jeff has suggested, one fruitful >> approach to that inquiry is to ask *Why did Peirce find it necessary in >> 1904 to make an explicit distinction between the dynamic and immediate >> objects* of a sign? That is the approach Bellucci has taken, and so has >> Stjernfelt in *Natural Propositions*, 3.13 (p. 96 ff.) That is the >> passage you (Gary) asked me to point to where Stjernfelt deals with >> immediate objects. (There may be others, but I know you have a copy of the >> book, and that passage will do nicely.) >> >> You ask whether I agree “with Bellucci's characterization of Peirce's >> dynamic object as being akin to Frege's *Bedeutung* (reference) and his >> immediate object being akin to Frege's *Sinn *(sense)”. That of course >> is the interpretation that Bellucci is arguing *against* in his paper; >> and I do accept that characterization of “the Fregean interpretation,” and >> take it to be equivalent with the position you and Jon are taking in the >> debate that I don’t want to engage in. You may find, if you download and >> read the paper, that it differs from your position in some respects. I just >> used it as a convenient label for your position, that’s all — one that you >> would recognize if you’ve read Bellucci on this issue. >> >> Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote (from >> the *Syllabus*) which I think could throw some light on the distinction >> between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s definition of the >> *rheme*: >> >> [[ A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of >> qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and >> such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some >> information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]] >> >> That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction, because >> dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational signs,” *are* >> interpreted as affording information, while rhemes are *not*. The >> crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a sign must have >> an *actual* object, i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, extension >> as well as intension. The reason that a rheme is *not* interpreted as >> affording information is that it is not interpreted as directing attention >> to an actual object, as a dicisign is, by definition. This point is closely >> related to one that Peirce makes in the Lowell Lecture 5 when he introduces >> *graphs >> of graphs*: >> >> [[ It is essential to a graph or any other expression of a proposition >> that it should be represented by its interpretant sign to be *true*. But >> to say that it is true implies that it really is affected by its object; >> and in order that this object should have a real effect upon it, this >> object must be a subject of force, which is an individual. Consequently, an >> adequate interpretant of a graph must represent it as a sign of an >> *individual*. How, then, can there be a *graph* of a *graph*, >> considering that a graph is a *legisign*, or sign which has the mode of >> being of a *general type*, just as any word is a general type, and not a >> single individual object in a single definite place at a single instant. >> The answer is that a graph can only have a graph for its object indirectly. >> Directly, it can only refer to a graph replica. But it can assert what it >> asserts of any *graph-replica* you please so long as it be *equivalent* >> to a given graph replica. ]R 470 CSP 126-8] >> >> The point about a rheme is that it is not interpreted as being really >> affected by its object, but only “understood as representing such and >> such a kind of possible Object.” Give it an actual object by making it a >> part of a dicisign, and it will afford the *depth* component of the >> information conveyed by that dicisign. But in the absence of some part of >> the sign indicating what that information is *about*, it can’t be >> interpreted as informational. >> >> I take this as relevant background to an inquiry into the nature of the >> “immediate object.” Whether you choose to make use of it for that purpose >> is, of course, up to you. >> >> Gary f. >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
