Gary F., List: GF: The real question for inquiry, in my view, is *What is an immediate object?*
In simplest terms, the IO is "the Object as the Sign itself represents it" (CP 4.536; 1906). Therefore, if a Sign does not have an IO, then it does not represent its Object *at all*--which is clearly absurd, since a Sign is *defined *as something that represents its Object. GF: The crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a sign must have an *actual *object, i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, extension as well as intension. But the Dynamic Object of a Dicisign/Pheme need not be actual (Existent), it can also be general (Necessitant); and the Dynamic Object of a Rheme/Seme need not be Possible, it can also be actual (e.g., a proper name) or general (e.g., a common noun). So the difference between a Dicisign/Pheme and a Rheme/Seme is not *solely *to be found in the nature of the Dynamic (or Immediate) Object, since the only difference in that regard is that a Rheme/Seme *can *have a Dynamic and/or Immediate Object that is *merely *Possible. The issue, or at least a key aspect of it, seems to be whether the depth of a Sign belongs to its Object or to its Interpretant. You (and Bellucci) apparently ascribe only the breadth to the Object and the depth to the Interpretant. My view is that breadth (Matter) and depth (Form) are two different aspects of the Object, while information as their product belongs to the Interpretant--i.e., the two dimensions are *only *brought together in and by the Sign (Entelechy). I see this as evident in Peirce's concept of the continuous predicate--the purely logical relation that is left over when everything that fills its blanks is "thrown into the subject." This is the end of analysis precisely because it fully isolates the components of the Object (both subjects and predicates) from the Interpretant that brings them together in a certain way. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 8:13 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list, > > To clarify: I do think a debate over whether “every sign has an immediate > object” or “only dicisigns have immediate objects” is pointless, for > reasons I’ve already given regarding the importance of context, but mostly > because taking either side in the debate presupposes a fixed opinion about > *what > an immediate object is*. The real question for inquiry, in my view, is *What > is an immediate object?* — taking that to be a technical term, and an > important one, in Peircean semiotic. As Jeff has suggested, one fruitful > approach to that inquiry is to ask *Why did Peirce find it necessary in > 1904 to make an explicit distinction between the dynamic and immediate > objects* of a sign? That is the approach Bellucci has taken, and so has > Stjernfelt in *Natural Propositions*, 3.13 (p. 96 ff.) That is the > passage you (Gary) asked me to point to where Stjernfelt deals with > immediate objects. (There may be others, but I know you have a copy of the > book, and that passage will do nicely.) > > You ask whether I agree “with Bellucci's characterization of Peirce's > dynamic object as being akin to Frege's *Bedeutung* (reference) and his > immediate object being akin to Frege's *Sinn *(sense)”. That of course is > the interpretation that Bellucci is arguing *against* in his paper; and I > do accept that characterization of “the Fregean interpretation,” and take > it to be equivalent with the position you and Jon are taking in the debate > that I don’t want to engage in. You may find, if you download and read the > paper, that it differs from your position in some respects. I just used it > as a convenient label for your position, that’s all — one that you would > recognize if you’ve read Bellucci on this issue. > > Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote (from > the *Syllabus*) which I think could throw some light on the distinction > between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s definition of the > *rheme*: > > [[ A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of > qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and > such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some > information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]] > > That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction, because > dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational signs,” *are* > interpreted as affording information, while rhemes are *not*. The crucial > point here is that in order to convey information, a sign must have an > *actual* object, i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, extension as > well as intension. The reason that a rheme is *not* interpreted as > affording information is that it is not interpreted as directing attention > to an actual object, as a dicisign is, by definition. This point is closely > related to one that Peirce makes in the Lowell Lecture 5 when he introduces > *graphs > of graphs*: > > [[ It is essential to a graph or any other expression of a proposition > that it should be represented by its interpretant sign to be *true*. But > to say that it is true implies that it really is affected by its object; > and in order that this object should have a real effect upon it, this > object must be a subject of force, which is an individual. Consequently, an > adequate interpretant of a graph must represent it as a sign of an > *individual*. How, then, can there be a *graph* of a *graph*, considering > that a graph is a *legisign*, or sign which has the mode of being of a > *general > type*, just as any word is a general type, and not a single individual > object in a single definite place at a single instant. The answer is that a > graph can only have a graph for its object indirectly. Directly, it can > only refer to a graph replica. But it can assert what it asserts of any > *graph-replica* you please so long as it be *equivalent* to a given graph > replica. ]R 470 CSP 126-8] > > The point about a rheme is that it is not interpreted as being really > affected by its object, but only “understood as representing such and > such a kind of possible Object.” Give it an actual object by making it a > part of a dicisign, and it will afford the *depth* component of the > information conveyed by that dicisign. But in the absence of some part of > the sign indicating what that information is *about*, it can’t be > interpreted as informational. > > I take this as relevant background to an inquiry into the nature of the > “immediate object.” Whether you choose to make use of it for that purpose > is, of course, up to you. > > Gary f. >
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