date:20150427

2015-04-28 8:37 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux :

>
>
> 2015-04-28 7:59 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :
>
>>  On 4/27/2015 10:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 28 avr. 2015 00:37, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>> >
>> > On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >>
>> >> I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
>> >> So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can
>> buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive
>> this year, if they're not already there.
>>
>> 17" 4k will arrive this year, are you claiming it's false?
>>
>>
>> No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms of
>> screen real estate, a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in
>> functionality from a 17" 1920x1200.  Sure it's got more resolution, but my
>> eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher resolution.  But I
>> will miss that loss of 17% of screen area.  So returning to the original
>> point I think that supports my case that laptops have peaked in
>> functionality and now they're just adding bells and whistles.
>>
>
> So anything even proof you're wrong support your case... well then yes...
> in dreamland.
>

And the so called bells and whistles, are just more powerful GPU/CPU/Bigger
RAM space, SSD... miniatirusation, just nothing at all, you're right, just
bells and whistlles.

And I'm sure again, that make your case too, because you're right so you're
right. It's easy to think like you.

Quentin

>
> Quentin
>
>>
>>
>>  Bigger screen and It's not a laptop anymore. But if you like your old
>> computer, keep it.
>>
>>
>> I will keep it (in fact I've got two).  But it's noticeably slow.  That's
>> why I was hoping for some real improvement.
>>
>> Brent
>>
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>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>



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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

2015-04-28 7:59 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :

>  On 4/27/2015 10:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> Le 28 avr. 2015 00:37, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
> >
> > On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>
> >> I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
> >> So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can
> buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive
> this year, if they're not already there.
>
> 17" 4k will arrive this year, are you claiming it's false?
>
>
> No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms of
> screen real estate, a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in
> functionality from a 17" 1920x1200.  Sure it's got more resolution, but my
> eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher resolution.  But I
> will miss that loss of 17% of screen area.  So returning to the original
> point I think that supports my case that laptops have peaked in
> functionality and now they're just adding bells and whistles.
>

So anything even proof you're wrong support your case... well then yes...
in dreamland.

Quentin

>
>
>  Bigger screen and It's not a laptop anymore. But if you like your old
> computer, keep it.
>
>
> I will keep it (in fact I've got two).  But it's noticeably slow.  That's
> why I was hoping for some real improvement.
>
> Brent
>
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>



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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

On 28 April 2015 at 11:58, meekerdb  wrote:

> You're nit picking.
>

Hah. Pot, kettle.

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

On 4/27/2015 10:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 28 avr. 2015 00:37, "meekerdb" mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> a 
écrit :

>
> On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
>> So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy a 60" TV 
4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this year, if they're not 
already there.

17" 4k will arrive this year, are you claiming it's false?

No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms of screen real estate, 
a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in functionality from a 17" 1920x1200.  Sure it's 
got more resolution, but my eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher 
resolution.  But I will miss that loss of 17% of screen area.  So returning to the 
original point I think that supports my case that laptops have peaked in functionality and 
now they're just adding bells and whistles.

Bigger screen and It's not a laptop anymore. But if you like your old computer, 
keep it.

I will keep it (in fact I've got two).  But it's noticeably slow. That's why I was hoping 
for some real improvement.

Brent

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

Le 28 avr. 2015 00:37, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>
> On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
>> So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can
buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive
this year, if they're not already there.

17" 4k will arrive this year, are you claiming it's false?

Bigger screen and It's not a laptop anymore. But if you like your old
computer, keep it.

Quentin
>
>
> They're not.  I've been looking to buy one since the first 4K laptops
were announced.  But doubling the resolution still doesn't make up for
losing 17% of the screen area.  The resolution was already as high as
useful for a 17" screen.
>
> I can buy a 60" 4K TV, but I can't take it with me.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: God

Le 28 avr. 2015 01:56, "John Clark"  a écrit :
>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 5:12 PM, QUENTIN THE HORSE FUCKER wrote::
>
>> > and so again you lie.
>
>
> I knew this was coming, and so now I must humbly suggest you go fuck
yourself and the horse you road in on.

And so here we are again with the horses. Just because you lie and you
can't accept when your lies and contradictions are put in front of you, you
go on fucking horses. It's shameful, you should consult and you should be
restrained to get near them.

Quentin
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: crime and duplication machines

On 4/27/2015 7:42 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
If you are punishing the family member the same way you would punish the perpetrator, 
then how is the disutility any different?

It's effect on the rest of the community is different.  Someone else in the community may 
think, "I can't really control what my son does and he's kinda mean and high-strung.  I'd 
better get out of this place before my son does something that gets me punished."

Brent

And correct me if I'm wrong, youre fine with punishing family members or friends if the 
deterrence value is sufficient?

On Monday, April 27, 2015, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:

On 4/27/2015 5:29 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

> You could just execute/imprison the two remaining actors

Well, i thought it was obvious that you can't just walk down the street and 
stop
them... I didn't realize I had to spell that out.

> You don't want to punish the first actor's family because that is 
disutility to
them as well as, or instead of, the actor

Right! We seem to care about punishing the person who committed the crime, 
not mere
deterrence. Deterrence is a necessary but not sufficient reason to inflict
disutility on a given person. It must also be the case that the punishee 
committed
the act that we want to deter.

So you cannot punish the delayed duplicate without weighing in on the 
personal
identity question.

No.  It's not that we care about punishing the person who committed the 
crime.  We
care about deterrence as it contributes to the overall well being of the society. 
So we weigh the disutility of punishing the family against the utility it would

provide in deterrence. I think it would come out highly negative, but it 
depends
somewhat on how much prospective murderers are influenced by their families 
welfare.
You usually get the most deterrent utility by punishing the person who 
committed the
crime, but that's a consequence of how psychology works - not a basic 
principle.

Brent
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Re: crime and duplication machines


On 4/27/2015 5:38 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 April 2015 at 12:04, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 4/27/2015 4:24 PM, LizR wrote:

On 28 April 2015 at 08:58, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one 
out goes
and commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide, later the 
delayed
duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would that be 
punishing them
for a "pre-crime"?


I think the "public safety" argument comes in here. We have very good 
evidence that
you are both dangerous and mentally unstable. I think we should at least 
consider
offering psychiatric help, and perhaps threaten imprisonment if it's 
refused.

But of course I don't know how the rest of this hypothetical SF society 
functions.
Maybe we keep you from being a threat by uploading you into a computerised 
utopia
in which your every wish is granted.

To really make a good decision we'd have to know a lot more - which is why 
we have
trials.


Of course. Having been on a jury, I do actually appreciate that.

Just from the above outline we don't even really know that the killer is 
dangerous
or mentally unstable.


It's a reasonable reading given the main facts - he committed a murder and then killed 
himself. Obviously there may be extenuating circumstances...


Maybe he murdered the guy who bullied his gay son online and caused his son 
to
commit suicide.


...but that isn't actually a justification for murder. (See your first comment about why 
we have trials.)


I'm not saying it's justification.  In fact from a utilitarian analysis of murder laws 
"justification" is a kind of derivative attribute of laws.  I'm saying that he may not be 
a danger to other people at all.  That's not good a basis for judging for judging the 
utility of punishment or laws.  People who kill their wife or husband in anger are very 
unlikely to kill anyone else.


Brent

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SciAm predicts strong future for renewable energy

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/strong-future-forecast-for-renewable-energy

As does Business Insider

http://www.businessinsider.com/solar-energy-is-on-the-verge-of-a-global-boom-2015-4?IR=T

Of course nothing doesa "global boom" quite as well as nuclear :-)

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Re: God

On 28 April 2015 at 14:06, John Clark  wrote:

>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 , LizR  wrote:
>
> >it is true that IF computation can be instantiated purely within
>> arithmetic, THEN that won't increase entropy or use energy.
>
>
> Yes absolutely, but that is a very very big if.
>
> Of course it is. But lots of scientific questions are big ifs. The point
was only that you were avoiding the topic under discussion by making a
statement that assumed what it was attempting to prove.

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Re: crime and duplication machines

If you are punishing the family member the same way you would punish the
perpetrator, then how is the disutility any different?

And correct me if I'm wrong, youre fine with punishing family members or
friends if the deterrence value is sufficient?

On Monday, April 27, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/27/2015 5:29 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
> > You could just execute/imprison the two remaining actors
>
>  Well, i thought it was obvious that you can't just walk down the street
> and stop them... I didn't realize I had to spell that out.
>
> > You don't want to punish the first actor's family because that is
> disutility to them as well as, or instead of, the actor
>
>  Right! We seem to care about punishing the person who committed the
> crime, not mere deterrence. Deterrence is a necessary but not sufficient
> reason to inflict disutility on a given person. It must also be the case
> that the punishee committed the act that we want to deter.
>
>  So you cannot punish the delayed duplicate without weighing in on the
> personal identity question.
>
>
> No.  It's not that we care about punishing the person who committed the
> crime.  We care about deterrence as it contributes to the overall well
> being of the society.  So we weigh the disutility of punishing the family
> against the utility it would provide in deterrence. I think it would come
> out highly negative, but it depends somewhat on how much prospective
> murderers are influenced by their families welfare. You usually get the
> most deterrent utility by punishing the person who committed the crime, but
> that's a consequence of how psychology works - not a basic principle.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: God

On 28 April 2015 at 14:01, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 LizR  wrote:
>
> >Your statement seems quite definitely to say that you do know that
>> computations must use energy and increase entropy.
>>
>
> Yes, and without exception each and every time a computation has been
> observed energy has always been used and entropy has always increased, and
> that is a FACT. But humans have observed computations only under a small
> range of conditions and I have no proof that fact would be the same under
> any conditions, but neither do I have proof that fact would change under
> different conditions. I just don't know.
>
> And even if that fact is always true I don't know if mathematics demands
> that fact always be true or if mathematics merely describes that true fact.
> I just don't know. Do you?
>
> As mentioned, no one knows anything for sure. That's what we call science.

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The dovetailer disassembled


Bruno Marchal wrote:


Bruce seems to ignore the (mind-body) problem, and to miss that the UDA 
just helps to make that problem more precise, in the frame of 
computationalism, and to make it more amenable to more rigorous 
treatments, ... without mentioning that the arithmetical translation of 
the UDA in arithmetic is a non trivial beginning of solution (and which 
might motivate people to study a lot of nice and fun results in 
theoretical computer science, at the least).


I think it is appropriate to look more closely at the dovetailer. As I 
understand it, the dovetailer calculates all computable functions over 
the natural numbers: phi_i(x) = y where x and y are natural numbers. In 
other words, phi_i is a map of the set of integers on to itself.


For example, the function phi(x) = x^2 +7 is one such function:
phi(1)=8, phi(2)=11, phi(3)=16, and so on.

So all that such a map does is establish a set of relations between 
natural numbers: 1<->7, 2<->11, 3<->16, and so on. On a physical 
computer we compute such a map by taking the input integer, multiplying 
it by itself, and then adding 7. What is a step in this computation? It 
seems to me that this depends on the level at which you look. In 
outline, step 1: take an integer; step 2: square it; step 3: add 7 to 
the result of step 2; step 4: store the result of step 3 somewhere.


Or you could describe this in terms of operations on individual computer 
registers, or in some other way. It seems to me that whatever you do 
about defining the steps, each step is nothing more than just another 
map between integers: just the computation of another function in the 
infinite set of possible computable functions over the integers.


So, rather than requiring all possible computable functions over the 
natural numbers, you could reduce your set of functions to consist of 
only *unique* operations. In this way you can show that the only 
computations required are the results of adding any two integers to give 
another integer as the result. All functions phi_i(x) can be reduced to 
this for an appropriate choice of the internal steps.


The real difficulty, however, arises when you move from calculations on 
a physical computer into Platonia. In Platonia, all you have are sets of 
relations between numbers: each map is a relation between two numbers. 
Any two numbers might have an indefinitely large number of programs 
mapping from one to the other, but all such programs reduce to simple 
additions of two numbers. Once you have specified the results of adding 
any two positive integers together, you have completed all possible 
computations of the dovetailer. What is more, these relations of 
addition are timeless. There was not a time when they were not true in 
Platonia, and no time at which the related computation was actually 
performed. So there are no useful computations in Platonia, and 
certainly nothing rich enough to support a physical world, much less to 
support consciousness.


Bruce

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Re: God

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 , LizR  wrote:

>it is true that IF computation can be instantiated purely within
> arithmetic, THEN that won't increase entropy or use energy.


Yes absolutely, but that is a very very big if.

  John K Clark

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Re: God

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 LizR  wrote:

>Your statement seems quite definitely to say that you do know that
> computations must use energy and increase entropy.
>

Yes, and without exception each and every time a computation has been
observed energy has always been used and entropy has always increased, and
that is a FACT. But humans have observed computations only under a small
range of conditions and I have no proof that fact would be the same under
any conditions, but neither do I have proof that fact would change under
different conditions. I just don't know.

And even if that fact is always true I don't know if mathematics demands
that fact always be true or if mathematics merely describes that true fact.
I just don't know. Do you?

  John K Clark

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Re: crime and duplication machines

On 4/27/2015 5:29 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

> You could just execute/imprison the two remaining actors

Well, i thought it was obvious that you can't just walk down the street and stop them...
I didn't realize I had to spell that out.

> You don't want to punish the first actor's family because that is disutility to them
as well as, or instead of, the actor

Right! We seem to care about punishing the person who committed the crime, not mere
deterrence. Deterrence is a necessary but not sufficient reason to inflict disutility on
a given person. It must also be the case that the punishee committed the act that we
want to deter.

So you cannot punish the delayed duplicate without weighing in on the personal identity
question.

No. It's not that we care about punishing the person who committed the crime. We care
about deterrence as it contributes to the overall well being of the society. So we weigh
the disutility of punishing the family against the utility it would provide in deterrence.
I think it would come out highly negative, but it depends somewhat on how much prospective
murderers are influenced by their families welfare. You usually get the most deterrent
utility by punishing the person who committed the crime, but that's a consequence of how
psychology works - not a basic principle.

Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or
useful rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That
means, of course, that we make mistakes, we are misled by imprecise
interpretations of perceptions, and of other peoples' intentions and
motives. But as long as we get it right often enough, we can
function perfectly adequately. As Brent might say, consciousness is
an engineering solution to living -- not a logician's solution.

So a Turing emulation of consciousness is perfectly possible, and
that consciousness would be not essentially different from yours or
mine.

I think the conclusion you draw here obfuscates the distinction between 
behaviour (normally) attributed to a conscious being and the putative 
additional fact (truth) of consciousness itself.


That is the Platonists move, and also leads to problems, as Kant found. 
When you use a phrase like "consciousness itself", one inevitably thinks 
of Kant's 'ding an sich', and the conclusion that this is essentially 
unknowable. Postulating a distinction between consciousness as found in 
conscious beings and "consciousness itself" is to postulate that 
conscious beings are explained by the inexplicable -- not a great advance!


Of course it is 
possible - implicitly or explicitly - to reject any such distinction, or 
what Bruno likes to call 'sweeping consciousness under the rug'. A 
fairly typical example of this (complete with the tell-tale terminology 
of 'illusion') can be found in the Graziano theory under discussion in 
another thread.


There is no "sweeping under the rug" here. Consciousness is that which 
is to be found in conscious beings. It supervenes on the physical, and 
came about by evolution -- a process of trial and error. That is why 
conscious living is by corrigible heuristics, not arithmetic or modal 
logics.



Alternatively one can look for an explicit nomological entailment for 
consciousness in, say, physical activity or computation. The problems 
with establishing any explicable nomological bridging principles from 
physical activity alone are well known and tend to lead to a 
more-or-less unintelligible brute identity thesis.


Can you indicate to me why relating consciousness is computations is 
Platonia is any less an unintelligible brute identity thesis? 
Arithmetical relations are static, not dynamic, so they do not 
instantiate the computations of a physical computer (or brain).


Bruce


Consequently physical 
activity is postulated as an adequate approximation of computation, at 
some level, and it is the latter that is assumed to provide the 
nomological bridge to consciousness. What is striking, then, about 
Bruno's UD argument is that it uses precisely this starting assumption 
to draw the opposite conclusion: i.e. that computation and not physical 
activity must be playing the primary role in this relation.


This is perhaps less of a shock to the imagination than it may at first 
appear. Idealists such as Berkeley and of course the Platonists that 
preceded him had already pointed out that deriving the appearance of 
matter from the 'mental' might present conceptual problems less 
insuperable than the reverse. What they lacked was any explicit 
conceptual apparatus to put flesh on the bare bones of such an 
intuition. What is interesting about Bruno's work, at least to me, is 
that it suggests (until proved in error) that the default assumption 
about the nomological basis of consciousness in fact leads to a kind of 
a quasi-idealism, albeit one founded on the neutral ontological basis of 
primary arithmetical relations. That then presents the 
empirically-testable task of validating, or ruling out, the entailment 
that physics itself (or more generally 'what is observable or 
shareable') relies on nothing more or less than such relations.


David


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Re: God


LizR wrote:


Your statement seems quite definitely to say that you do know that 
computations must use energy and increase entropy. That assumes physicalism.


I must admit that I do not know what a computation that does not utilize 
a computing machine (physical) is. Show me one, and indicate how it works.


Bruce

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Re: God

On 28 April 2015 at 05:41, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 1:09 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
> >> Because although we haven't discovered it yet maybe mathematics is
>>> saying that particular physical process (computation that uses energy and
>>> creates entropy) must exist or there will be a logical self contradiction.
>>> Or maybe mathematics is saying nothing of the sort and mathematics is just
>>> a language for describing that physical process.
>>>
>>
>> > That's not what you said, you said "computation can be made real, but
>> not without using energy and increasing entropy, in other words not without
>> turning to a PHYSICAL process."...
>>
>
> Yes I said that, and it's a fact that to make computations real you DO
> need to use energy and create entropy. What I don't know is if mathematics
> can explain why this fact must exist and it couldn't have been otherwise,
> or if mathematics is just describing a raw physical fact.
>
> Bruno claimed that "Computation can be concretized [made real] in any
> universal number, in arithmetic" and I said and will continue to say that
> nobody knows if that is true or not.
>

Oh, now I see. You simply misunderstood what Bruno said. Fair enough.

He isn't using "real" to mean "physically real" (of course). He means
"ontologically primitive".

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Re: God

On 28 April 2015 at 05:06, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015  Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> >> No, I'm saying I don't know. You claimed that you did know and gave a
>>> reason for thinking so; and I'm saying your reasoning doesn't hold up. I
>>> don't know if mathematics or physics is more fundamental and neither do
>>> you.
>>>
>>
>> > So why are you claiming that a computation to be real need using energy
>> and be turned to a PHYSICAL process ?
>>
>
> Because although we haven't discovered it yet maybe mathematics is saying
> that particular physical process (computation that uses energy and creates
> entropy) must exist or there will be a logical self contradiction. Or maybe
> mathematics is saying nothing of the sort and mathematics is just a
> language for describing that physical process. I don't know which is true
> and neither do you and neither does Bruno and neither does anybody else.
>
> Although your answer doesn't appear to address the question, that is also
fortunately irrelevant (though perhaps faux-naif) because nobody can know
anything, and Bruno certainly never claimed that comp is true.

However it is true that IF computation can be instantiated purely within
arithmetic, THEN that won't increase entropy or use energy. (If that is
true, energy must be an emergent phenomenon, as entropy already is, even
within physicalism).

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Re: God

On 28 April 2015 at 04:20, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>    But computation is not an abstract idea it is a concrete
> physical process,

 >>>  Wrong. Computation can be concretized in any universal number, in
 arithmetic.

 >> Yes computation can be made real, *but not without using energy and
>>> increasing entropy*, in other words not without turning to a PHYSICAL
>>> process.
>>>
>>
>> > That contradicts your claim that you are open to the idea that
>> mathematics might be more fundamental than physics. Here you take
>> "physical" for granted.
>>
>
> No, I'm saying I don't know. You claimed that you did know and gave a
> reason for thinking so; and I'm saying your reasoning doesn't hold up. I
> don't know if mathematics or physics is more fundamental and neither do
> you.
>
> Your statement seems quite definitely to say that you do know that
computations must use energy and increase entropy. That assumes physicalism.

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 28 April 2015 at 05:25, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/27/2015 2:34 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>  On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> That all relies too much on the assumption that comp is true
>
>
>  At the risk of pointing out the stunningly obvious, *everything* in
> Bruno's argument is premised on the truth of the comp thesis, summarised in
> the claim that consciousness is invariant for a purely digital
> transformation (at some level). In practice this postulate is widely
> accepted, even though in many if not most cases neither the assumption nor
> its possible consequences are made completely explicit, as Bruno is
> striving to do.
>
> But his argument also includes other assumptions, some more controversial
> than others, c.f. the discussion of whether a recording can instantiate
> consciousness or how much scope is required for counterfactual
> correctness.  So Bruno often confusingly uses his shorthand of "assuming
> comp" to mean either the digital substitution of some brain function OR the
> whole argument and its conclusion.
>

I think the point about recordings is that if you assume comp, then you
tacitly assume records can't be conscious because a recording isn't a
computation - although one might be involvesd in its playback, this is not
a computation which should instantiate consciousness, being (presumably)
far too simple to do so. Although given that physical supervenience is
possible, I guess it could apply to anything really. (A rock, I think, is
the ultimate example?)

But being a bear of little brain I expect to be corrected on that point
shortly.

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Re: crime and duplication machines

On 28 April 2015 at 12:04, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/27/2015 4:24 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 28 April 2015 at 08:58, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one
>> out goes and commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide,
>> later the delayed duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would
>> that be punishing them for a "pre-crime"?
>>
>
>  I think the "public safety" argument comes in here. We have very good
> evidence that you are both dangerous and mentally unstable. I think we
> should at least consider offering psychiatric help, and perhaps threaten
> imprisonment if it's refused.
>
>  But of course I don't know how the rest of this hypothetical SF society
> functions. Maybe we keep you from being a threat by uploading you into a
> computerised utopia in which your every wish is granted.
>
> To really make a good decision we'd have to know a lot more - which is why
> we have trials.
>

Of course. Having been on a jury, I do actually appreciate that.


> Just from the above outline we don't even really know that the killer is
> dangerous or mentally unstable.
>

It's a reasonable reading given the main facts - he committed a murder and
then killed himself. Obviously there may be extenuating circumstances...


> Maybe he murdered the guy who bullied his gay son online and caused his
> son to commit suicide.
>

...but that isn't actually a justification for murder. (See your first
comment about why we have trials.)


> Or maybe he murdered his duplicate because his duplicate stole his
> identity?
>

Ditto, although it might make a fun plot for an SF story.

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Re: crime and duplication machines

On 28 April 2015 at 11:28, Dennis Ochei  wrote:

> That only holds if you were planning the murder before you dupped.
>
> I assumed that was implied by Brent's comment that "people might be
tempted to use this as a way of killing someone they hate".

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Re: crime and duplication machines

> You could just execute/imprison the two remaining actors

Well, i thought it was obvious that you can't just walk down the street and
stop them... I didn't realize I had to spell that out.

> You don't want to punish the first actor's family because that is
disutility to them as well as, or instead of, the actor

Right! We seem to care about punishing the person who committed the crime,
not mere deterrence. Deterrence is a necessary but not sufficient reason to
inflict disutility on a given person. It must also be the case that the
punishee committed the act that we want to deter.

So you cannot punish the delayed duplicate without weighing in on the
personal identity question.

So you cannot punish the delayed duplicate unless you are saying the
delayed duplicate is the same p
On Monday, April 27, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:

>  You don't want to punish the first actor's family because that is
> disutility to them as well as, or instead of, the actor and their happiness
> counts in the society's utility as well as that of the murder victim.  You
> could just execute/imprison the two remaining actors on the assumption that
> (a) that will deter similar schemes and (b) they are "would be murders".
>
> Brent
>
> On 4/27/2015 4:42 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
> Right, but *who* to punish in order to deter is dependent on these
> questions of identity. Suppose there are three actors who are willing to do
> this delayed duplication murder suicide scheme. Furthermore, they don't
> care what happens to their duplicate. (Perhaps they think of him as someone
> else) However, each have a family member that the care about deeply. You
> tell the first that his duplicate will be punished if he commits his crime.
> He doesn't care. You then say you will transfer the punishment onto his
> family member. This would deter him, but he doesn't believe you are
> actually so utilitarian and so he carries out his plans. Now, there are
> still two would be murderers. Do you punish the first man's family member
> in order to prove you mean business, deterring the remaining actors?
>
>  On purely utilitarian grounds, there is just as much disutility
> generated when you punish the first actor's duplicate as when you punish
> the first actor's family member. Furthermore, unless we reolve this
> question of identity who this disutility is doled out to doesn't matter as
> long as it serves its deterrent purpose.
>
> On Monday, April 27, 2015, meekerdb  > wrote:
>
>>  You make a rule about punishing people that will deter them from
>> committing crimes in a way that maximizes satisfaction in the community.
>> I'm not sure what rules that is, but it doesn't necessarily have to solve
>> some philosophical problem of personal identity.
>>
>> In your example, suppose society said, "No we won't punish him."  Then
>> people might be tempted to use this as a way of killing someone they hate.
>> So society would probably say, "Yes, we'll punish him...and any additional
>> copies of him too."
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> On 4/27/2015 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one
>> out goes and commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide,
>> later the delayed duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would
>> that be punishing them for a "pre-crime"?
>>
>>  Jason
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 7:19 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>>> You should both go to jail, on the basis that both copies of you had the
>>> same consciousness as the person who committed the murder, and therefore
>>> you are both equally responsible (leaving aside considerations of free will
>>> etc)
>>>
>>>  And (this is the clincher) you are both equally a danger to society,
>>> having had your psychopathic tendencies duplicated means you're twice as
>>> much of a danger as you were when there was only one of you.
>>>
>>>  QED, "You're nicked, sunshine."
>>>
>>
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Re: crime and duplication machines

2015-04-27 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 12:05:31AM -0700, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> The argument weak point detector is quite strong with this one :). Well, I
> was leaning on Parfit's reasoning that on a Reductionist view of identity,
> such distinctions would be arbitrary. But we could for instance divide
> memories into essential and superfluous categories and pretend we could
> divine the difference between the two. Addition or loss of an essential
> memory changes identity, while the same for a superfluous memory does not.
> It does seem that without sophisticated brain scanning equipment you could
> not know the facts of your identity--a body might lose or gain an essential
> memory without the resulting person *realizing* it. The facts of identity
> might not follow the phenomenology of identity. Of course, the fact that a
> simple change of one memory could alter identity makes all these law
> enforcement evasion strategies by memory transfer that much easier.
> 

Yes - I find myself in quite a bit of disagreement with Parfit on
this. He seems to assume that the components of a person interact in
simple additive ways, whereas from what we know of real biological
organisms, the interactions tend to be complex and close to
criticality. A single change _can_ cause an avalanche that causes the
whole system to unravel. Not every change of course. For example, one
can usually remove quite a number of species from an ecosystem without
it changing much. But remove a "keystone" species, and the ecosystem
colapses.

I am rather taken by Marvin Minsky's "Society of the Mind" idea, which
also fits into this notion that one's person (or identity) may be
robust to the removal of some elements, but then catastrophically
collapse when the wrong bit is removed.

Cheers
-- 

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: crime and duplication machines

You don't want to punish the first actor's family because that is disutility to them as 
well as, or instead of, the actor and their happiness counts in the society's utility as 
well as that of the murder victim.  You could just execute/imprison the two remaining 
actors on the assumption that (a) that will deter similar schemes and (b) they are "would 
be murders".


Brent

On 4/27/2015 4:42 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
Right, but *who* to punish in order to deter is dependent on these questions of 
identity. Suppose there are three actors who are willing to do this delayed duplication 
murder suicide scheme. Furthermore, they don't care what happens to their duplicate. 
(Perhaps they think of him as someone else) However, each have a family member that the 
care about deeply. You tell the first that his duplicate will be punished if he commits 
his crime. He doesn't care. You then say you will transfer the punishment onto his 
family member. This would deter him, but he doesn't believe you are actually so 
utilitarian and so he carries out his plans. Now, there are still two would be 
murderers. Do you punish the first man's family member in order to prove you mean 
business, deterring the remaining actors?


On purely utilitarian grounds, there is just as much disutility generated when you 
punish the first actor's duplicate as when you punish the first actor's family member. 
Furthermore, unless we reolve this question of identity who this disutility is doled out 
to doesn't matter as long as it serves its deterrent purpose.


On Monday, April 27, 2015, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


You make a rule about punishing people that will deter them from committing 
crimes
in a way that maximizes satisfaction in the community.  I'm not sure what 
rules that
is, but it doesn't necessarily have to solve some philosophical problem of 
personal
identity.

In your example, suppose society said, "No we won't punish him."  Then 
people might
be tempted to use this as a way of killing someone they hate.  So society 
would
probably say, "Yes, we'll punish him...and any additional copies of him 
too."

Brent

On 4/27/2015 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one out 
goes and
commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide, later the delayed
duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would that be punishing 
them for
a "pre-crime"?

Jason

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 7:19 PM, LizR > wrote:

You should both go to jail, on the basis that both copies of you had 
the same
consciousness as the person who committed the murder, and therefore you 
are
both equally responsible (leaving aside considerations of free will etc)

And (this is the clincher) you are both equally a danger to society, 
having had
your psychopathic tendencies duplicated means you're twice as much of a 
danger
as you were when there was only one of you.

QED, "You're nicked, sunshine."



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Re: crime and duplication machines


On 4/27/2015 4:24 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 April 2015 at 08:58, Jason Resch > wrote:


What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one out 
goes and
commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide, later the delayed
duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would that be punishing 
them for a
"pre-crime"?


I think the "public safety" argument comes in here. We have very good evidence that you 
are both dangerous and mentally unstable. I think we should at least consider offering 
psychiatric help, and perhaps threaten imprisonment if it's refused.


But of course I don't know how the rest of this hypothetical SF society functions. Maybe 
we keep you from being a threat by uploading you into a computerised utopia in which 
your every wish is granted.


To really make a good decision we'd have to know a lot more - which is why we have 
trials.  Just from the above outline we don't even really know that the killer is 
dangerous or mentally unstable. Maybe he murdered the guy who bullied his gay son online 
and caused his son to commit suicide.  Or maybe he murdered his duplicate because his 
duplicate stole his identity?


Brent

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading


On 4/27/2015 4:17 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 April 2015 at 08:25, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 4/27/2015 10:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-04-27 19:18 GMT+02:00 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>:

On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:

I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly 
driven by
the profit motive (although of course there have been significant 
injections
from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the profit 
motive
requires that people keep buying, and that requires that computers (in 
all
their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend to wear out 
THAT quickly.


Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my 
five year
old HP.


Maybe because you can buy laptop with better display, like 4k resolution...

http://www.toshiba.com/us/p50t

And maybe because a lot of new things are done with mobile devices... there 
are
phones that will have 4k display next year...


But having twice the resolution on a smaller screen is worthless.  My HP has a 
17"
screen and 1920x1200 is plenty of resolution for my old eyes. Going to a 
15.6"
screen with 3840x2160 is NOT an improvement (to say nothing having to use 
Windoze
8.1). If they're going to make 3840x2160 graphics they should put them on 
the bigger
screens, not the smaller ones!?


I did wonder why you wanted more resolution on a small screen - given that one selling 
point of laptops is their small size. I guess you were just disagreeing for the sake of 
it, as usual.


I wanted more resolution on a 17" screen, 1920x1200 instead of 1920x1080.  I wasn't 
disagreeing with anything except that 4K resolution on a laptop is not an improvement.  
You're nit picking.


Brent

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Re: God

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 5:12 PM, QUENTIN THE HORSE FUCKER wrote::

> and so again you lie.
>

I knew this was coming, and so now I must humbly suggest you go fuck
yourself and the horse you road in on.

  John K Clark

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Re: crime and duplication machines

Right, but *who* to punish in order to deter is dependent on these
questions of identity. Suppose there are three actors who are willing to do
this delayed duplication murder suicide scheme. Furthermore, they don't
care what happens to their duplicate. (Perhaps they think of him as someone
else) However, each have a family member that the care about deeply. You
tell the first that his duplicate will be punished if he commits his crime.
He doesn't care. You then say you will transfer the punishment onto his
family member. This would deter him, but he doesn't believe you are
actually so utilitarian and so he carries out his plans. Now, there are
still two would be murderers. Do you punish the first man's family member
in order to prove you mean business, deterring the remaining actors?

On purely utilitarian grounds, there is just as much disutility generated
when you punish the first actor's duplicate as when you punish the first
actor's family member. Furthermore, unless we reolve this question of
identity who this disutility is doled out to doesn't matter as long as it
serves its deterrent purpose.

On Monday, April 27, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:

>  You make a rule about punishing people that will deter them from
> committing crimes in a way that maximizes satisfaction in the community.
> I'm not sure what rules that is, but it doesn't necessarily have to solve
> some philosophical problem of personal identity.
>
> In your example, suppose society said, "No we won't punish him."  Then
> people might be tempted to use this as a way of killing someone they hate.
> So society would probably say, "Yes, we'll punish him...and any additional
> copies of him too."
>
> Brent
>
> On 4/27/2015 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one out
> goes and commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide, later
> the delayed duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would that be
> punishing them for a "pre-crime"?
>
>  Jason
>
> On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 7:19 PM, LizR  > wrote:
>
>> You should both go to jail, on the basis that both copies of you had the
>> same consciousness as the person who committed the murder, and therefore
>> you are both equally responsible (leaving aside considerations of free will
>> etc)
>>
>>  And (this is the clincher) you are both equally a danger to society,
>> having had your psychopathic tendencies duplicated means you're twice as
>> much of a danger as you were when there was only one of you.
>>
>>  QED, "You're nicked, sunshine."
>>
>
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Re: crime and duplication machines

That only holds if you were planning the murder before you dupped.

On Monday, April 27, 2015, LizR  wrote:

> On 28 April 2015 at 08:58, Jason Resch  > wrote:
>
>> What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one
>> out goes and commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide,
>> later the delayed duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would
>> that be punishing them for a "pre-crime"?
>>
>
> I think the "public safety" argument comes in here. We have very good
> evidence that you are both dangerous and mentally unstable. I think we
> should at least consider offering psychiatric help, and perhaps threaten
> imprisonment if it's refused.
>
> But of course I don't know how the rest of this hypothetical SF society
> functions. Maybe we keep you from being a threat by uploading you into a
> computerised utopia in which your every wish is granted.
>
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Re: crime and duplication machines

On 28 April 2015 at 10:33, meekerdb  wrote:

>  You make a rule about punishing people that will deter them from
> committing crimes in a way that maximizes satisfaction in the community.
> I'm not sure what rules that is, but it doesn't necessarily have to solve
> some philosophical problem of personal identity.
>
> In your example, suppose society said, "No we won't punish him."  Then
> people might be tempted to use this as a way of killing someone they hate.
> So society would probably say, "Yes, we'll punish him...and any additional
> copies of him too."
>

I agree in principle, although ISTM you'd have to hate someone an awful LOT
to kill them and then commit suicide so your duplicate could escape being
punished for the crime.

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Re: crime and duplication machines

On 28 April 2015 at 08:58, Jason Resch  wrote:

> What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one out
> goes and commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide, later
> the delayed duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would that be
> punishing them for a "pre-crime"?
>

I think the "public safety" argument comes in here. We have very good
evidence that you are both dangerous and mentally unstable. I think we
should at least consider offering psychiatric help, and perhaps threaten
imprisonment if it's refused.

But of course I don't know how the rest of this hypothetical SF society
functions. Maybe we keep you from being a threat by uploading you into a
computerised utopia in which your every wish is granted.

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

On 28 April 2015 at 08:25, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/27/2015 10:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2015-04-27 19:18 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :
>
>>  On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>> I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven
>> by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant
>> injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the
>> profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that
>> computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend
>> to wear out THAT quickly.
>>
>>
>> Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my
>> five year old HP.
>>
>
>  Maybe because you can buy laptop with better display, like 4k
> resolution...
>
>  http://www.toshiba.com/us/p50t
>
>  And maybe because a lot of new things are done with mobile devices...
> there are phones that will have 4k display next year...
>
>
> But having twice the resolution on a smaller screen is worthless.  My HP
> has a 17" screen and 1920x1200 is plenty of resolution for my old eyes.
> Going to a 15.6" screen with 3840x2160 is NOT an improvement (to say
> nothing having to use Windoze 8.1).  If they're going to make 3840x2160
> graphics they should put them on the bigger screens, not the smaller ones!?
>

I did wonder why you wanted more resolution on a small screen - given that
one selling point of laptops is their small size. I guess you were just
disagreeing for the sake of it, as usual.

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

On 28 April 2015 at 05:18, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
>
> I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven
> by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant
> injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the
> profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that
> computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend
> to wear out THAT quickly.
>
> Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my five
> year old HP.  I think personal computers have already gone past their peak
> of functionality and the "improvements" now are in the profit margin and
> the minds of the marketing department.
>

My point was that they are doing - or trying to do - whatever they think
will make people want to buy them. However, I agree that PCs as such have
probably peaked (but they are very useful for writers such as myself, even
so).

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading


On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy a 60" TV 4k 
screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this year, if they're not 
already there.


They're not.  I've been looking to buy one since the first 4K laptops were announced.  But 
doubling the resolution still doesn't make up for losing 17% of the screen area.  The 
resolution was already as high as useful for a 17" screen.


I can buy a 60" 4K TV, but I can't take it with me.

Brent

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Re: crime and duplication machines

You make a rule about punishing people that will deter them from committing crimes in a
way that maximizes satisfaction in the community. I'm not sure what rules that is, but it
doesn't necessarily have to solve some philosophical problem of personal identity.

In your example, suppose society said, "No we won't punish him." Then people might be
tempted to use this as a way of killing someone they hate. So society would probably say,
"Yes, we'll punish him...and any additional copies of him too."

Brent

On 4/27/2015 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one out goes and
commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide, later the delayed duplicate of
you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would that be punishing them for a "pre-crime"?

Jason

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 7:19 PM, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:

You should both go to jail, on the basis that both copies of you had the
same
consciousness as the person who committed the murder, and therefore you are
both
equally responsible (leaving aside considerations of free will etc)

And (this is the clincher) you are both equally a danger to society, having
had your
psychopathic tendencies duplicated means you're twice as much of a danger
as you
were when there was only one of you.

QED, "You're nicked, sunshine."

Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

2015-04-27 22:25 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :

>  On 4/27/2015 10:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-04-27 19:18 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :
>
>>  On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>> I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven
>> by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant
>> injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the
>> profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that
>> computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend
>> to wear out THAT quickly.
>>
>>
>> Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my
>> five year old HP.
>>
>
>  Maybe because you can buy laptop with better display, like 4k
> resolution...
>
>  http://www.toshiba.com/us/p50t
>
>  And maybe because a lot of new things are done with mobile devices...
> there are phones that will have 4k display next year...
>
>
> But having twice the resolution on a smaller screen is worthless.  My HP
> has a 17" screen and 1920x1200 is plenty of resolution for my old eyes.
> Going to a 15.6" screen with 3840x2160 is NOT an improvement (to say
> nothing having to use Windoze 8.1).  If they're going to make 3840x2160
> graphics they should put them on the bigger screens, not the smaller ones!?
>

I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy
a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this
year, if they're not already there... those laptops have not only better
screen than your old HP, they are way more powerful... So what's your point
? Innovation and better PC and better GPU and better screen are still
done... Your old HP cannot make latest games for example running with full
details at the screen resolution it offers... latest high end laptop can...
you don't play ? What exists doesn't please you ? You don't play games ?
fine, keep your old HP but don't pretend they don't exists, they do.


Quentin

>
>
> Brent
>
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Re: God

2015-04-27 21:53 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > Again you said you do know... I quote you again "computation can be made
>> real, but not without using energy and increasing entropy, in other words
>> not without turning to a PHYSICAL process."
>>
>
> And again I said " What I don't know is if mathematics can explain why
> this fact must exist and it couldn't have been otherwise, or if mathematics
> is just describing a raw physical fact".
>

No you said what I was quoting above... and maintaining that you don't
know, which is a contradiction, either you don't know, and you can't say
that computations *need* energy to be *real* or you maintain it and that
means you can't entertain the idea that physics could not be primary and
reducible to something else and so again you lie.

To answer your question, I don't know either, but I wouldn't pretend that
computations need *energy* as energy is a physical notion and at the same
time saying it could be that physics is not primary. If computations are
primary, energy is something that is a result of/generated by computations
and not the other way around, that's what it means to be primary. And do
not play with words again... I'm not saying *they are* primary see the "to
answer your question" part.

So what is it ? Do you pretend that computations *need* energy or not ? Do
you or not pretend that computations need to be a physical process to be
real ? If you answer affirmatively, please explain if computation are
*primary*, how can they must be a *physical* process while physics itself
must be reducible to computations as they are *primary* ?

Quentin

Quentin

>
>
> And you haven't answered my question, unlike me do you know if mathematics
> begat physics or physics begat mathematics?  I honestly don't know, do
> you?   Are you claiming that you have found a way to make a calculation
> without using a physical process? There might be a way but if there is I
> don't know it. Do you?
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
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>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
>> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>>
>> --
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Re: crime and duplication machines

2015-04-27 Thread Jason Resch

What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one out
goes and commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide, later
the delayed duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would that be
punishing them for a "pre-crime"?

Jason

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 7:19 PM, LizR  wrote:

> You should both go to jail, on the basis that both copies of you had the
> same consciousness as the person who committed the murder, and therefore
> you are both equally responsible (leaving aside considerations of free will
> etc)
>
> And (this is the clincher) you are both equally a danger to society,
> having had your psychopathic tendencies duplicated means you're twice as
> much of a danger as you were when there was only one of you.
>
> QED, "You're nicked, sunshine."
>
> --
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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading


On 4/27/2015 10:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-04-27 19:18 GMT+02:00 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>:

On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:

I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven 
by the
profit motive (although of course there have been significant injections 
from other
areas, little things like the internet!) But the profit motive requires 
that people
keep buying, and that requires that computers (in all their forms) continue 
to
improve, since they don't tend to wear out THAT quickly.


Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my five 
year old HP.


Maybe because you can buy laptop with better display, like 4k resolution...

http://www.toshiba.com/us/p50t

And maybe because a lot of new things are done with mobile devices... there are phones 
that will have 4k display next year...


But having twice the resolution on a smaller screen is worthless. My HP has a 17" screen 
and 1920x1200 is plenty of resolution for my old eyes.  Going to a 15.6" screen with 
3840x2160 is NOT an improvement (to say nothing having to use Windoze 8.1).  If they're 
going to make 3840x2160 graphics they should put them on the bigger screens, not the 
smaller ones!?



Brent

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Re: God

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> Again you said you do know... I quote you again "computation can be made
> real, but not without using energy and increasing entropy, in other words
> not without turning to a PHYSICAL process."
>

And again I said " What I don't know is if mathematics can explain why this
fact must exist and it couldn't have been otherwise, or if mathematics is
just describing a raw physical fact".

And you haven't answered my question, unlike me do you know if mathematics
begat physics or physics begat mathematics?  I honestly don't know, do
you?   Are you claiming that you have found a way to make a calculation
without using a physical process? There might be a way but if there is I
don't know it. Do you?

  John K Clark






an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>>
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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Re: God


On 4/27/2015 8:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 Apr 2015, at 22:32, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/26/2015 9:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 3:26 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 4/22/2015 2:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


No, you don't. Reread jason detailed post of last year please.


Who elected Jason to speak for most people on the planet?  Did he take a 
survey?



I spoke for no one. I only quoted people from that faith or excerpts from their 
religious scriptures directly. Here is a link to the post for those that are new to 
the list:


https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/Ua-eNt_vdBE/PV_pwPhvCxcJ

(Note you may need to click "Show Trimmed Content")

This same conversation seems to recur every 6 - 12 months, and every time Brent and 
John seem to forget everything that was said from the last time it happened. Maybe 
this time it will be different.


Maybe you should remember my rejoinder too.

It was not you who claimed to speak for other people, it was Bruno that claimed 
you did:

Bruno:/Jason Resh shows you that my definition of God is the same as the Chinese, 
Indian, Greeks, /

///
///Brent:/Are you claiming that all Chinese, Indians, and Greeks agree on a canonical 
definition for "God"?  That would certainly be remarkable (especially as "god" is an 
English word)./



John Clark: /I already know what most people on this planet mean by the word 
"God" /


Bruno: /No, you don't. Reread jason detailed post of last year please. /

Brent: /Who elected Jason to speak for most people on the planet?  Did he take 
a survey?/

No he didn't take a survey; he cherry picked from ancient texts and theologians who 
agreed with him.  And Jason didn't even go so far as to say these were majority 
opinions or common meanings; only that they were other conceptions of "God" consistent 
with Bruno's mystic ONE or TRUTH.



I am not sure I understand.

Let me try to be clear, and suggest a series of equivalent definitions of God, which 
indeed generalize all notion of God used by people.


God = ultimate reality, or "real" reality, ...
God = intended subject matter of a theory of everything (which I will call indifferently 
theology or metaphysics, as it assumes such everything makes sense),

God = whatever is the cause of the existence or appearance of things.

Then, let me tell you what is common, about God in *many* human theologies, mystical 
reports, and the theology of machines.


Yes those are common to many, but so is "the world".  Your "equivalent definitions" are 
deficient because it is also common to many (almost all) human theologies, that God is a 
person, that God is powerful, that God should be worshipped, that God is morally good, 
that God cares about humans and their behavior (especially when they're nude).  And it it 
specifically these attributes of God that distinguish him from scientific theories of 
everything; which do not assume personality or goodness or need for worship.




I recall first what I mean by "theology of the machine or number M": it is the set of 
the Gödel numbers of all true propositions containing references to M and its most 
probable universal computation/environment".


?? You help yourself to some notion of probability over "universal 
computation/environment".  I don't understand "universal environment" and I don't 
understand what probability measures there are and I don't understand why reference to a 
machine AND its most probably universal environment should be of interest or be called "a 
theology"?




And I focus to ideally correct machines, which never assert false proposition, and which 
are rational, which means that they believes B when they believe the propositions A -> B 
and A. It is not difficult to understand that all ideally correct machines, once 
believing in RA and the induction axioms, will have the same theology,


How can the theologies be the same when they are required to refer to different 
machines?


and we can extend the theology of M to the whole arithmetical truth.

What is common between many religion and machine's theology?
- No machine M can prove the existence of God


You haven't defined God, so what do you mean by no machine can prove the 
existence of God?

(indeed, that would be equivalent to proving its consistency violating Gödel's 
incompleteness <>t -> ~[]<>t). Most religions have inherited this from Plato and 
Aristotle (which might themselves inherit them from others).


The most common religion on Earth, Catholicism, teaches that Aquinas proved the existence 
of a God.


- No machine M can provide a name, or description, or definition of God (indeed that 
would be equivalent to define arithmetical truth in arithmetical term, which is 
impossible (already saw by Gödel, known often under the theorem of Tarski).


Well then it's not surprising that the existence of God can't be proven, since the thing 
to be proven cannot even be described.



God is not rational

Re: Consciousness creates physics

2015-04-27 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


Dear John,

Recently I have found a nice statement from David Hume, one of the 
greatest skeptics. Interestingly enough that Hume has declared that 
"Nature is always too strong for principle", see below this statement in 
the context:


"But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any 
constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would 
be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he 
will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his 
principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all 
action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till 
the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable 
existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. 
Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may 
throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his 
profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put 
to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every 
point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other 
sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical 
researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join 
in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections 
are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the 
whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; 
though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy 
themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove 
the objections, which may be raised against them."


Evgenii

Am 26.04.2015 um 22:44 schrieb John Mikes:

Evgeniy, I, for one, like your approach on the Hoffmann-Prokosh
idea. In my terms (Ccness = REPLY (reflection?) to RELATIONS
definitely points to the Berkeley wisdom (to accept as existing one
must perceive the item, in concise Latin: *ESSE* (to include into our
worldview) *est PERCIPI*. Difference may be in faith-based religion
where ACCEPTANCE is also good enough. It may be an extension for the
Kantian 'revolution': our entire image of the WORLD (the Everything,
Nature, you name it) is the product of our mind. (And please, do not
ask what I mean by 'mind').

All our 'knowledge' about the WORLD(?) is the reflection of the human
mind on phenomena (items, processes) perceived in adjusted formats
available to the mind.  No justification and no formatting to any
'reality'. That includes the Hoffmann-Prakash Psychology as well. (I
did not read the paper). JM

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 4:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi 
wrote:


Dear Brent,

I would agree that it is unclear what conscious agents introduced
in the paper have to do with human consciousness.

For me it was interesting to see that the cognitive science is
close to Kantian revolution (space and time are created by the
mind) and that Berkeley's "to be is to be perceived" (esse est
percipi) is still actual.

The next natural step for the cognitive science would be radical
constructivism.

Evgenii

Am 26.04.2015 um 21:35 schrieb meekerdb:


I think the authors are more interested in being provocative than
in being clear.  For example:

/The interface theory entails that these first two steps were
mere warm up. The next step in the intellectual history of H.
sapiens is a big one. We must recognize that all of our
perceptions of space, time and objects no more reflect reality
than does our perception of a flat earth. It's not just this or
that aspect of our perceptions that must be corrected, it is the
entire framework of a space-time containing objects, the
fundamental organization of our perceptual systems, that must be
recognized as a mere species-specific mode of perception rather
than an insight into objective reality./ / //By this time it
should be clear that, if the arguments given here are sound, then
the current Bayesian models of object perception need more than
tinkering around the edges, they need fundamental transformation.
And this transformation will necessarily have ramifications for
scientific questions well-beyond the confines of computational
models of object perception./

There's no justification for the "mere".  Our perception has
gone well beyond what biology provided.  Nor is there any reason
to suppose that the transformation they propose will be THE
OBJECTIVE TRUTH either. / //Similarly, most of my mental
processes are not directly conscious to me, but that does not
entail that they are unconscious./


This just seems to make of muddle of what is meant by
"conscious".

Anyway, I'll finish reading it.  I think an explanation of
consciousness based on evolution is one useful approach.

Brent

On 4/26/2015 1:22 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Enjoy. Evgenii

Donald David Hoffman, Chetan Prakash, Objects of
consciousness, Frontiers in Psychology, v. 5, N 00577, 2014.

http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 27 April 2015 at 19:24, meekerdb  wrote:

 On 4/27/2015 4:07 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>  On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>  Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or useful
>> rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That means, of
>> course, that we make mistakes, we are misled by imprecise interpretations
>> of perceptions, and of other peoples' intentions and motives. But as long
>> as we get it right often enough, we can function perfectly adequately. As
>> Brent might say, consciousness is an engineering solution to living -- not
>> a logician's solution.
>>
>> So a Turing emulation of consciousness is perfectly possible, and that
>> consciousness would be not essentially different from yours or mine.
>>
>
>  I think the conclusion you draw here obfuscates the distinction between
> behaviour (normally) attributed to a conscious being and the putative
> additional fact (truth) of consciousness itself. Of course it is possible -
> implicitly or explicitly - to reject any such distinction, or what Bruno
> likes to call 'sweeping consciousness under the rug'. A fairly typical
> example of this (complete with the tell-tale terminology of 'illusion') can
> be found in the Graziano theory under discussion in another thread.
>
>  Alternatively one can look for an explicit nomological entailment for
> consciousness in, say, physical activity or computation. The problems with
> establishing any explicable nomological bridging principles from physical
> activity alone are well known and tend to lead to a more-or-less
> unintelligible brute identity thesis.
>
>
> I disagree on that point.  Physical activity in the brain can give a very
> fine-grained identity between processes and qualia and much progress has
> been made as technology allows finer resolution of brain activity.  I think
> that's the way progress will be made.
>

No doubt. But it still won't give an account of the essential difference
(which for the sake of argument I still assume you accept) between an
'engineering' description at any (3p) level whatsoever and the (1p)
actuality of conscious experience.

  A convergence of brain neurophysiology and computer AI will give us the
> ability to create beings that act as conscious as human beings do and we'll
> have engineering level knowledge of creating consciousness to order and
> questions about qualia will be bypassed as semantic philosophizing.
>

Again, you may be right in this, since most people are not unnaturally
inclined to accept the fruits of technological progress despite, in most
cases, having no more than the dimmest notion of the relevant principles.
But my point above still stands notwithstanding.

> It's Bruno's modal logic that postulates a "brute indentity" between
> axiomatic provability and qualia.
>

I don't think that's right. There is a proposed 3-p identity, IIUC, both
for qualia (non-sharable) and quanta (sharable), with types of provable
propositions or beliefs, instantiated computationally. But 'conscious
reality', again IIUC, is postulated as standing in transcendent (1p)
relation to belief, such that the 3p belief and its 1p truth are
coincident, but not provably so (hence Bp *and* p). The truth of the
relevant belief or proposition, though in a sense fully entailed by its
function (i.e. it is quasi-analytic), cannot be further described in 3p
terms. Such truths are 'transcendently' accessible only in the 1p view of a
knower possessed of the relevant belief.

Obviously this doesn't hold for you, but to me there is something
powerfully intuitive about all this. The idea that consciousness
corresponds with some incorrigible truth goes back to Descartes, and
probably a lot further than that. You've previously remarked that
consciousness is far from obviously incorrigible but I think you
persistently miss the distinction between the immediate and indispensable
incorrigibility of consciousness and what may subsequently be inferred,
concluded, or believed on the basis of that primary truth.

A partial analogy that comes to mind is watching a movie. Any particular
viewer of a movie may be mistaken to any arbitrary, secondary degree about
the action taking place, the motives of the characters, or anything else
whatsoever. But all those inferences must necessarily be based on *some*
primary representation that is not, *in itself* and in the moment, open to
correction, but is rather the source of everything that follows. Such
'experiential incorrigibility', it should be noted, must be understood as
quite distinct from any other consideration of the 'correctness' or
otherwise of the enterprise as a whole.

  He proposes that this is just a technical problem...but one with no
> solution in sight.
>

I don't know about 'just', but it is indeed a technical problem in the
relevant theory and whether there is a solution in sight is a separate
matter. Science would be in a parlous state if we only pursued a course
where the e

Re: God


On 4/27/2015 7:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  But I think that's just another form of giving up or invoking magic,



Why? On the contrary, it eliminates magic here. I don't see why you say so.


Because it assumes that having found one theory that says "This stuff isn't expalinable" 
one need look no further.  Why not look for another theory that makes "This stuff" 
explainable too?  You base your theory on digital computation, i.e Church-Turing.  But why 
not on real numbers?  Or category theory?  Or ZFC?  Do we know that they can't give a 
better or more complete explanation of the world?


Brent

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Re: God


On 4/27/2015 6:58 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Monday, April 27, 2015, Dennis Ochei > wrote:
> I tend to agree that the word God has way too much baggage. I feel like it's used to 
induce a fictitious sense of agreement. If you said you believed in God, no one would 
think you were referring to the material universe or arithmetic. You would be performing 
an act of deception on them.


It would be good to clarify, but arithmetical truth is infinite, incomprehensible, 


Wrong, it's comprehensible within bigger systems.

uncreated, 


Maybe.  Maybe not.

immutable, 


Meaningless.  That's like saying "red" is immutable because it always means red.

omnipresent, 


Or it's only present when you think of it.

transcendent, 


Mystification.

the source of reality and consciousness, 


That's what YOU say.

etc. If you ask a Christian, Sikh, Hindu and Platonist if they believe in God and they 
all say yes, is the Platonist being any more deceptive than any other, when they each 
hold different ideas in their head?


No, which exactly why no serious person should apply the term "God" to anything - unless 
of course they want to stir up religious fervor and create a pogrom, crusade, holocaust, 
jihad, or theocracy.


Brent
Peter: What would you say if I told you there was Master of all we see, a Creator of the 
universe, who watches and judges everything we do.

Curls: I'd say you were about to take up a collection.
--- Johnny Hart, in B.C.

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Re: God

2015-04-27 19:49 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Yes I said that, and it's a fact that to make computations real you DO
>>> need to use energy and create entropy.
>>>
>>
>> So how can you have an ontology where computations are primary ? energy
>> is a physical property ?
>>
>
> Maybe mathematics can shed light on that, or maybe it can't. I don't know.
> Do you?
>

Again you said you do know... I quote you again "computation can be made
real, but not without using energy and increasing entropy, in other words
not without turning to a PHYSICAL process." So what backpedals do you want
to take ?

Quentin

>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 4/27/2015 4:07 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or useful
rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That means, of
course, that
we make mistakes, we are misled by imprecise interpretations of
perceptions, and of
other peoples' intentions and motives. But as long as we get it right often
enough,
we can function perfectly adequately. As Brent might say, consciousness is
an
engineering solution to living -- not a logician's solution.

So a Turing emulation of consciousness is perfectly possible, and that
consciousness
would be not essentially different from yours or mine.

I think the conclusion you draw here obfuscates the distinction between behaviour
(normally) attributed to a conscious being and the putative additional fact (truth) of
consciousness itself. Of course it is possible - implicitly or explicitly - to reject
any such distinction, or what Bruno likes to call 'sweeping consciousness under the
rug'. A fairly typical example of this (complete with the tell-tale terminology of
'illusion') can be found in the Graziano theory under discussion in another thread.

Alternatively one can look for an explicit nomological entailment for consciousness in,
say, physical activity or computation. The problems with establishing any explicable
nomological bridging principles from physical activity alone are well known and tend to
lead to a more-or-less unintelligible brute identity thesis.

I disagree on that point. Physical activity in the brain can give a very fine-grained
identity between processes and qualia and much progress has been made as technology allows
finer resolution of brain activity. I think that's the way progress will be made. A
convergence of brain neurophysiology and computer AI will give us the ability to create
beings that act as conscious as human beings do and we'll have engineering level knowledge
of creating consciousness to order and questions about qualia will be bypassed as semantic
philosophizing.

It's Bruno's modal logic that postulates a "brute indentity" between axiomatic provability
and qualia. He proposes that this is just a technical problem...but one with no solution
in sight.

Consequently physical activity is postulated as an adequate approximation of
computation, at some level, and it is the latter that is assumed to provide the
nomological bridge to consciousness. What is striking, then, about Bruno's UD argument
is that it uses precisely this starting assumption to draw the opposite conclusion: i.e.
that computation and not physical activity must be playing the primary role in this
relation.

This is perhaps less of a shock to the imagination than it may at first appear.
Idealists such as Berkeley and of course the Platonists that preceded him had already
pointed out that deriving the appearance of matter from the 'mental' might present
conceptual problems less insuperable than the reverse. What they lacked was any explicit
conceptual apparatus to put flesh on the bare bones of such an intuition. What is
interesting about Bruno's work, at least to me, is that it suggests (until proved in
error) that the default assumption about the nomological basis of consciousness in fact
leads to a kind of a quasi-idealism, albeit one founded on the neutral ontological basis
of primary arithmetical relations. That then presents the empirically-testable task of
validating, or ruling out, the entailment that physics itself (or more generally 'what
is observable or shareable') relies on nothing more or less than such relations.

Did anyone suppose that physics did not rely on shared perception and intersubjective
agreement? The "laws of physics" are just models that physicists invent to try to codify
and predict those perceptions. Reality is of the ontology of our best current
model...always subject to revision.

Brent

Re: God

On 27 Apr 2015, at 11:03, Dennis Ochei wrote:

I tend to agree that the word God has way too much baggage. I feel
like it's used to induce a fictitious sense of agreement. If you
said you believed in God, no one would think you were referring to
the material universe or arithmetic. You would be performing an act
of deception on them.

It is the contrary I think. Talking about matter like if it was not a
God, is more deceptive. Of course, in a scientific context, we
redefine and sometimes generalize the notion, so that we can reason
more easily.

In this case, you just said something that machine can already prove
(although this is not entirely obvious): using the term God is always
an act of deception unless we give the general definition, so nobody
will be deceipt. People can sad if the God of the machine is too much
different than the God in which they believe, but they can do the
comparison, and conclude what they want ("I was deluded" if they find
comp plausible, or machines are deluded if they keep their faith
without change, in that case).

It is a theology for a different reason: it has its funeral special
rites. John Clark paid some money for it, for example. It is a sort of
bet in a sort of reincarnation, with the problem of "handling" the
infinity of them in arithmetic.

"God" is the worst name of it, except for all the others. In my own
pictorial personal oversimplifying arithmetical legend, I think as
God (arithmetical truth) more like a Mother than a Father, but this is
just by tiredness reaction with the prevalent machism in religion.

Fairy tales can help some people, but should never been taken
seriously, if that was not obvious.

Bruno

On Monday, April 27, 2015, LizR wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 16:46, meekerdb wrote:
Theology is never having to say, "That's not God."

While Fundamentalism means never having to say you got it wrong.

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?



On 27 Apr 2015, at 13:07, David Nyman wrote:

On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett   
wrote:


Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or  
useful rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That  
means, of course, that we make mistakes, we are misled by imprecise  
interpretations of perceptions, and of other peoples' intentions and  
motives. But as long as we get it right often enough, we can  
function perfectly adequately. As Brent might say, consciousness is  
an engineering solution to living -- not a logician's solution.


So a Turing emulation of consciousness is perfectly possible, and  
that consciousness would be not essentially different from yours or  
mine.


I think the conclusion you draw here obfuscates the distinction  
between behaviour (normally) attributed to a conscious being and the  
putative additional fact (truth) of consciousness itself. Of course  
it is possible - implicitly or explicitly - to reject any such  
distinction, or what Bruno likes to call 'sweeping consciousness  
under the rug'. A fairly typical example of this (complete with the  
tell-tale terminology of 'illusion') can be found in the Graziano  
theory under discussion in another thread.


Alternatively one can look for an explicit nomological entailment  
for consciousness in, say, physical activity or computation. The  
problems with establishing any explicable nomological bridging  
principles from physical activity alone are well known and tend to  
lead to a more-or-less unintelligible brute identity thesis.  
Consequently physical activity is postulated as an adequate  
approximation of computation, at some level, and it is the latter  
that is assumed to provide the nomological bridge to consciousness.  
What is striking, then, about Bruno's UD argument is that it uses  
precisely this starting assumption to draw the opposite conclusion:  
i.e. that computation and not physical activity must be playing the  
primary role in this relation.


This is perhaps less of a shock to the imagination than it may at  
first appear. Idealists such as Berkeley and of course the  
Platonists that preceded him had already pointed out that deriving  
the appearance of matter from the 'mental' might present conceptual  
problems less insuperable than the reverse. What they lacked was any  
explicit conceptual apparatus to put flesh on the bare bones of such  
an intuition. What is interesting about Bruno's work, at least to  
me, is that it suggests (until proved in error) that the default  
assumption about the nomological basis of consciousness in fact  
leads to a kind of a quasi-idealism, albeit one founded on the  
neutral ontological basis of primary arithmetical relations. That  
then presents the empirically-testable task of validating, or ruling  
out, the entailment that physics itself (or more generally 'what is  
observable or shareable') relies on nothing more or less than such  
relations.



All good and important points that you clearly expose, David.

Bruce seems to ignore the (mind-body) problem, and to miss that the  
UDA just helps to make that problem more precise, in the frame of  
computationalism, and to make it more amenable to more rigorous  
treatments, ... without mentioning that the arithmetical translation  
of the UDA in arithmetic is a non trivial beginning of solution (and  
which might motivate people to study a lot of nice and fun results in  
theoretical computer science, at the least).


Bruno




David

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Re: God

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
>
>> Yes I said that, and it's a fact that to make computations real you DO
>> need to use energy and create entropy.
>>
>
> So how can you have an ontology where computations are primary ? energy is
> a physical property ?
>

Maybe mathematics can shed light on that, or maybe it can't. I don't know.
Do you?

  John K Clark






>


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Re: God

2015-04-27 19:41 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 1:09 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
> >> Because although we haven't discovered it yet maybe mathematics is
>>> saying that particular physical process (computation that uses energy and
>>> creates entropy) must exist or there will be a logical self contradiction.
>>> Or maybe mathematics is saying nothing of the sort and mathematics is just
>>> a language for describing that physical process.
>>>
>>
>> > That's not what you said, you said "computation can be made real, but
>> not without using energy and increasing entropy, in other words not without
>> turning to a PHYSICAL process."...
>>
>
> Yes I said that, and it's a fact that to make computations real you DO
> need to use energy and create entropy.
>

So how can you have an ontology where computations are primary ? energy is
a physical property ? If they need energy, then they can't be primary and
physics must be, so you're contradicting yourself.

Quentin


> What I don't know is if mathematics can explain why this fact must exist
> and it couldn't have been otherwise, or if mathematics is just describing a
> raw physical fact.
>
> Bruno claimed that "Computation can be concretized [made real] in any
> universal number, in arithmetic" and I said and will continue to say that
> nobody knows if that is true or not.
>
>
>> > Are you saying you didn't wrote that ?
>>
>
> No. Are you saying that unlike me you know for sure if mathematics or
> physics is more fundamental?
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>>>
>>>
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Re: God

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 1:09 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>> Because although we haven't discovered it yet maybe mathematics is
>> saying that particular physical process (computation that uses energy and
>> creates entropy) must exist or there will be a logical self contradiction.
>> Or maybe mathematics is saying nothing of the sort and mathematics is just
>> a language for describing that physical process.
>>
>
> > That's not what you said, you said "computation can be made real, but
> not without using energy and increasing entropy, in other words not without
> turning to a PHYSICAL process."...
>

Yes I said that, and it's a fact that to make computations real you DO need
to use energy and create entropy. What I don't know is if mathematics can
explain why this fact must exist and it couldn't have been otherwise, or if
mathematics is just describing a raw physical fact.

Bruno claimed that "Computation can be concretized [made real] in any
universal number, in arithmetic" and I said and will continue to say that
nobody knows if that is true or not.


> > Are you saying you didn't wrote that ?
>

No. Are you saying that unlike me you know for sure if mathematics or
physics is more fundamental?

  John K Clark




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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?



On 27 Apr 2015, at 08:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Apr 2015, at 02:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:


That seems odd to me. The starting point was that the brain was  
Turing emulable (at some substitution level). Which seems to  
suggest that consciousness (usually associated with brain  
function) is Turing emulable.
Using an identity thesis which does no more work, as normally UDA  
makes clear.
If you find at the end or your chain of reasoning that  
consciousness isn't computable (not Turing emulable?), it seems  
that you might have hit a contradiction.
Not necessarily. Consciousness, like truth, is a notion that the  
machine cannot define for itself, although she can study this for  
machine simpler than herself.


I can define my own consciousness, at least to a level that is  
sufficient for me to operate successfully in the world. If my brain  
and body functions can be taken over by a general-purpose computer,  
then that computer could define its own consciousness perfectly  
adequately, just as I now do.


That is what computationalism makes conceivable, but it does not  
define consciousness, and you have to bet on some substitution level.





The same happens with knowledge. Those notions mix what the machine  
can define and believe, and semantical notions related to truth,  
which would need stronger beliefs, that no machine can get about  
itself for logical reason. We don't hit the contradiction, we just  
explore the G* minus G logic of machines  which are "correct" by  
definition (something necessarily not constructive).


I don't think that people, or other conscious beings, understand  
their own consciousness, or that of others, in these terms.


Nor do I. Nor do the machine. Indeed, the conscious part will be  
related to the "soul" (axiomatized by S4Grz if defined in the  
Theaetetus way), which cannot recognize itself in the beweisbar  
predicta nor its logic G, unless betting on comp and reasoning.




Consciousness evolved in beings (people) operating in the physical  
world,


I don't know that.



and it does not need to be able to define itself in order to be able  
to operate quite successfully.


It needs to think about this when asking if it will say "yes" to a  
doctor.  We must be careful to separate the level of reflexion.




People do not run their lives according to "truths" that they can  
"prove", or worry themselves needlessly about whether their  
reasoning is consistent or complete.


We search a TOE soliving the measure problem in arithmetic. Wer don't  
search to explain everyday thinking.





Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or  
useful rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That  
means, of course, that we make mistakes, we are misled by imprecise  
interpretations of perceptions, and of other peoples' intentions and  
motives. But as long as we get it right often enough, we can  
function perfectly adequately. As Brent might say, consciousness is  
an engineering solution to living -- not a logician's solution.


?

I give a mathematical problem to those believing in computationalism  
and in primitive materialism.







So a Turing emulation of consciousness is perfectly possible, and  
that consciousness would be not essentially different from yours or  
mine.



Of course we don't know that, but thank to recall the computationalist  
assumption. That is step zero.


I don't tell my personal opinion on this. I just shows logical  
relation between set of beliefs.






Consciousness is not much more than the mental first person state  
of a person believing *correctly* in some reality, be it a dream or  
a physical universe. That notion relies on another non definable  
nition: reality, which per se, is not Turing emulable.
The brain does not produce or compute consciousness, it might even  
been more like a filter, which differentiate consciousness in the  
many histories, and make a person having some genuine first person  
perspective, which are also not definable (although locally  
approximable by the (correct) person's discourse, once having  
enough introspective ability).


That all relies too much on the assumption that comp is true.


?





And I am far from believing that you have actually demonstrated that,



Why?



or that the assumption that comp is true is a useful step towards  
understanding the world.



That assumption leads to big problem, indeed. But where I thought  
finding contradiction, I find only quantum weirdness, so I think comp  
is not refuted.


If you have a non comp theory, give it to us, as there are none know  
today, except Penrose and people using the idea that the collapse of  
the wave is due to consciousness (but this is well refuted by Shimony).





Comp explains all this, with a big price: we have to extract the  
apparent stability of the physical laws from machine's self- 
reference logics. The laws of physics have to be brain-invarian

Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

2015-04-27 19:18 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :

>  On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
>
> I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven
> by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant
> injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the
> profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that
> computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend
> to wear out THAT quickly.
>
>
> Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my five
> year old HP.
>

Maybe because you can buy laptop with better display, like 4k resolution...

http://www.toshiba.com/us/p50t

And maybe because a lot of new things are done with mobile devices... there
are phones that will have 4k display next year...


> I think personal computers have already gone past their peak of
> functionality and the "improvements" now are in the profit margin and the
> minds of the marketing department.
>


> Brent
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 4/27/2015 2:34 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

That all relies too much on the assumption that comp is true

At the risk of pointing out the stunningly obvious, *everything* in Bruno's argument is
premised on the truth of the comp thesis, summarised in the claim that consciousness is
invariant for a purely digital transformation (at some level). In practice this
postulate is widely accepted, even though in many if not most cases neither the
assumption nor its possible consequences are made completely explicit, as Bruno is
striving to do.

But his argument also includes other assumptions, some more controversial than others,
c.f. the discussion of whether a recording can instantiate consciousness or how much scope
is required for counterfactual correctness. So Bruno often confusingly uses his shorthand
of "assuming comp" to mean either the digital substitution of some brain function OR the
whole argument and its conclusion.

Brent

Of course there is no compulsion to accept the premise, but once it is adopted, even
hypothetically, the onus is on the challenger (Bruno included) to reveal some flaw in
the derivation, e.g. an invalid inference or contradiction. That some of the
consequences may be counter-intuitive does not of itself invalidate the premise. On the
other hand, if you reject it at the outset, there is little further to be said.

David
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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading


On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven by the profit 
motive (although of course there have been significant injections from other areas, 
little things like the internet!) But the profit motive requires that people keep 
buying, and that requires that computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since 
they don't tend to wear out THAT quickly.


Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my five year old HP. I 
think personal computers have already gone past their peak of functionality and the 
"improvements" now are in the profit margin and the minds of the marketing department.


Brent

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Re: God

2015-04-27 19:06 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015  Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> >> No, I'm saying I don't know. You claimed that you did know and gave a
>>> reason for thinking so; and I'm saying your reasoning doesn't hold up. I
>>> don't know if mathematics or physics is more fundamental and neither do
>>> you.
>>>
>>
>> > So why are you claiming that a computation to be real need using energy
>> and be turned to a PHYSICAL process ?
>>
>
> Because although we haven't discovered it yet maybe mathematics is saying
> that particular physical process (computation that uses energy and creates
> entropy) must exist or there will be a logical self contradiction. Or maybe
> mathematics is saying nothing of the sort and mathematics is just a
> language for describing that physical process.
>

That's not what you said, you said "computation can be made real, but not
without using energy and increasing entropy, in other words not without
turning to a PHYSICAL process."...

Are you saying you didn't wrote that ? Or that this is not a claim and
computations could be real without that ? Waiting your backpedal circular
answer.

Quentin


> I don't know which is true and neither do you and neither does Bruno and
> neither does anybody else.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading


On 4/27/2015 12:22 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
Yes that's more of less what SA said - they've got around the clock speed limit by 
multiplying cores, but they can't get around the fact that components can't be scaled 
below (I think) 14nm without that transistors leaking electrons - at least not without 
some radical new technology. So it was about whether some new paradigm is on the way to 
keep things heading towards the what's his name - begins with L I think's - limit. 
(Memristors nanotubes etc)


Actually, what I took from the article was that future improvements in computing are 
going to be driven by the commercial imperative of profits. This is not likely to happen 
by pursuing faster processors and memory chips per se.
"...our vision of computers themselves is evolving. It turns out that we do not want 
stand-alone, oraclelike "thinking machines" as much as late 20th-century science-fiction 
writers thought we would. ... Instead, the relentless pursuit of lower cost per function 
will be driven by so-called heterogeneous computing."


Bruce



Yeah, no need for computing power on your desk, just let it all be done on the cloud - 
we're all connected to the NSA computers anyway, let them do it.


Brent

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Re: God

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015  Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>> No, I'm saying I don't know. You claimed that you did know and gave a
>> reason for thinking so; and I'm saying your reasoning doesn't hold up. I
>> don't know if mathematics or physics is more fundamental and neither do
>> you.
>>
>
> > So why are you claiming that a computation to be real need using energy
> and be turned to a PHYSICAL process ?
>

Because although we haven't discovered it yet maybe mathematics is saying
that particular physical process (computation that uses energy and creates
entropy) must exist or there will be a logical self contradiction. Or maybe
mathematics is saying nothing of the sort and mathematics is just a
language for describing that physical process. I don't know which is true
and neither do you and neither does Bruno and neither does anybody else.

 John K Clark

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Re: crime and duplication machines



On 27 Apr 2015, at 08:21, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:55 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 24 Apr 2015, at 02:30, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 1:19 AM, LizR  wrote:
You should both go to jail, on the basis that both copies of you  
had the same consciousness as the person who committed the murder,  
and therefore you are both equally responsible (leaving aside  
considerations of free will etc)


I agree. I would be curious to know if anyone disagrees with this,  
and why.



Now, I agree. And Liz gave two good arguments, one pure 3p, and the  
other is terms of moral punishment. The first one is enough, but the  
second one make sense too.


Another "terrible question": do people have the right to torture  
copies, when they accepted the protocols, that is with consent made  
at the time before the duplication?


Should that be made illegal?  (assuming the technology, comp, etc.)

If you assume comp, I don't think this is different from the dilemma  
of whether a person has the right to torture another if the other  
consents.


I can conceive that some find this not acceptable, as long as we have  
only one exemplary of oneself.





Some people are masochistic and desire torture, even to be placed in  
a situation where they know they can't withdraw consent later. Our  
current legal systems tend to solve this problem using Monty Python  
logic: if someone wants to be tortured they have a mental problem,  
if they have a mental problem they cannot give consent.


I think mainstream western ethics are influenced by the golden rule.  
We could do worse than the golden rule (see ISIS) be perhaps we  
could also do better: do unto others as they would have done unto  
them. This requires a level of tolerance for individual preferences  
that I don't think human civilization has attained yet.


Yes. It will take time.

Bruno





Telmo.


Bruno





And (this is the clincher) you are both equally a danger to  
society, having had your psychopathic tendencies duplicated means  
you're twice as much of a danger as you were when there was only  
one of you.


QED, "You're nicked, sunshine."

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: God



On 27 Apr 2015, at 06:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/26/2015 9:33 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 10:55 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 4/26/2015 8:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Why not move past the denial that some very particular and very  
specific notion of God exists, and test other conceptions to see  
which one's work and to what extent they serve as efficacious  
theories?


Because (a) I'm not denying a very particular and very specific  
notion of God.  I'm denying the general notion of a God that is a  
person who creates or  influences the world and is  
morally good.  And (b) I don't "move past this" because this is the  
conception of God that wields political power in the world which I  
find pernicious.  And (c) why would I look for effacious theories  
in the writings of ignorant people who thought the Earth was flat  
and women had a different number of teeth than men.  I'm glad to  
look for theories for how the world is and how it came to be that  
way and how to predict its evolution.  But I see no reason to use  
the word "god" for such theories, since that would just cause  
confusion with the concepts (a) and (b) above which is what is  
meant in common discourse.


Your answer is to abandon a field because some in that field hold  
incorrect ideas,


I said, "I'm glad to look for theories for how the world is and how  
it came to be that way and how to predict its evolution."  Maybe you  
think "the field" is fighting over whether to call this "god" or  
"science", but I don't.


which is fine as a personal choice but that won't fix anything and  
won't advance the field. You need not find efficacious theories in  
existing texts, but if you find efficacious theories that bear a  
resemblance to preexisting ideas in existing religions, then all  
the better if your aim is to move more people towards a more  
correct theology. No new religion has ever succeeded in getting  
people to deny god, they've only succeeded in changing the idea of  
what god is (even Atheism has only succeeded in changing god to be  
the material universe).


That's because you, like Tillich and other theologians, just keep  
redefining "god".  But I notice that when I expressed doubt that  
there was any ONE, any single explanation for the world, Bruno was  
shocked at such heresy and insisted I must not understand what  
explanation means.  So even some theologians are not flexible enough  
to consider multiple "gods".  To bad, they'd better be careful.  If  
they start to have definite concepts they may find they're wrong.


It is more a matter of definitions. With computationalism there are  
trivially many gods or angels, that is set containing the beliefs of  
the ideally correct machine + some non computable extension, like the  
pi_2, sigma_2, ... pi_n, sigma_n ... sets. But there is only one union  
of those.


With comp, God might still have a Mother, and better definition/ 
focusing remains possible. 0, and 2 shouldn't be jealous of 1, they  
have big role too.


To do science, we consciously oversimplify, and in this case, this  
still leads to complex unsolved questions.


The theologians which do theology with some amount of scientific  
(modesty) attitude keep redefining God, as it is ... impossible to get  
a definite description of it, ... only approximations, or negations,  
or partial aspects, etc.


The rational theology of the neoplatonists are more radically negative  
assertions: God is not characterized by its attributes:. It is not  
infinity, it is not science, it is not what we can seen, it is not ...


I remind you that the greek theory (and others) have always three  
Gods, and that with comp, God (Arithmetical truth) has the two  
"emanations": the Intellect ([]A, divine with G*) and the soul (the  
inner God).


Theological problems becomes problems in mathematics. Problem: does  
the inner god of the machine (qS4Grz) believe in the Godel-St-Anselmus  
God. Not sure as Gödel used S5, and there is an infinity of  
intermediate modal logics between S4Grz and S5. Open problem.


Bruno



Brent
Theology is never having to say, "That's not God."

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015  Dennis Ochei  wrote:

> Is uploading possible?

Yes, unless the religious crap about the soul turns out to be real, but I
think it more likely that Santa Claus will turn out to be real.

> If so, when will we have it?

In one sense we *might* have it today. If the blood in your brain is
replaced with a sort of biological antifreeze and then the temperature of
your brain is reduced to liquid nitrogen temperatures enough information
might be retained so that you could be uploaded when technology advances
enough (scientific advances are unnecessary for this). And it doesn't
matter how long you objectively remain at a liquid nitrogen temperature
because subjectively it will be instantaneous.

That's why I spent $80,000 to be frozen when I die, it *might* work and if
it doesn't I won't be any deader.

  John K Clark

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Re: God

2015-04-27 18:20 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
>
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>    But computation is not an abstract idea it is a concrete
> physical process,

 >>>  Wrong. Computation can be concretized in any universal number, in
 arithmetic.

 >> Yes computation can be made real, but not without using energy and
>>> increasing entropy, in other words not without turning to a PHYSICAL
>>> process.
>>>
>>
>> > That contradicts your claim that you are open to the idea that
>> mathematics might be more fundamental than physics. Here you take
>> "physical" for granted.
>>
>
> No, I'm saying I don't know. You claimed that you did know and gave a
> reason for thinking so; and I'm saying your reasoning doesn't hold up. I
> don't know if mathematics or physics is more fundamental and neither do
> you.
>
>
So why are you claiming that a computation to be real need using energy and
be turned to a PHYSICAL process ? That's claiming you're not open to the
idea physics is not primary, not that you don't know...

Quentin


>   John K Clark
>
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Re: God

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

   But computation is not an abstract idea it is a concrete
 physical process,
>>>
>>> >>>  Wrong. Computation can be concretized in any universal number, in
>>> arithmetic.
>>>
>>> >> Yes computation can be made real, but not without using energy and
>> increasing entropy, in other words not without turning to a PHYSICAL
>> process.
>>
>
> > That contradicts your claim that you are open to the idea that
> mathematics might be more fundamental than physics. Here you take
> "physical" for granted.
>

No, I'm saying I don't know. You claimed that you did know and gave a
reason for thinking so; and I'm saying your reasoning doesn't hold up. I
don't know if mathematics or physics is more fundamental and neither do
you.

  John K Clark

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Re: God



On 26 Apr 2015, at 22:32, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/26/2015 9:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 3:26 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 4/22/2015 2:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


No, you don't. Reread jason detailed post of last year please.


Who elected Jason to speak for most people on the planet?  Did he  
take a survey?



I spoke for no one. I only quoted people from that faith or  
excerpts from their religious scriptures directly. Here is a link  
to the post for those that are new to the list:


https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/Ua-eNt_vdBE/PV_pwPhvCxcJ

(Note you may need to click "Show Trimmed Content")

This same conversation seems to recur every 6 - 12 months, and  
every time Brent and John seem to forget everything that was said  
from the last time it happened. Maybe this time it will be different.


Maybe you should remember my rejoinder too.

It was not you who claimed to speak for other people, it was Bruno  
that claimed you did:


Bruno: Jason Resh shows you that my definition of God is the same as  
the Chinese, Indian, Greeks,


Brent: Are you claiming that all Chinese, Indians, and Greeks agree  
on a canonical definition for "God"?  That would certainly be  
remarkable (especially as "god" is an English word).


John Clark: I already know what most people on this planet mean by  
the word "God"


Bruno: No, you don't. Reread jason detailed post of last year please.

Brent: Who elected Jason to speak for most people on the planet?   
Did he take a survey?


No he didn't take a survey; he cherry picked from ancient texts and  
theologians who agreed with him.  And Jason didn't even go so far as  
to say these were majority opinions or common meanings; only that  
they were other conceptions of "God" consistent with Bruno's mystic  
ONE or TRUTH.



I am not sure I understand.

Let me try to be clear, and suggest a series of equivalent definitions  
of God, which indeed generalize all notion of God used by people.


God = ultimate reality, or "real" reality, ...
God = intended subject matter of a theory of everything (which I will  
call indifferently theology or metaphysics, as it assumes such  
everything makes sense),

God = whatever is the cause of the existence or appearance of things.

Then, let me tell you what is common, about God in *many* human  
theologies, mystical reports, and the theology of machines.


I recall first what I mean by "theology of the machine or number M":  
it is the set of the Gödel numbers of all true propositions containing  
references to M and its most probable universal computation/ 
environment".


And I focus to ideally correct machines, which never assert false  
proposition, and which are rational, which means that they believes B  
when they believe the propositions A -> B and A. It is not difficult  
to understand that all ideally correct machines, once believing in RA  
and the induction axioms, will have the same theology, and we can  
extend the theology of M to the whole arithmetical truth.


What is common between many religion and machine's theology?
- No machine M can prove the existence of God (indeed, that would be  
equivalent to proving its consistency violating Gödel's incompleteness  
<>t -> ~[]<>t). Most religions have inherited this from Plato and  
Aristotle (which might themselves inherit them from others).
- No machine M can provide a name, or description, or definition of  
God (indeed that would be equivalent to define arithmetical truth in  
arithmetical term, which is impossible (already saw by Gödel, known  
often under the theorem of Tarski). God is not rationally conceivable.  
It is Unknown, in the normal state of consciousness.
- God provides the sense, or meaning of "life" or of the computable  
processes, i.e. the computations. That is illustrated by the use of  
model theory, or semantic to specify the algorithm and verify the  
codes. Here the theory of meaning is literally the logician's model  
theory (which I have explained for classical (and modal) propositional  
logic, but I see I should explain the whole first order thing: it is  
in all textbooks, though).
- M needs stronger axioms, indeed an infinity of them to get better  
approximations of that theology, but the Unknown kicks back  
immediately and "becomes" bigger. The more you handle terrestrial  
descriptions, the less you know, *relatively* to God. The more  
powerful the lantern or the telescope is when looking in the cavern,  
the more big the cavern appears to be, and, like in Plato, what you  
see is not what you get, as the cavern is a product of machine self- 
reference.


The ideally correct self-referential machine is bound to get mystical,  
when looking inward, and such machine quickly makes the difference  
between the rationally justifiable and truth.



With the neoplatonist theology, the resemblance with the machine's  
discourse strikes the eye, which is perhaps normal, when assuming  
comp, as the neoplatonist

Re: God



On 26 Apr 2015, at 22:10, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/25/2015 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A muslim can agree that Allah verifies the definition above. An  
atheist can agree that "The material reality" plays the role of  
God,


That already assumes that there is such a role.  It's not in my  
play.


I am not sure I understand.


I don't think there's a single cause/source of for all of physical  
reality, culuture, ethics, art, mathematics, consciousness...   
There is circumstance and accident at different levels.


We agree on that. But what about the initial assumptions? The TOE?


Initial assumptions and TOE's are not everything.


Of course. But they are the theories of everything. They have to  
explain everything explainable, and they have to explain why some  
things remain non explainable, and which one.




You yourself often refer to "geography" as a metaphor for the other  
accidental stuff; which physicists call "symmetry breaking".


Yes, as computationalism, indeed self-multiplication on multiple  
computation can explain the existence of the contingencies (of type  
~[]# or  <>#)







I know this list is based on the idea that any "geography" you can't  
explain can be swept under the rug of "everything happens (just not  
here)".


Yes, it leads to the indexical explanation, and the self-relative truth.



  But I think that's just another form of giving up or invoking magic,



Why? On the contrary, it eliminates magic here. I don't see why you  
say so.


Bruno


of which you often accuse materialists.

Brent

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Re: God

On 27 Apr 2015, at 03:43, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> I gave you the definition.

You said there was no definition for God.

> Then I gave example, not of God which I would assume, but that  
some people assumed.

And now you say the examples of God that you gave are no good. So  
"God" like "free will" is just a noise.

>> Common patterns between arithmetical truth and Allah?

> Of course there are.

Maybe you're right. Timmy and Bobby are suicide bombers, Allah gives  
suicide bombers 72 virgins in the afterlife, so when Timmy and Bobby  
blow themselves up they get 144 virgins.

> You seem to confuse ~[]p & ~[]~p with []p & []~p

Now how could anybody possibly confuse ~[]p & ~[]~p with []p & []~p ?

>> But computation is not an abstract idea it is a concrete physical  
process,

> Wrong. Computation can be concretized in any universal number, in  
arithmetic.

Yes computation can be made real, but not without using energy and  
increasing entropy, in other words not without turning to a PHYSICAL  
process.

That contradicts your claim that you are open to the idea that  
mathematics might be more fundamental than physics. Here you take  
"physical" for granted.

I don't comment the other paragraphs, as the answer were already  
given, but you quote only subparts, making fool of me without trying  
to understand. This shows that your goal is ad hominem critics, and  
not subject related.

Bruno

 John K Clark

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Re: Consciousness creates physics


Dear Evgenii,


On 26 Apr 2015, at 22:01, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Dear Brent,

I would agree that it is unclear what conscious agents introduced in  
the paper have to do with human consciousness.


For me it was interesting to see that the cognitive science is close  
to Kantian revolution (space and time are created by the mind) and  
that Berkeley's "to be is to be perceived" (esse est percipi) is  
still actual.


I can appreciate this conclusion, although if that is true, that does  
not yet make mind into the fundamental thing, as it can emerge from a  
neutral ontology, like arithmetic.





The next natural step for the cognitive science would be radical  
constructivism.



That would be like focusing on the first person, or the third  
hypostases. But theology, and theoretical computer science, and  
general mathematics, contains necessarily non-constructive  
propositions, and radical constructivism would eliminate them. Radical  
constructivism put the others, and the unknown, under the rug, I would  
say.


Bruno




Evgenii

Am 26.04.2015 um 21:35 schrieb meekerdb:

I think the authors are more interested in being provocative than in
being clear.  For example:

/The interface theory entails that these first two steps were mere
warm up. The next step in the intellectual history of H. sapiens is a
big one. We must recognize that all of our perceptions of space, time
and objects no more reflect reality than does our perception of a
flat earth. It's not just this or that aspect of our perceptions that
must be corrected, it is the entire framework of a space-time
containing objects, the fundamental organization of our perceptual
systems, that must be recognized as a mere species-specific mode of
perception rather than an insight into objective reality./ / //By
this time it should be clear that, if the arguments given here are
sound, then the current Bayesian models of object perception need
more than tinkering around the edges, they need fundamental
transformation. And this transformation will necessarily have
ramifications for scientific questions well-beyond the confines of
computational models of object perception./

There's no justification for the "mere".  Our perception has gone
well beyond what biology provided.  Nor is there any reason to
suppose that the transformation they propose will be THE OBJECTIVE
TRUTH either. / //Similarly, most of my mental processes are not
directly conscious to me, but that does not entail that they are
unconscious./

This just seems to make of muddle of what is meant by "conscious".

Anyway, I'll finish reading it.  I think an explanation of
consciousness based on evolution is one useful approach.

Brent

On 4/26/2015 1:22 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Enjoy. Evgenii

Donald David Hoffman, Chetan Prakash, Objects of consciousness,
Frontiers in Psychology, v. 5, N 00577, 2014.

http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577/full




“We develop the dynamics of interacting conscious agents, and study

how the perception of objects and space-time can emerge from such
dynamics. We show that one particular object, the quantum free
particle, has a wave function that is identical in form to the
harmonic functions that characterize the asymptotic dynamics of
conscious agents; particles are vibrations not of strings but of
interacting conscious agents. This allows us to reinterpret
physical properties such as position, momentum, and energy as
properties of interacting conscious agents, rather than as
preexisting physical truths.”





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Re: God

2015-04-27 Thread Jason Resch

On Monday, April 27, 2015, Dennis Ochei  wrote:
> I tend to agree that the word God has way too much baggage. I feel like
it's used to induce a fictitious sense of agreement. If you said
you believed in God, no one would think you were referring to the material
universe or arithmetic. You would be performing an act of deception on them.

It would be good to clarify, but arithmetical truth is infinite,
incomprehensible, uncreated, immutable, omnipresent, transcendent, the
source of reality and consciousness, etc. If you ask a Christian, Sikh,
Hindu and Platonist if they believe in God and they all say yes, is the
Platonist being any more deceptive than any other, when they each hold
different ideas in their head?

Jason

>
> On Monday, April 27, 2015, LizR  wrote:
>>
>> On 27 April 2015 at 16:46, meekerdb  wrote:
>> Theology is never having to say, "That's not God."
>>
>> While Fundamentalism means never having to say you got it wrong.
>>
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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

I should have added - the writer doesn't know enough science fiction. He
says the SF writers were wrong to invent HAL but then goes on to describe
what is effectively Asimov style robots. Asimov had a better idea of an
omniintelligent environment - as much as anyone did, at least - than Clarke
did.

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or useful
> rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That means, of
> course, that we make mistakes, we are misled by imprecise interpretations
> of perceptions, and of other peoples' intentions and motives. But as long
> as we get it right often enough, we can function perfectly adequately. As
> Brent might say, consciousness is an engineering solution to living -- not
> a logician's solution.
>
> So a Turing emulation of consciousness is perfectly possible, and that
> consciousness would be not essentially different from yours or mine.
>

I think the conclusion you draw here obfuscates the distinction between
behaviour (normally) attributed to a conscious being and the putative
additional fact (truth) of consciousness itself. Of course it is possible -
implicitly or explicitly - to reject any such distinction, or what Bruno
likes to call 'sweeping consciousness under the rug'. A fairly typical
example of this (complete with the tell-tale terminology of 'illusion') can
be found in the Graziano theory under discussion in another thread.

Alternatively one can look for an explicit nomological entailment for
consciousness in, say, physical activity or computation. The problems with
establishing any explicable nomological bridging principles from physical
activity alone are well known and tend to lead to a more-or-less
unintelligible brute identity thesis. Consequently physical activity is
postulated as an adequate approximation of computation, at some level, and
it is the latter that is assumed to provide the nomological bridge to
consciousness. What is striking, then, about Bruno's UD argument is that it
uses precisely this starting assumption to draw the opposite conclusion:
i.e. that computation and not physical activity must be playing the primary
role in this relation.

This is perhaps less of a shock to the imagination than it may at first
appear. Idealists such as Berkeley and of course the Platonists that
preceded him had already pointed out that deriving the appearance of matter
from the 'mental' might present conceptual problems less insuperable than
the reverse. What they lacked was any explicit conceptual apparatus to put
flesh on the bare bones of such an intuition. What is interesting about
Bruno's work, at least to me, is that it suggests (until proved in error)
that the default assumption about the nomological basis of consciousness in
fact leads to a kind of a quasi-idealism, albeit one founded on the neutral
ontological basis of primary arithmetical relations. That then presents the
empirically-testable task of validating, or ruling out, the entailment that
physics itself (or more generally 'what is observable or shareable') relies
on nothing more or less than such relations.

David

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>
> I can define my own consciousness, at least to a level that is sufficient
> for me to operate successfully in the world. If my brain and body functions
> can be taken over by a general-purpose computer, then that computer could
> define its own consciousness perfectly adequately, just as I now do.
>
>  The same happens with knowledge. Those notions mix what the machine can
>> define and believe, and semantical notions related to truth, which would
>> need stronger beliefs, that no machine can get about itself for logical
>> reason. We don't hit the contradiction, we just explore the G* minus G
>> logic of machines  which are "correct" by definition (something necessarily
>> not constructive).
>>
>
> I don't think that people, or other conscious beings, understand their own
> consciousness, or that of others, in these terms.

With respect, the above comment leads me to doubt that you've fully grasped
the point of what Bruno is saying here. He's not claiming that conscious
beings necessarily or explicitly think about their consciousness in these
terms. His intention is rather to establish a method of differentiating, on
principles motivated by his starting premise, some aspects of consciousness
that are communicable (shareable) from some that are inalienably private.
Of course, to be valid, these elementary principles should eventually
*entail* specific boundaries to self-knowledge (and especially the peculiar
limits on what is communicable) but they cannot be expected to fully
characterise it.

David

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

That all relies too much on the assumption that comp is true


At the risk of pointing out the stunningly obvious, *everything* in Bruno's
argument is premised on the truth of the comp thesis, summarised in the
claim that consciousness is invariant for a purely digital transformation
(at some level). In practice this postulate is widely accepted, even though
in many if not most cases neither the assumption nor its possible
consequences are made completely explicit, as Bruno is striving to do.

Of course there is no compulsion to accept the premise, but once it is
adopted, even hypothetically, the onus is on the challenger (Bruno
included) to reveal some flaw in the derivation, e.g. an invalid inference
or contradiction. That some of the consequences may be counter-intuitive
does not of itself invalidate the premise. On the other hand, if you reject
it at the outset, there is little further to be said.

David

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Re: God

I tend to agree that the word God has way too much baggage. I feel like
it's used to induce a fictitious sense of agreement. If you said
you believed in God, no one would think you were referring to the material
universe or arithmetic. You would be performing an act of deception on them.

On Monday, April 27, 2015, LizR  wrote:

> On 27 April 2015 at 16:46, meekerdb  > wrote:
> Theology is never having to say, "That's not God."
>
> While Fundamentalism means never having to say you got it wrong.
>
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Re: God

On 27 April 2015 at 16:46, meekerdb  wrote:
Theology is never having to say, "That's not God."

While Fundamentalism means never having to say you got it wrong.

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

On 27 April 2015 at 19:22, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> Yes that's more of less what SA said - they've got around the clock speed
>> limit by multiplying cores, but they can't get around the fact that
>> components can't be scaled below (I think) 14nm without that transistors
>> leaking electrons - at least not without some radical new technology. So it
>> was about whether some new paradigm is on the way to keep things heading
>> towards the what's his name - begins with L I think's - limit. (Memristors
>> nanotubes etc)
>>
>
> Actually, what I took from the article was that future improvements in
> computing are going to be driven by the commercial imperative of profits.
> This is not likely to happen by pursuing faster processors and memory chips
> per se.
> "...our vision of computers themselves is evolving. It turns out that we
> do not want stand-alone, oraclelike "thinking machines" as much as late
> 20th-century science-fiction writers thought we would. ... Instead, the
> relentless pursuit of lower cost per function will be driven by so-called
> heterogeneous computing."
>
> I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven
by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant
injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the
profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that
computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend
to wear out THAT quickly. As someone one told me, the safest thing you can
do to avoid losing your precious data is set up computers for specific
functions - one to do word processing, for example - and keep them
disconnected from the outside world; once they do what you want, never
upgrade anything. We have in fact done this with an old Windows XP PC which
is only *ever* used for putting home videos onto DVDs (although nowadays we
don't do that so often, memory sticks being the medium of choice now).
However, most people want the latest gadgets, and regularly upgrade desktop
and laptop computers, but they only do so because they have continually
improved in performance in various ways, enabling software to keep getting
more features (some consider this a bad thing, but anyway - as a heavy user
of Word and various other applications I have found myself forced to keep
running to stand still...)

What interested me was the ideas about how they might go about continuing
to meet this challenge, insofar as I could grasp them.

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading


LizR wrote:
Yes that's more of less what SA said - they've got around the clock 
speed limit by multiplying cores, but they can't get around the fact 
that components can't be scaled below (I think) 14nm without that 
transistors leaking electrons - at least not without some radical new 
technology. So it was about whether some new paradigm is on the way to 
keep things heading towards the what's his name - begins with L I 
think's - limit. (Memristors nanotubes etc)


Actually, what I took from the article was that future improvements in 
computing are going to be driven by the commercial imperative of 
profits. This is not likely to happen by pursuing faster processors and 
memory chips per se.
"...our vision of computers themselves is evolving. It turns out that we 
do not want stand-alone, oraclelike "thinking machines" as much as late 
20th-century science-fiction writers thought we would. ... Instead, the 
relentless pursuit of lower cost per function will be driven by 
so-called heterogeneous computing."


Bruce

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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

Hmm... I think you can speed this up if you precompute and stick the
answers in a lookup table. Of course, you still have to calculate the index
of the answer

On Sunday, April 26, 2015, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 12:22:21PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 9:59 PM, Russell Standish  >
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Not sure I follow you here. Arbitrary precision does not mean infinite
> > > precision. If I want my calculation to be accurate to 300 digits, then
> > > it can be calculated to 300 digits precision within finite time. If I
> > > then want it to 600 digits, I can do that also, but very likely it
> > > will 10^300 times as long.
> > >
> >
> > Doesn't it only double the amount of processing time to go from 300 digit
> > precision numbers to 600 digit precision numbers?
> >
>
> Depends on the algorithm. To compute the addition of two numbers, you
> need only double the time for double precision. Multiplication is
> quadratic if I remember my primary school arithmetic correctly (don't
> quote me on this). But computing polynomial approximations to
> transcendental functions takes way longer, as many more terms are
> required to achieve the stated precision.
>
> --
>
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
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Re: crime and duplication machines

The argument weak point detector is quite strong with this one :). Well, I
was leaning on Parfit's reasoning that on a Reductionist view of identity,
such distinctions would be arbitrary. But we could for instance divide
memories into essential and superfluous categories and pretend we could
divine the difference between the two. Addition or loss of an essential
memory changes identity, while the same for a superfluous memory does not.
It does seem that without sophisticated brain scanning equipment you could
not know the facts of your identity--a body might lose or gain an essential
memory without the resulting person *realizing* it. The facts of identity
might not follow the phenomenology of identity. Of course, the fact that a
simple change of one memory could alter identity makes all these law
enforcement evasion strategies by memory transfer that much easier.

On Sunday, April 26, 2015, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 01:50:47PM -0700, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> > indeed. The memory criterion reveals itself to be problematic the moment
> > you consider partial transfers. If you transfer all my memories, we've
> > decided, per the criterion, that I would wake up at the destination. But
> > what if you transferred all but one memory? 75%? 50%? Via the sorites
> > paradox, you'd have to conclude that a null transfer still allows you to
> > wake up in the new body. Or you could conclude there is some critical
> > percentage where you go from not arriving to arriving in the new body,
> > which is absurd.
>
> Why is this absurd? What if all your memories are interlinked into
> some sort of network, and if you leave out enough memories, a
> percolation threshold is crossed, and your identity falls apart?
>
> --
>
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
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Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading