Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:




 On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  
 wrote:

 >> Mind is what a brain does
>
>  
>
 >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
> for some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>

 Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) 
 to do it.


 Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 

 Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
 that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
 some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 

 What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
 reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
 Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.

 But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
 hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
 counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
 ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
 in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
 the question).

 Up to now, you have failed to that.

 Bruno



>>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
>>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
>>> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>>>
>>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>>  
>>>
>>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>>>
>>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>>>
>>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
>>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
>>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
>>> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
>>> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
>>> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
>>> “seen from inside”.
>>>
>>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
>>> from that theory of consciousness.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to 
>> summarize in my own words the Goff view.
>>
>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic 
>> Computationalism*:
>>
>>
>>  
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
>>
>>
>> By Pure Computationalism [ 
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean 
>> that everything
>>
>>
>> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
>> basically) alone.
>>
>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
>> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 
>>
>> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).
>>
>>
>>
>> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can 
>> add nuances later. 
>>
>> But with computationalism, neither materialism (even weak, the belief in 
>> some matter not reducible to something else) nor physicalism are consistent 
>> with Mechanism. A short argument can be find here:
>>
>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>> International System Administration and Network 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/23/2018 8:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some 
transformation), and derive from that, constructively, the 
appearances, including the physical appearances, so that we can test.


But the physical appearances you derive are very thin on the ground.

Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, 
through computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which 
basically predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non 
definable sort of knowledge),


With that sort of logic


Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some 
hypothesis.



I can prove that my cat is a dog:
My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so 
my cat is a dog.


That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the 
work already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you 
have not read the papers.


No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some 
superficial similarity between things and then conclude that they are 
identical.


Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?


Quoting from above: "...the logic of self-reference basically predict 
consciousness"


Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
consciousness is not sufficient.


Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.


Sufficient to explain consciousness. I quote what you say...

I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first derive 
informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.


You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative 
and shows the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that 
other people (and cats and dogs) are conscious.


?

I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof is 
inconsistent.


I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some 
transformation), and derive from that, constructively, the 
appearances, including the physical appearances, so that we can test.


Proof is a formal concept. A proof conveys truth only in so far as the 
axioms/assumptions that were assumed at the start are true. Your proof 
assumes arithmetical realism (platonism). I do not accept that 
arithmetical realism is true. Therefore your proof is irrelevant.



I don’t think you have studied my papers, or my long version.


If I do not accept the starting point, then studying the long version of 
your argument is not going to convince me.



I don’t claim any truth.


Good. The conclusions of formal proofs are true only in so far as the 
premises are true. You can't prove the truth of arithmetical realism.


I give a proof, showing that the physical science are reduced to 
arithmetic, once we assume the mechanist thesis in metaphysics, and 
the proof is constructive, so I do provide the theorem prover programs 
for each modes (including the physical) at the propositional level.


So if we do not assume that mechanism is true then your proofs are 
valueless.


Bruce

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Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

Bruno Marcha wrote:

>>Bruno, that's my definition but think long and hard before you agree with
>> it because if you still agree with it in your next post I give you fair
>> warning my next question to you will be "How many cities will the Helsinki
>> man see?”.
>
>
> *> Only one, from its first person view.*
>

So you demand that the first person view of the Moscow man tomorrow predict
today what will happen to him despite the fact that today the first person
view of the Moscow man tomorrow *DOES NOT EXIST*! There is one property
that every good oracle needs, and that is the property of existence, and
the first person Moscow man of tomorrow doesn't have it in Helsinki today.

I did warn you that you needed to think long and hard.


> > *We need to ask the H-guy reconstitute in each city*[...]
>

Nobody can ask the H-guy anything unless yesterday before any of this
started everybody agreed on exactly what "the H-guy" means, I have provided
a clear unambiguous definition of that term but you have not.


> > *and indeed, they both see one city*,
>

Asking "How many cities do you see?" would be a dumb question to ask. What
you should ask is "Given our predetermined agreement about what the term
means made before anybody was copied how many cities do you think the H-guy
ended up seeing?". Depending on what the agreement was the correct answer
could be zero or two or there was no agreement and thus there was no answer
because there was no question, there was only gibberish.

John K Clark


>

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 23, 2018 at 11:50 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>>it's true I am confused I don't understand, but anybody who thinks they
>> understand gibberish is a fool.
>>
>
> *> To me and probably to many others it seems obvious that the Helsinki
> man can expect to end up either in Moscow or Washington after the
> duplication. *
>

Before you me or anybody else can say what the Helsinki man should expect
to see tomorrow we need to agree on exactly what "the Helsinki man
tomorrow" means, and the most important person who needs to agree and the
person who should make the definition is the Helsinki man today. After that
we can debate what "the Helsinki man tomorrow" will or will not see;
otherwise we're just spinning our wheels.


> *> Can you perhaps step outside of the argument and speculate as to why
> there should be such disagreement, why you imagine some people would think
> it is obvious when you think it is not only not obvious, but ridiculous? *


Probably because it's all so far outside of normal everyday experience. For
technological (not scientific) reasons people duplicating machines don't
exist yet and thus somebody can live their entire life just fine and never
think deeply about any of this stuff even once. And although logically
consistent this stuff is certainly weird and counterintuitive so it's easy
to just dismiss it. Or say it's all so theoretical and abstract that it's
of no more importance than debating how many angels can dance on the head
of a pin; and that may be true today but in less than 80 years (maybe less
than 20) resolving this matter in your mind will be of enormous practical
value. It will become a matter of survival not abstract philosophy.

As for me I think if logic takes me to a place that is counterintuitive
then my intuition must have been wrong, it wouldn't be the first time. And
I think resolving this matter in my mind is rather important even today,
that's why I signed up with Alcor.

 John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 
 
 On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift > 
 wrote:
 
 >> Mind is what a brain does
  
 >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
 There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for 
 some pair of legs to be doing it.
 
 Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to 
 do it.
>>> 
>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>> 
>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt that 
>>> to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or some 
>>> electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>> 
>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
>>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
>>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
>>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
>>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
>>> the question).
>>> 
>>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument against 
>>> a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based purely on 
>>> numbers, combinators, etc.)
>>> 
>>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>>> 
>>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>>> 
>>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
>>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
>>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which shows 
>> that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
>> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
>> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
>> “seen from inside”.
>> 
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
>> from that theory of consciousness.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>>  ] to summarize 
>> in my own words the Goff view.
>> 
>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on Realistic Computationalism:
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> By Pure Computationalism [ 
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems 
>>  ] I mean 
>> that everything
> 
> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
>> basically) alone.
>> 
>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
>> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 
>> 
>> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).
> 
> 
> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can add 
> nuances later. 
> 
> But with computationalism, neither materialism 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
 
 I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
 computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
 consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
 knowledge),
>>> 
>>> With that sort of logic
>> 
>> Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some hypothesis.
>> 
>>> I can prove that my cat is a dog:
>>> My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my cat 
>>> is a dog.
>> 
>> That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work 
>> already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have not 
>> read the papers.
> 
> No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some superficial 
> similarity between things and then conclude that they are identical.

Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?





> Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
> consciousness is not sufficient.


Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.

I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first derive 
informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.









> You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative and shows 
> the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that other people (and cats 
> and dogs) are conscious.


?

I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof is 
inconsistent.

I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some transformation), and 
derive from that, constructively, the appearances, including the physical 
appearances, so that we can test.

I don’t think you have studied my papers, or my long version. 

I don’t claim any truth. I give a proof, showing that the physical science are 
reduced to arithmetic, once we assume the mechanist thesis in metaphysics, and 
the proof is constructive, so I do provide the theorem prover programs for each 
modes (including the physical) at the propositional level.

It is computer science. Universal machine have a theology, and those believing 
in enough induction axioms have a pretty good knowledge of that theology, even 
if they cannot really believe it (all that for logical reason).

My PhD is in computer science and mathematical logic. Not only I prove 
everything I say, but I prove it entirely using no more than few identity rules 
and

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

Have you follow the combinators thread? 

I can use also only elementary arithmetic. It is more demanding as it takes the 
full first order predicate calculus/logic + the “non logical” axioms:

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

(Of course, I make detour through the meta-level, where I use the induction 
axiom, like any mathematcian, but in the metaphysics, everything is eventually 
derived from those seven axioms, or those two combinatory formula.

You do seem to have some prejudice, because in the matter of rigorous in this 
field, I am not sure any one has made so many people to verify all points. And 
yet, I have discovered some error later, and made the correction reverified.

Now, in this field, there is a tradition of use of authoritative arguments, and 
of people cling not know the truth, and things like that. I do not, I extract a 
theory both by an intuitive reasoning and then by a full formalisation in 
arithmetic with induction, and then without induction for the ontology.




> Mere similarity is not enough -- that is the cat=dog fallacy.


I don’t use any “similarity”. I assume that there is a level of description of 
my body such that I would survive, in the clinical, and personal, usual sense. 
It is the digital version of Descartes rationalism. It is not my theory. I have 
a theorem instead.



> Consciousness is a first person experience -- you cannot have first person 
> experience of a self-referential logic.

Most logic are not self-referential. I guess you meant theory or machine, then 
you are just asserting that you believe that Mechanism is false.

I do not do such kind of philosophy/religion. 

I put my hypothesis on the table (Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis + “yes 
doctor for some level n”).

Then I deduce, first intuitively (so that you get quickly the picture, 
including that physics will be a sum on infinitely many computations supporting 
machine and seen from their self-referential modes)






> You cannot prove that logic is consciousness any more than you can prove, by 
> logic alone, that other people are conscious.


Excellent! (But I have never asserted anything like that, and this really show 
you have not yet begin to read any thing I 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 23 Sep 2018 at 5:19 pm, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 3:39 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > *Given the definition of the first person*, [...]  *By the definition
>> of the first person notion* [...]
>>
>
> You act as if you've given a robust definition of "the first person" that
> doesn't fall apart into logical contradictions at the first use of a people
> copying machine, or even with nothing more than the passage of time. But
> you never have. For example, you'll say things like "the first person"
> means the conscious being experiencing Helsinki today and then try to
> predict what "the first person" will experience tomorrow. But even if we
> forget about people copying machines and stay put in Helsinki if that's
> your definition of "the first person" then "the first person" will not
> exist at all tomorrow because tomorrow nobody will be experiencing Helsinki
> today.
>
> And then you will say the man experiencing Moscow tomorrow could not have
> predicted that he would be doing that today, and that's true but only
> because today the man experiencing Moscow tomorrow does not exist so he's
> unable to do ANYTHING, and that includes making predictions.  I've made
> this point many times before of course and each time your only defence is
> I'm "just playing with words", an odd defence from somebody who claims to
> be a logician.
>
> I don't have the problem that Bruno has because I define "the Helsinki
> man" as anyone who remembers being the Helsinki man today, but if Bruno
> accepted my definition and followed its logical consequences he'd have to
> conclude that the Helsinki man will see 2 cities not one and saw them both
> at the exact same time. And this conclusion could be proven by interviewing
> both the Moscow man and the Washington man provided that before any copying
> was done the Helsinki man himself agreed on the definition of "the Helsinki
> man". Yes if you asked the Washington or Moscow man how many cities they
> saw they would say only one, but that is the wrong question to ask. The
> correct question to ask is "How many cities do you think the Helsinki man
> ended up seeing at the same time?". If they are logical and truthful they
> will answer "I don't have enough information to answer that but If the
> experiment went as planned and my brother really is in that other city then
> the Helsinki man ended up seeing 2 cities at exactly the same time".
>
> *>That is pseudo-religion. You talk like a member of the clergy.*
>
>
> And you talk as if you hadn't repeated verbatim that same schoolboy insult
> 6.02*10^23 times before. By your next post I wouldn't be surprised if the
> tally reached (6.02*10^23) +1
>
> > *Handwaving and insults just confirms that you have decided to not
>> understand.*
>>
>
> Speaking of hand waving, nobody can explain who exactly is supposed to
> make the prediction, or who or what the prediction is about, and even after
> the event is over there is no way even in principle to know if the
> prediction turned out to be correct or not. So it's true I am confused I
> don't understand, but anybody who thinks they understand gibberish is a
> fool.
>

To me and probably to many others it seems obvious that the Helsinki man
can expect to end up either in Moscow or Washington after the duplication.
Can you perhaps step outside of the argument and speculate as to why there
should be such disagreement, why you imagine some people would think it is
obvious when you think it is not only not obvious, but ridiculous?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 3:39 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *Given the definition of the first person*, [...]  *By the definition of
> the first person notion* [...]
>

You act as if you've given a robust definition of "the first person" that
doesn't fall apart into logical contradictions at the first use of a people
copying machine, or even with nothing more than the passage of time. But
you never have. For example, you'll say things like "the first person"
means the conscious being experiencing Helsinki today and then try to
predict what "the first person" will experience tomorrow. But even if we
forget about people copying machines and stay put in Helsinki if that's
your definition of "the first person" then "the first person" will not
exist at all tomorrow because tomorrow nobody will be experiencing Helsinki
today.

And then you will say the man experiencing Moscow tomorrow could not have
predicted that he would be doing that today, and that's true but only
because today the man experiencing Moscow tomorrow does not exist so he's
unable to do ANYTHING, and that includes making predictions.  I've made
this point many times before of course and each time your only defence is
I'm "just playing with words", an odd defence from somebody who claims to
be a logician.

I don't have the problem that Bruno has because I define "the Helsinki man"
as anyone who remembers being the Helsinki man today, but if Bruno accepted
my definition and followed its logical consequences he'd have to conclude
that the Helsinki man will see 2 cities not one and saw them both at the
exact same time. And this conclusion could be proven by interviewing both
the Moscow man and the Washington man provided that before any copying was
done the Helsinki man himself agreed on the definition of "the Helsinki
man". Yes if you asked the Washington or Moscow man how many cities they
saw they would say only one, but that is the wrong question to ask. The
correct question to ask is "How many cities do you think the Helsinki man
ended up seeing at the same time?". If they are logical and truthful they
will answer "I don't have enough information to answer that but If the
experiment went as planned and my brother really is in that other city then
the Helsinki man ended up seeing 2 cities at exactly the same time".

*>That is pseudo-religion. You talk like a member of the clergy.*


And you talk as if you hadn't repeated verbatim that same schoolboy insult
6.02*10^23 times before. By your next post I wouldn't be surprised if the
tally reached (6.02*10^23) +1

> *Handwaving and insults just confirms that you have decided to not
> understand.*
>

Speaking of hand waving, nobody can explain who exactly is supposed to make
the prediction, or who or what the prediction is about, and even after the
event is over there is no way even in principle to know if the prediction
turned out to be correct or not. So it's true I am confused I don't
understand, but anybody who thinks they understand gibberish is a fool.

John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >> Mind is what a brain does

  

>>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
 *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
 for some pair of legs to be doing it.*

>>>
>>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) 
>>> to do it.
>>>
>>>
>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>>
>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
>>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
>>> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>>
>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
>>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
>>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>>
>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
>>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
>>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
>>> the question).
>>>
>>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
>> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>>
>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>>
>>
>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>  
>>
>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>>
>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>>
>>
>>
>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>>
>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
>> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
>> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
>> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
>> “seen from inside”.
>>
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
>> from that theory of consciousness.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to summarize 
> in my own words the Goff view.
>
> I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic 
> Computationalism*:
>
>
>  
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
>
>
> By Pure Computationalism [ 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean 
> that everything
>
>
> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
>
>
>
>
> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
> basically) alone.
>
> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 
>
> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).
>
>
>
> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can 
> add nuances later. 
>
> But with computationalism, neither materialism (even weak, the belief in 
> some matter not reducible to something else) nor physicalism are consistent 
> with Mechanism. A short argument can be find here:
>
> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
> (sane04)
>
>
> More details are given here:
>
> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. 
> Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, 
through computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which 
basically predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non 
definable sort of knowledge),


With that sort of logic


Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some 
hypothesis.



I can prove that my cat is a dog:
My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so 
my cat is a dog.


That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work 
already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have 
not read the papers.


No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some superficial 
similarity between things and then conclude that they are identical. 
Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
consciousness is not sufficient. You have to show me a logic that has a 
coherent internal narrative and shows the signs of consciousness that I 
use to conclude that other people (and cats and dogs) are conscious. 
Mere similarity is not enough -- that is the cat=dog fallacy. 
Consciousness is a first person experience -- you cannot have first 
person experience of a self-referential logic. You cannot prove that 
logic is consciousness any more than you can prove, by logic alone, that 
other people are conscious.


Bruce

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>> knowledge),
> 
> With that sort of logic

Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some hypothesis.


> I can prove that my cat is a dog:
> My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my cat is 
> a dog.

That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work already 
done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have not read the 
papers.

Bruno





> 
> Bruce
> 
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Re: Nerve cells in the human brain can "count"

[Bruno Marchal]

It confirms Mechanism, like all biological studies, and most of observations in 
physics.

It does not confirm directly the Mechanist Immaterialism, unlike QM, but, 
unless error in may derivation, it confirms it indirectly.

It is not much, as there has never been any confirmation of the existence of 
primary matter. To est primary matter, we need to find a discrepancy between 
the physics in the head of the universal machine (which “lives” in arithmetic, 
with the observation. None her been found so far. 

I have bot much time to read the paper. Be vigilant, because the study of 
neuronal correlate contains very often error in the interpretation of 
statistics, sometimes well hidden (not intentionally I guess).

Bruno



> On 22 Sep 2018, at 23:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> I'm not sure whether this is evidence for Bruno's Platonism or it just shows 
> why it's a common illusion.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
>  Forwarded Message 
> 
> Nerve cells in the human brain can 'count'
> 
> September 21, 2018, University of Bonn 
> 
>   
> 
> Professor Florian Mormann from the Department of Epileptology at the 
> University of Bonn. Credit: © Rolf Müller/UKB-Ukom
> How do we know if we're looking at three apples or four? Researchers at the 
> Universities of Bonn and Tübingen are now one step closer to answering this 
> question. They were able to demonstrate that some brain cells fire mainly for 
> quantities of three, others for quantities of four and others for other 
> quantities. A similar effect can be observed for digits: In humans, the 
> neurons activated in response to a "2" are, for instance, different from the 
> neurons activated for a "5." The results also demonstrate how humans learn to 
> handle number symbols in comparison to quantities. The study is published 
> online in the journal Neuron.
> 
> People are born with the ability to count. Shortly after birth, babies can 
> estimate the number of events and even perform simple calculations. But what 
> exactly happens in the brain ? And do 
> we process abstract numbers differently from concrete quantities? Researchers 
> from the Department of Epileptology at the University of Bonn and 
> neurobiologists from the University of Tübingen have investigated these two 
> questions. They benefited from a special feature of Bonn University Hospital: 
> The epileptology clinic located there specializes in brain surgery. The 
> clinic's doctors seek to cure epilepsy patients 
>  by means of an operation 
> in which they remove the diseased nerve tissue. In some cases, they first 
> have to insert electrodes into the patient's brain in order to ascertain the 
> location of the epileptogenic focus. As a side effect, researchers can use 
> this to watch patients think.
> 
> In the current study, surgeons inserted extremely fine microelectrodes into 
> the temporal lobes of nine epilepsy patients. "This enabled us to measure the 
> reaction of individual nerve cells to visual stimuli," explains Prof. Dr. Dr. 
> Florian Mormann, head of the Cognitive and Clinical Neurophysiology group. 
> The scientists showed their subjects a different number of points on a 
> computer screen—sometimes only one, sometimes four or even five. "We were 
> able to demonstrate that certain nerve cells fired primarily in response to 
> very specific quantities," explains Esther Kutter, lead author of the study. 
> "For example, some were activated mainly by three dots, others by one."
> 
> Each quantity therefore creates a specific activity pattern in the human 
> brain. "We have written a classification algorithm that evaluates this 
> pattern," Mormann explains. "This allowed us to use the arousal state of the 
> nerve cells to read how many points our respective subject could see."
> 
> The scientists also observed an interesting effect: Although the neurons 
>  were "set" to a certain quantity, 
> they also responded to slightly different quantities. A brain cell set to 
> quantities of three also fired in response to two or four points, but weaker. 
> With one or five points, however, it could hardly be activated. Experts call 
> this the "numerical distance effect." Prof. Dr. Andreas Nieder from the 
> University of Tübingen, co-supervisor of the study, demonstrated the same 
> phenomenon in experiments on monkeys. "Numbers are processed in our brains in 
> exactly the same way as in the brains of monkeys," he says. "This confirms 
> monkeys as an indispensable model for research into the processing of 
> quantitative information."
> 
> How we process digits, i.e. symbols that represent quantities, cannot be 
> answered with the help of animals. The scientists have now been able to show 
> for the 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
>>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
>>> for some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>>>
>>
>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to 
>> do it.
>>
>>
>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>
>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
>> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>
>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>
>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
>> the question).
>>
>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>
> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>
>
> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>  
>
> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>
> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>
>
>
> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>
> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>
>
>
>
> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
> “seen from inside”.
>
> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
> from that theory of consciousness.
>
> Bruno
>
>
That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's 
[ https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to summarize 
in my own words the Goff view.

I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic Computationalism*
:



 https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 


By Pure Computationalism 
[ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean 
that everything can be seen as computation with quantitative information 
(numbers, basically) alone.

Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
(pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 

But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).

- pt
 

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically 
predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable 
sort of knowledge),


With that sort of logic I can prove that my cat is a dog:
My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my 
cat is a dog.


Bruce

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Sep 2018, at 19:11, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Bruno, that's my definition but think long and hard before you agree with it 
> because if you still agree with it in your next post I give you fair warning 
> my next question to you will be "How many cities will the Helsinki man see?”. 


Only one, from its first person view.

Two in the third person description.

Verification:

We need to ask the H-guy reconstitute in each city, and indeed, they both see 
one city, confirming the fact that from there first person view, they were 
right, when in Helsinki they predicted to see only one city.



Bruno


> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>  
>> >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
>> There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for 
>> some pair of legs to be doing it.
>> 
>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to do 
>> it.
> 
> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
> 
> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt that 
> to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or some 
> electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
> 
> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than Church 
> thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
> 
> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a counter-argument. 
> The most you can do, if you really want to take your ontology for granted, is 
> to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake in my argument, without 
> using your ontological commitment (which would beg the question).
> 
> Up to now, you have failed to that.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument against a 
> purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based purely on 
> numbers, combinators, etc.)
> 
> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
> 
> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>  
> 
> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
> 
> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
> 
> 
> 
> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
> 
> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism (one 
> greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality (qualitative 
> states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”



That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which shows 
that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many believe 
that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are logically 
incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic “seen from 
inside”.

I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through computer 
science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict consciousness 
(indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of knowledge), but with the 
price of forcing to drive the physical appearance from that theory of 
consciousness.

Bruno



> 
> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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