Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 3/6/2019 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I use mechanism in the sense that if little daemon substitute each 
piece of my brain, at some resolution level,  by functional digital 
equivalent, then my consciousness would not notice the difference.


According to your theory, your consciousness is instantiated by the 
computational threads of the universal dovetailer, which exists within 
arithmetic.  So whether a piece of your brain is present, replaced, or 
removed should make no difference to you consciousness.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>
>

There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
applied mathematics (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics 
(PM, P for "Pure") and Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at 
*some* universities. There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what 
"computing" is.

In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
etc.).

AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
material computers, natural or manmade. 

- pt

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 3/6/2019 5:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Every time I mention this you strike back at the straw man of primitive 
matter...which I never refer to.

But then, why do you criticise the theorem? Maybe you don’t? Bt then why are 
you saying that elementary arithmetic is not a TOE? It explain the coupling 
consciousness/matter using only elementary arithmetic.


My criticism of the theory is different from my criticism of your 
repeated claim that you have eliminated and matter and attributing 
anything to it is "Aristotles error".   My criticism of the theory that 
arithmetic is a TOE is that arithmetic proves too much.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 3/6/2019 1:27 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 1:03:16 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:



On 3/5/2019 10:02 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Saturday, March 2, 2019 at 2:29:50 AM UTC-7,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 10:14:02 PM UTC-7,
agray...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 12:09:27 PM UTC-7,
Brent wrote:



On 2/28/2019 4:07 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, February 27, 2019 at 8:10:16 PM UTC-7,
Brent wrote:



On 2/27/2019 4:58 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

*Are you assuming uniqueness to tensors; that
only tensors can produce covariance in 4-space?
Is that established or a mathematical
speculation? TIA, AG *


That's looking at it the wrong way around. 
Anything that transforms as an object in space,
must be representable by tensors. The informal
definition of a tensor is something that
transforms like an object, i.e. in three space
it's something that has a location and an
orientation and three extensions. Something that
doesn't transform as a tensor under coordinate
system changes is something that depends on the
arbitrary choice of coordinate system and so
cannot be a fundamental physical object.

Brent


1) Is it correct to say that tensors in E's field
equations can be represented as 4x4 matrices which
have different representations depending on the
coordinate system being used, but represent the same
object?


That's right as far as it goes.   Tensors can be of
any order.  The curvature tensor is 4x4x4x4.


2) In SR we use the LT to transform from
one*non-accelerating* frame to another. In GR, what
is the transformation for going from one
*accelerating* frame to another?


The Lorentz transform, but only in a local patch.


*That's what I thought you would say. But how does this
advance Einstein's presumed project of finding how the
laws of physics are invariant for accelerating frames?
How did it morph into a theory of gravity? TIA, AG *


*Or suppose, using GR, that two frames are NOT within the
same local patch.  If we can't use the LT, how can we
transform from one frame to the other? TIA, AG *
*
*
*Or suppose we have two arbitrary accelerating frames, again
NOT within the same local patch, is it true that Maxwell's
Equations are covariant under some transformation, and what
is that transformation? TIA, AG*


*I think I can simplify my issue here, if indeed there is an
issue: did Einstein, or anyone, ever prove what I will call the
General Principle of Relativity, namely that the laws of physics
are invariant for accelerating frames? If the answer is
affirmative, is there a transformation equation for Maxwell's
Equations which leaves them unchanged for arbitrary accelerating
frames? TIA, AG
*


Your question isn't clear.  If you're simply asking about the
equations describing physics/*as expressed*/ in an accelerating
(e.g. rotating) reference frame, that's pretty trivial.  You write
the equations in whatever reference frame is convenient (usually
an inertial one) and then transform the coordinates to the
accelerated frame coordinates.   But if you're asking about what
equations describe some physical system while it is being
accelerated as compared to it not being accelerated, that's more
complicated.


*Thanks, but I wasn't referring to either of those cases; rather, the 
case of transforming from one accelerating frame to another 
accelerating frame, and whether the laws of physics are invariant. *


For simplicity consider just flat Minkowski space time.  If you know the 
motion of a particle in reference frame, whether the reference frame is 
accelerated or not, you can determine its motion in any other reference 
frame.  As for the particle path through spacetime, that's just some 
geometric path and you're changing from describing it in one coordinate 
system to describing it in another system...no physics is changing, just 
the description.  If the reference frames are accelerated you get extra 
terms in this description, like "centrifugal acceleration" which are 
just artifacts of the frame choice. This is the same as in Newtonian 
mechanics.


But if the particle is actually a

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Mar 2019, at 11:47, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 6:24:35 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:49, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 7:58:01 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 7:32:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> 
>> Bringing Gödel into physics is treading on a mine field as it is. Believe 
>> me, most physicists react in horror at the mere suggestion of this. I have 
>> this suspicion however that quantum measurement is a a sort of Gödel 
>> self-reference with quantum information or qubits. This may, at least within 
>> how we describe quantum mechanics if it should turn out to be not how the 
>> quantum world actually is, be one reason why we have this growing pantheon 
>> of quantum interpretations and no apparent way to decide which is 
>> definitively correct. 
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> I still think it's Darwin, not Gödel,  that has anything to do with  
>> "quantum measurement".
>> 
>> But physicists recoil in horror from that.
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
>> Darwinian logic did put down the Aristotelian-Cartesian hierarchical 
>> structure with respect to biology.
> 
> OK. Darwin use both mechanism (quasi-explicitly), and is understood usually 
> in the materialist frame, but Darwin just do not address that question.
> 
> 
> 
>> Aristotle and Plato are the two most known Hellenic philosophers because 
>> their systems of thought were wrapped into the New Testament Bible. Plato 
>> had this idea of there being a hierarchy of being, which was taken up by St 
>> Paul, carried further by Augustine, Aquinas and eventually encoded by 
>> Descartes. Descartes had this hierarchy of structure over function, design 
>> over material form etc, which was carried into science during the 17th and 
>> 18th century. In some ways Newtonian mechanics was seen as a confirmation of 
>> Descartes' metaphysics.
> 
> That is true. Today we know that Newtonian Mechanics is highly not 
> computable. But Newton saw that, and indeed, distrusted his Mechanics, and 
> saw it as an approximation. 
> 
> 
> 
> I would say classical mechanics is NP computable.


In classical mechanics, the three body problem is Turing universal, I think. No 
doubt for for the many body problem as the billiard board computer illustrates.

Any theorem complete for arbitrary finite Newtonian mechanical system will be 
Turing complete, and thus essentially undecidable (in the sense of Tarski: it 
means that all its effective consistent extensions are undecidable as well). 
Turing universal = partial computable (not total computable).



> The problems of chaos are similar to to NP problems in that for a Turing 
> machine that computes P these problems are exponential in space and time. 
> Chaos is of that nature, but it is convergent. One can compute for some 
> finite time the evolution of complex systems.


?

We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensionnal equality 
of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 

P NP are complexity classes included in the total computable. Once Turing 
universal, the behaviour can be non computable, not even in exponential or 
super-exponential time. In no time at all. 




>  
> 
>> Darwin struck a fatal blow to this with respect to biology.
> 
> He struck the wrong view on Descartes and Mechanism, but his own Mechanism is 
> a foreseen of digital mechanism, and its confirmation by molecular genetics, 
> and the genetical code.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Darwin did away with Aristotle and Descartes with biology. Gödel had an 
>> impact on Plato, though it is not clear to me how. Gödel saw himself as a 
>> Platonist and that his incompleteness theorem demonstrated how mathematical 
>> truth is independent of knowing it. I tend to see this in terms of Turing 
>> machines, which would say that certain problems are not computable and as 
>> such no information can be derived.
> 
> … can be derived mechanically. But the truth can be guessed and experience by 
> non algorithmic, mechanical, means, even by a machine. Gödel’s theorem is 
> already proved by machine, which can even prove their own Gödel’s theorem, 
> and enforces them to be mystical, that is, to believe that there is something 
> more than their own consciousness.
> 
> 
> 
> Gödel’s theorem is proven in a computable manner, and so is an algorithm of 
> sorts.


Like all theorems in mathematics and physics. A theorem has to be easy to 
check. That is not possible in full second order logic (Analysis), but Analysis 
can be done in effective part of second order logic, or inside first order 
theories, like ZF.

What is true iw what you say, is that the (sound, or consistent) machine can 
prove its own Gödel theorem. It can prove that if it is (3p) consistent, then 
it can (3p)-prove its consistency. The (1p) related person ([]p & p) find on 
the contrary its own consistency as the most obvious and indubitable thing.





> My point though i

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

[John Clark]

On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 11:21 AM  wrote:

 >>Maxwell's original equations already did what you ask for,
>>
>
> *>I don't think so. ME's are invariant under the LT. AFAIK, this applies
> to inertial frames, not accelerating frames, which is what I was asking
> about. AG*
>


If you are accelerating (or equivalently standing in a gravitational
field)  and you measure the speed of light produced by the Laser pointer in
your hand you will find it is exactly what Maxwell said it would be. And.
although it could look different for other observers the frequency and
wavelength of the light you measure is the same as when you measured it
when you were not accelerating or in a gravitational field.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 7:18:04 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 1:02 AM > wrote:
>
> *> did Einstein, or anyone, ever prove what I will call the General 
>> Principle of Relativity, namely that the laws of physics are invariant for 
>> accelerating frames? If the answer is affirmative, is there a 
>> transformation equation for Maxwell's Equations which leaves them unchanged 
>> for arbitrary accelerating frames? *
>
>
> Mathematicians prove things Physicists don't, they find theories that are 
> less wrong than previous ideas, but Maxwell's original equations already 
> did what you ask for, 
>

*I don't think so. ME's are invariant under the LT. AFAIK, this applies to 
inertial frames, not accelerating frames, which is what I was asking about. 
AG*
  

> they enabled you to calculate the speed of light and they indicated the 
> speed was the same for any reference frame.  In fact this was the reason 
> Einstein suspected Newtonian physics didn't tell the entire story and is 
> why he started working on Relativity in the first place. Maxwell needs 
> modification to be consistent with Quantum Mechanics but with Special or 
> General Relativity no change is required.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 7:59:04 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Mar 2019, at 19:27, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 6:23:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Mar 2019, at 00:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 3/4/2019 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" 
>> possibility): Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* 
>> (a spigot one, in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that 
>> stream of digits is the Standard Model Equation
>>
>> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>>  
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>
>> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>>
>>
>> Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
>> sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
>> everything.
>>
>>
>> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do 
>> not compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the 
>> rock. A rock is not even a definable digital object. 
>>
>>
>> It's an ostensively definable object...which is much better.
>>
>>
>> Ostension is dream-able. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If someone want to convince me that a rock can compute everything, I will 
>> ask them to write a complier of the combinators, say, in the rock. I will 
>> ask an algorithm generating the phi_i associated to the rock.
>>
>>
>> There is no particular phi_i associated to the rock.  That's the point.  
>> The rock goes thru various states so there exists a mapping from that 
>> sequence of states to any computation with a similar number of states.
>>
>>
>> It is a mapping of states. It is like a bijection. You need something 
>> like a morphism preserving the computability structure, which do not exist 
>> in the rock. A computation is not just a sequence of states, it is a 
>> sequence of states defined by the universal machine which brought those 
>> states. 
>>
>> There are bijections between N and Z, but only Z is a group, because 
>> those bijections does not preserve the algebraic structure. Similarly, 
>> there is a bijection between a computation and a movie of that computation, 
>> but it does not preserve the causal/logical relation between the states, 
>> which is a universal machine for the computation, and just a linear order 
>> for the sequence, without structure, of the states.
>>
>>
>>
>>   Of course one may object that the actual computation is in the 
>> mapping...but that's because of our prejudice for increasing entropy.
>>
>>
>> OK.Now, a bijection between a physical computation and an arithmetical 
>> computation do preserve the computability structure, that is why we can say 
>> that the arithmetical reality/model implements genuinely the computations.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
> The bijection
>
>material [physical] computation ↔ arithmetical computation 
>
> is like (New Testament) Paul's thesis: There's earthly bodies and 
> spiritual bodies.
>
>
> Hmm… You could say that, as a reductio ad absurd of the idea that there 
> are *primitive* material bodies.
>
> But my point was that a bijection is not enough, you need a fiathftull, 
> consciousness preserving transformation, then this can help to derive 
> constructively physics from arithmetic, and the physical reality is 
> recvovred as a part of the machine theology (G*).
>
>
>
>
> "Not all flesh is the same: People have one kind of flesh, animals have 
> another, birds another and fish another. 
>
>
> That reminds me of the argument by the catholic that “obviously” Indian 
> have no souls. 
>
> I am not sure by what you mean “have different flesh”. We are all using 
> the sae DNA, quite similar protein and enzyme, and the difference are as 
> contingent as the fact that you and me are different person, in our 
> relative current incarnation/implementation.
>
>
>
>
> There are also heavenly bodies and there are earthly bodies; but the 
> splendor of the heavenly bodies is one kind, and the splendor of the 
> earthly bodies is another. ... If there is a natural body, there is also a 
> spiritual body.”
>
>
> Possible, when you assume non-mechanism, which you do. I’am afraid that 
> many things are possible in that case.
>
>
>
>
> Spiritual or heavenly fictionalism is like arithmetical fictionalism: 
> spirits (like numbers) do not exist.
>
>
>
> I will try to convince my tax perceptor …
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Thanks for the Commentary above on the New Testament text:

  
 
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+Corinthians+15%3A39-44&version=NIV


A tax auditor may think of (fictional) numbers, but is in reality looking 
for a pound of (material) flesh.

- pt

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Gro

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

[John Clark]

On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 1:02 AM  wrote:

*> did Einstein, or anyone, ever prove what I will call the General
> Principle of Relativity, namely that the laws of physics are invariant for
> accelerating frames? If the answer is affirmative, is there a
> transformation equation for Maxwell's Equations which leaves them unchanged
> for arbitrary accelerating frames? *


Mathematicians prove things Physicists don't, they find theories that are
less wrong than previous ideas, but Maxwell's original equations already
did what you ask for, they enabled you to calculate the speed of light and
they indicated the speed was the same for any reference frame.  In fact
this was the reason Einstein suspected Newtonian physics didn't tell the
entire story and is why he started working on Relativity in the first
place. Maxwell needs modification to be consistent with Quantum Mechanics
but with Special or General Relativity no change is required.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 19:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 6:23:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Mar 2019, at 00:43, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 3/4/2019 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker > 
 wrote:
 
 
 
 On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" 
> possibility): Suppose in pi (which is computable, so has a program (a 
> spigot one, in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that 
> stream of digits is the Standard Model Equation
> 
> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>  
> 
> 
> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
> 
 
 Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
 sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
 everything.
>>> 
>>> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do 
>>> not compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the 
>>> rock. A rock is not even a definable digital object.
>> 
>> It's an ostensively definable object...which is much better.
> 
> Ostension is dream-able. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>>> If someone want to convince me that a rock can compute everything, I will 
>>> ask them to write a complier of the combinators, say, in the rock. I will 
>>> ask an algorithm generating the phi_i associated to the rock.
>> 
>> There is no particular phi_i associated to the rock.  That's the point.  The 
>> rock goes thru various states so there exists a mapping from that sequence 
>> of states to any computation with a similar number of states.
> 
> It is a mapping of states. It is like a bijection. You need something like a 
> morphism preserving the computability structure, which do not exist in the 
> rock. A computation is not just a sequence of states, it is a sequence of 
> states defined by the universal machine which brought those states. 
> 
> There are bijections between N and Z, but only Z is a group, because those 
> bijections does not preserve the algebraic structure. Similarly, there is a 
> bijection between a computation and a movie of that computation, but it does 
> not preserve the causal/logical relation between the states, which is a 
> universal machine for the computation, and just a linear order for the 
> sequence, without structure, of the states.
> 
> 
> 
>>   Of course one may object that the actual computation is in the 
>> mapping...but that's because of our prejudice for increasing entropy.
> 
> OK.Now, a bijection between a physical computation and an arithmetical 
> computation do preserve the computability structure, that is why we can say 
> that the arithmetical reality/model implements genuinely the computations.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The bijection
> 
>material [physical] computation ↔ arithmetical computation 
> 
> is like (New Testament) Paul's thesis: There's earthly bodies and spiritual 
> bodies.

Hmm… You could say that, as a reductio ad absurd of the idea that there are 
*primitive* material bodies.

But my point was that a bijection is not enough, you need a fiathftull, 
consciousness preserving transformation, then this can help to derive 
constructively physics from arithmetic, and the physical reality is recvovred 
as a part of the machine theology (G*).



> 
> "Not all flesh is the same: People have one kind of flesh, animals have 
> another, birds another and fish another.

That reminds me of the argument by the catholic that “obviously” Indian have no 
souls. 

I am not sure by what you mean “have different flesh”. We are all using the sae 
DNA, quite similar protein and enzyme, and the difference are as contingent as 
the fact that you and me are different person, in our relative current 
incarnation/implementation.




> There are also heavenly bodies and there are earthly bodies; but the splendor 
> of the heavenly bodies is one kind, and the splendor of the earthly bodies is 
> another. ... If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body.”

Possible, when you assume non-mechanism, which you do. I’am afraid that many 
things are possible in that case.



> 
> Spiritual or heavenly fictionalism is like arithmetical fictionalism: spirits 
> (like numbers) do not exist.


I will try to convince my tax perceptor …

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To post to

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 20:01, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/5/2019 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> RNA, proteins, krebs cycle, and proton pumps are all necessary for that.
>> 
>> That is carbon chauvinism, with all my respect. I am a lover of Krebs cycle, 
>> and even more Calvin cycle (in photosynthesis). My initial inspiration of 
>> Mechanism came from Molecular biology. But nothing there has been shown to 
>> be non-Turing emulable. Your artificial brain, when you say “yes” to the 
>> doctor, might not involve any of these cycles, but use a simple battery 
>> instead (or you are just telling me that you doubt Digital Mechanism, which 
>> is my basic working hypothesis to solve the Mind-Body problem.
> 
> That you can emulate those processes is beside the point.  The point is that 
> you would have to emulate them in order to support your contention that 
> bacteria are Turing complete. 

? I do’nt undersatnd. When Turing showed that his Turing machine are able to 
emulate lambda calculus, and that lambda calculus can emulate the Turing 
machine, nobody ask them to emulate them. Turing also showed that elementary 
arithmetic emulates them “already”.

You argument is equivalent to saying that we have to enumerate the primes 
number to make sense of Riemann hypothesis. That looks like extreme 
physicalism, akin to ultra-finitism.




> That's has been my "doubt" of your theory all along.  It is not a TOE in 
> which consciousness appears without matter.  It is a theory in which 
> consciousness and matter must appear together. 

Yes, but from numbers only (or from combinators only, …), which is the point, 
and that makes elementary arithmetic into the only TOE available. If you can 
found a discrepancy with nature, you will show that we cannot be machine (if 
your proofs is understandable by humans).



> Every time I mention this you strike back at the straw man of primitive 
> matter...which I never refer to.


But then, why do you criticise the theorem? Maybe you don’t? Bt then why are 
you saying that elementary arithmetic is not a TOE? It explain the coupling 
consciousness/matter using only elementary arithmetic. No need of Mechanism, 
which can be used only for the motivation for the Theatetus definition, for 
those who have not read Plato.

I am just trying to understand your point.

Bruno 



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*> You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical
> religious fundamentalism*


I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly before,
you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!

> By theology, you know that  [...]  *Plato define God by* [...]


I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 19:13, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > But in the “theology of the machine” [...]
> 
> Given the fact that I don't have an infinite amount of time to read things my 
> rule of thumb is to stop reading whenever I encounter the T word.


Not using the T word, in this case, consists in encouraging people to continue 
to belief in fairy tale, and to accept the invalid argument of the materialist 
in the field.

You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical religious 
fundamentalism. I sincerely thought this was just an European latin disease, 
but since 20 years, that fundamentalism seems to develop even, in the west.

By theology, you know that I mean the study of G*, and its intensional variant. 
God, is just the (sigma_1) truth. Plato define God by the truth, because he 
intuited that Truth is not definable. The word is only a pointer to what we 
search. The greeks knew that using God as an explanation is necessarily a 
fraud. 

The only reason why theology has been taken out of science was to mix state and 
religion, to steal people, simply. The only way to separate state and church is 
to let theology, the science, to come back in science, where it is born (and 
where it gives rise to physics and mathematics, and even mathematical logic, 
etc.).

Also, I have avoided the T word for long. But in my life, I ahem been asked to 
avoid many words, like consciousness, person soul, quantum (sic), even 
“machine”.

But if you study the work, you will see that I can use any words, without 
changing the prediction. So, that problems with word is just a pretext to avoid 
thinking. 

I prefer to think that religion is the only goal, and science is the only mean. 
To separate religion from science, makes exact science inexact and human 
science inhuman, as we can se when reading the news each morning.

Bruno







> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list 
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 15:53, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 8:03 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > The expression "Non computable numbers” appears only in intuitionist logic,
> 
> If so then just by reading the title of Turing's famous 1936 paper where he 
> first described a device that we now call a Turing Machine you'd have to 
> conclude that Turing was a intuitionist,


Not at all. He was talking about REAL numbers, not natural numbers.



> it was called "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
> Entscheidungsproblem”.


But I told you that everybody agrees, Turing the first, that its definition of 
“computable  (real) numbers” was misleading, and has been abandoned since.

I predicted that you would confuse soon or later something like f(x) and 
[x]f(x) in the context of that paper by Turing, and you did it when using 
“computable number” for a natural number. At, least Turing made clear he was 
talking on real numbers. 

All natural numbers, rational numbers, integers are “trivially” computable. 

Real numbers are better seen as higher order construct, having the nature of 
functions and operators.

Turing’s paper is a very important work. It convinced Gödel of the Church’s 
thesis? But it is full of errors (from typo, to pedagogical simplification 
which eventually mislead people. The two main one is the use of computable for 
real numbers, the second is the idea that a universal machine needs an infinite 
tape, and so would be an infinite object, when it is capital for the whole 
recursion theory to understand that a universal machine is a finite object.

Bruno





> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
>> On 4 Mar 2019, at 23:31, John Clark > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 11:04 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> >> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is unknowable then it is 
>> >> certainly uncomputable
>> 
>> > That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The program is 
>> > “output n”.
>> 
>> I think you're being silly. You're saying if you already know that the 
>> answer to a problem is n then you can write a program that will "compute" 
>> the answer with just a "print n" command. But that's not computing that's 
>> just printing.
> 
> I am even more silly. I claim that I need only to know that there is an 
> answer to say that BB(n), unlike [n]BB(n), is computable, trivially and non 
> interestingly, perhaps, but that follows from the classical definition of 
> Turing, Church, Markov, Hebrand-Gödel, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Incidentally very recently Stefan O’Rear has reduced Aaronson' s 7918 number 
>> so now we know that BB(1919) is not computable.
> 
> Nice!!!
> 
> Of course, we know only that BB(1919) = k, for k any enough big number is 
> undeciadbale in ZF.
> 
> Perhaps tomorrow, we will know that BB(1919) = k is decidable in ZFC + kappa. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> So we know that:
>> • BB(1)=1
>> • BB(2)=6
>> • BB(3)=21 
>> • BB(4)=107
>> 
>> and that's all we know for sure, but we do know some lower bounds:
>> 
>> • BB(5) ≥ 47,176,870 
>> • BB(6) ≥ 7.4 *10^36534 
>> • BB(7) >10^((10^10)^(10^10)^7)
>> 
>> > BB(n) is not computable means that there is no algorithm, which given n, 
>> > will give BB(n).
>> 
>> Yes, so what are we arguing about?
> 
> 
> That we should not confuse the many possible notions of computable functions 
> from R to R, for which there is no standard definition on which everyone 
> would agree, and no corresponding Church-Turing notion, with the notion of 
> computable function from N to N (or any set of finitely describable objects, 
> always trivially computable).
> 
> Mechanism use the Church-Turing notion. A digital brain has no real numbers 
> as input; nor real numbers as output.
> 
> In the classical theory of computability, a real number is seen as an 
> infinite objects, and is modelled by total computable functions; or by 
> recursive operator, not by the usual partial recursive functions (phi_i).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>   
>> > what Aaronson has shown, is that above 7918, we loss any hope to find it 
>> > by using the theory ZF. But may be someone will find it by using ZF + 
>> > kappa, which is much more powerful that ZF,
>> 
>> It's easy to find a system of axioms more powerful than ZF, the problem is 
>> it may be so powerful it can even prove things that aren't true.
> 
> That is always the risk. It cannot been avoided. Provability is a relative 
> notion. No provers can prove its own consistency. 
> 
> 
> 
>> Would you really trust a system that claimed to be able to solve the Halting 
>> Problem? I certainly wouldn't! And if you can't solve the Halting Problem 
>> then there is absolutely no way to calculate BB(7918) or BB(1919) and I 
>> wouldn't be surprised if even BB(5) is out of reach.
> 
> 
> You are right on this. The BB function computability is equivalent with 
> computability with the halting oracle.
> With an orac

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

[PGC]

On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 7:24:11 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Mar 2019, at 20:42, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 8:49:54 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Very interesting and rather compelling. OK. But to solve the mind body 
>> problem, both space and time must be recovered from self-reference, itself 
>> deducible from the little theory above.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> I still think this semantics of qualia is ultimately "joy eliminativism"  
> (a great term introduced here by someone before).
>
>
>
> Why do you think that. N the contrary, Mechanism makes the notion of 
> person, including its first person soul, central in metaphysics, but also 
> quite opposed to anthropomorphism, and panphsyicsime. It is more a 
> Turing-universal-machine-centered points of view foundations. All universal 
> number are born equal, if I may say.
>

If you want folks to relate to your posts more, stop mixing up theory with 
reality. It's hardly credible to attack the world for doing so in some 
homegrown, undeveloped primary physicalist sense, while every post of yours 
includes the usual anthropomorphisms. It's like saying you understand birth 
because of Kleene's recursion theorems and believing it, while admonishing 
others for believing in their personal stuff. In this sense, you don't see 
yourself as an equal to others, if I may say, and so why would universal 
numbers be stupid enough to believe the same?
 

>
> You are the one introducing a reductionism of person and machine. You are 
> the one depriving them of joy, apparently.
>

Says the guy that's quoting biblical scripture and proclaiming the 
"theology of the machines or some equivalent universal system, which cannot 
be stated!" over and over.  
 

> I’m afraid you are the one who will be angry if your daughter decide to 
> marry a man-machine, like a guy having said yes already to the doctor. If 
> you don’t them the right to vote, no doubt that they will feel less joy …
>

That's quite a jump. So what if somebody were angry that their offspring 
feels like they married their fridge because in feeding that high flying 
fridge god everyday, they feed themselves? Because in a way, a fridge is a 
more awesome description of ourselves: a mechanistic process that ends in 
coolness with nobody dying at least for now! 

And maybe somebody says no to a doctor, while they're angry at the wedding 
between their offspring and the fridge, even if they don't like saying yes 
to doctors. Or somebody says yes to a doctor occasionally but is OK with a 
fridge marrying into the family, as it will keep volatility low at the 
obligatory family meets. Instead of long histories of arguments on politics 
or religion, people can bring quality foods to be preserved instead. 
Win-win for everybody!

For yours truly, "avoiding less joy" is a sure way to not enjoy ourselves. 
But sure, people have incredibly fun times at voting and registration. 
Whenever one of my friends feels down, I just tell them that we could 
always go vote... on something, and immediately everybody's day becomes the 
best in their lives, which is what yours is about to become, if you just 
went and voted! Participatory politics only works when people show the 
ability to handle it. Otherwise it's just hyper conservative agenda doing 
what it always does by muddying the waters and distracting everybody. And 
people like that at times, apparently. PGC

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 6:24:35 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:49, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 7:58:01 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 7:32:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> Bringing Gödel into physics is treading on a mine field as it is. Believe 
>>> me, most physicists react in horror at the mere suggestion of this. I have 
>>> this suspicion however that quantum measurement is a a sort of Gödel 
>>> self-reference with quantum information or qubits. This may, at least 
>>> within how we describe quantum mechanics if it should turn out to be not 
>>> how the quantum world actually is, be one reason why we have this growing 
>>> pantheon of quantum interpretations and no apparent way to decide which is 
>>> definitively correct. 
>>>  
>>>
>>
>>  
>> I still think it's Darwin, not Gödel,  that has anything to do with  
>> "quantum measurement".
>>
>> But physicists recoil in horror from that.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> Darwinian logic did put down the Aristotelian-Cartesian hierarchical 
> structure with respect to biology. 
>
>
> OK. Darwin use both mechanism (quasi-explicitly), and is understood 
> usually in the materialist frame, but Darwin just do not address that 
> question.
>
>
>
> Aristotle and Plato are the two most known Hellenic philosophers because 
> their systems of thought were wrapped into the New Testament Bible. Plato 
> had this idea of there being a hierarchy of being, which was taken up by St 
> Paul, carried further by Augustine, Aquinas and eventually encoded by 
> Descartes. Descartes had this hierarchy of structure over function, design 
> over material form etc, which was carried into science during the 17th and 
> 18th century. In some ways Newtonian mechanics was seen as a confirmation 
> of Descartes' metaphysics.
>
>
> That is true. Today we know that Newtonian Mechanics is highly not 
> computable. But Newton saw that, and indeed, distrusted his Mechanics, and 
> saw it as an approximation. 
>
>
>
I would say classical mechanics is NP computable. The problems of chaos are 
similar to to NP problems in that for a Turing machine that computes P 
these problems are exponential in space and time. Chaos is of that nature, 
but it is convergent. One can compute for some finite time the evolution of 
complex systems.
 

>
> Darwin struck a fatal blow to this with respect to biology.
>
>
> He struck the wrong view on Descartes and Mechanism, but his own Mechanism 
> is a foreseen of digital mechanism, and its confirmation by molecular 
> genetics, and the genetical code.
>
>
>
>
> Darwin did away with Aristotle and Descartes with biology. Gödel had an 
> impact on Plato, though it is not clear to me how. Gödel saw himself as a 
> Platonist and that his incompleteness theorem demonstrated how mathematical 
> truth is independent of knowing it. I tend to see this in terms of Turing 
> machines, which would say that certain problems are not computable and as 
> such no information can be derived. 
>
>
> … can be derived mechanically. But the truth can be guessed and experience 
> by non algorithmic, mechanical, means, even by a machine. Gödel’s theorem 
> is already proved by machine, which can even prove their own Gödel’s 
> theorem, and enforces them to be mystical, that is, to believe that there 
> is something more than their own consciousness.
>
>
>
Gödel’s theorem is proven in a computable manner, and so is an algorithm of 
sorts. My point though is that physical systems are in a sense mechanical 
and as such involve a mathematical system that describes how the state of a 
system, or equivalently a'la Born rule how an observable changes, evolves 
in time. So mechanism is an algorithmic process as we describe it.
 

>
> Whether there is a self-referential truth that is not enumerated is less 
> important. The real number line has a continuum of elements and there is 
> not enough information, even if that is infinite, to encode it all. We 
> might say in some sense that these numbers exist as if being in Plato's 
> cave we can imagine the existence of things by looking at shadows.
>
>
>
> Yes. For a set-theoretical realist, there are aleph_0 computable 
> functions, and thus 2^aleph_0 non computable functions.
>
> Now, in many toposes, all functions are computable, and all real-functions 
> are continuous. That is the case for the effective topos of Highland, based 
> on Kleene’s notion of realisability. Mechanism ask for arithmetical 
> realism, just to define what is a machine, but it does not asks for 
> set-theoretical realism, or analytical realism.
>
>
There are plenty of functions that are not continuous. There is the 
Weierstrass theorem that functions are integrable if they are continuous 
almost everywhere.

I think in some ways there is a loss of clarity on what we are meaning by 
computable. A function is generally computable, but not all of its domain 
or range are c

Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 3:35:55 AM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Saturday, March 2, 2019 at 8:28:01 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 4:23 PM Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> > There are numbers that have no description in a practical sense. The 
>>> numbers 10^{10^{10^{10}}} and 10^{10^{10^{10^{10 have a vast number of 
>>> numbers that have no description with any information theoretic sense.
>>>
>>
>> The 8000th Busy Beaver Number can be named but not calculated even 
>> theoretically, but most Real Numbers can't even be uniquely named with 
>> ASCII characters, not even with an infinite number of them.   
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>
> There exists an uncountably infinite number of reals in the interval (0, 
> 1), and they exhaust all possible information theoretic description. Some 
> mathematicians have argued this means they do not in some ways exist. Most 
> mathematicians disagree with that by arguing computational tractability is 
> not equivalent to mathematical existence. 
>

FWIW, that's my view. Since there's no way to describe irrational numbers, 
with a few exceptions such as pi and e, one can prove they exist, but 
they're impossible to calculate. AG 

>
> LC 
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 1:03:16 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/5/2019 10:02 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, March 2, 2019 at 2:29:50 AM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 10:14:02 PM UTC-7, agray...@gmail.com wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 12:09:27 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: 



 On 2/28/2019 4:07 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Wednesday, February 27, 2019 at 8:10:16 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: 
>
>
>
> On 2/27/2019 4:58 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> *Are you assuming uniqueness to tensors; that only tensors can produce 
> covariance in 4-space? Is that established or a mathematical speculation? 
> TIA, AG *
>
>
> That's looking at it the wrong way around.  Anything that transforms 
> as an object in space, must be representable by tensors. The informal 
> definition of a tensor is something that transforms like an object, i.e. 
> in 
> three space it's something that has a location and an orientation and 
> three 
> extensions.  Something that doesn't transform as a tensor under 
> coordinate 
> system changes is something that depends on the arbitrary choice of 
> coordinate system and so cannot be a fundamental physical object.
>
> Brent
>

 1) Is it correct to say that tensors in E's field equations can be 
 represented as 4x4 matrices which have different representations depending 
 on the coordinate system being used, but represent the same object? 


 That's right as far as it goes.   Tensors can be of any order.  The 
 curvature tensor is 4x4x4x4.

 2) In SR we use the LT to transform from one* non-accelerating* frame 
 to another. In GR, what is the transformation for going from one 
 *accelerating* frame to another? 


 The Lorentz transform, but only in a local patch.

>>>
>>> *That's what I thought you would say. But how does this advance 
>>> Einstein's presumed project of finding how the laws of physics are 
>>> invariant for accelerating frames? How did it morph into a theory of 
>>> gravity? TIA, AG *
>>>
>>
>> *Or suppose, using GR, that two frames are NOT within the same local 
>> patch.  If we can't use the LT, how can we transform from one frame to the 
>> other? TIA, AG *
>>
>> *Or suppose we have two arbitrary accelerating frames, again NOT within 
>> the same local patch, is it true that Maxwell's Equations are covariant 
>> under some transformation, and what is that transformation? TIA, AG*
>>
>
>
> *I think I can simplify my issue here, if indeed there is an issue: did 
> Einstein, or anyone, ever prove what I will call the General Principle of 
> Relativity, namely that the laws of physics are invariant for accelerating 
> frames? If the answer is affirmative, is there a transformation equation 
> for Maxwell's Equations which leaves them unchanged for arbitrary 
> accelerating frames? TIA, AG *
>
>
> Your question isn't clear.  If you're simply asking about the equations 
> describing physics* as expressed* in an accelerating (e.g. rotating) 
> reference frame, that's pretty trivial.  You write the equations in 
> whatever reference frame is convenient (usually an inertial one) and then 
> transform the coordinates to the accelerated frame coordinates.   But if 
> you're asking about what equations describe some physical system while it 
> is being accelerated as compared to it not being accelerated, that's more 
> complicated. 
>

*Thanks, but I wasn't referring to either of those cases; rather, the case 
of transforming from one accelerating frame to another accelerating frame, 
and whether the laws of physics are invariant. Here the "laws" could be ME 
or Mechanics. It seem as if GR is a special case for gravity, but I was 
asking whether invariance, or covariance, has been generally established. 
Also, if the LT works locally in GR, how do we transform between non-local 
frames? TIA, AG*
 

> Maxwell's equations apply to the description of the EM field of an 
> accelerating charged particle and show that the particle loses energy to an 
> EM wave, but how the particle interacts with it's own field when 
> accelerated produces unrealistic results which were superceded by quantum 
> field theory.  Bill Unruh showed that the accelerated system interacts with 
> the vacuum as though the vacuum is hot.  
>
> Brent
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 3/5/2019 10:02 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Saturday, March 2, 2019 at 2:29:50 AM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:




On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 10:14:02 PM UTC-7, agray...@gmail.com
wrote:



On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 12:09:27 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:



On 2/28/2019 4:07 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, February 27, 2019 at 8:10:16 PM UTC-7,
Brent wrote:



On 2/27/2019 4:58 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

*Are you assuming uniqueness to tensors; that only
tensors can produce covariance in 4-space? Is that
established or a mathematical speculation? TIA, AG *


That's looking at it the wrong way around. Anything
that transforms as an object in space, must be
representable by tensors. The informal definition of
a tensor is something that transforms like an object,
i.e. in three space it's something that has a
location and an orientation and three extensions. 
Something that doesn't transform as a tensor under
coordinate system changes is something that depends
on the arbitrary choice of coordinate system and so
cannot be a fundamental physical object.

Brent


1) Is it correct to say that tensors in E's field
equations can be represented as 4x4 matrices which have
different representations depending on the coordinate
system being used, but represent the same object?


That's right as far as it goes.   Tensors can be of any
order.  The curvature tensor is 4x4x4x4.


2) In SR we use the LT to transform from
one*non-accelerating* frame to another. In GR, what is
the transformation for going from one *accelerating*
frame to another?


The Lorentz transform, but only in a local patch.


*That's what I thought you would say. But how does this
advance Einstein's presumed project of finding how the laws of
physics are invariant for accelerating frames? How did it
morph into a theory of gravity? TIA, AG *


*Or suppose, using GR, that two frames are NOT within the same
local patch.  If we can't use the LT, how can we transform from
one frame to the other? TIA, AG *
*
*
*Or suppose we have two arbitrary accelerating frames, again NOT
within the same local patch, is it true that Maxwell's Equations
are covariant under some transformation, and what is that
transformation? TIA, AG*


*I think I can simplify my issue here, if indeed there is an issue: 
did Einstein, or anyone, ever prove what I will call the General 
Principle of Relativity, namely that the laws of physics are invariant 
for accelerating frames? If the answer is affirmative, is there a 
transformation equation for Maxwell's Equations which leaves them 
unchanged for arbitrary accelerating frames? TIA, AG

*


Your question isn't clear.  If you're simply asking about the equations 
describing physics/*as expressed*/ in an accelerating (e.g. rotating) 
reference frame, that's pretty trivial.  You write the equations in 
whatever reference frame is convenient (usually an inertial one) and 
then transform the coordinates to the accelerated frame coordinates.   
But if you're asking about what equations describe some physical system 
while it is being accelerated as compared to it not being accelerated, 
that's more complicated.  Maxwell's equations apply to the description 
of the EM field of an accelerating charged particle and show that the 
particle loses energy to an EM wave, but how the particle interacts with 
it's own field when accelerated produces unrealistic results which were 
superceded by quantum field theory.  Bill Unruh showed that the 
accelerated system interacts with the vacuum as though the vacuum is hot.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.