Re: Truth and Existence

[David Nyman]

Thanks Jason

I love that series! Yes, Minsky makes the point very well. He's obviously
an everythingist of the so-called platonic sort (sorry Brent). "If you have
the idea of the program and its processes, then that's enough to determine
everything that happens in it." This general trend, of some species of
everything-ism with observer selection, seems destined either to fizzle out
as not even wrong or else turn into a paradigm shift that shows our former
views (once again) in a far too parochial light. Probably nothing in
between though.Your points are spot on, and point 3 in particular is I
think very helpful in thinking about otherwise extremely puzzling concepts
that the interviewer was clearly struggling with. As you must know by now
I'm rather partial to Fred Hoyle's way of conceptualising this. There's
something rather compelling for me about his subjectively monopsychic
serialisation of moments. Amongst other things, it makes the much-abused
old philosophical position of solipsism respectable. But also it
rationalises the unobservability of consciousness in the concrete world,
since according to this heuristic it is uniquely an epistemological
characteristic of the universal experiencer. We cannot observe it because
there's no "it" to be observed; instead it is an epistemological term of
art which refers to the "mode of observation" itself, or alternatively the
manner in which an "observable" is subjectively manifested. So at each
momentary juncture, and to that extent only, it becomes epistemologically
"real" or "actual". The sense of actual that Minsky declines to accept, to
the obvious consternation of his host, is by contrast ontological. This
attribution is, as he rightly says, entirely supernumerary and consequently
can add only confusion.

David

On 21 May 2017 at 23:54, Jason Resch  wrote:

> David,
>
> I always appreciate your e-mails. Your comments regarding the term
> "existence" reminds me of what Minsky says of the word (2 minutes 50
> seconds in):
> https://www.closertotruth.com/series/what-are-possible-worlds#video-2729
>
> I agree that humans have an innate prejudice against the reality of things
> we can't see. Even the idea that objects continue to exist when we no
> longer see them has to be learned
> , through repeatedly
> witnessing objects that have fallen out of our sight.
>
> I think this may explain:
> 1. Why humans gravitate towards presentism rather than eternalism,
> (because we don't revisit past points in time), despite what relativity
> tells us  on the matter.
> 2. Why people resist the many worlds interpretation, (because we don't see
> the other branches) against what the mathematics* of the theory should lead
> them to believe.
> 3. Why some find the idea of a singular "universal
> experiencer/person/soul" bewildering, (because we don't recall being
> others), despite the failures
> 
> of conventional theories of personal identity.
>
>
> * “Schrödinger also had the basic idea of parallel universes shortly
> before Everett, but he didn't publish it. He mentioned it in a lecture in
> Dublin, in which he predicted that the audience would think he was crazy.
> Isn't that a strange assertion coming from a Nobel Prize winner—that he
> feared being considered crazy for claiming that his equation, the one that
> he won the Nobel Prize for, might be true.” -- David Deutsch
>
>
>
> Jason
>
> On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 11:06 AM, David Nyman 
> wrote:
>
>> Recent discussions have got me thinking again about these categories.
>> ISTM in particular that there's a lot of probably unhelpful worrying about
>> the application of the term "existence". For example, it's held in some
>> quarters that physics exists in a sense that mathematics or computation
>> doesn't. However, I've become more and more convinced that such confusion
>> arises from a fundamental mis-categorisation of concepts. For example, when
>> we speak of physics we typically don't parse it into its component
>> concepts, but perhaps it's important that we should. In my view, these
>> components are a perceptual or concrete one - the observable part, and an
>> abstract, mathematical or mechanistic component - the theoretical or
>> reductive part. ISTM that any putative "theory of everything" must stand on

Re: Truth and Existence

[Jason Resch]

David,

I always appreciate your e-mails. Your comments regarding the term
"existence" reminds me of what Minsky says of the word (2 minutes 50
seconds in):
https://www.closertotruth.com/series/what-are-possible-worlds#video-2729

I agree that humans have an innate prejudice against the reality of things
we can't see. Even the idea that objects continue to exist when we no
longer see them has to be learned
, through repeatedly
witnessing objects that have fallen out of our sight.

I think this may explain:
1. Why humans gravitate towards presentism rather than eternalism, (because
we don't revisit past points in time), despite what relativity tells us
 on the matter.
2. Why people resist the many worlds interpretation, (because we don't see
the other branches) against what the mathematics* of the theory should lead
them to believe.
3. Why some find the idea of a singular "universal experiencer/person/soul"
bewildering, (because we don't recall being others), despite the failures

of conventional theories of personal identity.


* “Schrödinger also had the basic idea of parallel universes shortly before
Everett, but he didn't publish it. He mentioned it in a lecture in Dublin,
in which he predicted that the audience would think he was crazy. Isn't
that a strange assertion coming from a Nobel Prize winner—that he feared
being considered crazy for claiming that his equation, the one that he won
the Nobel Prize for, might be true.” -- David Deutsch



Jason

On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 11:06 AM, David Nyman  wrote:

> Recent discussions have got me thinking again about these categories. ISTM
> in particular that there's a lot of probably unhelpful worrying about the
> application of the term "existence". For example, it's held in some
> quarters that physics exists in a sense that mathematics or computation
> doesn't. However, I've become more and more convinced that such confusion
> arises from a fundamental mis-categorisation of concepts. For example, when
> we speak of physics we typically don't parse it into its component
> concepts, but perhaps it's important that we should. In my view, these
> components are a perceptual or concrete one - the observable part, and an
> abstract, mathematical or mechanistic component - the theoretical or
> reductive part. ISTM that any putative "theory of everything" must stand on
> both of these legs or be left seriously lame. Now, the odd thing is that
> most people are convinced that the observables of the first component
> "exist" in a sense they are more reluctant to grant to the ontological
> constituency of the unobservable, abstract or theoretical one. Seeing is
> believing, apparently, in this instance. But surely it is obvious, at least
> after a little reflection, that the observable part isn't properly an
> "existent". It's not in itself a "thing" that can be decomposed into
> constituent parts. That decomposition always takes place in terms of the
> second or theoretical component, which is FAPP the putative existent - i.e.
> the assumptive, reductive ontology of the theory in which the reasoning
> takes place. The second and all subsequently derivative parts lie within
> the domain of an epistemology, not an ontology, and as such are more
> tractable in terms of an adequate theory of knowledge.
>
> If the foregoing is valid (and obviously I think it may well be) then a
> more illuminating criterion to be applied in matters within the observable
> or perceptual spectrum is not whether they exist in an ontological sense
> but rather whether they are true in an epistemological one. By true I don't
> mean necessarily "veridical" in the conventional sense that all, or indeed
> any, inferences that might be drawn from them are thereby accurate. The
> sense of truth I'm using here is more or less equivalent to Descartes'
> realisation that the primary characteristic of experience (pace Brent's
> parsing of the precise grammar of this claim) is that it is logically
> indubitable. Veridicality in the more general sense relies on much more
> than primary perceptual indubitability. But does anyone in fact doubt any
> of this? Well, yes, if their claims are to be taken at face value, the
> school of Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett et al do believe that such
> experiences (or in 

Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/12/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I  
haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please  
forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent reality  
with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is  
possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it  
can mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous,  
would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in  
which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the  
idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a  
reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a  
reality.


t is possible looks like a category error to me.


t is equivalent with (p - p), it is the constant boolean valued  
function true. So t is an admissible atomic formula and  applies  
to all formula.


In the arithmetical interpretation (of the modal logic G), t is  
consistent('~(0=1)'), that is ~beweisbar('~(0=1)').


NOT PROVABLE FALSE = CONSISTENT TRUE.

~[]f  = t

This is standard use, in both modal logic and meta-arithmetic.





  A is possible means A refers to the state of some world.


No. It refers to a state, or to a world, or to a number, or to a cow.  
At this abstraction level, some world looks like a 1004 distracting  
pseudo-information. We are not doing metaphysics, just math, which  
then is applied to formulate the comp measure problem, and get quantum  
logic from there.




I don't see that t or 1=1 refers to some world, they are just  
tautologies, artifacts of language.


t is indeed a tautology, that is a proposition true (by definition) in  
all possible worlds (a world here is simply a function from the set  
of atomic sentences letter in {0, 1}, or {false, true}.


But 1=1 cannot be deduced from logic alone, and you need primitive  
terms, like s and 0, to name the non trivial object s(0), and you need  
some axioms on equality, =. Usually x = x, is an axiom.


In particular 1 = 1 does refer to a reality, which is the usual  
(standard) model of arithmetic, denoted by the mathematical structure  
(N, +, x).


1=1 is supposed to refer to that (mathematical) reality.






This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the  
notion of possibility by making the notion of possibility  
relative to the world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA  
and ZF, more can be said, once we interpret the modal box by the  
Gödelian beweisbar('p'), which can be translated in arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property,  
discovered by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as completeness,  
which (here) means that provability is equivalent with truth in all  
models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify or  
not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of  
classical first order logical theories.
For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true  
in all models of PA.


If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is consistency  
(~beweisbar('~A').


A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the  
truth table)


 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means  
that A is consistent.


So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation  
~beweisbar('~t'), = ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and by  
Gödel completeness theorem, this means that there is a mathematical  
structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition  
having some meaning in term of syntactical object (proofs)  
existence, it is also a way for PA, or Löbian entities, to refer,  
implicitly at first, to the existence of a reality.


But why should the failure to prove f imply anything about reality?


Because it preserves the hope that there is a reality to which you are  
connected.


If you prove 1=1 in classical logic, you can prove anything, you get  
inconsistent. There might still be a reality, but you are not  
connected to it.


You are in a cul-de-sac world, when seen in Kripke semantics of G.  
But don't take this in any literal way, except in terms of the  
behavior, including discourse of the machine.


The theory is correct for any arithmetically effective machines having  
sound extension beliefs of those beliefs:


0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1))  - x = y
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x

+ the induction 

Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:


On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I  
haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please  
forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent reality  
with t.
Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is  
possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can  
mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous,  
would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in  
which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the  
idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a  
reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a  
reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant  
proposition is true (e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is- 
dangerous) than t, which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A REALITY  
beta verifying A.


so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t is  
verified in all worlds. So, if alpha verifies t (if t is true in  
alpha), then t means simply that there is some world beta accessible  
(given that t is true in all world).


t = truth is possible = I am consistent = there is a reality  
out there = I am connected to a reality =truth is accessible.


Note that this well captured by modal logic, but also by important  
theorem for first order theories. In particular Gödel completeness  
theorem, which can put in this way: a theory is consistent if and only  
the theory has a model.


Gödel completeness (two equivalent versions):
- provable(p) (in a theory) entails p is true in all models of the  
theory.
- consistent(p) (in a theory) entails there is at least one model in  
which p is verified (true).


Bruno





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Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2014 8:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/12/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't had the 
time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't understand 
how you could represent reality with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is possible.

Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean situation, 
state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would consist in 
showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea that this 
means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a reality verifying 
a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant true, or 1=1 
in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


t is possible looks like a category error to me.


t is equivalent with (p - p), it is the constant boolean valued function true. So t 
is an admissible atomic formula and  applies to all formula.


In the arithmetical interpretation (of the modal logic G), t is consistent('~(0=1)'), 
that is ~beweisbar('~(0=1)').


NOT PROVABLE FALSE = CONSISTENT TRUE.

~[]f  = t

This is standard use, in both modal logic and meta-arithmetic.





  A is possible means A refers to the state of some world.


No. It refers to a state, or to a world, or to a number, or to a cow. At this 
abstraction level, some world looks like a 1004 distracting pseudo-information. We are 
not doing metaphysics, just math, which then is applied to formulate the comp measure 
problem, and get quantum logic from there.




I don't see that t or 1=1 refers to some world, they are just tautologies, 
artifacts of language.


t is indeed a tautology, that is a proposition true (by definition) in all possible 
worlds (a world here is simply a function from the set of atomic sentences letter in 
{0, 1}, or {false, true}.


But 1=1 cannot be deduced from logic alone, and you need primitive terms, like s and 
0, to name the non trivial object s(0), and you need some axioms on equality, =. 
Usually x = x, is an axiom.


In particular 1 = 1 does refer to a reality, which is the usual (standard) model of 
arithmetic, denoted by the mathematical structure (N, +, x).


1=1 is supposed to refer to that (mathematical) reality.






This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the notion of 
possibility by making the notion of possibility relative to the world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA and ZF, more can be 
said, once we interpret the modal box by the Gödelian beweisbar('p'), which can be 
translated in arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered by Gödel (in 
his PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here) means that provability is 
equivalent with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can 
verify or not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first 
order logical theories.

For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true in all models 
of PA.

If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is consistency 
(~beweisbar('~A').

A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the truth table)

 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means that A is 
consistent.

So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation ~beweisbar('~t'), 
= ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and by Gödel *_completeness_* theorem, this 
means that there is a mathematical structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition having some meaning in 
term of syntactical object (proofs) existence, it is also a way for PA, or Löbian 
entities, to refer, implicitly at first, to the existence of a reality.


But why should the failure to prove f imply anything about reality?


Because it preserves the hope that there is a reality to which you are 
connected.

If you prove 1=1 in classical logic, you can prove anything, you get inconsistent. 
There might still be a reality, but you are not connected to it.


Above you deflect the criticism of a category error by saying, We are not doing 
metaphysics, just math, which then is applied to formulate the comp measure problem, and 
get quantum logic from there.  But then it turns out you really are doing metaphysics. 
You are taking a tautology in mathematics and using it to infer things about reality and 
your relation to it.


Brent




You are in a cul-de-sac world, when seen in Kripke semantics of G. But 

Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:


On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't 
had the
time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't
understand how you could represent reality with t.

Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is possible.

Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean
situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.

To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would 
consist in
showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is dangerous.

so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea 
that this
means that there is a reality in which A is true.

Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a reality
verifying a proposition.

In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant true, 
or
1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant proposition is true (e.g. 
one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is-dangerous) than t, 
which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A REALITY beta 
verifying A.

so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t is verified in all 
worlds.


This is a point that confuses me in trying your exercises (which I'm attempting to do 
without reading your exchanges with Liz).  There you refer to a formula being respected 
when it is true in all worlds for all valuations.  But does all valuations of a formula 
A include f when A=p-p?  Are we to assume that t is a formula in all worlds and it's 
value is always t?  And then is f also a formula in every world?


Brent


So, if alpha verifies t (if t is true in alpha), then t means simply that there is 
some world beta accessible (given that t is true in all world).


t = truth is possible = I am consistent = there is a reality out there = I am 
connected to a reality =truth is accessible.


Note that this well captured by modal logic, but also by important theorem for first 
order theories. In particular Gödel completeness theorem, which can put in this way: a 
theory is consistent if and only the theory has a model.


Gödel completeness (two equivalent versions):
- provable(p) (in a theory) entails p is true in all models of the theory.
- consistent(p) (in a theory) entails there is at least one model in which p is verified 
(true).


Bruno





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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Mar 2014, at 17:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 8:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/12/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately  
I haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so  
please forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent  
reality with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A  
is possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it  
can mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is  
dangerous, would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a  
reality in which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with  
the idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is  
true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of  
a reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is  
a reality.


t is possible looks like a category error to me.


t is equivalent with (p - p), it is the constant boolean valued  
function true. So t is an admissible atomic formula and   
applies to all formula.


In the arithmetical interpretation (of the modal logic G), t is  
consistent('~(0=1)'), that is ~beweisbar('~(0=1)').


NOT PROVABLE FALSE = CONSISTENT TRUE.

~[]f  = t

This is standard use, in both modal logic and meta-arithmetic.





  A is possible means A refers to the state of some world.


No. It refers to a state, or to a world, or to a number, or to a  
cow. At this abstraction level, some world looks like a 1004  
distracting pseudo-information. We are not doing metaphysics, just  
math, which then is applied to formulate the comp measure problem,  
and get quantum logic from there.




I don't see that t or 1=1 refers to some world, they are just  
tautologies, artifacts of language.


t is indeed a tautology, that is a proposition true (by definition)  
in all possible worlds (a world here is simply a function from  
the set of atomic sentences letter in {0, 1}, or {false, true}.


But 1=1 cannot be deduced from logic alone, and you need  
primitive terms, like s and 0, to name the non trivial object s(0),  
and you need some axioms on equality, =. Usually x = x, is an  
axiom.


In particular 1 = 1 does refer to a reality, which is the usual  
(standard) model of arithmetic, denoted by the   
mathematical structure (N, +, x).


1=1 is supposed to refer to that (mathematical) reality.






This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the  
notion of possibility by making the notion of possibility  
relative to the world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like  
PA and ZF, more can be said, once we interpret the modal box by  
the Gödelian beweisbar('p'), which can be translated in  
arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property,  
discovered by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as  
completeness, which (here) means that provability is equivalent  
with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure  
which can verify or not, but in a well defined mathematical  
sense, a formula of classical first order logical theories.
For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true  
in all models of PA.


If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is  
consistency (~beweisbar('~A').


A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the  
truth table)


 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means  
that A is consistent.


So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation  
~beweisbar('~t'), = ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and  
by Gödel completeness theorem, this means that there is a  
mathematical structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition  
having some meaning in term of syntactical object (proofs)  
existence, it is also a way for PA, or Löbian entities, to refer,  
implicitly at first, to the existence of a reality.


But why should the failure to prove f imply anything about reality?


Because it preserves the hope that there is a reality to which you  
are connected.


If you prove 1=1 in classical logic, you can prove anything, you  
get inconsistent. There might still be a reality, but you are not  
connected to it.


Above you deflect the criticism of a category error by saying, We  
are not doing metaphysics, just math, which then is applied to  
formulate the comp measure problem, and get quantum logic from  
there.  But then it turns out you really are doing metaphysics.   
You are taking a tautology in mathematics and using it to infer  

Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Mar 2014, at 18:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:


On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I  
haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please  
forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent reality  
with t.
Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is  
possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it  
can mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous,  
would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in  
which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with  
the idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of  
a reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is  
a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant  
proposition is true (e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is- 
dangerous) than t, which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A  
REALITY beta verifying A.


so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t  
is verified in all worlds.


This is a point that confuses me in trying your exercises (which I'm  
attempting to do without reading your exchanges with Liz).  There  
you refer to a formula being respected when it is true in all  
worlds for all valuations.  But does all valuations of a formula A  
include f when A=p-p?


No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic  p, q, r,  (in  
modal propositional logic).
Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and the  
modal formula get their value by the Kripke semantics, that is, the  
truth values of the boxed an diamonded propositions depends on the  
locally accessible worlds.





Are we to assume that t is a formula in all worlds and it's value  
is always t?


Yes. It is a boolean constant. You can suppress it and replaced it by  
(p - p), as this is true in all words (as this is true in the worlds  
where p is true, and is true in the worlds where p is false).







And then is f also a formula in every world?


You can represent it by (p  ~p), or just ~t, and it is false in every  
world.


The cul-de-sac worlds get close, as they verify []f.

Fortunately they don't verify []A - A.

f is never met, in any world, but you can met []f, [][]f, [][][]f, ...  
G* proves ◊[]f, ◊[][]f,◊[][][]f, ... in the G-worlds.


(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)

Bruno







Brent


So, if alpha verifies t (if t is true in alpha), then t means  
simply that there is some world beta accessible (given that t is  
true in all world).


t = truth is possible = I am consistent = there is a reality  
out there = I am connected to a reality =truth is accessible.


Note that this well captured by modal logic, but also by important  
theorem for first order theories. In particular Gödel completeness  
theorem, which can put in this way: a theory is consistent if and  
only the theory has a model.


Gödel completeness (two equivalent versions):
- provable(p) (in a theory) entails p is true in all models of the  
theory.
- consistent(p) (in a theory) entails there is at least one model  
in which p is verified (true).


Bruno





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Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2014 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Mar 2014, at 18:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:

On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be 
wrote:


Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't 
had
the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't
understand how you could represent reality with t.

Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is possible.

Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean
situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.

To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would 
consist
in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is 
dangerous.

so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea 
that
this means that there is a reality in which A is true.

Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a reality
verifying a proposition.

In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant true, 
or
1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant proposition is true 
(e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is-dangerous) than t, 
which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A REALITY beta 
verifying A.

so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t is verified in all 
worlds.


This is a point that confuses me in trying your exercises (which I'm attempting to do 
without reading your exchanges with Liz).  There you refer to a formula being 
respected when it is true in all worlds for all valuations.  But does all 
valuations of a formula A include f when A=p-p?


No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic  p, q, r,  (in modal propositional 
logic).
Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and the modal formula get 
their value by the Kripke semantics, that is, the truth values of the boxed an 
diamonded propositions depends on the locally accessible worlds.


Then t and f cannot be treated as atomic propositions, which was my objection to writing 
t. In such a formula, t can only be regarded as shorthand for some tautology.  So t 
doesn't mean There is some reality it means There is some tautology: a proposition that 
is t in virtue of the definition of relations , V, ~, etc.








Are we to assume that t is a formula in all worlds and it's value is always t?


Yes. It is a boolean constant. You can suppress it and replaced it by (p - p), as this 
is true in all words (as this is true in the worlds where p is true, and is true in the 
worlds where p is false).







And then is f also a formula in every world?


You can represent it by (p  ~p), or just ~t, and it is false in every world.

The cul-de-sac worlds get close, as they verify []f.

Fortunately they don't verify []A - A.

f is never met, in any world, but you can met []f, [][]f, [][][]f, ... G* proves ◊[]f, 
◊[][]f,◊[][][]f, ... in the G-worlds.


You say (p  ~p) is false in every world, but f is never met in any world.  That seems 
contradictory.  If p is a proposition in some world, are we not always allowed to form (p 
 ~p), which will have the value f for all valuations of p?






(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)


I see it.

Brent

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Re: truth of experience

[LizR]

 (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)

Yes I do!

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Re: truth of experience

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10:45AM +1300, LizR wrote:
  (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)
 
 Yes I do!
 

Not me (alas). Although it is visible when typing my response.

Cheers

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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Mar 2014, at 20:05, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Mar 2014, at 18:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:


On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately  
I haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so  
please forgive me but I don't understand how you could  
represent reality with t.
Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A  
is possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it  
can mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is  
dangerous, would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or  
a reality in which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with  
the idea that this means that there is  
a  reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence  
of a reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there  
is a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant  
proposition is true (e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is- 
dangerous) than t, which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A  
REALITY beta verifying A.


so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and  
t is verified in all worlds.


This is a point that confuses me in trying your exercises (which  
I'm attempting to do without reading your exchanges with Liz).   
There you refer to a formula being respected when it is true in  
all worlds for all valuations.  But does all valuations of a  
formula A include f when A=p-p?


No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic  p, q, r,   
(in modal propositional logic).
Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and  
the modal formula get their value by the Kripke semantics, that is,  
the truth values of the boxed an diamonded propositions depends  
on the locally accessible worlds.


Then t and f cannot be treated as atomic propositions,


Why? Pi is constant, but still a (real) number. Why could we not have  
constant proposition?




which was my objection to writing t. In such a formula, t can only  
be regarded as shorthand for some tautology.


If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do.


So t doesn't mean There is some reality it means There is some  
tautology: a proposition that is t in virtue of the definition of  
relations , V, ~, etc.


t means, in Kripke semantics, that there is a world in which t is  
true (and as t is true in any world, it does mean that there is a world.


Then when A is the diamond consistency of A, it means that there  
is a model verufying A, by Gödel's completeness theorem.


Bruno












Are we to assume that t is a formula in all worlds and it's  
value is always t?


Yes. It is a boolean constant. You can suppress it and replaced it  
by (p - p), as this is true in all words (as this is true in the  
worlds where p is true, and is true in the worlds where p is false).







And then is f also a formula in every world?


You can represent it by (p  ~p), or just ~t, and it is false in  
every world.


The cul-de-sac worlds get close, as they verify []f.

Fortunately they don't verify []A - A.

f is never met, in any world, but you can met []f, [][]f, [][] 
[]f, ... G* proves ◊[]f, ◊[][]f,◊[][][]f, ... in the G- 
worlds.


You say (p  ~p) is false in every world, but f is never met in any  
world.  That seems contradictory.  If p is a proposition in some  
world, are we not always allowed to form (p  ~p), which will have  
the value f for all valuations of p?






(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)


I see it.

Brent

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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Mar 2014, at 22:10, LizR wrote:


 (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)

Yes I do!


Nice, I hope everyone see it. Does someone not see a lozenge? Here:  ◊

Do someone not see Gödel's second theorem here: ◊t - ~[]◊t   ?

Bruno





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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Mar 2014, at 01:49, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10:45AM +1300, LizR wrote:

(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)


Yes I do!



Not me (alas).


Damned. I will need to use the more ugly  instead of the cute ◊ !

No problem.

Bruno




Although it is visible when typing my response.

Cheers

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Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2014 9:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
which was my objection to writing t. In such a formula, t can only be regarded as 
shorthand for some tautology.


If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do.


Then f also occurs in every world since (p  ~p) can be formed in every world.  But you 
say we never meet f in any world?


Brent



So t doesn't mean There is some reality it means There is some tautology: a 
proposition that is t in virtue of the definition of relations , V, ~, etc.


t means, in Kripke semantics, that there is a world in which t is true (and as t is 
true in any world, it does mean that there is a world.


Then when A is the diamond consistency of A, it means that there is a model 
verufying A, by Gödel's completeness theorem.


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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Mar 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 9:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
which was my objection to writing t. In such a formula, t can  
only be regarded as shorthand for some tautology.


If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do.


Then f also occurs in every world since (p  ~p) can be formed in  
every world.  But you say we never meet f in any world?


I meant that f, like (p  ~p), is FALSE in every world. By met it I  
mean met it true.


Bruno





Brent



So t doesn't mean There is some reality it means There is  
some tautology: a proposition that is t in virtue of the  
definition of relations , V, ~, etc.


t means, in Kripke semantics, that there is a world in which t is  
true (and as t is true in any world, it does mean that there is a  
world.


Then when A is the diamond consistency of A, it means that  
there is a model verufying A, by Gödel's completeness theorem.


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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I  
haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please  
forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent reality  
with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is  
possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can  
mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous,  
would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in  
which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the  
idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a  
reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant  
true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.



This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the notion  
of possibility by making the notion of possibility relative to the  
world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA and  
ZF, more can be said, once we interpret the modal box by the Gödelian  
beweisbar('p'), which can be translated in arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered  
by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here)  
means that provability is equivalent with truth in all models, where  
models are mathematical structure which can verify or not, but in a  
well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first order  
logical theories.
For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true in  
all models of PA.


If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is consistency  
(~beweisbar('~A').


A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the truth  
table)


 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means that  
A is consistent.


So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation  
~beweisbar('~t'), = ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and by  
Gödel completeness theorem, this means that there is a mathematical  
structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition having  
some meaning in term of syntactical object (proofs) existence, it is  
also a way for PA, or Löbian entities, to refer, implicitly at first,  
to the existence of a reality. Of course, when asked about t, the  
sound machines stay mute (Gödel's first incompleteness theorem), and  
eventually, the Löbian one, like PA and ZF,  explains why they stay  
mute, by asserting

t - ~[]t (Gödel's second incompleteness).

This is capital, as it means that []p, although it implies p, that  
implication cannot be proved by the machine, so that to a get a  
probability on the relative consistent extension, the less you can  
ask, is p, and by incompleteness, although both []p and []p  p,  
will prove the same arithmetical propositions, they will obey  
different logics.


More on this later. When you grasp the link between modal logic and  
Gödel, you can see that modal logic can save a lot of work. Modal  
logic does not add anything to the arithmetical reality, nor even to  
self-reference, but it provides a jet to fly above the arithmetical  
abysses, even discover them, including their different panorama, when  
filtered by local universal machines/numbers. As there are also modal  
logics capable of representing quantum logic(s), modal logics can help  
to compare the way nature selects the observable-possibilities, and  
the computable, or sigma_1 arithmetical selection enforced, I think,  
by computationalism.


Bruno



On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 2:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

Hi Terran,


On 11 Mar 2014, at 17:10, Terren Suydam wrote:



Hi Bruno,

Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers  
to the contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many  
cases. I am in pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but  
other felt sensations can be doubted, e.g. see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/


Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in  
Ramachandran's Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/


Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of  
our brains' constructions, like a waking dream, guided in healthy  
brains by the patterns of information streaming from our sense  
organs.


Exactly: like a walking dream. That's the root of the Bp  p idea,  
in the Theaetetus. To do the math I concentrate to rich (Löbian)  
machine for the B, but the idea of defining knowledge by true  
belief is an act of modesty with respect to the 

Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/12/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't had the time 
to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't understand how you 
could represent reality with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is possible.

Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean situation, 
state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would consist in 
showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea that this means 
that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a reality verifying a 
proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant true, or 1=1 in 
arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


t is possible looks like a category error to me.   A is possible means A refers to the 
state of some world.  I don't see that t or 1=1 refers to some world, they are just 
tautologies, artifacts of language.





This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the notion of possibility 
by making the notion of possibility relative to the world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA and ZF, more can be 
said, once we interpret the modal box by the Gödelian beweisbar('p'), which can be 
translated in arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered by Gödel (in his 
PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here) means that provability is equivalent 
with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify or 
not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first order 
logical theories.

For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true in all models 
of PA.

If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is consistency 
(~beweisbar('~A').

A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the truth table)

 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means that A is 
consistent.

So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation ~beweisbar('~t'), 
= ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and by Gödel *_completeness_* theorem, this 
means that there is a mathematical structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition having some meaning in 
term of syntactical object (proofs) existence, it is also a way for PA, or Löbian 
entities, to refer, implicitly at first, to the existence of a reality.


But why should the failure to prove f imply anything about reality?

Brent


Of course, when asked about t, the sound machines stay mute (Gödel's *_first 
incompleteness_* theorem), and eventually, the Löbian one, like PA and ZF,  explains why 
they stay mute, by asserting

t - ~[]t (Gödel's *_second_* *_incompleteness_*).

This is capital, as it means that []p, although it implies p, that implication cannot 
be proved by the machine, so that to a get a probability on the relative consistent 
extension, the less you can ask, is p, and by incompleteness, although both []p and 
[]p  p, will prove the same arithmetical propositions, they will obey different logics.


More on this later. When you grasp the link between modal logic and Gödel, you can see 
that modal logic can save a lot of work. Modal logic does not add anything to the 
arithmetical reality, nor even to self-reference, but it provides a jet to fly above the 
arithmetical abysses, even discover them, including their different panorama, when 
filtered by local universal machines/numbers. As there are also modal logics capable of 
representing quantum logic(s), modal logics can help to compare the way nature selects 
the observable-possibilities, and the computable, or sigma_1 arithmetical selection 
enforced, I think, by computationalism.


Bruno


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Re: truth of experience

[LizR]

On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hello Terren,

 On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

 Hi Bruno,

 Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't
 had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I
 don't understand how you could represent reality with t.

 Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is
 possible.

 Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean
 situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.

 To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would
 consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is
 dangerous.

 so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea
 that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.

 Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a
 reality verifying a proposition.

 In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant
 true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant proposition
is true (e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?

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Re: truth of experience

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Hi Bruno,

 Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers to the 
 contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many cases. I am in 
 pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but other felt sensations 
 can be doubted, e.g. see 
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/

 Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in Ramachandran's 
 Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see 
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/

 Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of our 
 brains' constructions,


Illusions are only evidence that experience has multiple layers of 
reference and expectation, and the brain conditions affect those layers. 
That doesn't mean that the brain is constructing anything though (except 
for neurotransmitters). If what we experience is a construction, then that 
means the entire universe could be a construction, including the 
expectation of a universe which is either 'illusory' or not.
 

 like a waking dream, guided in healthy brains by the patterns of 
 information streaming from our sense organs.  Brains that are defective in 
 this manner result in schizophrenia and presumably other dissociative 
 pathologies.

 For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp  p is an accurate formalization 
 for experience, but I might be missing something. Can you make sense of Bp 
  p for a schizophrenic who hears voices?  How about your own salvia 
 experiences?


As far as I can tell, Bp  p is a fragile notion that has been generalized 
from from formalities within communication and has very little to do with 
experience. It is a radically normative and narrow consideration of only 
one aspect of consciousness.

Craig


 T

 On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:
  wrote:


 On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:28, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Question for you Bruno:.

 You say (with help from Theaetetus) that 1p experience is given by Bp  
 p. Yet, our experience is often deluded, as in optical illusions, or in 
 various kinds of emotional  psychological denial. Can we ever really say 
 that our knowledge, even 1p experience, refers to anything True?


 In public?  No.

 In private?  Yes.

 I would say.

 Then in the frame of theories about such 1p things, like consciousness, 
 we can decide to agree on some property of the notion. Then, 
 consciousness-here-and-now might be a candidate for a possible true 
 reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now is undoubtable or 
 incorrigible.

 Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible, the 
 probable, the relatively expectable, etc.

 If someone complains, is the pain real or fake? Eventually it is a 
 question for a judge.

 The truth is what no machine can really grasp the whole truth, but all 
 machines can know very well some aspect of it, I think, but very few in 
 justifiable modes.


 Bruno




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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Terran,


On 11 Mar 2014, at 17:10, Terren Suydam wrote:



Hi Bruno,

Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers  
to the contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many  
cases. I am in pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but  
other felt sensations can be doubted, e.g. see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/


Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in  
Ramachandran's Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/


Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of  
our brains' constructions, like a waking dream, guided in healthy  
brains by the patterns of information streaming from our sense organs.


Exactly: like a walking dream. That's the root of the Bp  p idea, in  
the Theaetetus. To do the math I concentrate to rich (Löbian)  
machine for the B, but the idea of defining knowledge by true belief  
is an act of modesty with respect to the question if we are dreaming  
or not, or more generally, if we are wrong or not.





 Brains that are defective in this manner result in schizophrenia  
and presumably other dissociative pathologies.


OK.





For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp  p is an accurate  
formalization for experience, but I might be missing something.


As I said above, it is a simplest meta definition which capture the  
main thing (the truth of the experience) without needing to define it.


Also, for the physical first person *experience*, Bp  p, which is  
only the knower, is not enough, you will need Bp  t  p, which by  
incompleteness has its own logic, quantum like when restricted to the  
sigma_1 truth. You need a reality (t).





Can you make sense of Bp  p for a schizophrenic who hears voices?


If a schizophrenic says that he hears voices, and if he hears voice  
(mentally, virtually, arithmetically, brain-biologically, ...), then  
he knows he hears voice.


An insane guy who says that he is Napoleon does not know that he is  
napoleon, but he believes it only. He still might know that he  
believes being Napoleon, and be only ignorant or denying that this is  
false.







How about your own salvia experiences?


It is very hard to describe, even more to interpret. And I am biased.

It is indeed:  [](... what-the-f.) and ... what the f.  Most plausibly.

It is like remembering forgotten qualia since eons.

It might confirms the idea that brains, machines, words, theories  
filter consciousness only.

Consciousness would be a close sister of (arithmetical) truth.

Salvia might open the appetite for platonism, but of course it is also  
a question of taste.



Bruno








T

On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:28, Terren Suydam wrote:



Question for you Bruno:.

You say (with help from Theaetetus) that 1p experience is given by  
Bp  p. Yet, our experience is often deluded, as in optical  
illusions, or in various kinds of emotional  psychological denial.  
Can we ever really say that our knowledge, even 1p experience,  
refers to anything True?


In public?  No.

In private?  Yes.

I would say.

Then in the frame of theories about such 1p things, like  
consciousness, we can decide to agree on some property of the  
notion. Then, consciousness-here-and-now might be a candidate for  
a possible true reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now  
is undoubtable or incorrigible.


Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible,  
the probable, the relatively expectable, etc.


If someone complains, is the pain real or fake? Eventually it is a  
question for a judge.


The truth is what no machine can really grasp the whole truth, but  
all machines can know very well some aspect of it, I think, but very  
few in justifiable modes.



Bruno



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Re: truth of experience

[Terren Suydam]

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't
had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I
don't understand how you could represent reality with t.

Thanks,
T


On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 2:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hi Terran,


 On 11 Mar 2014, at 17:10, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Hi Bruno,

 Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers to the
 contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many cases. I am in
 pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but other felt sensations
 can be doubted, e.g. see
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/

 Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in Ramachandran's
 Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/

 Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of our
 brains' constructions, like a waking dream, guided in healthy brains by the
 patterns of information streaming from our sense organs.


 Exactly: like a walking dream. That's the root of the Bp  p idea, in the
 Theaetetus. To do the math I concentrate to rich (Löbian) machine for the
 B, but the idea of defining knowledge by true belief is an act of modesty
 with respect to the question if we are dreaming or not, or more generally,
 if we are wrong or not.




  Brains that are defective in this manner result in schizophrenia and
 presumably other dissociative pathologies.


 OK.




 For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp  p is an accurate formalization
 for experience, but I might be missing something.


 As I said above, it is a simplest meta definition which capture the
 main thing (the truth of the experience) without needing to define it.

 Also, for the physical first person *experience*, Bp  p, which is only
 the knower, is not enough, you will need Bp  t  p, which by
 incompleteness has its own logic, quantum like when restricted to the
 sigma_1 truth. You need a reality (t).



 Can you make sense of Bp  p for a schizophrenic who hears voices?


 If a schizophrenic says that he hears voices, and if he hears voice
 (mentally, virtually, arithmetically, brain-biologically, ...), then he
 knows he hears voice.

 An insane guy who says that he is Napoleon does not know that he is
 napoleon, but he believes it only. He still might know that he believes
 being Napoleon, and be only ignorant or denying that this is false.





 How about your own salvia experiences?


 It is very hard to describe, even more to interpret. And I am biased.

 It is indeed:  [](... what-the-f.) and ... what the f.  Most plausibly.

 It is like remembering forgotten qualia since eons.

 It might confirms the idea that brains, machines, words, theories filter
 consciousness only.
 Consciousness would be a close sister of (arithmetical) truth.

 Salvia might open the appetite for platonism, but of course it is also a
 question of taste.


 Bruno







 T

 On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:28, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Question for you Bruno:.

 You say (with help from Theaetetus) that 1p experience is given by Bp 
 p. Yet, our experience is often deluded, as in optical illusions, or in
 various kinds of emotional  psychological denial. Can we ever really say
 that our knowledge, even 1p experience, refers to anything True?


 In public?  No.

 In private?  Yes.

 I would say.

 Then in the frame of theories about such 1p things, like consciousness,
 we can decide to agree on some property of the notion. Then,
 consciousness-here-and-now might be a candidate for a possible true
 reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now is undoubtable or
 incorrigible.

 Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible, the
 probable, the relatively expectable, etc.

 If someone complains, is the pain real or fake? Eventually it is a
 question for a judge.

 The truth is what no machine can really grasp the whole truth, but all
 machines can know very well some aspect of it, I think, but very few in
 justifiable modes.


 Bruno



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Re: truth vs reality

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Dec 2012, at 19:54, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I hate to be a spoiler, but, being a pragmatist and nominalist,
to me, the word truth is a stumbling block and a red herring.
To me, the One contains many types of truth, differing
according to their definitions.


Well, all the hypostases comes from the one, so this makes sense.





To me, the word real would be a better one, and
to a follower of Leibniz such as I am, only each monad is
real and nothing else (physical things aren't real).


This is coherent with identifying the monads with the numbers, at  
least when coupled with some universal number (they become programs  
relatively to that universal number/supreme monad).






And
there being an infinitely different set of monads, each of which
keeps changing, there are an infinite set (actually, a dust) of
continually changing reals, each real being a substance
of one part.


OK.

Bruno






[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/12/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-12, 12:16:23
Subject: Re: How mathematical truth might enter our universe


On 12 Dec 2012, at 17:00, Jason Resch wrote:


All,

One of the questions in mathematics is where does mathematical truth
come from, if it exists platonically, how does it manifest
physically (e.g. as the utterances of mathematicians).


I could explain, but it can be long, that it is impossible to explain
where the natural numbers come from, or where the Fortran programs
come from, of were the GoL comes from.

Now if you assume the natural numbers, and the + and x laws, then I
can prove the existence of the Fortran programs, and of GoL, etc.

if you assume GoL, I can prove the existence of the numbers, etc.

So the numbers, or anything Turing equivalent are mysterious. It is
the least that we have to assume to get anything capable of supporting
a computer, or a brain.

But once we assume the numbers, then we can explain why they will
eventually develop a mathematics (and physics) much richer than the
numbers (including many infinities).

Above arithmetic, the mathematics (and physics) are just number mind
tools to simplify their lives when the relation with other (universal)
numbers get too much complex, a bit like the complex Riemann Zeta
function is a tool for making simpler the relation between the prime
numbers and the study of their distribution.





I had a thought inspired by one of Roger's posts regarding cause and
effect extending outside of spacetime. I thought, there is nothing
preventing the goings on in this universe from having causal
implications outside our universe. Consider that an advanced
civilization might choose to simulate our universe and inspect it.
Then when they observe what happens in our universe the observations
generate causal effects in their own universe. The same applies to
our universe, we might choose to observe another universe through
simulation, and our discoveries or observations of that other
universe change us. Thus, the various universes that can exist out
there are more interconnected than we might suppose. Our universe
is an open book to those universes possessing sufficient
computational power to simulate it. Likewise, how simple universes
like certain small instances of the game of life are open books to
us. The possibilities of gliders in the GoL has led to many
discussions about GoL gliders, their existence in the GoL universe
has led to the manifestation of physical changes in our own universe.

I think the entrance of mathematical truth to our own universe is no
different. Mathematicians have used their minds to simulate objects
and structures that exist in other universes, in a sense they
observe them, and then those mathematicians report their
observations and discoveries concerning those objects, just as an
advanced civilization might report discoveries about our universe,
or we might report discoveries about the GoL universe. Thus the
structures and objects which exist in other universes have directly
changed the course of the evolution of our own.


This explanation seems to assume universe(s) and observers, but with
the CTM, we know we don't need to assume them, nor can we really use
them to relate consciousness and matter. This should follow form the
uda reasoning, normally. Apart from this, mathematics looks indeed
like exploration of mathematical realities, but the physical reality
is not one mathematical structure among others, it is a mathematical
structure summing all the other mathematical structure, in some way,
and in arithmetic.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: truth and reality cannot be expressed in words, only experienced

[Richard Ruquist]

Roger,
Is God part of your reality and if so how do you experience God, or is
god just a theory.?
For me god is described by a theory.
Richard

On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 7:36 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
 Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

 Weyl makes complicated what is ultimately simple--
 reality, which is subjective, which is experiencing,
 which is now. Which is focussing your attention
 on your breath going out and coming in. This is what
 yoga teaches. Weyl does best we he touches on color.

 Reality is knowledge by acquaintance. The best that science
 can give us is knowledge by description. But that is
 just words, code, and words are not reality. The
 only reality is in experiencing, such as experiencing
 your breathing.

 Kierkegard said it much better than Weyl, when he
 stated that truth is subjective.


 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
 11/4/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


 - Receiving the following content -
 From: Evgenii Rudnyi
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-11-03, 14:01:41
 Subject: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality


 Some more quotes from Bas C Van Fraassen Scientific Representation:
 Paradoxes of Perspective. This time on what Weyl has said on isomorphism
 between mathematics and reality.

 p. 208 Herman Weyl expressed the fundamental insight as follows in 1934:

 'A science can never determine its subject-matter expect up to
 isomorphic representation. The idea of isomorphism indicates the
 self-understood, insurmountable barrier of knowledge. [...T]oward the
 nature of its objects science maintains complete indifference.' (Weyl
 1934:19)

 The initial assertion is clearly based on two basic convictions:

 o that scientific representation is mathematical, and
 o that in mathematics no distinction cuts across structural sameness.

 p. 209 Weyl illustrates this with the example of a color space and an
 isomorphic geometric object. ... The color space is a region on the
 projective plane. If we can nevertheless distinguish the one from the
 other, or from other attribute spaces with that structure, doesn't that
 mean that we can know more that what science, so conceived, can deliver?
 Weyl accompanies his point about this limitation with an immediate
 characterization of the 'something else' which is then left un-represented.

 'This - for example what distinguish the colors from the point of the
 projective plane - one can only know in immediate alive intuition.' (Ibid.)

 p. 210 We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives:

 o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or

 o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical
 representation alone, or

 o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be
 incomplete, or

 o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism,
 are illusory.

 In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for
 the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of
 this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something
 that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a
 proposition that could be part of some scientific theory?

 Evgenii
 --
 http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen

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Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Jul 2012, at 20:55, John Mikes wrote:


Dear Bruno: here we go again (quote from Ronald Reagan).
The vocabulary of different (belief?) systems. You seem to abide  
firmly at axioms, meaning not more in MY vocabulary than  
postulates to make OUR (actual, conventional, ongoing) theories  
VALID. Changing theories make axioms invalid.


HUMAN? I doubt if we have a universally agreed-upon definition
(and please, count me into the 'universal) standing up to both  
'living/nonliving' creatures, computers (as we knew them yesterday -  
including the skeletally composed AI)  with all the potentials that  
can be filled in future, additionally, as it has been supplied in  
the past millennia. Mathematical logic is IMO a human achievement of  
yesterday. It is fine and supports our conventional sciences (more  
than usually presumed so) but not the 'total' of an infinite view.  
(What I do not have).

You may say: un-scientific, baseless, etc., I agree.
What I disagree about is a firm belief of we know it all.


I can' agree more with this.



Not even 1+1=2.


But that is not all. We don't know it, perhaps. But we believe it very  
strongly and use it daily, and it does not mean anything to say that  
we doubt it. It looks like provocative for the pleasure.




Hence my joke of 1+1=11. Or Brent's 10.


Yes, a joke. I am glad you make this clear.


I claim: there are no numbers in Nature, it is us (allow me to call  
ourselves: 'humans') representing observations of 'natural' hints  
with their ongoing explanations into number-related (calculable?)  
formulations. Hence (our?) arithmetic.


Here I do not follow you. I am more confident in the elementary  
arithmetical proposition than on any sentences involving humans, which  
are much more abstract and complex entities.


Actually, I don't really believe in human. By we I tend to mean  
all Löbian relative numbers, and this, on this planet, might start  
from the jumping spiders. I still respect a lot the lesser animal  
from bacteria to worms like my pet the planarians.


You say that there are no numbers in Nature. But is not Nature a human  
conventional projection? I don't believe necessarily in Nature. It  
looks like a fake God to me. But there is no problem with believing in  
an even basic (ontological) Nature, but then my point is that you  
might need to refuse the doctor proposition to get an artificial brain.


My point is logical. No theories can bring the numbers without  
assuming them (implicitly or explicitly), and assuming comp we *have  
to* entirely explain the illusion of nature from the numbers. Then  
computer science shows that such an enterprise makes sense.


I am no saying that the comp theory is true, but it presents at least  
a precise rational alternative to the Aristotelian naturalism, which  
tend to eliminate person (human or not).






As I already explained: the (human) genius formulated out of such  
theories an ingenious technology that is ALMOST good.

And I bow to that.


The difference between natural and artificial is artificial.  
Technologies, like living entities can give the best and the worst,  
and it is relative to what and who benefits from it.


Bruno





John M
On Fri, Jul 6, 2012 at 4:45 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno:
Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2  
are just imagining something else.  -

 do you mean: imagining something else
THAN WHAT YOU WERE IMAGINING? sounds like a claim to some  
priviledge to imagining - only YOUR WAY?

(I know you will vehemently deny that - ha ha).

To Guitarist:
It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do  
stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11
You made my point - which was to (agnostically) expose that we have  
no approved authority to a ONE AND ONLY opinion.

Not even within what we may call 'possible'.

John M



On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

Hi Guitar boy,

On 04 Jul 2012, at 16:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:


Hello Everythinglisters,

First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions  
from time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more  
musical tendency.


It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do  
stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11


If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like  
with personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0,  
with a kind of zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy  
justification.


Well in Z_2 = {0, 1}, we do have a law with 1+1 = 0. (modular  
arithmetic). But 1 is still different from 0. But I get your point.



And anybody still willing to assert this could post their bank  
account details and pin numbers and be freed from arithmetic  
dictatorship by having their account cleaned out by other  
everything listers that DO believe in sums, successors etc. as 0 =  
whatever they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't really  
matter, as it's only 

Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Jul 2012, at 22:45, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno:
Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2  
are just imagining something else.  -

 do you mean: imagining something else
THAN WHAT YOU WERE IMAGINING? sounds like a claim to some  
priviledge to imagining - only YOUR WAY?

(I know you will vehemently deny that - ha ha).


I meant something else with respect to anything obeying to the axioms  
on which we already agreed, at the least. Like 0 ≠ s(0), x ≠ y -  
s(x) ≠ s(y), addition and multiplication law.
Actually it is a bit more, which is what the logicians call the  
standard model of arithmetic, and known as the structure (N, +, *) in  
high school.  But that is not really relevant here. The magic of  
numbers is that humans have a good sharable intuition about them.

Are you doubting that the s(0) + s(0) = s(s(0)) ?
If that is the case, nothing in math, physics, chemistry can make much  
sense, and I have no way to explain you anything in computer science.  
And you can abandon relativiy theory and quantum mechanics which are  
based on elementary arithmetic.
In fact, if you doubt that 1+1=2, then I have to doubt what you mean  
by telling us that we are humans, or that we are not human, and even  
what is a human.

The reason to doubt 1+1=2 are more doubtable than 1+1=2.





To Guitarist:
It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do  
stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11
You made my point - which was to (agnostically) expose that we have  
no approved authority to a ONE AND ONLY opinion.

Not even within what we may call 'possible'.


That is why we do semi-axiomatic.
The question is only: do you agree with the axioms (together with  
classical logic):


0 ≠ s(x)
x ≠ y - s(x) ≠ s(y)
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

Then you should agree with 0 ≠ s(0), s(0) ≠ s(s(0), etc., and s(0)  
+ s(0) = s(s(0)), even if we did not succeed in defining completely  
what are those numbers.


Bruno



On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

Hi Guitar boy,

On 04 Jul 2012, at 16:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:


Hello Everythinglisters,

First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions  
from time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more  
musical tendency.


It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do  
stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11


If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like  
with personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0,  
with a kind of zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy  
justification.


Well in Z_2 = {0, 1}, we do have a law with 1+1 = 0. (modular  
arithmetic). But 1 is still different from 0. But I get your point.



And anybody still willing to assert this could post their bank  
account details and pin numbers and be freed from arithmetic  
dictatorship by having their account cleaned out by other  
everything listers that DO believe in sums, successors etc. as 0 =  
whatever they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't really  
matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by a few control  
freaks.


Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2  
are just imagining something else. It is not an arguent that a truth  
is not absolute, but that the notation used to described it can have  
other interpreations. In the Z_2 structure, which plays a key role  
in many places: 2 = 0. But 2 does not represent the successor of of  
the successor of zero, it represents the rest when we divide by the  
usual number 2. It really means:


odd + odd = even   (the rest of 1 + 1 divided by 2 = 0)
even + even = even (the rest of 2 + 2 divided by 2 = 0)
odd + even = odd  (the rest of 1 + 2 divided by  2 = 1)




Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a  
less than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details  
here :)


Guitar is hardest, imo. You need good trained digits!





Looking forward to contributing from time to time.



You are welcome,

Bruno




On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:
Bruno asked:
  . Is that an absolute truth?

By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY  
agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept  
better expressions.

(Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
And Teilhard was a great master of words.
John M

On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:


Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever  
WE accept is human.



Is that an absolute truth?

In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When  
I listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems  
to disagree.


Bruno

We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are  
spiritual beings having a 

Re: truth

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno: here we go again (quote from Ronald Reagan).
The vocabulary of different (belief?) systems. You seem to abide firmly
at axioms, meaning not more in MY vocabulary than postulates to make *OUR
*(actual, conventional, ongoing) theories VALID. Changing theories make
axioms invalid.

*HUMAN? *I doubt if we have a universally agreed-upon definition
(and please, count me into the 'universal) standing up to both
'living/nonliving' creatures, computers (as we knew them yesterday -
including the skeletally composed AI)  with all the potentials that can be
filled in future, additionally, as it has been supplied in the past
millennia. Mathematical logic is IMO a human achievement of yesterday. It
is fine and supports our conventional sciences (more than usually presumed
so) but not the 'total' of an infinite view. (What I do not have).
You may say: un-scientific, baseless, etc., I agree.
What I disagree about is a firm belief of we know it all.
Not even 1+1=2. Hence my joke of 1+1=11. Or Brent's 10.
I claim: there are no numbers in Nature, it is us (allow me to call
ourselves: 'humans') representing observations of 'natural' hints with
their ongoing explanations into number-related (calculable?)
formulations. Hence (our?) arithmetic.

As I already explained: the (human) genius formulated out of such theories
an ingenious technology that is ALMOST good.
And I bow to that.

John M
On Fri, Jul 6, 2012 at 4:45 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:

 Bruno:
 *Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2 are
 just imagining something else.*  -
  do you mean: imagining something else
 THAN WHAT YOU WERE *IMAGINING*? sounds like a claim to some priviledge
 to imagining - only YOUR WAY?
 (I know you will vehemently deny that - ha ha).

 To Guitarist:
  *It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do
 stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11*
 You made my point - which was to (agnostically) expose that we have no
 approved authority to a ONE AND ONLY opinion.
 Not even within what we may call 'possible'.

 John M
  * *


 On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hi Guitar boy,

  On 04 Jul 2012, at 16:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

 Hello Everythinglisters,

 First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions from
 time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more musical tendency.

 It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do stuff
 like: 1 + 1 = 11

 If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like with
 personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0, with a kind of
 zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy justification.


 Well in Z_2 = {0, 1}, we do have a law with 1+1 = 0. (modular
 arithmetic). But 1 is still different from 0. But I get your point.


 And anybody still willing to assert this could post their bank account
 details and pin numbers and be freed from arithmetic dictatorship by having
 their account cleaned out by other everything listers that DO believe in
 sums, successors etc. as 0 = whatever they want, and the sum of their
 balance doesn't really matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by
 a few control freaks.


 Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2 are
 just imagining something else. It is not an arguent that a truth is not
 absolute, but that the notation used to described it can have other
 interpreations. In the Z_2 structure, which plays a key role in many
 places: 2 = 0. But 2 does not represent the successor of of the successor
 of zero, it represents the rest when we divide by the usual number 2. It
 really means:

 odd + odd = even   (the rest of 1 + 1 divided by 2 = 0)
 even + even = even (the rest of 2 + 2 divided by 2 = 0)
 odd + even = odd  (the rest of 1 + 2 divided by  2 = 1)



 Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a less
 than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details here :)


 Guitar is hardest, imo. You need good trained digits!




 Looking forward to contributing from time to time.


 You are welcome,

 Bruno



 On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:

 Bruno asked:
   . Is that an absolute truth?

 By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY
 agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept better
 expressions.
 (Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
 And Teilhard was a great master of words.
 John M

 On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


  On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:

  Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

 My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
 We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever WE
 accept is human.



 Is that an absolute truth?

 In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When I
 listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems to
 

Re: truth

[John Mikes]

Bruno:
*Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2 are
just imagining something else.*  -
 do you mean: imagining something else
THAN WHAT YOU WERE *IMAGINING*? sounds like a claim to some priviledge to
imagining - only YOUR WAY?
(I know you will vehemently deny that - ha ha).

To Guitarist:
*It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do stuff
like: 1 + 1 = 11*
You made my point - which was to (agnostically) expose that we have no
approved authority to a ONE AND ONLY opinion.
Not even within what we may call 'possible'.

John M
*


*
On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hi Guitar boy,

  On 04 Jul 2012, at 16:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

 Hello Everythinglisters,

 First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions from
 time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more musical tendency.

 It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do stuff
 like: 1 + 1 = 11

 If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like with
 personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0, with a kind of
 zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy justification.


 Well in Z_2 = {0, 1}, we do have a law with 1+1 = 0. (modular arithmetic).
 But 1 is still different from 0. But I get your point.


 And anybody still willing to assert this could post their bank account
 details and pin numbers and be freed from arithmetic dictatorship by having
 their account cleaned out by other everything listers that DO believe in
 sums, successors etc. as 0 = whatever they want, and the sum of their
 balance doesn't really matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by
 a few control freaks.


 Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2 are
 just imagining something else. It is not an arguent that a truth is not
 absolute, but that the notation used to described it can have other
 interpreations. In the Z_2 structure, which plays a key role in many
 places: 2 = 0. But 2 does not represent the successor of of the successor
 of zero, it represents the rest when we divide by the usual number 2. It
 really means:

 odd + odd = even   (the rest of 1 + 1 divided by 2 = 0)
 even + even = even (the rest of 2 + 2 divided by 2 = 0)
 odd + even = odd  (the rest of 1 + 2 divided by  2 = 1)



 Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a less
 than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details here :)


 Guitar is hardest, imo. You need good trained digits!




 Looking forward to contributing from time to time.


 You are welcome,

 Bruno



 On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:

 Bruno asked:
   . Is that an absolute truth?

 By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY
 agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept better
 expressions.
 (Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
 And Teilhard was a great master of words.
 John M

 On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


  On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:

  Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

 My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
 We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever WE
 accept is human.



 Is that an absolute truth?

 In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When I
 listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems to
 disagree.

 Bruno

 *We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are
 spiritual beings having a human experience.*
 (de Chardin).


  What is Mother Nature accepting?

 John M

 On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Brent:
 I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain
 peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
 So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
 John


 Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of
 Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop).  So
 whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the applicability of arithmetic to
 your model.

 Brent


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Re: truth

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

Ok then, I guess I got caught.Confession: On most days, I am agnostically
exposed ideologue of 1 + 1 = 2.

Please forgive the offense of my heresy. Maybe a prohibitive law should be
drafted to stop these kinds of irresponsible thoughts :)

But privilege to imagining? He just said something else, which implies
no judgement or privilege. Sometimes something else is just something else,
without better or privilege.


On Fri, Jul 6, 2012 at 10:45 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:

 Bruno:
 *Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2 are
 just imagining something else.*  -
  do you mean: imagining something else
 THAN WHAT YOU WERE *IMAGINING*? sounds like a claim to some priviledge
 to imagining - only YOUR WAY?
 (I know you will vehemently deny that - ha ha).

 To Guitarist:
 *It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do
 stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11*
 You made my point - which was to (agnostically) expose that we have no
 approved authority to a ONE AND ONLY opinion.
 Not even within what we may call 'possible'.

 John M
 * *


 On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hi Guitar boy,

  On 04 Jul 2012, at 16:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

 Hello Everythinglisters,

 First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions from
 time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more musical tendency.

 It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do stuff
 like: 1 + 1 = 11

 If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like with
 personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0, with a kind of
 zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy justification.


 Well in Z_2 = {0, 1}, we do have a law with 1+1 = 0. (modular
 arithmetic). But 1 is still different from 0. But I get your point.


 And anybody still willing to assert this could post their bank account
 details and pin numbers and be freed from arithmetic dictatorship by having
 their account cleaned out by other everything listers that DO believe in
 sums, successors etc. as 0 = whatever they want, and the sum of their
 balance doesn't really matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by
 a few control freaks.


 Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2 are
 just imagining something else. It is not an arguent that a truth is not
 absolute, but that the notation used to described it can have other
 interpreations. In the Z_2 structure, which plays a key role in many
 places: 2 = 0. But 2 does not represent the successor of of the successor
 of zero, it represents the rest when we divide by the usual number 2. It
 really means:

 odd + odd = even   (the rest of 1 + 1 divided by 2 = 0)
 even + even = even (the rest of 2 + 2 divided by 2 = 0)
 odd + even = odd  (the rest of 1 + 2 divided by  2 = 1)



 Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a less
 than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details here :)


 Guitar is hardest, imo. You need good trained digits!




 Looking forward to contributing from time to time.


 You are welcome,

 Bruno



 On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:

 Bruno asked:
   . Is that an absolute truth?

 By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY
 agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept better
 expressions.
 (Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
 And Teilhard was a great master of words.
 John M

 On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


  On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:

  Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

 My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
 We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever WE
 accept is human.



 Is that an absolute truth?

 In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When I
 listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems to
 disagree.

 Bruno

 *We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are
 spiritual beings having a human experience.*
 (de Chardin).


  What is Mother Nature accepting?

 John M

 On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Brent:
 I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain
 peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
 So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
 John


 Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of
 Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop).  
 So
 whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the applicability of arithmetic to
 your model.

 Brent


 --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
 Groups Everything List group.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**c*
 *om everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 To unsubscribe from this group, send email 

Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Guitar boy,

On 04 Jul 2012, at 16:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:


Hello Everythinglisters,

First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions  
from time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more musical  
tendency.


It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do  
stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11


If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like  
with personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0,  
with a kind of zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy  
justification.


Well in Z_2 = {0, 1}, we do have a law with 1+1 = 0. (modular  
arithmetic). But 1 is still different from 0. But I get your point.



And anybody still willing to assert this could post their bank  
account details and pin numbers and be freed from arithmetic  
dictatorship by having their account cleaned out by other everything  
listers that DO believe in sums, successors etc. as 0 = whatever  
they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't really matter, as  
it's only some personal belief shared by a few control freaks.


Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2  
are just imagining something else. It is not an arguent that a truth  
is not absolute, but that the notation used to described it can have  
other interpreations. In the Z_2 structure, which plays a key role in  
many places: 2 = 0. But 2 does not represent the successor of of the  
successor of zero, it represents the rest when we divide by the usual  
number 2. It really means:


odd + odd = even   (the rest of 1 + 1 divided by 2 = 0)
even + even = even (the rest of 2 + 2 divided by 2 = 0)
odd + even = odd  (the rest of 1 + 2 divided by  2 = 1)




Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a  
less than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details  
here :)


Guitar is hardest, imo. You need good trained digits!





Looking forward to contributing from time to time.



You are welcome,

Bruno




On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:
Bruno asked:
  . Is that an absolute truth?

By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY  
agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept  
better expressions.

(Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
And Teilhard was a great master of words.
John M

On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:


Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever  
WE accept is human.



Is that an absolute truth?

In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When  
I listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems  
to disagree.


Bruno

We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are  
spiritual beings having a human experience.

(de Chardin).



What is Mother Nature accepting?

John M

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain  
peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.

So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
John

Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of  
Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one  
raindrop).  So whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the  
applicability of arithmetic to your model.


Brent


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Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jul 2012, at 05:16, Stephen P. King wrote:


Hi,

It seems obvious that what is true, as referenced below, is  
some kind of collection and that it's labeling can easily be seen to  
not be fixed a priori. We might think of it of a Kripke frame and  
the models have forced truths. The thing here is that we have to be  
careful that we don't box ourselves into thinking that the totality  
of all that exists is finite or even only countably infinite.


If we are machine then the cardinality of reality is  at least  
countably infinite and it is absolutely undecidable if there is  
anything more.


You might try to imagine an experimental set-up to test if the  
cardinal of reality (whatever ontology) is bigger than aleph_zero.  
It will succumbs to the dream argument (assuming comp).


But that countable reality, as seen from inside,  can also be proved  
to be bigger than anything nameable. But that reality is  
epistemological. It does not need to be reified (put in an ontology).


Bruno







On 7/4/2012 2:05 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
The thread is about the possibility of an omnipotent being being  
able to manipulate what is true.


On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com 
 wrote:

Hello Everythinglisters,

First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions  
from time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more  
musical tendency.


It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do  
stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11


If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like  
with personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0,  
with a kind of zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy  
justification. And anybody still willing to assert this could post  
their bank account details and pin numbers and be freed from  
arithmetic dictatorship by having their account cleaned out by  
other everything listers that DO believe in sums, successors etc.  
as 0 = whatever they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't  
really matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by a few  
control freaks.


Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a  
less than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details  
here :)


Looking forward to contributing from time to time.




On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:
Bruno asked:
  . Is that an absolute truth?

By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY  
agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept  
better expressions.

(Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
And Teilhard was a great master of words.
John M

On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:


Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever  
WE accept is human.



Is that an absolute truth?

In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When  
I listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems  
to disagree.


Bruno

We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are  
spiritual beings having a human experience.

(de Chardin).



What is Mother Nature accepting?

John M

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain  
peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.

So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
John

Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of  
Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one  
raindrop).  So whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the  
applicability of arithmetic to your model.


Brent




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Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: truth

[Brian Tenneson]

The thread is about the possibility of an omnipotent being being able to
manipulate what is true.

On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:

 Hello Everythinglisters,

 First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions from
 time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more musical tendency.

 It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do stuff
 like: 1 + 1 = 11

 If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like with
 personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0, with a kind of
 zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy justification. And anybody
 still willing to assert this could post their bank account details and pin
 numbers and be freed from arithmetic dictatorship by having their account
 cleaned out by other everything listers that DO believe in sums, successors
 etc. as 0 = whatever they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't really
 matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by a few control freaks.

 Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a less
 than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details here :)

 Looking forward to contributing from time to time.




 On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:

 Bruno asked:
   . Is that an absolute truth?

 By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY
 agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept better
 expressions.
 (Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
 And Teilhard was a great master of words.
 John M

 On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


  On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:

  Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

 My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
 We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever WE
 accept is human.



 Is that an absolute truth?

 In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When I
 listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems to
 disagree.

 Bruno

 *We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are
 spiritual beings having a human experience.*
 (de Chardin).


  What is Mother Nature accepting?

 John M

 On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Brent:
 I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain
 peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
 So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
 John


 Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of
 Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop).  So
 whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the applicability of arithmetic to
 your model.

 Brent


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Re: truth

[Synes Thesis]

Yup, so anything goes from there. But I fail to see anything convincingly
constructive, except maybe a few ideas for fiction, where everybody is
omnipotent god that can manipulate truth. So fiction section in bookstore
or Amazon?

On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 8:05 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:

 The thread is about the possibility of an omnipotent being being able to
 manipulate what is true.


 On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
 multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:

 Hello Everythinglisters,

 First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions from
 time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more musical tendency.

 It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do stuff
 like: 1 + 1 = 11

 If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like with
 personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0, with a kind of
 zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy justification. And anybody
 still willing to assert this could post their bank account details and pin
 numbers and be freed from arithmetic dictatorship by having their account
 cleaned out by other everything listers that DO believe in sums, successors
 etc. as 0 = whatever they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't really
 matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by a few control freaks.

 Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a less
 than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details here :)

 Looking forward to contributing from time to time.




 On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:

 Bruno asked:
   . Is that an absolute truth?

 By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY
 agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept better
 expressions.
 (Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
 And Teilhard was a great master of words.
 John M

 On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


  On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:

  Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

 My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
 We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever WE
 accept is human.



 Is that an absolute truth?

 In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When I
 listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems to
 disagree.

 Bruno

 *We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are
 spiritual beings having a human experience.*
 (de Chardin).


  What is Mother Nature accepting?

 John M

 On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Brent:
 I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain
 peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
 So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
 John


 Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of
 Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop).  
 So
 whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the applicability of arithmetic to
 your model.

 Brent


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Re: truth

[meekerdb]

On 7/4/2012 11:05 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
The thread is about the possibility of an omnipotent being being able to manipulate what 
is true.


I guess I don't understand that.  I can manipulate what's true.  It's true I am sitting at 
a computer - and I can stand up so it would be false.  So what's interesting about an 
omnipotent being (an incoherent concept) being able to do it.


Brent

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Re: truth

[Stephen P. King]

Hi,

It seems obvious that what is true, as referenced below, is some 
kind of collection and that it's labeling can easily be seen to not be 
fixed a priori. We might think of it of aKripke frame 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kripke_semantics and the models have 
forced truths. The thing here is that we have to be careful that we 
don't box ourselves into thinking that the totality of all that exists 
is finite or even only countably infinite.



On 7/4/2012 2:05 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
The thread is about the possibility of an omnipotent being being able 
to manipulate what is true.


On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
multiplecit...@gmail.com mailto:multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:


Hello Everythinglisters,

First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions
from time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more
musical tendency.

It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do
stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11

If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like
with personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0,
with a kind of zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy
justification. And anybody still willing to assert this could post
their bank account details and pin numbers and be freed from
arithmetic dictatorship by having their account cleaned out by
other everything listers that DO believe in sums, successors etc.
as 0 = whatever they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't
really matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by a few
control freaks.

Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a
less than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my
details here :)

Looking forward to contributing from time to time.




On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:

Bruno asked:
  . Is that an absolute truth?
By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something
in MY agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I
accept better expressions.
(Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
And Teilhard was a great master of words.
John M

On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:


Brent, thanks for the appreciation!
My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth.
Whatever WE accept is human.



Is that an absolute truth?

In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite
relative. When I listen to the jumping spiders or the
Löbian machines, most seems to disagree.

Bruno

/We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We
are spiritual beings having a human experience./
(de Chardin).



What is Mother Nature accepting?
John M

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb
meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Brent:
I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in
binary, just in plain peasant logic, when 1 and 1
make 11, nothing more.
So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more
relatives.
John


Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The
father of Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one
raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop).  So whether
successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the applicability of
arithmetic to your model.

Brent




--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jun 2012, at 22:18, Brian Tenneson wrote:

What I meant is an omnipotent being being able to manipulate what is  
actually, absolutely true (so in a parallel 2+2 might actually be  
17).  Not manipulate the perception of truth.


You can just define a new addition + by the rule x + y = the usual  
sum of x and y added to 15 with 15 being the usual  
(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))).


But again, this does not make 1+1=2 relative. It is just a change of  
the definition. It means we are not talking about 1, + and 17.


If you believe that a God can change the truth value of 1+1=2, with  
their standard meaning, then such a God is inconsistent with  
elementary arithmetic, meaning that it does not exist. I am not sure  
what that someone would even mean when saying that 1+1=17, with their  
standard meaning.


1+1 ≠ 17 in *all* interpretations of the elementary axioms of  
arithmetic.


Bruno




On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 1:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 6/28/2012 1:06 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote:


What I was wondering, and I know this is ill-formed, is if in  
different parallels, different things are absolutely true. Things  
like 2+2=17.  It may be completely impractical to imagine such  
parallels since there is presumably zero overlap and no means of  
travel to there.  The basic premise is that an omnipotent being  
has the ability to fool computers into thinking various things are  
true.


It doesn't take an omnipotent being to do that - unless you think  
Rush Limbaugh is omnipotent.


Brent

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Re: truth

[John Mikes]

Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever WE
accept is human.
What is Mother Nature accepting?

John M

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Brent:
 I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain peasant
 logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
 So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
 John


 Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of
 Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop).  So
 whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the applicability of arithmetic to
 your model.

 Brent


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Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:


Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever  
WE accept is human.



Is that an absolute truth?

In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When I  
listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems to  
disagree.


Bruno

We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are  
spiritual beings having a human experience.

(de Chardin).



What is Mother Nature accepting?

John M

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain  
peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.

So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
John

Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of  
Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one  
raindrop).  So whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the  
applicability of arithmetic to your model.


Brent


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Re: truth

[John Mikes]

Bruno asked:
  . Is that an absolute truth?

By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY
agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept better
expressions.
(Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
And Teilhard was a great master of words.
John M

On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:

  Brent, thanks for the appreciation!

 My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
 We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever WE
 accept is human.



 Is that an absolute truth?

 In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When I
 listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems to
 disagree.

 Bruno

 *We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are spiritual
 beings having a human experience.*
 (de Chardin).


  What is Mother Nature accepting?

 John M

 On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Brent:
 I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain peasant
 logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
 So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
 John


 Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of
 Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop).  So
 whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the applicability of arithmetic to
 your model.

 Brent


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Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear John,


Dear Bruno, think about it as absolute truth:
Isn't 1+1 not 2, but 11?




If  11 is a notation for 2, then it is the *same*  absolute truth,  
just written with non standard notation.


If 11 denotes eleven (1*10 + 1), as it usually does, then it is an  
absolute falsity, which contradicts directly what we have already  
agree on since a long time, notably the law of addition:


x + 0 = x
x + successor(y) = successor(x+y)

OK?

Bruno







On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

Hello John,

On 24 Jun 2012, at 21:43, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno:

Doesn't it emerge in this respect WHAT truth? or rather
WHOSE truth? is there an accepted authority to verify an  
absolute truth judgeable from a different belief system?


I don't think such authority exists. We can only agree on  
hypotheses, about such truth, concerning some domain of investigation.


We can also agree on the existence or non existence of facts  
confirming some truth concerning some reality.


But we can bet such truth exists, even if we cannot believe it or  
know it for sure.


Examples:

- Few people doubt that 1+1=2 is an absolute truth, when 1 and 2  
are used as the usual name for the standard natural numbers, and +  
represents the standard addition operation. Likewise for the whole  
elementary (first order) arithmetic.


- We usually don't doubt the mundane informations. So, 'Obama is the  
actual president of the US' can reasonably be assumed as absolute. I  
mean, with actual, that Obama is the actual president of the US  
in our reality is the absolute truth. Not the proposition Obama is  
the actual president of the US which might be false in the universe  
next door.


Most theoretical truth are absolute, thanks to their conditional  
shapes. For example the existence of parallel universes in the  
theoretical framework of QM-without-collapse is absolute, accepting  
some reasonable definition of what is a universe (a set of events  
closed for interaction, for example). This is absolute as it is a  
theorem in QM-without-collapse (or of comp). Of course the  
proposition parallel universes exist is not absolute at all.


Bruno


On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 23 Jun 2012, at 09:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
I have many questions.

One is what if truth were malleable? --
HI Brian,

If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our
standards of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of
the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of
absolute space.


If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the  
question would be if a reality were malleable.




Right. Which leads to the question; what does Brian mean by truth  
is malleable?


Would this entail that arithmetical truth is malleable? What would  
it mean that the truth of 17 is prime is malleable. It looks like  
we need a more solid truth than arithmetic in which we can make  
sense of the malleability of the truth in arithmetic, but I cannot  
see anything more solid than elementary arithmetic.


Some truth can be malleable in some operational sense, but this  
will be only metaphorical. For example the truth that cannabis is  
far more safe than alcohol, appears to be quite malleable, but this  
is just because special interest exploits the lack of education in  
logic. People driven by power are used to mistreat truth, but it is  
just errors or lies. I guess Brian's question is more metaphysical,  
but then in which non malleable context can we make sense of  
metaphysically malleable truth? Perhaps Brian should elaborate on  
what he means by truth is malleable? It seems to me that such an  
idea is similar to complete relativism, which defeats itself by not  
allowing that very idea to be relativized.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: truth

[John Mikes]

Brent:
I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain peasant
logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
John

On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 5:36 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 6/27/2012 2:26 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Dear Bruno, think about it as absolute truth:
 Isn't 1+1 not 2, but 11?
 Respectfully John


 Naah!  It's 10.

 Brent
 There are 10 kinds of people; those who think in binary and those who
 don't.

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Re: truth

[Brian Tenneson]

What I was wondering, and I know this is ill-formed, is if in different
parallels, different things are absolutely true. Things like 2+2=17.  It
may be completely impractical to imagine such parallels since there is
presumably zero overlap and no means of travel to there.  The basic
premise is that an omnipotent being has the ability to fool computers into
thinking various things are true.

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:

 Brent:
 I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain peasant
 logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
 So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
 John

 On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 5:36 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 6/27/2012 2:26 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Dear Bruno, think about it as absolute truth:
 Isn't 1+1 not 2, but 11?
 Respectfully John


 Naah!  It's 10.

 Brent
 There are 10 kinds of people; those who think in binary and those who
 don't.

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Re: truth

[meekerdb]

On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Brent:
I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain peasant logic, when 1 
and 1 make 11, nothing more.

So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
John


Or less facetiously,  (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of Gennifer)=(One, me)  and  
(one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop).  So whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on 
the applicability of arithmetic to your model.


Brent

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Re: truth

[meekerdb]

On 6/28/2012 1:06 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
What I was wondering, and I know this is ill-formed, is if in different parallels, 
different things are absolutely true. Things like 2+2=17.  It may be completely 
impractical to imagine such parallels since there is presumably zero overlap and no 
means of travel to there.  The basic premise is that an omnipotent being has the 
ability to fool computers into thinking various things are true.


It doesn't take an omnipotent being to do that - unless you think Rush Limbaugh 
is omnipotent.

Brent

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Re: truth

[Brian Tenneson]

What I meant is an omnipotent being being able to manipulate what is
actually, absolutely true (so in a parallel 2+2 might actually be 17).  Not
manipulate the perception of truth.

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 1:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 6/28/2012 1:06 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

 What I was wondering, and I know this is ill-formed, is if in different
 parallels, different things are absolutely true. Things like 2+2=17.  It
 may be completely impractical to imagine such parallels since there is
 presumably zero overlap and no means of travel to there.  The basic
 premise is that an omnipotent being has the ability to fool computers into
 thinking various things are true.


 It doesn't take an omnipotent being to do that - unless you think Rush
 Limbaugh is omnipotent.

 Brent

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Re: truth

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno, think about it as absolute truth:
Isn't 1+1 not 2, but 11?
Respectfully John

On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hello John,

   On 24 Jun 2012, at 21:43, John Mikes wrote:

  Bruno:

 Doesn't it emerge in this respect WHAT truth? or rather
 WHOSE truth? is there an accepted authority to verify an absolute
 truth judgeable from a different belief system?


 I don't think such authority exists. We can only agree on hypotheses,
 about such truth, concerning some domain of investigation.

 We can also agree on the existence or non existence of facts confirming
 some truth concerning some reality.

 But we can bet such truth exists, even if we cannot believe it or know it
 for sure.

 Examples:

 - Few people doubt that 1+1=2 is an absolute truth, when 1 and 2 are
 used as the usual name for the standard natural numbers, and + represents
 the standard addition operation. Likewise for the whole elementary (first
 order) arithmetic.

 - We usually don't doubt the mundane informations. So, 'Obama is the
 actual president of the US' can reasonably be assumed as absolute. I mean,
 with actual, that Obama is the actual president of the US in our
 reality is the absolute truth. Not the proposition Obama is the actual
 president of the US which might be false in the universe next door.

 Most theoretical truth are absolute, thanks to their conditional shapes.
 For example the existence of parallel universes in the theoretical
 framework of QM-without-collapse is absolute, accepting some reasonable
 definition of what is a universe (a set of events closed for interaction,
 for example). This is absolute as it is a theorem in QM-without-collapse
 (or of comp). Of course the proposition parallel universes exist is not
 absolute at all.

 Bruno


  On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 23 Jun 2012, at 09:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

 On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following:

 On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

 I have many questions.

 One is what if truth were malleable? --

 HI Brian,

 If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our
 standards of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of
 the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of
 absolute space.


 If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the question
 would be if a reality were malleable.




 Right. Which leads to the question; what does Brian mean by truth is
 malleable?

 Would this entail that arithmetical truth is malleable? What would it
 mean that the truth of 17 is prime is malleable. It looks like we need a
 more solid truth than arithmetic in which we can make sense of the
 malleability of the truth in arithmetic, but I cannot see anything more
 solid than elementary arithmetic.

 Some truth can be malleable in some operational sense, but this will be
 only metaphorical. For example the truth that cannabis is far more safe
 than alcohol, appears to be quite malleable, but this is just because
 special interest exploits the lack of education in logic. People driven by
 power are used to mistreat truth, but it is just errors or lies. I guess
 Brian's question is more metaphysical, but then in which non malleable
 context can we make sense of metaphysically malleable truth? Perhaps Brian
 should elaborate on what he means by truth is malleable? It seems to me
 that such an idea is similar to complete relativism, which defeats itself
 by not allowing that very idea to be relativized.


 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: truth

[meekerdb]

On 6/27/2012 2:26 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, think about it as absolute truth:
Isn't 1+1 not 2, but 11?
Respectfully John


Naah!  It's 10.

Brent
There are 10 kinds of people; those who think in binary and those who don't.

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Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

Hello John,

On 24 Jun 2012, at 21:43, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno:

Doesn't it emerge in this respect WHAT truth? or rather
WHOSE truth? is there an accepted authority to verify an  
absolute truth judgeable from a different belief system?


I don't think such authority exists. We can only agree on hypotheses,  
about such truth, concerning some domain of investigation.


We can also agree on the existence or non existence of facts  
confirming some truth concerning some reality.


But we can bet such truth exists, even if we cannot believe it or know  
it for sure.


Examples:

- Few people doubt that 1+1=2 is an absolute truth, when 1 and 2  
are used as the usual name for the standard natural numbers, and +  
represents the standard addition operation. Likewise for the whole  
elementary (first order) arithmetic.


- We usually don't doubt the mundane informations. So, 'Obama is the  
actual president of the US' can reasonably be assumed as absolute. I  
mean, with actual, that Obama is the actual president of the US in  
our reality is the absolute truth. Not the proposition Obama is the  
actual president of the US which might be false in the universe next  
door.


Most theoretical truth are absolute, thanks to their conditional  
shapes. For example the existence of parallel universes in the  
theoretical framework of QM-without-collapse is absolute, accepting  
some reasonable definition of what is a universe (a set of events  
closed for interaction, for example). This is absolute as it is a  
theorem in QM-without-collapse (or of comp). Of course the proposition  
parallel universes exist is not absolute at all.


Bruno


On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 23 Jun 2012, at 09:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
I have many questions.

One is what if truth were malleable? --
HI Brian,

If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our
standards of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of
the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of
absolute space.


If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the question  
would be if a reality were malleable.




Right. Which leads to the question; what does Brian mean by truth  
is malleable?


Would this entail that arithmetical truth is malleable? What would  
it mean that the truth of 17 is prime is malleable. It looks like  
we need a more solid truth than arithmetic in which we can make  
sense of the malleability of the truth in arithmetic, but I cannot  
see anything more solid than elementary arithmetic.


Some truth can be malleable in some operational sense, but this will  
be only metaphorical. For example the truth that cannabis is far  
more safe than alcohol, appears to be quite malleable, but this is  
just because special interest exploits the lack of education in  
logic. People driven by power are used to mistreat truth, but it is  
just errors or lies. I guess Brian's question is more metaphysical,  
but then in which non malleable context can we make sense of  
metaphysically malleable truth? Perhaps Brian should elaborate on  
what he means by truth is malleable? It seems to me that such an  
idea is similar to complete relativism, which defeats itself by not  
allowing that very idea to be relativized.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: truth

[John Mikes]

Bruno:

Doesn't it emerge in this respect WHAT truth? or rather
WHOSE truth? is there an accepted authority to verify an absolute truth
judgeable from a different belief system?

JohnM




On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 23 Jun 2012, at 09:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

 On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following:

 On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

 I have many questions.

 One is what if truth were malleable? --

 HI Brian,

 If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our
 standards of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of
 the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of
 absolute space.


 If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the question
 would be if a reality were malleable.




 Right. Which leads to the question; what does Brian mean by truth is
 malleable?

 Would this entail that arithmetical truth is malleable? What would it mean
 that the truth of 17 is prime is malleable. It looks like we need a more
 solid truth than arithmetic in which we can make sense of the malleability
 of the truth in arithmetic, but I cannot see anything more solid than
 elementary arithmetic.

 Some truth can be malleable in some operational sense, but this will be
 only metaphorical. For example the truth that cannabis is far more safe
 than alcohol, appears to be quite malleable, but this is just because
 special interest exploits the lack of education in logic. People driven by
 power are used to mistreat truth, but it is just errors or lies. I guess
 Brian's question is more metaphysical, but then in which non malleable
 context can we make sense of metaphysically malleable truth? Perhaps Brian
 should elaborate on what he means by truth is malleable? It seems to me
 that such an idea is similar to complete relativism, which defeats itself
 by not allowing that very idea to be relativized.


 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: truth

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

I have many questions.

One is what if truth were malleable? --

HI Brian,

If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our
standards of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of
the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of
absolute space.



If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the question 
would be if a reality were malleable.


Evgenii

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Re: truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jun 2012, at 09:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

I have many questions.

One is what if truth were malleable? --

HI Brian,

If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our
standards of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of
the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of
absolute space.



If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the question  
would be if a reality were malleable.




Right. Which leads to the question; what does Brian mean by truth is  
malleable?


Would this entail that arithmetical truth is malleable? What would it  
mean that the truth of 17 is prime is malleable. It looks like we  
need a more solid truth than arithmetic in which we can make sense of  
the malleability of the truth in arithmetic, but I cannot see anything  
more solid than elementary arithmetic.


Some truth can be malleable in some operational sense, but this will  
be only metaphorical. For example the truth that cannabis is far  
more safe than alcohol, appears to be quite malleable, but this is  
just because special interest exploits the lack of education in logic.  
People driven by power are used to mistreat truth, but it is just  
errors or lies. I guess Brian's question is more metaphysical, but  
then in which non malleable context can we make sense of  
metaphysically malleable truth? Perhaps Brian should elaborate on what  
he means by truth is malleable? It seems to me that such an idea is  
similar to complete relativism, which defeats itself by not allowing  
that very idea to be relativized.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Truth values as dynamics?

[acw]

On 2/12/2012 15:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/11/2012 5:15 PM, acw wrote:

On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:

I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a
sentence
has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you
know it or not.


Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have the
same
exact truth value. This is like Einstein arguing with Bohr with the
quip: The moon is still there when I do not see it. My reply to
Einstein would be: Sir, you are not the only observer of the
moon! We
have to look at the situation from the point of view of many
observers
or, in this case, truth detectors, that can interact and communicate
consistently with each other. We cannot think is just solipsistic
terms.


Sure, but what if nobody is looking at the moon? Or instead of moon,
pick something even less likely to be observed. To put it
differently,
Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture truth-value should not
depend on the observers thinking of it - they may eventually discover
it, and such a discovery would depend on many computational
consequences, of which the observers may not be aware of yet, but
doesn't mean that those consequences don't exist - when the
computation is locally performed, it will always give the same result
which could be said to exist timelessly.

[SPK]
My point is that any one or thing that could be affected by the truth
value of the moon has X, Y, Z properties will, in effect, be an
observer of the moon since it is has a definite set of properties as
knowledge. The key here is causal efficacy, if a different state of
affairs would result if some part of the world is changed then the
conditions of that part of the world are observed. The same thing
holds for the truth value Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture,
since there would be different worlds for each of their truth
values. My
point is that while the truth value or reality of the moon does not
depend on the observation by any _one_ observer, it does depend for
its
definiteness on the possibility that it could be observed by some
observer. It is the possibility that makes the difference. A object
that
cannot be observer by any means, including these arcane versions
that I
just laid out, cannot be said to have a definite set of properties or
truth value, to say the opposite is equivalent to making a truth claim
about a mathematical object for whom no set of equations or
representation can be made.


You're conjecturing here that there were worlds where Riemann
hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture have different truth values. I
don't think arithmetical truths which happen to have proofs have
indexical truth values, this is due to CTT. Although most physical
truths are indexical (or depend on the axioms chosen).
We could limit ourselves to decidable arithmetical truths only, but
you'd bump into the problem of consistency of arithmetic or the
halting problem. It makes no sense to me that a machine which is
defined to either halt or not halt would not do either. We might not
know if a machine halts or not, but that doesn't mean that if when ran
in any possible world it would behave differently. Arithmetical truth
should be the same in all possible worlds. An observer can find out a
truth value, but it cannot alter it, unless it is an indexical
(context-dependent truth, such as what time it is now or where do
you live).
Of course, we cannot talk about the truth value of undefined stuff,
that would be non-sense. However, we can talk about the truth value of
what cannot be observed - this machine never halts is only true if
no observation of the machine halting can ever be made, in virtue of
how the machine is defined, yet someone could use various
meta-reasoning to reach the conclusion that the machine will never
halt (consistency of arithmetic is very much similar to the halting
problem - it's only consistent if a machine which enumerates proofs
never finds a proof of 0=1; of course, this is not provable within
arithmetic itself, thus it's a provably unprovable statement for any
consistent machine, thus can only be a matter of theology as Bruno
calls it).


Hi ACW,

I am considering that the truth value is a function of the theory with
which a proposition is evaluated. In other words, meaningfulness,
including truth value, is contextual while existence is absolute.


Of course it's a function of the theory. Although, I do think some
theories like arithmetic, computability and first-order logic are so
general and infectious that they can be found in literally any
non-trivial theory. That is, one cannot really escape their
consequences. At that point, one might as well consider them absolute.
That said, an axiom that says you're now in structure X and state Y
would be very much contextual.

Hi ACW,

I was considering something like a field of propositions what say I am
now in structure X_i, state Y_j and an internal model Z_k and a truth
value 

Re: Truth values as dynamics?

[Stephen P. King]

On 2/11/2012 5:15 PM, acw wrote:

On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a 
sentence

has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you
know it or not.


Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have the
same
exact truth value. This is like Einstein arguing with Bohr with the
quip: The moon is still there when I do not see it. My reply to
Einstein would be: Sir, you are not the only observer of the 
moon! We
have to look at the situation from the point of view of many 
observers

or, in this case, truth detectors, that can interact and communicate
consistently with each other. We cannot think is just solipsistic
terms.


Sure, but what if nobody is looking at the moon? Or instead of moon,
pick something even less likely to be observed. To put it 
differently,

Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture truth-value should not
depend on the observers thinking of it - they may eventually discover
it, and such a discovery would depend on many computational
consequences, of which the observers may not be aware of yet, but
doesn't mean that those consequences don't exist - when the
computation is locally performed, it will always give the same result
which could be said to exist timelessly.

[SPK]
My point is that any one or thing that could be affected by the truth
value of the moon has X, Y, Z properties will, in effect, be an
observer of the moon since it is has a definite set of properties as
knowledge. The key here is causal efficacy, if a different state of
affairs would result if some part of the world is changed then the
conditions of that part of the world are observed. The same thing
holds for the truth value Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture,
since there would be different worlds for each of their truth 
values. My

point is that while the truth value or reality of the moon does not
depend on the observation by any _one_ observer, it does depend for 
its

definiteness on the possibility that it could be observed by some
observer. It is the possibility that makes the difference. A object 
that
cannot be observer by any means, including these arcane versions 
that I

just laid out, cannot be said to have a definite set of properties or
truth value, to say the opposite is equivalent to making a truth claim
about a mathematical object for whom no set of equations or
representation can be made.


You're conjecturing here that there were worlds where Riemann
hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture have different truth values. I
don't think arithmetical truths which happen to have proofs have
indexical truth values, this is due to CTT. Although most physical
truths are indexical (or depend on the axioms chosen).
We could limit ourselves to decidable arithmetical truths only, but
you'd bump into the problem of consistency of arithmetic or the
halting problem. It makes no sense to me that a machine which is
defined to either halt or not halt would not do either. We might not
know if a machine halts or not, but that doesn't mean that if when ran
in any possible world it would behave differently. Arithmetical truth
should be the same in all possible worlds. An observer can find out a
truth value, but it cannot alter it, unless it is an indexical
(context-dependent truth, such as what time it is now or where do
you live).
Of course, we cannot talk about the truth value of undefined stuff,
that would be non-sense. However, we can talk about the truth value of
what cannot be observed - this machine never halts is only true if
no observation of the machine halting can ever be made, in virtue of
how the machine is defined, yet someone could use various
meta-reasoning to reach the conclusion that the machine will never
halt (consistency of arithmetic is very much similar to the halting
problem - it's only consistent if a machine which enumerates proofs
never finds a proof of 0=1; of course, this is not provable within
arithmetic itself, thus it's a provably unprovable statement for any
consistent machine, thus can only be a matter of theology as Bruno
calls it).


Hi ACW,

I am considering that the truth value is a function of the theory with
which a proposition is evaluated. In other words, meaningfulness,
including truth value, is contextual while existence is absolute.

Of course it's a function of the theory. Although, I do think some 
theories like arithmetic, computability and first-order logic are so 
general and infectious that they can be found in literally any 
non-trivial theory. That is, one cannot really escape their 
consequences. At that point, one might as well consider them absolute.
That said, an axiom that says you're now in structure X and state Y 
would be very much contextual.

Hi ACW,

I was considering something like a field of propositions what say 
I am now in structure X_i, state Y_j and an internal model Z_k and a 
truth value that is only 

Re: Truth values as dynamics?

[acw]

On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:

I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence
has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you
know it or not.


Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have the
same
exact truth value. This is like Einstein arguing with Bohr with the
quip: The moon is still there when I do not see it. My reply to
Einstein would be: Sir, you are not the only observer of the moon! We
have to look at the situation from the point of view of many observers
or, in this case, truth detectors, that can interact and communicate
consistently with each other. We cannot think is just solipsistic
terms.


Sure, but what if nobody is looking at the moon? Or instead of moon,
pick something even less likely to be observed. To put it differently,
Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture truth-value should not
depend on the observers thinking of it - they may eventually discover
it, and such a discovery would depend on many computational
consequences, of which the observers may not be aware of yet, but
doesn't mean that those consequences don't exist - when the
computation is locally performed, it will always give the same result
which could be said to exist timelessly.

[SPK]
My point is that any one or thing that could be affected by the truth
value of the moon has X, Y, Z properties will, in effect, be an
observer of the moon since it is has a definite set of properties as
knowledge. The key here is causal efficacy, if a different state of
affairs would result if some part of the world is changed then the
conditions of that part of the world are observed. The same thing
holds for the truth value Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture,
since there would be different worlds for each of their truth values. My
point is that while the truth value or reality of the moon does not
depend on the observation by any _one_ observer, it does depend for its
definiteness on the possibility that it could be observed by some
observer. It is the possibility that makes the difference. A object that
cannot be observer by any means, including these arcane versions that I
just laid out, cannot be said to have a definite set of properties or
truth value, to say the opposite is equivalent to making a truth claim
about a mathematical object for whom no set of equations or
representation can be made.


You're conjecturing here that there were worlds where Riemann
hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture have different truth values. I
don't think arithmetical truths which happen to have proofs have
indexical truth values, this is due to CTT. Although most physical
truths are indexical (or depend on the axioms chosen).
We could limit ourselves to decidable arithmetical truths only, but
you'd bump into the problem of consistency of arithmetic or the
halting problem. It makes no sense to me that a machine which is
defined to either halt or not halt would not do either. We might not
know if a machine halts or not, but that doesn't mean that if when ran
in any possible world it would behave differently. Arithmetical truth
should be the same in all possible worlds. An observer can find out a
truth value, but it cannot alter it, unless it is an indexical
(context-dependent truth, such as what time it is now or where do
you live).
Of course, we cannot talk about the truth value of undefined stuff,
that would be non-sense. However, we can talk about the truth value of
what cannot be observed - this machine never halts is only true if
no observation of the machine halting can ever be made, in virtue of
how the machine is defined, yet someone could use various
meta-reasoning to reach the conclusion that the machine will never
halt (consistency of arithmetic is very much similar to the halting
problem - it's only consistent if a machine which enumerates proofs
never finds a proof of 0=1; of course, this is not provable within
arithmetic itself, thus it's a provably unprovable statement for any
consistent machine, thus can only be a matter of theology as Bruno
calls it).


Hi ACW,

I am considering that the truth value is a function of the theory with
which a proposition is evaluated. In other words, meaningfulness,
including truth value, is contextual while existence is absolute.

Of course it's a function of the theory. Although, I do think some 
theories like arithmetic, computability and first-order logic are so 
general and infectious that they can be found in literally any 
non-trivial theory. That is, one cannot really escape their 
consequences. At that point, one might as well consider them absolute.
That said, an axiom that says you're now in structure X and state Y 
would be very much contextual.

Onward!

Stephen




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Re: Truth values as dynamics? (was: Ontological Problems of COMP)

[Stephen P. King]

On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:

I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence
has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you
know it or not.


Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have the 
same

exact truth value. This is like Einstein arguing with Bohr with the
quip: The moon is still there when I do not see it. My reply to
Einstein would be: Sir, you are not the only observer of the moon! We
have to look at the situation from the point of view of many observers
or, in this case, truth detectors, that can interact and communicate
consistently with each other. We cannot think is just solipsistic 
terms.



Sure, but what if nobody is looking at the moon? Or instead of moon,
pick something even less likely to be observed. To put it differently,
Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture truth-value should not
depend on the observers thinking of it - they may eventually discover
it, and such a discovery would depend on many computational
consequences, of which the observers may not be aware of yet, but
doesn't mean that those consequences don't exist - when the
computation is locally performed, it will always give the same result
which could be said to exist timelessly.

[SPK]
My point is that any one or thing that could be affected by the truth
value of the moon has X, Y, Z properties will, in effect, be an
observer of the moon since it is has a definite set of properties as
knowledge. The key here is causal efficacy, if a different state of
affairs would result if some part of the world is changed then the
conditions of that part of the world are observed. The same thing
holds for the truth value Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture,
since there would be different worlds for each of their truth values. My
point is that while the truth value or reality of the moon does not
depend on the observation by any _one_ observer, it does depend for its
definiteness on the possibility that it could be observed by some
observer. It is the possibility that makes the difference. A object that
cannot be observer by any means, including these arcane versions that I
just laid out, cannot be said to have a definite set of properties or
truth value, to say the opposite is equivalent to making a truth claim
about a mathematical object for whom no set of equations or
representation can be made.

You're conjecturing here that there were worlds where Riemann 
hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture have different truth values. I 
don't think arithmetical truths which happen to have proofs have 
indexical truth values, this is due to CTT. Although most physical 
truths are indexical (or depend on the axioms chosen).
We could limit ourselves to decidable arithmetical truths only, but 
you'd bump into the problem of consistency of arithmetic or the 
halting problem. It makes no sense to me that a machine which is 
defined to either halt or not halt would not do either. We might not 
know if a machine halts or not, but that doesn't mean that if when ran 
in any possible world it would behave differently. Arithmetical truth 
should be the same in all possible worlds. An observer can find out a 
truth value, but it cannot alter it, unless it is an indexical 
(context-dependent truth, such as what time it is now or where do 
you live).
Of course, we cannot talk about the truth value of undefined stuff, 
that would be non-sense. However, we can talk about the truth value of 
what cannot be observed - this machine never halts is only true if 
no observation of the machine halting can ever be made, in virtue of 
how the machine is defined, yet someone could use various 
meta-reasoning to reach the conclusion that the machine will never 
halt (consistency of arithmetic is very much similar to the halting 
problem - it's only consistent if a machine which enumerates proofs 
never finds a proof of 0=1; of course, this is not provable within 
arithmetic itself, thus it's a provably unprovable statement for any 
consistent machine, thus can only be a matter of theology as Bruno 
calls it). 


 Hi ACW,

I am considering that the truth value is a function of the theory 
with which a proposition is evaluated. In other words, meaningfulness, 
including truth value, is contextual while existence is absolute.


Onward!

Stephen

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