Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 12:39 PM smitra  > wrote:
> On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift  > >
> > wrote:
> > 
> > "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
> > 
> > Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
> > probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
> > tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
> > 
> > We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
> > than one branch of the multiverse?
> > 
> > Bruce
> 
> Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
> doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number 
> of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that your 
> mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be 
> consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that given 
> your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector should be 
> described as a very complex superposition involving a large number of 
> brain states that are entangled with the environment.
> 
> My brain currently has only one state.

How do you know that? How could you know that.


> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these do 
> not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states consistent 
> with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you ever prove such 
> a thing?

We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume 
mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the 
infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness. 

Of course, this should not be a problem for a non-mechanist, except that he has 
to provide its non-mechanist theory of mind, and still explain the role of the 
(not finitely descriptible) substrate in generating its consciousness. 





> If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate 
> ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following 
> paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At 
> all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just 
> transitioning from one particular state to another state. Since 
> consciousness is related to the actual physical state of the computer, 
> replacing the computer by a dumb device that doesn't compute anything, 
> which simply cycles through physical states that the computer would move 
> through given some particular set of inputs, will render exactly the 
> same consciousness.
> 
> Yes, and so what? If my consciousness is a sequence of brain states, anything 
> that produces that same sequence of brain states will produce my 
> consciousness. Substrate independence, after all.
> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption,
> 
> It is not absurd in the least. Argument ad absurdum is not a logical 
> argument. What is absurd to you may be perfectly reasonable to someone else.
> it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals.

Which will need to assume actual infinities, and very big one.



> 
> How can a counterfactual exist? By definition, it is counter to the facts, 
> hence, non-existent.
>  
> Clearly actions 
> as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for 
> consciousness,
> 
> But there cannot be any such thing as a counterfactual input. You might 
> consider "What if" scenarios. But they are not relevant for my current 
> brain state. It will do what it will do, whatever the input.
> but there is no room to do that within classical single 
> World physics. But as I pointed out above the generic state of a 
> conscious involves being located not in a single branch, but being 
> distributed over an astronomically large number of different branches.
> 
> Different branches are, by definition, non-interacting, so different branches 
> correspond to different persons. Anyway, I choose not to accept this load of 
> speculative rubbish.

Because you speculate on a physical universe which would be ontologically 
primary. With mechanism, we need not to assume more than 2+2=4, or Kxy = x, …

There is no problem with the MWI once we stop assuming physicalism, which seems 
to me to be the bg speculation here.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[smitra]

On 03-12-2019 05:21, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:

On 12/2/2019 5:39 PM, smitra wrote:

On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:


On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:

|universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>

We can then analyse the system in some basis:

|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,

where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.

It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have

|universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).

Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
original state.
??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
basis vector.


The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis 
vector
becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the 
result

of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
to avoid the "M" word.)


The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
because initial conditions may make it zero.


Irrelevant to the main point.


The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
state.

If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
stochastic single-world model.


Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.


Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
out life insurance..

Bruce

"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"

Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
than one branch of the multiverse?

Bruce


Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The 
number of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large 
that your mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going 
to be consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that 
given your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector 
should be described as a very complex superposition involving a large 
number of brain states that are entangled with the environment.


That's true.  But it waaay under estimating the number of brain states
consistent with a thought.  The reason is that many different
quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that
thought...not only different quantum superpositions.



If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate 
ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following 
paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At 
all moments in time, the 

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 2:39:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2019, at 22:59, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 2:49:17 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:33:26 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll 
>>> talks about, here's a concrete case:
>>>
>>> *In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.*
>>>
>>> *In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap.* 
>>>
>>> I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", 
>>> or how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> It really is not so much that a person is in a superposition than the 
>> quantum particles and states that compose them are.
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
>
>
> In the MWI branch world Jog where Sean is jogging and in the branch world 
> Nap where Sean is napping, the jogging-Sean particles in Jog and the 
> napping-Sean particles in Nap are in superposition. 
>
> Then there is another branching of Jog where Sean is hit by a car 
> Jog-HitByCar and one where he isn't Jog-NotHitByCar. Particles in 
> superpositions: Nap, Jog, Jog-HitByCar, Jog-NotHitByCar, ...
>
> This seems like it should make no sense.
>
>
> Yet, that happens in the arithmetical reality. So it certainly makes 
> sense, up to verify this regularly (the theory might be false). It is 
> counter-intuitive, but there is no contradiction, and it is the simpler way 
> to reconcile mind and matter, and the observations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
This proves my point that Many Worlds can only work in a pure informational 
(or arithmetical) reality.

The Many Worlders are (like Sean Carroll) anti-materialists - in the sense 
that they think everything is information (or quantum information).

@philipthrift
 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 05:21, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2019 5:39 PM, smitra wrote:
>> On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
 On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
 
 On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
  wrote:
 
 On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 
 Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
 screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
 Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
 the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:
 
 |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
 
 We can then analyse the system in some basis:
 
 |system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
 
 where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
 vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
 
 It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
 acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
 convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have
 
 |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
 
 Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
 equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
 original state.
 ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
 space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
 basis vector.
>>> 
>>> The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
>>> becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result
>>> of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
>>> anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
>>> whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
>>> to avoid the "M" word.)
>>> 
 The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
 anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
 because initial conditions may make it zero.
>>> 
>>> Irrelevant to the main point.
>>> 
> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
> this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
> state.
> 
> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
> self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
> conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
> depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
> it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
> so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
> treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
> are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
> stochastic single-world model.
 
 Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
 interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
 after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
 interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
 the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>>> 
>>> Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
>>> either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
>>> everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
>>> single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
>>> end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
>>> no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
>>> about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
>>> out life insurance..
>>> 
>>> Bruce
>>> 
>>> "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
>>> 
>>> Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
>>> probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
>>> tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
>>> 
>>> We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
>>> than one branch of the multiverse?
>>> 
>>> Bruce
>> 
>> Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
>> doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number of 
>> distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that your mindset 
>> and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be consistent with 
>> only one physical brain state. This means that given your subjective state, 
>> the physical state of your MWI sector should be described as a very complex 
>> superposition involving a large number of brain states that are entangled 
>> with the environment.
> 
> 

Re: Branching on real-world decisions

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Dec 2019, at 12:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 8:08 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 29 Nov 2019, at 00:50, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:27 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 26 Nov 2019, at 22:39, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 12:27 AM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> On 25 Nov 2019, at 22:53, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
 Because, the wave-function itself is non-local -- it contains entangled 
 particles that are widely separated in space. That is the definition of 
 non-locality!
>>> 
>>> I am not sure. I use “non-locality” for “FTL physical influence”.
>>> 
>>> That is just an abuse of language. Non-local means "not local", i.e., not 
>>> all in one place.
>> 
>> Then even Newton Universe is non local. 
>> 
>> Yes Newton was aware of this.
>> 
>>  
>>> Some attempt has been made to replace the term "non-local" with the term 
>>> "non-seperable”.
>> 
>> Yes, notably d’Espagnat. It avoids the confusion with the Eisnsteinian 
>> non-locality, which requires FTL (cf the “spooky action at a distance”), 
>> which must exist in QM + the assumption of a unique universe.
>> 
>>> I think we can all agree that the singlet wave function is non-separable -- 
>>> it cannot be written as a simple product of two terms, one referring to 
>>> each particle.
>> 
>> Yes, we agree on this.
>> 
>>> I maintain that it is also non-local, in that the two particles are at 
>>> different locations (locales). Non-local can have no other meaning in 
>>> ordinary linguistic usage.
>> 
>> I invite you, and Alice, and I give you an envelop to each of you. You are 
>> told that one contain a piece of paper with O inscribed on it, and the other 
>> with one. Then you go in different galaxies, say, and open it. Once you see 
>> 0 (res. 1) you know that Alice will see 1 (res. 0). This seems non local in 
>> your sense, where most would agree that in this case, there is no 
>> “non-locality” issue. What I claim is that in the Everett theory, all 
>> non-locality are of that type.
>> 
>> That non-loclality has a common cause explanation. Like Bertlmann's socks, 
>> there is no mystery here. The problem is with entangled systems, where 
>> non-separability means non-locality that has no common cause explanation, 
>> even in many-worlds theory.
> 
> I doubt this. The MWI reduces the non-separability of the probabilities into 
> an equivalent with Bertlmann’s socks, still keeping the violation of Bell’s 
> inequality justifying the appearance of non-locality. 
> 
> The devil is in the detail. And you have still not provided any detail.


You are the one who seem to believe in some FTL physical action (not just the 
quantum inseparability), and that indeed follows clearly from the “one-world” 
assumption. Then with mechanism, we get 0 universes, but infinitely many 
relative histories, structured by self-reference. 



> 
>>> In the MWI, some particles can be entangled but without implying any 
>>> possible FTL when we do measurement on them, except from the local point of 
>>> view, due to our ignorance of all terms of the wave. It means simply that 
>>> Alice and Bob belongs to the same branch of history/reality.
>>> 
>>> The trouble with this hope is that it no local account of the EPR 
>>> correlations been realised in any coherent mathematics. Bell's theorem 
>>> rules it out: no local hidden variable account of the EPR correlations is 
>>> possible in any theory, whatsoever. It is a no-go theorem; it proves a 
>>> negative -- something is impossible. Many-worlds does not subvert Bell's 
>>> theorem.
>> 
>> That is right. But the violation of Bell’s inequality entails FTL only when 
>> one world is assumed, with well defined outcome for all measurement, or put 
>> in another way, assuming a unique reality, with one Bob and one Alice, but 
>> Bell’s reasoning does not prove FTL influence in The many-worlds, where all 
>> outcomes are obtained, and propagate between diverse Alice and Bob locally, 
>> leading to the apparent violation of Bell’s inequality, but without FTL.
>> 
>> Bell did not assume a collapse. His is a mathematical result, where the only 
>> assumption is locality. As usual, if you think there is a local explanation 
>> of the EPR correlations in many-worlds, then produce it.
> 
> We differ only on the way we interpreted the wave and the worlds. The singlet 
> state is … local! It does not entail any correlation between the Alices and 
> the Bobs. It enforces only that the Alices and Bobs can meet only their 
> corresponding correlated partners, among the infinitely many Alices and Bobs 
> (most of them being not accessible from each others).
> 
> The singlet state is non-separable, and hence non-local when Alice and Bob 
> are separated.


I don’t know which difference you 

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:21:53 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
>  The reason is that many different 
> quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that thought...not 
> only different quantum superpositions. 
>
>
> Brent 
>
>

Doesn't Penrose think that there cannot be thoughts (no such things as real 
non-zombie thoughts like we experience in our brains) without quantum 
mechanical stuff going on? :)

@philipthrift 

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Dec 2019, at 19:10, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2019 12:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> In First Order Logic, Real Numbers are the one which simplifies. The first 
>> order theory of the real is decidable, unlike the first order theory of the 
>> natural numbers. The digital, or discrete, reality is more complex than the 
>> reals, which fits all holes, and provides (in the complex extensions) all 
>> roots for the polynomials.
> 
> Do you know whether Gisin's "random" numbers produce a decidable structure?

It certainly does not. Real numbers are logically much simpler than Natural 
Numbers (think about x^n + y^n = z^n in integer structure and with real numbers 
for example), but Gisin use QM, which adds the trigonometrical functions, or 
complex numbers, and this re-intrdouces the discrete structure and the integers 
in the picture (sin(2pi*x) = 0). Trigonometry, or waves, is what makes the 
continuum able to imitate the digital. Whatever physics can appear from 
arithmetic, it is described by a continuum, and it needs to be able to imitate 
the digital machines (or we would not be there (assuming Mechanism of course).

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> Also, Nicolas Gisin use the Aristotelian act of faith (defining “real” by 
>> “physical”), which requires a non Mechanist theory of mind.
>> With Mechanism, real number are phenomenological constructs by digital 
>> entities. It is real, but not ontologically real.
>> 
>> Bruno
> 
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Nov 2019, at 19:38, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 12:12:22 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11/27/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:39:09 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark > wrote:
>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett > wrote:
>> 
>> > I think your [Brent Meeker] point about other conservation laws is 
>> > interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a 
>> > state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and get 
>> > charge conservation in every branch?
>> 
>> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems likely all 
>> of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem like much of 
>> a problem.
>> 
>> 
>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number of 
>> sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can land. 
>> There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very large 
>> number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in all other 
>> branches.
>> 
>> LC 
>> 
>> 
>> So the number of coulombs  in a branching Many Worlds grows exponentially .
>> 
>> Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units 
>> , 
>> which took effect on 20 May 2019,[2] 
>>  the elementary 
>> charge  (the charge of the 
>> proton ) is exactly 1.602176634×10−19 
>> coulombs. Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge of 1/(1.602176634×10−19) 
>> protons, which is approximately 6.2415090744×1018 protons (1.036×10−5 mol 
>> ). The same number of electrons 
>>  has the same magnitude but opposite 
>> sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.
>> 
>> 
>> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book came 
>> out.
>> 
>> There has never been an answer.
> 
> If you think in terms of the wf of the multiverse, it's just a ray in Hilbert 
> space and moves around.  It doesn't split.  What "splits" is the subspace 
> we're on.  So when we measure a spin as UP or DOWN, our subspace splits into 
> two orthogonal subspaces on which the ray projects.  But they are only 
> orthogonal on that one dimension (the spin of that particle), so any other 
> variable encoded in the ray gets projected with the same value as before, 
> e.g. the energy or the particle.
> 
> Brent
> 
> That is more in line with what is going on. The charge of an electron, along 
> with all other quantum numbers of the electron or any elementary particle, is 
> not duplicated. It only appears in any sort of branch and with the 
> renormalization of probability there is this mistaken idea of duplication. 
> Nothing is duplicated any more than a superposition of basis states implies 
> duplication.  That ray in Hilbert space is projected onto a tangent vector in 
> projective Hilbert space along a geodesic. The observer is just forced into 
> observing that evolution with the vector projected once again onto a certain 
> basis element. 
> 
> Now how that happens with the measurement being ultimately nonlocal, with it 
> might be added an ambiguity as to the probability at the measurement, is an 
> open question. In MWI there is no fundamental localization of a wave 
> function, so assigning that projectivization is ambiguous. However, we may 
> "cheat" and say the phenomenological appearance of a localization by the 
> observer acts as this projectivization that appears as a collapse. 
> 
> Nothing is fundamentally duplicated.

OK. Like with Mechanism in arithmetic, there is only first person 
self-differentiation, which appears as self-projection in consistent histories, 
which all exists in an atemporal static embedded in the (structured) collection 
of all computations.

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 30 Nov 2019, at 02:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 5:12 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> On 11/27/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book 
>>> came out.
>>> 
>>> There has never been an answer.
>> 
>> If you think in terms of the wf of the multiverse, it's just a ray in 
>> Hilbert space and moves around.  It doesn't split.  What "splits" is the 
>> subspace we're on.  So when we measure a spin as UP or DOWN, our subspace 
>> splits into two orthogonal subspaces on which the ray projects.  But they 
>> are only orthogonal on that one dimension (the spin of that particle), so 
>> any other variable encoded in the ray gets projected with the same value as 
>> before, e.g. the energy or the particle.
>> 
>> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen or 
>> through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert space. We can 
>> take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest of the universe to 
>> recover the full Hilbert space:
>> 
>>   |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>> 
>> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>> 
>>|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>> 
>> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis vectors for 
>> (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>> 
>> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts over 
>> the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted with the same 
>> 'environment' in each case, we have
>> 
>> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>> 
>> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation, so it 
>> carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state.
> 
> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert space.  It 
> doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a basis vector.  The c_i 
> can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry anything.  No 
> every Schrodinger equation solution is realized because initial conditions 
> may make it zero.
> 
>> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum 
>> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in this sum 
>> has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.
>> 
>> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a self-contained 
>> separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved in each world. 
>> Whether there is global conservation depends on how we treat the 
>> coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies of the 
>> basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in each 
>> individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this situation is not 
>> clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just 
>> have a stochastic single-world model.
> 
> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic 
> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize after the 
> measurement.  And one problem with the ontic interpretation is saying what 
> probability means.  But it seems that the epistemic interpretation leaves the 
> wf to be a personal belief.


It is a first person plural belief, sharable by vast collection of interacting 
universal entities whose existence can be proved in weak theory of arithmetic. 
It is a view from inside any model of arithmetic, but unprovable in any theory 
of arithmetic.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 2:40:27 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 7:30:13 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 2:52:05 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 12:58 PM Lawrence Crowell <
>>> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> > Spacetime does not really fundamentally exist. It is just a geometric 
 representation for how qubits interact and are entangled with each other.

>>>
>>> I agree it's possible Spacetime is not fundamental, it might be a 
>>> composite and be constructed out of something else, but if that more 
>>> fundamental "something else" is how Qubits interact and if there is a 
>>> smallest scale at which a quantum bit of information can be localized then 
>>> how can there be a one to one correspondence between the finite number of 
>>> such localized areas and the infinite number of points in smooth continuous 
>>> geometric spacetime that the Gamma Ray Burst results seem to indicate is 
>>> the way things really are?
>>>
>>>  John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> Spacetime is an epiphenomenology of entanglement. There are several ways 
>> entanglement can happen. There is topological order that has no scaling, or 
>> where the entanglement occurs without any reference to space or distance. 
>> Then there are symmetry protected topological orders, where there is a 
>> locality. How these two are related is a matter of research, but it is a 
>> sort of quantum phase transition. 
>>
>> An event horizon is a region where on either side there are entangled 
>> states. Close to the horizon there is are small regions on either side that 
>> are entangled. Further away these regions are larger. This has a sort of 
>> scaling and fractal geometry to it. As with fractals or chaos there are 
>> regions with regular dynamics where things are smooth and these are related 
>> to fractal geometry by the Feigenbaum number 4.669... . Classical spacetime 
>> is the a manifestation of a condensate of symmetry protected states that 
>> construct a surface that is smooth.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
I am not thinking of this. In fact this idea seems completely wrong headed. 
It might have been that people would have tried to capture QM by imposing 
stochastic Wiener processes and the like. 

LC
 

>
> I don't see how this relates to stochastic metric spaces:
>
>
> https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2399-6528/aaa851
>
> Stochastic Metric Quantization (SMQ)
>
> In this work, a new quantization method based on the mathematical theory 
> of probability is proposed. The concept is developed as follows: We 
> consider the decay process of a given radioisotope. Because the probability 
> of observing a decay during a unit of time is constant, the number of 
> decays observed during a given time interval follows a Poisson 
> distribution. Using this phenomenon, a clock in which the second hand 
> advances each time a decay observed can be constructed; hereafter, this 
> will be referred to as a Poisson-clock. We assume for simplicity that the 
> Poisson-clock is designed to advance one tick per second on average. We 
> then compare this clock to an ordinary mechanical clock, in which the time 
> interval per tick of the second hand is constant. From the point of view of 
> an observer using the mechanical clock, the second hand of the 
> Poisson-clock seems to move randomly; however, this is of course a relative 
> observation tied to the reference frame of the mechanical clock. If instead 
> the time measured by the Poisson-clock is defined as the regular interval, 
> the running of the mechanical clock becomes random. A distribution of 'one 
> second' of the Poisson-clock, as measured by the mechanical clock, becomes 
> an exponential distribution with an average value of unity. Following the 
> central limit theorem, the deviation between the Poisson and the mechanical 
> clock after n seconds will have a Gaussian distribution around zero with a 
> variance of n. Using the mechanical clock to measure the time-of-flight of 
> a free particle following a classical inertial path will result in a 
> constant measured velocity. On the other hand, if the Poisson-clock is 
> used, measurement becomes a stochastic-process based on the Wiener measure 
> and can be expressed using a stochastic differentiation equation. It has 
> been shown that such as expression agrees with the stochastic equation 
> obtained by Nelson [6] that is used in stochastic quantization. Thus, 
> classical mechanics with a Poisson-time measure results in QM, which 
> suggests a new quantization method—Stochastic Metric Quantization(SMQ). 
> This observation can be extended to spatial coordinates as well, and an 
> equal treatment of space and time is necessary to apply this method to 
> relativistic quantum field theories. A quantum field theory can be given on 
> the stochastic metric space, not only for flat spaces such as Minkowski 
> space, but also for 

Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 4:38:56 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
>
>>
> I am not thinking of this. In fact this idea seems completely wrong 
> headed. It might have been that people would have tried to capture QM by 
> imposing stochastic Wiener processes and the like. 
>
> LC
>  
>

There is a connection between

"The subject [of path integration in stochastic processes] began with the 
work of *Wiener *during the 1920's, corresponding to a sum over random 
trajectories, *anticipating by two decades Feynman's famous work* on the 
path integral representation of quantum mechanics."
(Path Integrals for Stochastic Processes: An Introduction, Horacio S. Wio) 

and the

"Path integral on the SLM[stochastic Lorentz metric]-space"
(Stochastic metric space and quantum mechanics, Yoshimasa Kurihara).


@philipthrift 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 29 Nov 2019, at 22:59, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 2:49:17 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:33:26 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll talks 
> about, here's a concrete case:
> 
> In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.
> 
> In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap. 
> 
> I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", or 
> how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> It really is not so much that a person is in a superposition than the quantum 
> particles and states that compose them are.
> 
> LC 
> 
> 
> 
> In the MWI branch world Jog where Sean is jogging and in the branch world Nap 
> where Sean is napping, the jogging-Sean particles in Jog and the napping-Sean 
> particles in Nap are in superposition. 
> 
> Then there is another branching of Jog where Sean is hit by a car 
> Jog-HitByCar and one where he isn't Jog-NotHitByCar. Particles in 
> superpositions: Nap, Jog, Jog-HitByCar, Jog-NotHitByCar, ...
> 
> This seems like it should make no sense.

Yet, that happens in the arithmetical reality. So it certainly makes sense, up 
to verify this regularly (the theory might be false). It is counter-intuitive, 
but there is no contradiction, and it is the simpler way to reconcile mind and 
matter, and the observations.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 7:30:13 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 2:52:05 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 12:58 PM Lawrence Crowell <
>> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > Spacetime does not really fundamentally exist. It is just a geometric 
>>> representation for how qubits interact and are entangled with each other.
>>>
>>
>> I agree it's possible Spacetime is not fundamental, it might be a 
>> composite and be constructed out of something else, but if that more 
>> fundamental "something else" is how Qubits interact and if there is a 
>> smallest scale at which a quantum bit of information can be localized then 
>> how can there be a one to one correspondence between the finite number of 
>> such localized areas and the infinite number of points in smooth continuous 
>> geometric spacetime that the Gamma Ray Burst results seem to indicate is 
>> the way things really are?
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>
> Spacetime is an epiphenomenology of entanglement. There are several ways 
> entanglement can happen. There is topological order that has no scaling, or 
> where the entanglement occurs without any reference to space or distance. 
> Then there are symmetry protected topological orders, where there is a 
> locality. How these two are related is a matter of research, but it is a 
> sort of quantum phase transition. 
>
> An event horizon is a region where on either side there are entangled 
> states. Close to the horizon there is are small regions on either side that 
> are entangled. Further away these regions are larger. This has a sort of 
> scaling and fractal geometry to it. As with fractals or chaos there are 
> regions with regular dynamics where things are smooth and these are related 
> to fractal geometry by the Feigenbaum number 4.669... . Classical spacetime 
> is the a manifestation of a condensate of symmetry protected states that 
> construct a surface that is smooth.
>
> LC
>



I don't see how this relates to stochastic metric spaces:


https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2399-6528/aaa851

Stochastic Metric Quantization (SMQ)

In this work, a new quantization method based on the mathematical theory of 
probability is proposed. The concept is developed as follows: We consider 
the decay process of a given radioisotope. Because the probability of 
observing a decay during a unit of time is constant, the number of decays 
observed during a given time interval follows a Poisson distribution. Using 
this phenomenon, a clock in which the second hand advances each time a 
decay observed can be constructed; hereafter, this will be referred to as a 
Poisson-clock. We assume for simplicity that the Poisson-clock is designed 
to advance one tick per second on average. We then compare this clock to an 
ordinary mechanical clock, in which the time interval per tick of the 
second hand is constant. From the point of view of an observer using the 
mechanical clock, the second hand of the Poisson-clock seems to move 
randomly; however, this is of course a relative observation tied to the 
reference frame of the mechanical clock. If instead the time measured by 
the Poisson-clock is defined as the regular interval, the running of the 
mechanical clock becomes random. A distribution of 'one second' of the 
Poisson-clock, as measured by the mechanical clock, becomes an exponential 
distribution with an average value of unity. Following the central limit 
theorem, the deviation between the Poisson and the mechanical clock after n 
seconds will have a Gaussian distribution around zero with a variance of n. 
Using the mechanical clock to measure the time-of-flight of a free particle 
following a classical inertial path will result in a constant measured 
velocity. On the other hand, if the Poisson-clock is used, measurement 
becomes a stochastic-process based on the Wiener measure and can be 
expressed using a stochastic differentiation equation. It has been shown 
that such as expression agrees with the stochastic equation obtained by 
Nelson [6] that is used in stochastic quantization. Thus, classical 
mechanics with a Poisson-time measure results in QM, which suggests a new 
quantization method—Stochastic Metric Quantization(SMQ). This observation 
can be extended to spatial coordinates as well, and an equal treatment of 
space and time is necessary to apply this method to relativistic quantum 
field theories. A quantum field theory can be given on the stochastic 
metric space, not only for flat spaces such as Minkowski space, but also 
for highly curved spaces such as the surface of the black hole. As 
applications of this method, quantum effects in the early universe can be 
analyzed.

A main purpose of this work is to give a new framework of a quantum theory 
using mathematical tools of the stochastic metric space. In other words, a 
new stochastic quantization method is proposed in this work. A concept of 
our method is, in 

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 02:39, smitra  wrote:
> 
> On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>> On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
>>>  wrote:
>>> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
>>> screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
>>> Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
>>> the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:
>>> |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>>> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>>> |system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>>> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
>>> vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>>> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
>>> acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
>>> convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have
>>> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>>> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
>>> equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
>>> original state.
>>> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
>>> space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
>>> basis vector.
>> The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
>> becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result
>> of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
>> anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
>> whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
>> to avoid the "M" word.)
>>> The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
>>> anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
>>> because initial conditions may make it zero.
>> Irrelevant to the main point.
 The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
 quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
 this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
 state.
 If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
 self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
 conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
 depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
 it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
 so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
 treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
 are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
 stochastic single-world model.
>>> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
>>> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
>>> after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
>>> interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
>>> the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>> Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
>> either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
>> everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
>> single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
>> end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
>> no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
>> about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
>> out life insurance..
>> Bruce
>> "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
>> Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
>> probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
>> tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
>> We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
>> than one branch of the multiverse?
>> Bruce
> 
> Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), doesn't 
> fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number of distinct 
> physical brain states is so astronomically large that your mindset and how 
> you are feeling about everything isn't going to be consistent with only one 
> physical brain state. This means that given your subjective state, the 
> physical state of your MWI sector should be described as a very complex 
> superposition involving a large number of brain states that are entangled 
> with the environment.
> 
> If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate ourselves 
> in one single branch, then this leads to the following paradox. Consider 
> simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At all moments in time, the 
> physical state of the computer is just 

Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Lawrence Crowell]

For symmetry protected quantum states, which are local entanglements, they 
are local because the symmetry or group action is generally covariant. This 
covariant property enforces what we think of as space and time.

LC

On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 7:29:13 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 8:30 PM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> > *Spacetime is an epiphenomenology of entanglement. There are several 
>> ways entanglement can happen. There is topological order that has no 
>> scaling, or where the entanglement occurs without any reference to space or 
>> distance.*
>>
>
> If there is no reference to space or distance in that sort of 
> entanglement then where does the epistemological phenomenon of distance 
> come from? Do 2 points in space less than a Planck Length apart 
> correspond to 2 different entanglements, and is there any experimental 
> evidence that could help us answer this question? It seems to me the Gamma 
> Ray Burst results must be telling us something. 
>  
> And what about time, is it fundamental; it's right there in the 
> Schrödinger equation and just takes it as a given.
>  
>
>> > *Then there are symmetry protected topological orders, where there is 
>> a locality.*
>>
>
> But we know from experiment that Bell's Inequality is violated, so I don't 
> see how that sort of entanglement could have produced the world we 
> observe. 
>
>  John K Clark
>
>>
>>

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 8:30 PM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> *Spacetime is an epiphenomenology of entanglement. There are several ways
> entanglement can happen. There is topological order that has no scaling, or
> where the entanglement occurs without any reference to space or distance.*
>

If there is no reference to space or distance in that sort of entanglement then
where does the epistemological phenomenon of distance come from? Do 2
points in space less than a Planck Length apart correspond to 2 different
entanglements, and is there any experimental evidence that could help us
answer this question? It seems to me the Gamma Ray Burst results must be
telling us something.

And what about time, is it fundamental; it's right there in the Schrödinger
equation and just takes it as a given.


> > *Then there are symmetry protected topological orders, where there is a
> locality.*
>

But we know from experiment that Bell's Inequality is violated, so I don't
see how that sort of entanglement could have produced the world we observe.

 John K Clark

>
>

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 8:02:29 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> For symmetry protected quantum states, which are local entanglements, they 
> are local because the symmetry or group action is generally covariant. This 
> covariant property enforces what we think of as space and time.
>
> LC
>
>
>>>
It's reasonable that space and time precedes symmetry. We get symmetries 
from spacial measurements.

@philipthrift

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/3/2019 12:51 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:21:53 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



 The reason is that many different
quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that
thought...not
only different quantum superpositions.


Brent



Doesn't Penrose think that there cannot be thoughts (no such things as 
real non-zombie thoughts like we experience in our brains) without 
quantum mechanical stuff going on? :)


He also thinks Goedel's theorem doesn't apply to the community of 
mathematicians.


I don't find philosophical zombies at all plausible.  I think 
consciousness is a necessary component of human level intelligence; it's 
implicit in the ability to imagine plans in which you are an actor.


Brent

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Re: C60 Interference

[Alan Grayson]

The interpretation of a superposition as representing a system that can
be in one or the other state, is incompatible with interference
experiments. 

*Please, if you can, elaborate why this is the case? AG*

And physicist don't care much about interpretation and the
language used to communicate what certain concepts mean. So, many
physicists may say that a particle in a superposition between being in
position x and y is at x and y simultaneously, even though they know
that's not really what a superposition means (obviously there is only
one particle not 2). What matters is the mathematical formulation of the
theory, not the words used to describe this.
Saibal



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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> My brain currently has only one state.
>
> How do you know that? How could you know that.
>

It is a pretty good hypothesis.

> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these
> do not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states
> consistent with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you
> ever prove such a thing?
>
> We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume
> mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the
> infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness.
>

The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe
is what it is, and your brain, being part of it, is what it is. No need to
choose anything.



>  Of course, this should not be a problem for a non-mechanist, except that
> he has to provide its non-mechanist theory of mind, and still explain the
> role of the (not finitely descriptible) substrate in generating its
> consciousness.
>

So why should that be a problem? My non-mechanist theory of mind is that
mind is what brains do. Why should I need to explain the role of the
substrate in generating consciousness? I simply have to do normal science
and explore the relationship between my physical brain and my conscious
experience. Maybe difficult, but no
insurmountable conceptual issues. Your problems here are all of your own
making.
Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 1:58:20 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/3/2019 12:51 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:21:53 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>>  The reason is that many different 
>> quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that thought...not 
>> only different quantum superpositions. 
>>
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>>
>
> Doesn't Penrose think that there cannot be thoughts (no such things as 
> real non-zombie thoughts like we experience in our brains) without quantum 
> mechanical stuff going on? :)
>
>
> He also thinks Goedel's theorem doesn't apply to the community of 
> mathematicians.  
>
> I don't find philosophical zombies at all plausible.  I think 
> consciousness is a necessary component of human level intelligence; it's 
> implicit in the ability to imagine plans in which you are an actor.
>
> Brent
>


The opposite of experiential realism.

• A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take 

   Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms 

 

@philipthrift 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/3/2019 6:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


The opposite of experiential realism.

• A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take 

Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms 





One wonders what Klein thinks including subjectivity would look like.  
Every example he gives is based on someone report subjective 
feelings...but reports are objective.


Brent

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