Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
There continues to be a misunderstanding. I don't understand how you can change the order of the semiosic process to, for example, have the Final Interpretant coming before the Immediate Interpretant. If you are instead saying that the FI is more dominant than the II in its formation of the Sign - that's one thing, but surely you aren't claiming that the FI is temporally earlier than the II. The ten examples provided by Short seem, to me, to be from Peirce's outline of the ten classes of signs. See CP 2.254-2.264. The order in Short's outline is as it is in Peirce's outline: Representamen-Object-Interpretant. BUT - this is not the order of processing. Again, there are two things to consider here. One is the temporal order of processing; the other is the informational power of each site in the action of semiosis. These are two very different things. Informationally, the Final Interpretant must be more powerful than the Immediate Interpretant. Informationally, the Representamen must be more powerful, but, it cannot be 'all-powerful', as it is an evolving set of habits/beliefs. For Peirce, reality was what is found objectively - not what is found in our beliefs. So- I think that this question about 'order-of-processing' and 'power-of-processing'...has to be cleared up first! From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, August 17, 2015 10:46 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: You evidently misunderstood what I was indicating, which is probably my fault for not being clear. I was only listing the six trichotomies that come AFTER the first four, which are Od Oi S (S-Od). Including all ten this time ... (a) Od Oi S (S-Od) If Id Ii (S-If) (S-Id) (S-Od-If). (b) Od Oi S (S-Od) If (S-If) Id (S-Id) Ii (S-Od-If). (c) Od Oi S (S-Od) (S-Od-If) (S-If) If (S-Id) Id Ii. I also forgot to mention that (a), unlike (b) and (c), is consistent with T. L. Short's assertion on page 253 of Peirce's Theory of Signs (2007) that Ii (S-If) (S-Id) is the only workable order for those three trichotomies. He even provided illustrative examples to support this claim, as follows. 1 1 1 = qualitative/hypothetic, term/rheme/seme, presented/suggestive = any work of art so far as ‘pure.’ 2 1 1 = experiental/categorical, term/rheme/seme, presented/suggestive = pokes in the back, pointings. 2 2 1 = experiental/categorical, proposition/dicent/pheme, presented/suggestive = questions. 2 2 2 = experiental/categorical, proposition/dicent/pheme, urged/imperative = commands, moral imperatives. 3 1 1 = logical/relative, term/rheme/seme, presented/suggestive = nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs. 3 2 1 = logical/relative, proposition/dicent/pheme, presented/suggestive = hypotheses, proposed plans. 3 2 2 = logical/relative, proposition/dicent/pheme, urged/imperative = assertions. 3 3 1 = logical/relative, argument/delome, presented/suggestive = the presentation of an argument. 3 3 2 = logical/relative, argument/delome, urged/imperative = the urging of an argument. 3 3 3 = logical/relative, argument/delome, submitted/indicative = the submission of an argument. Qualitative, experiential, and logical are my shorthand for Peirce's division of signs based on the immediate interpretant as given at CP8.339--interpretable in qualities of feeling or experience, interpretable in actual experiences, interpretable in thoughts or other signs of the same kind in infinite series. Presented, urged, and submitted come from CP8.338, which is also where Peirce clearly indicates that (S-If) (S-Id). According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument only may be submitted to its interpretant, as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent may be urged upon the interpretant by an act of insistence. 3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme can only be, presented to the interpretant for contemplation. Regards, Jon -- - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Wow, I must have completely misunderstood you before. To clarify (hopefully) once and for all ... 1. Which interpretant must have the MOST information, immediate or final/normal? 2. Which mode corresponds to the MOST information, Firstness or Thirdness? 3. If the dynamic interpretant is a Second, which interpretant can be a First--immediate or final/normal? Thanks, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: JON (earlier): Peirce clearly states, as we have quoted to each other several times now, It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. EDWINA: All this means is that an Object in, for example, a mode of Firstness cannot become an Interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness. But, an Object in, for example, a mode of Secondness CAN become an Interpretant in a mode of Firstness (eg, a rhematic indexical sinsign). And, an Interpretant in a Mode of Thirdness cannot be 'determined' by an Object in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. JON: Right; but based on what Peirce goes on to say, it ALSO means that an explicit interpretant in a mode of Thirdness cannot be determined by an effective interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. EDWINA: Again, I see the Destinate as a synonym of Immediate; the Effective is Dynamic; and the Explicit is Final/Normal. JON: If this were the case, then a final/normal interpretant in a mode of Thirdness could not correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. But a final/normal interpretant in a mode of Thirdness (MORE information) CAN, in fact, correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness (LESS information). Is it the IMMEDIATE interpretant in a mode of Thirdness (MORE information) that cannot correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness (LESS information). At least, that is what I understood from all of your previous comments. Thus, destinate=final/normal and explicit=immediate. EDWINA: I don't agree that IF the Dynamic Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness, that this means that the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness ... I don't see that the DI determines the II. JON: Likewise, a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness cannot correspond to an immediate interpretant in a mode of Secondness or Thirdness, because this would mean that the immediate interpretant has MORE information than the dynamic interpretant. Remember, determines in this context simply means has an equal or higher adicity; so if the DI must have equal or higher adicity than the II, as we previously agreed, then the DI DOES determine the II, in this specific sense. EDWINA: The process is from the II to DI to FI. Not the other way around. JON: One more time--I am NOT discussing the temporal sequence of the semiosic process, but rather the taxonomic order of determination that results in (only) 66 sign classes from 10 trichotomies. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
1) I think that you'll have to get someone else to explain to me why I continue to fail to understand your point of: JON: If this were the case, then a final/normal interpretant in a mode of Thirdness could not correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. But a final/normal interpretant in a mode of Thirdness (MORE information) CAN, in fact, correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness (LESS information). Is it the IMMEDIATE interpretant in a mode of Thirdness (MORE information) that cannot correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness (LESS information). At least, that is what I understood from all of your previous comments. Thus, destinate=final/normal and explicit=immediate. EDWINA: My point is that a FI in a mode of Thirdness cannot have its DI in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. And an II in a mode of Thirdness could have its DI andFI in modes of Firstness and Secondness (less information). Whereas, your point is that a FI can be in a mode of Thirdness while its DI could be only in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. I simply don't understand this. Where would the increased information in the FI come from? 2) EDWINA: I don't agree that IF the Dynamic Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness, that this means that the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness ... I don't see that the DI determines the II. JON: Likewise, a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness cannot correspond to an immediate interpretant in a mode of Secondness or Thirdness, because this would mean that the immediate interpretant has MORE information than the dynamic interpretant. Remember, determines in this context simply means has an equal or higher adicity; so if the DI must have equal or higher adicity than the II, as we previously agreed, then the DI DOES determine the II, in this specific sense. EDWINA: If the DI is in a mode of Firstness, then, the II could be in a mode of Secondness or Firstness!Yes, the II could have more information than the DI - and the DI would have, for some reason, lost information. I don't agree that the DI must have equal or higher adicity than the II; I think it's the other way around. The FI, for example, can't have higher adicity (modality) than the DI! Again - that sounds like Platonism. - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 1:44 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: JON (earlier): Peirce clearly states, as we have quoted to each other several times now, It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. EDWINA: All this means is that an Object in, for example, a mode of Firstness cannot become an Interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness. But, an Object in, for example, a mode of Secondness CAN become an Interpretant in a mode of Firstness (eg, a rhematic indexical sinsign). And, an Interpretant in a Mode of Thirdness cannot be 'determined' by an Object in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. JON: Right; but based on what Peirce goes on to say, it ALSO means that an explicit interpretant in a mode of Thirdness cannot be determined by an effective interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. EDWINA: Again, I see the Destinate as a synonym of Immediate; the Effective is Dynamic; and the Explicit is Final/Normal. JON: If this were the case, then a final/normal interpretant in a mode of Thirdness could not correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness. But a final/normal interpretant in a mode of Thirdness (MORE information) CAN, in fact, correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness (LESS information). Is it the IMMEDIATE interpretant in a mode of Thirdness (MORE information) that cannot correspond to a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Secondness (LESS information). At least, that is what I understood from all of your previous comments. Thus, destinate=final/normal and explicit=immediate. EDWINA: I don't agree that IF the Dynamic Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness, that this means that the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness ... I don't see that the DI determines the II. JON: Likewise, a dynamic interpretant in a mode of Firstness cannot correspond to an immediate interpretant in a mode of Secondness or Thirdness, because this would mean that the immediate interpretant has MORE information than the dynamic interpretant. Remember, determines in this context simply means has an equal or higher adicity; so if the DI must have equal or higher adicity than the II, as we previously agreed, then the DI DOES determine the II
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See my comments:
- Original Message -
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 12:43 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List:
EDWINA: I don't follow your interpretation of the Spink's comment - I see
the Destinate as a synonym of Immediate; the Effective is Dynamic; and the
Explicit is Final/Normal.
JON: Peirce clearly states, as we have quoted to each other several times
now, It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant.
EDWINA: All this means is that an Object in, for example, a mode of
Firstness cannot become an Interpretant in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness.
But, an Object in, for example, a mode of Secondness CAN become an Interpretant
in a mode of Firstness (eg, a rhematic indexical sinsign).
And, an Interpretant in a Mode of Thirdness cannot be 'determined' by an
Object in a mode of Firstness or Secondness.
2) Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid
Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which
determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective
Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, ... {Peirce}
If destinate=immediate, effective=dynamic, and explicit=final/normal, then
Ii = Id = If; that is, Ii can be a Third when Id and If are Firsts, which we
previously agreed is NOT the case.
EDWINA: Actually, yes, the DI and FI can lose information within the
process. What is NOT the case is that the Interpretive process would INCREASE
its informational content from II to DI to FI. So, for example, the rhematic
symbolic legisign, which begins with the Object in interaction with mediation
as a symbol (mode of Thirdness); and is mediated within habits of the legisign
(mode of Thirdness)...but...still ends up in the Interpretant in a mode of
Firstness. So - the interpretive process can and frequently does, lose
information.
JON: If Ii must be a First when Id is a First, and Id must be a First when
If is a First, then If = Id = Ii; i.e., destinate=final, effective=dynamic,
and explicit=immediate. Again, this is NOT the temporal sequence of the
semiosic process; it is the taxonomic order of determination that results in 66
sign classes from 10 trichotomies. As Ben Udell has pointed out, it is also
consistent with Peirce's use of words like predestinate and destined
EDWINA: I don't agree that IF the Dynamic Interpretant is in a mode of
Firstness, that this means that the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of
Firstness. Again, I see the Destinate as a synonym of Immediate; the Effective
is Dynamic; and the Explicit is Final/Normal.I don't see that the DI determines
the II. The process is from the II to DI to FI. Not the other way around.
And I don't see how your 'taxonomic order' can change the temporal or modal
informational order. But I urge you to read Spinks work - for he can possibly
answer your questions - which are far beyond my capability!
Regards,
Jon
-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Thank you for the clarification. Just to confirm, this is what I now understand to be your actual view. 1. Information never increases during the semeiosic process; it either stays the same or decreases. 2. The temporal sequence of the three interpretants during the semeiosic process is immediate, then dynamic, then final. 3. From #1 and #2, the final interpretant cannot have MORE information than the dynamic interpretant, which cannot have MORE information than the immediate interpretant. 4. More information entails less ambiguity, while less information entails greater ambiguity. 5. From #3 and #4, the immediate interpretant cannot be MORE ambiguous than the dynamic intepretant, which cannot be MORE ambiguous than the final interpretant. 6. A higher-mode interpretant has MORE information than a lower-mode interpretant; i.e., a Third has MORE information than a Second, which has MORE information than a First. 7. From #3 and #6, if the immediate interpretant is a First (qualitative/hypothetic), then the dynamic and final interpretants must also be Firsts (sympathetic/congruentive and gratific). 8. From #3 and #6, if the final interpretant is a Third (to produce self-control), then the dynamic and immediate interpretants must also be Thirds (usual and logical/relative). You agree with all of these statements, right? Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
- Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 3:01 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: Wow, I must have completely misunderstood you before. To clarify (hopefully) once and for all ... JON:1. Which interpretant must have the MOST information, immediate or final/normal? EDWINA: This question can't be answered the way it is posed. You can't declare that either the Immediate OR Final Interpretant MUST have the most information. After all, all three Interpretants could be in the same categorical mode of Firstness, and so- ALL would have the SAME amount of information. But, in my view, if the Immediate is in a mode of Firstness or Secondness, then, the Final CANNOT be in a mode of Thirdness. That would imply that it had MORE information than the two previous Interpretants..and I'd want to know where this information came from! JON: 2. Which mode corresponds to the MOST information, Firstness or Thirdness? EDWINA: The modes can even be considered as having the same amount of 'energy' (though this doesn't translate to information) even though presented in different forms. Firstness is packed full of energy but it's qualitative or ambiguous energy and as such, in itself offers little information. Secondness can be packed full of energy but it's formatted differently, in discrete specifics which we can consider as specific information. Thirdness is equally full of energy but it's generalized into rules - which are vital to formatting information. So, Thirdness, unpacked, would have the most information within its habits. JON: 3. If the dynamic interpretant is a Second, which interpretant can be a First--immediate or final/normal? EDWINA: I presume you are referring to modal categories. In my view, if the DI is in a mode of Secondness, then, the Final Interpretant could be in a mode of Secondness or Firstness. The Immediate Interpretant could also be in a mode of Secondness. I know that you consider that if the DI is in a mode of Secondness, that the II could be in a mode of Firstness. I simply don't see how the 'input' of this triad of interpretants (the II) could have a weaker informational mode than the output (the FI). How do you, for example, move your knowledge base about an external object or event from this FI (at the time) of, let's say, Firstness or Secondness...to moving closer to the truth of that external object/event? By MORE thought, MORE semiosic information being added, so that, over time, your Interpretants would be ALL in a mode of Thirdness! Thanks, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Unfortunately, your response today directly contradicts what you said just yesterday. EDWINA on 08/18 (below): But, in my view, if the Immediate is in a mode of Firstness or Secondness, then, the Final CANNOT be in a mode of Thirdness. That would imply that it had MORE information than the two previous Interpretants..and I'd want to know where this information came from! JON: This says that the final interpretant cannot have MORE information than the immediate interpretant. But previously ... EDWINA on 08/17 ( http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16975): That is, the earlier Interpretants cannot contain MORE information than the later ones. JON: This says that the (earlier) immediate interpretant cannot have MORE information than the (later) final interpretant. Which is it? EDWINA on 08/18 (below): So, Thirdness, unpacked, would have the most information within its habits. JON: This part, at least, is consistent. EDWINA on 08/18 (below): In my view, if the DI is in a mode of Secondness, then, the Final Interpretant could be in a mode of Secondness or Firstness. JON: This says that the dynamic interpretant must have an adicity that is equal to or higher than that of the final interpretant. But previously ... EDWINA on 08/17 ( http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16978): You suggested that your example of a Final Interpretant was one that was in a mode of Secondness...i.e. it wasn't 'truth-seeking'. So, if it was a Second, then, the DI has to be in a less 'energy-intensive' mode, either in a Firstness or Secondness, and the same with the Immediate Interpretant. If the FI is in a mode of Secondness, AND, in your example, the DI is in Firstness, then, of course, the II must be in a mode of Firstness. It cannot be in a higher energy-intensive mode! JON: This says that the final interpretant must have an adicity that is equal to or higher than that of the dynamic interpretant (and the immediate interpretant). Which is it? Thanks, Jon On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: - Original Message - *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com *To:* Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu *Sent:* Tuesday, August 18, 2015 3:01 PM *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: Wow, I must have completely misunderstood you before. To clarify (hopefully) once and for all ... JON:1. Which interpretant must have the MOST information, immediate or final/normal? EDWINA: This question can't be answered the way it is posed. You can't declare that either the Immediate OR Final Interpretant MUST have the most information. After all, all three Interpretants could be in the same categorical mode of Firstness, and so- ALL would have the SAME amount of information. But, in my view, if the Immediate is in a mode of Firstness or Secondness, then, the Final CANNOT be in a mode of Thirdness. That would imply that it had MORE information than the two previous Interpretants..and I'd want to know where this information came from! JON: 2. Which mode corresponds to the MOST information, Firstness or Thirdness? EDWINA: The modes can even be considered as having the same amount of 'energy' (though this doesn't translate to information) even though presented in different forms. Firstness is packed full of energy but it's qualitative or ambiguous energy and as such, in itself offers little information. Secondness can be packed full of energy but it's formatted differently, in discrete specifics which we can consider as specific information. Thirdness is equally full of energy but it's generalized into rules - which are vital to formatting information. So, Thirdness, unpacked, would have the most information within its habits. JON: 3. If the dynamic interpretant is a Second, which interpretant can be a First--immediate or final/normal? EDWINA: I presume you are referring to modal categories. In my view, if the DI is in a mode of Secondness, then, the Final Interpretant could be in a mode of Secondness or Firstness. The Immediate Interpretant could also be in a mode of Secondness. I know that you consider that if the DI is in a mode of Secondness, that the II could be in a mode of Firstness. I simply don't see how the 'input' of this triad of interpretants (the II) could have a weaker informational mode than the output (the FI). How do you, for example, move your knowledge base about an external object or event from this FI (at the time) of, let's say, Firstness or Secondness...to moving closer to the truth of that external object/event? By MORE thought, MORE semiosic information being added, so that, over time, your Interpretants would be ALL in a mode of Thirdness! Thanks, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon - I think it's time we ended this thread or went off-line. It must be tedious in the extreme for others on the list. I'll just answer this one - and then, if you want to continue the debate, please do so off-list. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 6:10 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: Thank you for the clarification. Just to confirm, this is what I now understand to be your actual view. Jon: 1. Information never increases during the semeiosic process; it either stays the same or decreases. EDWINA: Well, yes and no - The semiosic process moves ambiguity to information - but that's within the whole process. You have focused ONLY on the output, the three Interpretants and that's what my answers were referring to. But - If you consider the whole triad, then, the vital importance of the Representamen, which transforms input data from the Dynamic/Imm Objects should be considered. So, an unknown (ambiguous) sound from the outside can be transformed by the knowledge embedded in the Representamen to one's specific informed conclusion 'oh, that's the door bell'. JON: 2. The temporal sequence of the three interpretants during the semeiosic process is immediate, then dynamic, then final. EDWINA: Yes. JON: 3. From #1 and #2, the final interpretant cannot have MORE information than the dynamic interpretant, which cannot have MORE information than the immediate interpretant. EDWINA: Agreed. The FI cannot have more information unless some is added..from a networking with other Signs. This would reduce the ambiguity and clarify the result. Again - this is referring only to what's going on AFTER the mediation of the Representamen. JON: 4. More information entails less ambiguity, while less information entails greater ambiguity. EDWINA: Agreed - understanding that ambiguity does NOT mean 'generalizations'. The comparison should only be between Firstness and Secondness. JON: 5. From #3 and #4, the immediate interpretant cannot be MORE ambiguous than the dynamic intepretant, which cannot be MORE ambiguous than the final interpretant. EDWINA: Can the II be in a mode of Firstness while the DI is in a mode of Secondness? I don't think so. JON: 6. A higher-mode interpretant has MORE information than a lower-mode interpretant; i.e., a Third has MORE information than a Second, which has MORE information than a First. EDWINA: I don't think your comparison is accurate; the types of information are different - the FORM of the information is different; Secondness Information is local, particular, specific, while Thirdness Information is general and habitual modes. Now, Thirdness can be, possibly, reduced to specifics, but in its own nature, its information is 'common' and habitual rather than particular. JON: 7. From #3 and #6, if the immediate interpretant is a First (qualitative/hypothetic), then the dynamic and final interpretants must also be Firsts (sympathetic/congruentive and gratific). 8. From #3 and #6, if the final interpretant is a Third (to produce self-control), then the dynamic and immediate interpretants must also be Thirds (usual and logical/relative). EDWINA: Yes. You agree with all of these statements, right? Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: I will reply to the list one last time, just in case someone else would like to join the fun. I certainly am still interested in getting others' thoughts about my original question, especially since I feel like I am now right back where I started. If you prefer to continue our specific conversation off-list, that is fine. Frankly, what you said yesterday made more sense to me, even though prior to that I thought (as you do) that Ii = Id = If. It seems like the immediate interpretant would have to be the most ambiguous of the three, while the final interpretant would have to be the most definitive--consistent with the alignment of immediate/dynamic/final with Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness; or perhaps I should say doubly-degenerate/degenerate/genuine Thirdness. After all, how can the truth be MORE ambiguous than a mere first impression? I wonder if the problem all along has been my incomplete grasp of the terminology. Furthermore, how would you respond to Mueller's argument in favor of If = Id = Ii? Consider the il being of the nature of a First. Then by Peircean phenomenological principle this il can only rule dynamic and normal Interpretants of the same nature. But that is unacceptable. There must be the chance that a sign which given enough time for consideration would be interpreted (ni) as a Third is actually interpreted (di) as a Second. So the ni should precede the di and in analogy to the two objects the di the il. Note that precede here is not in the temporal sense (sequence of semeiosic process), but in the taxonomic sense (order of determination). In any event, what would still be really helpful to me are some illustrative examples. Assuming that you are correct about the taxonomic order of determination, what would be some signs that are shocking/percussive (Id=2) and either logical/relative (Ii=3) or gratific (If=1)? Contrary to that hypothesis, are there any signs that are shocking/percussive (Id=2) and either qualitative/hypothetic (Ii=1) or to produce self-control (If=3)? Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Thank you for the book suggestion, I will look into it. However ... EDWINA: If the Dynamic Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness, then, the Final won't be in a mode of Firstness! This is what we agreed earlier; but it entails that destinate=final and explicit=immediate. SPINKS, p. 197: the Destinate Interpretant becomes the Immediate Interpretant of the fifth trichotomy, the Effective Interpretant becomes the Dynamical Interpretants (Active and Passive) of the sixth and seventh trichotomoies, and the Explicit Interpretant becomes the eight, ninth and tenth trichtomoies dealing with the Normal Interpretant If this is correct--and I thought it was until yesterday--then the order is Ii = Id = In; i.e., if the dynamic interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness, then the final interpretant CAN be in in a mode of Firstness. Again, we agreed earlier that this is NOT the case. The adjustment to my notation (= rather than ) reflects the fact that the adicity of each trichotomy (1, 2, or 3) must always be equal to or less than that of its predecessor. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: EDWINA: I don't follow your interpretation of the Spink's comment - I see the Destinate as a synonym of Immediate; the Effective is Dynamic; and the Explicit is Final/Normal. JON: Peirce clearly states, as we have quoted to each other several times now, It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, ... If destinate=immediate, effective=dynamic, and explicit=final/normal, then Ii = Id = If; that is, Ii can be a Third when Id and If are Firsts, which we previously agreed is NOT the case. If Ii must be a First when Id is a First, and Id must be a First when If is a First, then If = Id = Ii; i.e., destinate=final, effective=dynamic, and explicit=immediate. Again, this is NOT the temporal sequence of the semiosic process; it is the taxonomic order of determination that results in 66 sign classes from 10 trichotomies. As Ben Udell has pointed out, it is also consistent with Peirce's use of words like predestinate and destined elsewhere. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Unfortunately, your response today directly contradicts what you said just yesterday. 1) EDWINA on 08/18 (below): But, in my view, if the Immediate is in a mode of Firstness or Secondness, then, the Final CANNOT be in a mode of Thirdness. That would imply that it had MORE information than the two previous Interpretants..and I'd want to know where this information came from! JON: This says that the final interpretant cannot have MORE information than the immediate interpretant. But previously ... EDWINA on 08/17 (http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16975): That is, the earlier Interpretants cannot contain MORE information than the later ones. JON: This says that the (earlier) immediate interpretant cannot have MORE information than the (later) final interpretant. Which is it? EDWINA: My apologies. I reread what I wrote - and I don't see that my example nullified my view that the Final Interpretant can't contain more information than is offered to it by the two previous Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants. It should read that the later interpretants can't contain more information than offered within the earlier interpretants. After all, information can be lost in the process from II-Di-Fi. I wrote: Obviously, these are within the three modal categories. Now - you ask IF the Final Interpretant, which I consider as operating only within 'mind-analysis' and using reason (the mode of Thirdness) , is in a mode of Secondness (and thus, 'tinged' with action) and, since it is linked to the earlier two Interpretants - then, this could be Thirdness-as-Secondness. So, you ask if the earlier Dynamic Interpretant in this same situation can be in a mode of Firstness? Yes, it could be in Thirdness-as-Firstness or Thirdness-as-Secondness. And the Immediate Interpretant, still linked to that Final Interpretant in its mode of Thirdness-as-Secondness, could be in a mode of 3-1 or 3-2. But most certainly not in pure Thirdness or 'Significative' or 'Relative'. That is, the earlier Interpretants cannot contain MORE information than the later ones. They can contain MORE ambiguity than the later ones. EDWINA on 08/18 (below): So, Thirdness, unpacked, would have the most information within its habits. JON: This part, at least, is consistent. 2) EDWINA on 08/18 (below): In my view, if the DI is in a mode of Secondness, then, the Final Interpretant could be in a mode of Secondness or Firstness. JON: This says that the dynamic interpretant must have an adicity that is equal to or higher than that of the final interpretant. But previously ... EDWINA on 08/17 (http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16978): You suggested that your example of a Final Interpretant was one that was in a mode of Secondness...i.e. it wasn't 'truth-seeking'. So, if it was a Second, then, the DI has to be in a less 'energy-intensive' mode, either in a Firstness or Secondness, and the same with the Immediate Interpretant. If the FI is in a mode of Secondness, AND, in your example, the DI is in Firstness, then, of course, the II must be in a mode of Firstness. It cannot be in a higher energy-intensive mode! JON: This says that the final interpretant must have an adicity that is equal to or higher than that of the dynamic interpretant (and the immediate interpretant). Which is it? EDWINA: Again, apologies: If the FI is in a mode of Secondness, then the DI has to be also in 2nd. The FI can't have an adicity higher than its DI and II. [I was mixing up Interpretants and Objects, for the DO and IO can 'reduce' where the DO can be in a mode of 2ndness but the IO can have lost that specificity and be in a mode of 1stness]. Thanks, Jon On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 3:01 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: Wow, I must have completely misunderstood you before. To clarify (hopefully) once and for all ... JON:1. Which interpretant must have the MOST information, immediate or final/normal? EDWINA: This question can't be answered the way it is posed. You can't declare that either the Immediate OR Final Interpretant MUST have the most information. After all, all three Interpretants could be in the same categorical mode of Firstness, and so- ALL would have the SAME amount of information. But, in my view, if the Immediate is in a mode of Firstness or Secondness, then, the Final CANNOT be in a mode of Thirdness. That would imply that it had MORE information than the two previous Interpretants..and I'd want to know where this information came from! JON: 2. Which mode
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
I do urge you to read the Spinks book; he goes into great detail on the interpretants. That 'third trichotomy' or 'signs related to their interpretants..all the way from ch 3 through 6. Very detailed. If we are talking about 'Interpretant Growth', which is to say, the depth of information held within that Interpretant, then, the growth must be from the II to DI to FI. The II is internal and thus, lacks the breadth and depth of relations with Others of the DI and FI. And certainly, categorically, Thirdness cannot, in these interpretants, precede Firstness. That would be a Platonic essentialism, suggesting that 'Truth' was pre-existent and Formed..and would 'draw' matter/concepts to it. I don't follow your interpretation of the Spink's comment - I see the Destinate as a synonym of Immediate; the Effective is Dynamic; and the Explicit is Final/Normal. - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 11:03 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: Thank you for the book suggestion, I will look into it. However ... EDWINA: If the Dynamic Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness, then, the Final won't be in a mode of Firstness! This is what we agreed earlier; but it entails that destinate=final and explicit=immediate. SPINKS, p. 197: the Destinate Interpretant becomes the Immediate Interpretant of the fifth trichotomy, the Effective Interpretant becomes the Dynamical Interpretants (Active and Passive) of the sixth and seventh trichotomoies, and the Explicit Interpretant becomes the eight, ninth and tenth trichtomoies dealing with the Normal Interpretant If this is correct--and I thought it was until yesterday--then the order is Ii = Id = In; i.e., if the dynamic interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness, then the final interpretant CAN be in in a mode of Firstness. Again, we agreed earlier that this is NOT the case. The adjustment to my notation (= rather than ) reflects the fact that the adicity of each trichotomy (1, 2, or 3) must always be equal to or less than that of its predecessor. Regards, Jon -- - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Responses interleaved below. EDWINA: See my comments below:..a side note; can you deal with your font. I can't read the small print - and can't seem to change it on my computer. JON: Strange, your font is the one that has been coming up small when I read and reply to your messages. I wonder if this is a List issue, a Gmail issue, both, or neither. Hopefully this message will come through better for you. Note that if you visit http://news.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce, you can see each message reproduced entirely in one consistent (and readable) font. EDWINA: Yes, only Actuals EXIST, but I am very cautious about your use of 'would-be'. Peirce writes: 'there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached (8.184). BUT - this Final Interpretant, which is a 'would-be' is NOT, I repeat NOT the same thing as 'general types'. The general type is a universal, and for Peirce, who is an Aristotelian and not a Platonist, generals are REAL. They are not some 'future would-be'; they are REAL, but function only within the articulation of particulars. This is not the same as a consideration of what the ultimate truth might-be, if we analyzed the situation long enough. JON: Understood, thanks for the clarification. EDWINA: Reality and existentiality are not the same thing. Peirce is referring, in this section to Habits - which are not the same as the Final Interpretant, but are operative within Thirdness...and usually, function within the Representamen, since they are generals and are not 'actualized' in discrete units'. Yes, truth is found in the Final Interpretant. But truth and habits are not identical. JON: Agreed, that brings into the picture what Peirce called the ultimate logical interpretant. EDWINA: If the FI is in a mode of Secondness, AND, in your example, the DI is in Firstness, then, of course, the II must be in a mode of Firstness. It cannot be in a higher energy-intensive mode! JON: Got it, thanks. Again, this confirms IfIdIi. EDWINA: But - we'd have to define what we mean by 'information' - and I'd say that the term refers to a reduction in ambiguity. JON: Right, as I stated, more information = greater determination = less vagueness. * * * Next question--given that IfIdIi, where do the three interpretant relation trichotomies fit? S-Id = Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant = Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Intepretant - Presented/Suggestive, Urged/Imperative, Submitted/Indicative. S-If = Relation of the Sign to the Normal/Final Interpretant = Nature of the Influence of the Sign - Rheme/Seme, Dicent/Pheme, Argument/Delome. S-Od-If = Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object and Its Normal/Final Interpretant = Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance - Instinct, Experience, Form. According to Peirce (CP8.338), we also know that S-IfS-Id. Here are some arrangements, consistent with this, that I have seen. (a) IfIdIiS-IfS-IdS-Od-If. (b) IfS-IfIdS-IdIiS-Od-If. (c) S-Od-IfS-IfIfS-IdIdIi. All of the correlates come before all of the relations in (a), and each correlate comes right before its corresponding relation in (b), except that the triadic relation is last. What bothers me about (c)--which has been advocated in years past by Ben Udell and Bernard Morand, perhaps others--is that it involves relation trichotomies determining their constituent correlate trichotomies. It seems to me that, just as S-Od comes after both Od and S, likewise S-If must come after both S and If, S-Id must come after both S and Id, and S-Od-If must come after Od, S, If, and S-If. The problem is that I can offer no good reason for such a restriction, other than the common-sense notion that a relation cannot be more determinate than any of its relata. Am I wrong about this? Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See comments below: 1) JON: Next question--given that IfIdIi, where do the three interpretant relation trichotomies fit? S-Id = Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant = Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Intepretant - Presented/Suggestive, Urged/Imperative, Submitted/Indicative. S-If = Relation of the Sign to the Normal/Final Interpretant = Nature of the Influence of the Sign - Rheme/Seme, Dicent/Pheme, Argument/Delome. S-Od-If = Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object and Its Normal/Final Interpretant = Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance - Instinct, Experience, Form. EDWINA: We must acknowledge that the Peircean Sign is triadic; it is NOT made up of dyads. Therefore, it is not made up of the Relation of the Representamen-DO, or Representamen-DI...etc. We can, however, analyze these internal-to-the-triad Relations. And, the Relations are obviously in any one of the three modal categories. BUT - again, within the full set of Six interactions DO-IO- Representamen-II-DI-FIthese must be in harmony - as has been slightly explained in previous posts. 2) JON: According to Peirce (CP8.338), we also know that S-IfS-Id. Here are some arrangements, consistent with this, that I have seen. EDWINA: I'm not sure of the above as a general truth. You are saying, if I understand your notations, that the Relation between the Representamen and the Final Interpretant has more information than the Relation between the Representamen and the Dynamic Interpretant. But they could be equal. 3) JON: (a) IfIdIiS-IfS-IdS-Od-If. EDWINA:What about Representamen-DOIO-Representamen-IIDOFO--Representamen.. Understanding the above within Peirce's Thought..is more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of us. 8.256. Understanding 'Thought' as 'Mind' and as held within the Representamen. That is, semiosis operates within Mind and its generalized universals...which are articulated/made existential within a triad of interactions: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. 4) JON: (b) IfS-IfIdS-IdIiS-Od-If. EDWINA: Seems to be a set of dyads...? The FI and DI and II have more information than the Representamen? Or just more particularized information? Your triad of S-Od-If, which I read as Representamen-Dynamic Object-Final Interpretant...Do you agree with my outline in point 3 above, which I copy here as: That is, semiosis operates within Mind and its generalized universals...which are articulated/made existential within a triad of interactions: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. (c) S-Od-IfS-IfIfS-IdIdIi. All of the correlates come before all of the relations in (a), and each correlate comes right before its corresponding relation in (b), except that the triadic relation is last. What bothers me about (c)--which has been advocated in years past by Ben Udell and Bernard Morand, perhaps others--is that it involves relation trichotomies determining their constituent correlate trichotomies. It seems to me that, just as S-Od comes after both Od and S, likewise S-If must come after both S and If, S-Id must come after both S and Id, and S-Od-If must come after Od, S, If, and S-If. The problem is that I can offer no good reason for such a restriction, other than the common-sense notion that a relation cannot be more determinate than any of its relata. Am I wrong about this? EDWINA: You've begun with the triad. And with the Representamen as 'the ground'. You've left out the Immediate Objectand have the Representamen in three dyads: R-FI; R-DI; R-II (I think). Sorry- but I don't understand what you are trying to get across. You state: just as S-Od comes after both Od and S, likewise S-If must come after both S and If,and I don't understand your point. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: You evidently misunderstood what I was indicating, which is probably my fault for not being clear. I was only listing the six trichotomies that come AFTER the first four, which are Od Oi S (S-Od). Including all ten this time ... (a) Od Oi S (S-Od) If Id Ii (S-If) (S-Id) (S-Od-If). (b) Od Oi S (S-Od) If (S-If) Id (S-Id) Ii (S-Od-If). (c) Od Oi S (S-Od) (S-Od-If) (S-If) If (S-Id) Id Ii. I also forgot to mention that (a), unlike (b) and (c), is consistent with T. L. Short's assertion on page 253 of *Peirce's Theory of Signs* (2007) that Ii (S-If) (S-Id) is the only workable order for those three trichotomies. He even provided illustrative examples to support this claim, as follows. 1 1 1 = qualitative/hypothetic, term/rheme/seme, presented/suggestive = any work of art so far as ‘pure.’ 2 1 1 = experiental/categorical, term/rheme/seme, presented/suggestive = pokes in the back, pointings. 2 2 1 = experiental/categorical, proposition/dicent/pheme, presented/suggestive = questions. 2 2 2 = experiental/categorical, proposition/dicent/pheme, urged/imperative = commands, moral imperatives. 3 1 1 = logical/relative, term/rheme/seme, presented/suggestive = nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs. 3 2 1 = logical/relative, proposition/dicent/pheme, presented/suggestive = hypotheses, proposed plans. 3 2 2 = logical/relative, proposition/dicent/pheme, urged/imperative = assertions. 3 3 1 = logical/relative, argument/delome, presented/suggestive = the presentation of an argument. 3 3 2 = logical/relative, argument/delome, urged/imperative = the urging of an argument. 3 3 3 = logical/relative, argument/delome, submitted/indicative = the submission of an argument. Qualitative, experiential, and logical are my shorthand for Peirce's division of signs based on the immediate interpretant as given at CP8.339--interpretable in qualities of feeling or experience, interpretable in actual experiences, interpretable in thoughts or other signs of the same kind in infinite series. Presented, urged, and submitted come from CP8.338, which is also where Peirce clearly indicates that (S-If) (S-Id). According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument only may be submitted to its interpretant, as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent may be urged upon the interpretant by an act of insistence. 3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme can only be, presented to the interpretant for contemplation. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
A further comment to my comments below. I do not view the possible divisions of the three Interpretants each into three modes as operationally functional. That is, the resultant nine divisions would move the sign into decomposition. Instead, we must consider the modes and where they overlap. For example, the Immediate Interpretant is strictly internal. Therefore, its modal categories must involve Firstness, operative spatially internally and within immediate time. It cannot move into a spatial categorical mode of Secondness (which is external and in linear time)..although, it could operate in the mode of Secondness-as-Firstness...(1.365)..which has no separate existentiality but is 'only conceived as such'. And it could operate within Thirdness-as-Firstness, which is 'Thirds degenerate in the second degree...that of resemblance' (1.367). The Dynamic Interpretant must involve Secondness. It could be linked to the Immediate Interpretant and ALSO be 'Secondness-as-Firstness'..but that would mean that the number of options would be reduced - for the Dynamic Interpretant wouldn't exist 'as such' but would actually be an Immediate Interpretant operating in that grade of Secondness which is 'degenerate'. And it could operate within Thirdness-as-Secondness...but that 'is where there is in the fact itself no Thirdness or mediation, but where there is true duality (1.366). Another example..The final Interpretant must involve Thirdness. ..but - if we consider its two degrees of degeneracy, we lose two in this area for they are linked to the Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. And the total number of interpretants in their modes is reduced to six. Edwina - Original Message - From: Edwina Taborsky To: Jon Alan Schmidt Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2015 8:44 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes See my comments below: - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2015 4:24 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. Edwina: Here, I disagree; as I said before, I don't see that each Representamen must have all three Interpretants. --- JON: The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by 'distinct'. As Peirce says, the immediate object is defined 'according to the Mode of Presentation (EP2:p 482, CP 8:344). So, the Immediate Object differs from the Dynamic Object because the DO functions according to its mode of Being (it IS an external sense, while the Immediate Object is an internal sense). Jon: However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. EDWINA: Peirce's analysis in these sections, eg, the list of ten..cp 8.344, doesn't, as far as I can see, divide each, eg, Interpretant into three further divisions, which is what you seem to be saying. For example, in this list, he refers to the Sign or Representamen as defined/functional within: its mode of apprehension; then, the Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object; then, the Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant; then, the Relation of the Sign to the Normal (Final) Interpretant; and, the Triadic Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object and to its Normal (Final ) Interpretant. Then, he goes on to examine these five functions of the Sign/Representamen in more detail. With regard to the Immediate Object, he refers to its mode of Presentation. That's it. With regard to the Dynamical Object, he refers to its Mode of Being[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign to that Dynamical Object). With regard to the Immediate Interpretant - he refers only to its 'mode of Presentation'. Similar to the Immediate Object'. With regard to the Dynamical Interpretant - he refers to its Mode of Being ..[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant] With regard to the normal/Final Interpretant, he refers to the Nature of this Interpretant..[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See below: - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, August 17, 2015 1:14 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: Again, briefly ... 1) EDWINA: Yes - the semiosic Sign (that triad) is a process of transformation of 'data to data', or 'information to information' so to speak. A complex process. And I agree that the order is: DO-IO-R...which then goes on to II-DI-FI. JON: Just to be clear--are you saying that the proper order of the three interpretant trichotomies, in accordance with the rule of determination, is IiIdIf? EDWINA: I find your use of the phrase 'rule of determination' a 'bit much'. I'm cautious about the agential force implied by this phrase, and I don't think that Peirce meant such a deterministic linearity. All I'm saying is what seems obvious; namely, that within the semiosic process, the process begins with the input stimuli from the external Dynamic Object; this 'input' as internalized, is the Immediate Object. This stimuli is transformed within the mediative process of the Representamen, and as a result is 'interpreted' within one or two or three forms, as the Internal Immediate Interpretant, and then, might be more actualized as a distinct external Dynamic Interpretant...and then..might, but not always..move on to the analyzed Final Interpretant. 2) EDWINA: WITH THE added caution, that not all three Interpretants are always experienced. As I've said before, I consider that the majority of our experience, as fallible daily-living humans, ends with the II and DI. We rarely go on to a thorough analytic reasoning of FI. JON: If we understand the final interpretant to be a would-be, its reality (not existence) is not dependent on anyone ever actually experiencing it. In that sense, every sign has an immediate interpretant and a final interpretant, but some signs do not have a dynamic interpretant; i.e., no interpretant of the sign is ever actualized. EDWINA: Well, here, I'm not so sure. I don't accept that 'would be' has any reality. I acknowledge that it certainly has no existence, but, I'm not sure that one could even declare that it has a reality. That, to me, is too deterministic and I feel you are moving into Platonism, and the point of evolution is that it is OPEN, adaptive, unknown..and NOT final or determined. I agree that some Signs operate only within the Immediate Interpretant and not also the Dynamic Interpretant. But I can't agree with your 'final interpretant' as it suggests a fundamentalist essentialist utopianism. 3) JON: However, there would still be a constraint on the mode of being or nature of any dynamic interpretant that could be actualized by that sign. Does that constraint come from the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant (IiId), or from the nature or purpose of the final interpretant (IfId)? Again, you seem to be saying the former, rather than the latter. The alternative is an order of either IiIfId or IfIiId, which no one advocates as far as I know. EDWINA: I think that your notion of the Final Interpretant, as essentially a Form, with its constraints, as a determinant on the being or nature of the Dynamic Interpretant..is Platonism - with that Form being the utopian perfection. Most unPeircean. Constraints come from the Representamen, the mediative process - and are not governed, authorized by some pre-existent Pure Form (the Final Interpretant!). 4) EDWINA: I don't see your problem with the above. Peirce is saying that there cannot be any change in the nature of an Immediate Object from its original stimuli, the Dynamic Object, and I don't see how there COULD be any difference. The Immediate Object cannot, on its own, ADD data to the stimuli of the External Dynamic Object! JON: I take Peirce to be saying that if the dynamic object is a Necessitant (collective), then the immediate object can be in any of the three categories (descriptive, denominative, distributive); if Od is an Actual (concretive), then Oi can be descriptive or denominative, but cannot be distributive; and if Od is a Possible, then Oi must be a descriptive. EDWINA: Peirce writes that if the DO is a 'possible' (mode of Firstness) then the IO could only be of the same nature 8.367, and 'If the Immediate Object were a Tendency or Habit, then the Dynamical Object must be of the same nature 8.367. So, I don't see how the Immediate Object can be MORE than the Dynamic Object. So, your outline above is, I think, correct. 5) EDWINA: Since all three Interpretants must have something in common, then, I'd agree with you that the order is: 3-1, 3-2 and finally, 3-3. JON: This is consistent with IiIdIf. Now, if the nature or purpose of the final interpretant is to produce action, the dynamic interpretant obviously can
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
I've just added a clarification - I might be misunderstanding Jon's notation... - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, August 17, 2015 1:14 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: Again, briefly ... EDWINA: Yes - the semiosic Sign (that triad) is a process of transformation of 'data to data', or 'information to information' so to speak. A complex process. And I agree that the order is: DO-IO-R...which then goes on to II-DI-FI. JON: Just to be clear--are you saying that the proper order of the three interpretant trichotomies, in accordance with the rule of determination, is IiIdIf? EDWINA: I might be misunderstanding your notation. I'm just considering that your IiIdIf notation simply means 'order of processing'. But I'm beginning to think that you mean something MORE. Your use of might be saying that Ii contains MORE information than Id; and that Id contains MORE information than If. I certainly would disagree with that! The Immediate Interpretant can be more ambiguous than the Dynamic Interpretant..and that more ambiguous than the Final Interpretant. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Briefly ... EDWINA: He later changed these to: Descriptive, Denominative and Distributive. The Immediate Object is internal. I note that Peirce did not, in his description of the above terms, refer to them as the 'Immediate Object'. He used only the term 'Objects'. Can the Immediate Object- which is internal - be a physical existentiality, akin to the external Dynamic Object? I can't agree with you that the above terms refer to the Immediate Object, seemingly in a separate existentiality for the mere fact of its being internal in 'an Other' means that it has no longer any separate existentiality. And Peirce notes, in 8.367, that the Immediate Object is in the same categorical mode as the Dynamical Object. JON: Peirce did, in fact, refer to the trichotomy of Descriptive, Designative/Denotative/Indicative/Denominative, Copulant/Copulative/Distributive as the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object (CP8.344, EP2:482). He later elaborated on the relations between this trichotomy and the one for the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign Itself--i.e., Potisign/Tone/Mark, Actisign/Token, Famisign/Type--and stated, The difference between the two trichotomies is that the one refers to the Presence to the Mind of the Sign and the other to that of the Immediate Object. (CP8.354, EP2:485) He went on to explain that, in accordance with the rule of determination, the proper order is OdOiS. The remaining six classes are possible, i.e., Copulative Potisigns, Denominative Potisigns, Copulative Actisigns, Descriptive Potisigns, Denominative Actisigns, Copulative Famisigns. (CP8.361, EP2:488) I was of the opinion that if the Dynamical Object be a mere Possible the Immediate Object could only be of the same nature, while if the Immediate Object were a Tendency or Habit then the Dynamical Object must be of the same nature. (CP8.367, EP2:489) This does not stipulate that the immediate object is always in the same categorical mode as the dynamic object; rather, it is simply a restatement of the rule of determination--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. (EP2:481) In other words, the possible modes of the immediate object are constrained by the actual mode of the dynamic object; only six of the nine combinations are possible. Unfortunately, Peirce did not provide the same kind of detailed analysis of the three interpretant trichotomies (CP8.369,370,372; EP2:489-490). Immediate - Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative Dynamic - Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual Final - Gratific, To produce action, To produce self-control How would you map the terminology from your message below to these? For example, are you saying that a gratific sign does not really have a dynamic or final interpretant--i.e., they are both identical to the immediate interpretant? If a sign does have a genuine final interpretant, does this entail that its dynamic and immediate interpretants are Thirdness-as-Secondness and Thirdness-as-Firstness, respectively--i.e., all signs to produce self-control are usual and relative? Your approach is interesting, and I might eventually come to agree with it, which would mean abandoning the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy; but for now, I want to treat the latter as a hypothesis and explicate it accordingly. It is only viable if there is exactly one proper order of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination, such that only 10 of the 27 combinations are possible. Regards, Jon On Mon, Aug 17, 2015 at 7:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: A further comment to my comments below. I do not view the possible divisions of the three Interpretants each into three modes as operationally functional. That is, the resultant nine divisions would move the sign into decomposition. Instead, we must consider the modes and where they overlap. For example, the Immediate Interpretant is strictly internal. Therefore, its modal categories must involve Firstness, operative spatially internally and within immediate time. It cannot move into a spatial categorical mode of Secondness (which is external and in linear time)..although, it could operate in the mode of Secondness-as-Firstness...(1.365)..which has no separate existentiality but is 'only conceived as such'. And it could operate within Thirdness-as-Firstness, which is 'Thirds degenerate in the second degree...that of resemblance' (1.367). The Dynamic Interpretant must involve Secondness. It could be linked to the Immediate Interpretant and ALSO be 'Secondness-as-Firstness'..but that would mean that the number of options would be reduced - for the Dynamic Interpretant wouldn't exist 'as such' but would actually be an Immediate Interpretant operating in that grade of Secondness which is 'degenerate'. And it could operate within Thirdness-as-Secondness...but that
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See my comments below: - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, August 17, 2015 11:15 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: Briefly ... EDWINA: He later changed these to: Descriptive, Denominative and Distributive. The Immediate Object is internal. I note that Peirce did not, in his description of the above terms, refer to them as the 'Immediate Object'. He used only the term 'Objects'. Can the Immediate Object- which is internal - be a physical existentiality, akin to the external Dynamic Object? I can't agree with you that the above terms refer to the Immediate Object, seemingly in a separate existentiality for the mere fact of its being internal in 'an Other' means that it has no longer any separate existentiality. And Peirce notes, in 8.367, that the Immediate Object is in the same categorical mode as the Dynamical Object. 1) JON: Peirce did, in fact, refer to the trichotomy of Descriptive, Designative/Denotative/Indicative/Denominative, Copulant/Copulative/Distributive as the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object (CP8.344, EP2:482). EDWINA: All he says in 8.344 is :'The ten respects according to which the chief divisions of signs are determined are as follows:...2nd, according to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object. He doesn't, in this section, refer to the IO, using the above terms. 2) JON: He later elaborated on the relations between this trichotomy and the one for the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign Itself--i.e., Potisign/Tone/Mark, Actisign/Token, Famisign/Type--and stated, The difference between the two trichotomies is that the one refers to the Presence to the Mind of the Sign and the other to that of the Immediate Object. (CP8.354, EP2:485) He went on to explain that, in accordance with the rule of determination, the proper order is OdOiS. EDWINA: Again, Peirce uses the term of Sign and Representamen interchangeably, and sometimes he means the mediate Representamen and sometimes the full triadic Sign. The correct quote for the above is: 'The inquiry ought, one would expect, to be an easy one, since both trichotomies depend on their being three Modes of Presence to the mind, which we may term The Immediate- The Direct - The Familiar Mode of Presence. The difference between the two trichotomies is that the one refers to the Presence to the Mind of the Sign and the other to that of the Immediate Object 8.354. I read the above 'Three Modes of Presence' to refer to the three categories and Peirce notes that the Sign/Representamen may have any Modality of Being, i.e., may belong to any one of the three Universes; its Immediate Object must be in some sense, in which the Sign need not be, Internal. 8.354. Now, if the Immediate Object is internal, then, it cannot be in a mode of pure Secondness, which by definition requires differentiation. So, it must be either in a mode of pure Firstness or, the 'degenerate' Secondness, which i term as Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., a 'copy' of a unique differentiation. Yes - the semiosic Sign (that triad) is a process of transformation of 'data to data', or 'information to information' so to speak. A complex process. And I agree that the order is: DO-IO-R...which then goes on to II-DI-FI. WITH THE added caution, that not all three Interpretants are always experienced. As I've said before, I consider that the majority of our experience, as fallible daily-living humans, ends with the II and DI. We rarely go on to a thorough analytic reasoning of FI. 3) JON: The remaining six classes are possible, i.e., Copulative Potisigns, Denominative Potisigns, Copulative Actisigns, Descriptive Potisigns, Denominative Actisigns, Copulative Famisigns. (CP8.361, EP2:488) I was of the opinion that if the Dynamical Object be a mere Possible the Immediate Object could only be of the same nature, while if the Immediate Object were a Tendency or Habit then the Dynamical Object must be of the same nature. (CP8.367, EP2:489) This does not stipulate that the immediate object is always in the same categorical mode as the dynamic object; rather, it is simply a restatement of the rule of determination--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. (EP2:481) In other words, the possible modes of the immediate object are constrained by the actual mode of the dynamic object; only six of the nine combinations are possible. EDWINA: I don't see your problem with the above. Peirce is saying that there cannot be any change in the nature of an Immediate Object from its original stimuli, the Dynamic Object, and I don't see how there COULD be any difference. The Immediate Object cannot, on its own, ADD data to the stimuli
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See my comments below:..a side note; can you deal with your font. I can't read the small print - and can't seem to change it on my computer. - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, August 17, 2015 4:07 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: I must admit that, contrary to my initial expectations, this exchange has been quite helpful; especially the notions of more information vs. more ambiguity, which I assume correspond to more determinate (less vague) vs. more vague (less determinate). EDWINA: I find your use of the phrase 'rule of determination' a 'bit much'. I'm cautious about the agential force implied by this phrase, and I don't think that Peirce meant such a deterministic linearity. JON: My intent is not to use that phrase with any agential force or to imply determinism, but rather simply as shorthand for the underlying logic of constraint when moving from one trichotomy to another. Again, in Peirce's words, It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. (EP2:481) Another way of saying it is that a Third can determine a First, a Second, or a Third; a Second can determine either a First or a Second; and a First can determine only a First. 1) EDWINA: Well, here, I'm not so sure. I don't accept that 'would be' has any reality. I acknowledge that it certainly has no existence, but, I'm not sure that one could even declare that it has a reality. That, to me, is too deterministic and I feel you are moving into Platonism, and the point of evolution is that it is OPEN, adaptive, unknown..and NOT final or determined. JON: Not Platonism, but Peircean extreme realism. My understanding is that Peirce held that would-bes are REAL, but only Actuals EXIST. For example, ... the external world ... does not consist of existent objects merely, nor merely of these and their reactions; but on the contrary, its most important reals have the mode of being of what the nominalist calls 'mere' words, that is, general types and would-bes. (CP8.191) Even more to the point, ... a true 'WOULD BE' is as real as an actuality. For what is it for a thing to be Real? ... To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of it would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled ... I call 'truth' the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which WOULD ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that particular direction. (EP2:456-457) Per Ben Udell, Peirce's use of predestinate here is one piece of evidence that destinate interpretant is another name for final interpretant; which leads to ... Edwina: I don't know what has reduced your font - but it's almost impossible to read!! Yes, only Actuals EXIST, but I am very cautious about your use of 'would-be'. Peirce writes: 'there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached (8.184). BUT - this Final Interpretant, which is a 'would-be' is NOT, I repeat NOT the same thing as 'general types'. The general type is a universal, and for Peirce, who is an Aristotelian and not a Platonist, generals are REAL. They are not some 'future would-be'; they are REAL, but function only within the articulation of particulars. This is not the same as a consideration of what the ultimate truth might-be, if we analyzed the situation long enough. Reality and existentiality are not the same thing. Peirce is referring, in this section to Habits - which are not the same as the Final Interpretant, but are operative within Thirdness...and usually, function within the Representamen, since they are generals and are not 'actualized' in discrete units'. Yes, truth is found in the Final Interpretant. But truth and habits are not identical. 2) EDWINA: Obviously, these are within the three modal categories. Now - you ask IF the Final Interpretant, which I consider as operating only within 'mind-analysis' and using reason (the mode of Thirdness) , is in a mode of Secondness (and thus, 'tinged' with action) and, since it is linked to the earlier
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: I must admit that, contrary to my initial expectations, this exchange has been quite helpful; especially the notions of more information vs. more ambiguity, which I assume correspond to more determinate (less vague) vs. more vague (less determinate). EDWINA: I find your use of the phrase 'rule of determination' a 'bit much'. I'm cautious about the agential force implied by this phrase, and I don't think that Peirce meant such a deterministic linearity. JON: My intent is not to use that phrase with any agential force or to imply determinism, but rather simply as shorthand for the underlying logic of constraint when moving from one trichotomy to another. Again, in Peirce's words, It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. (EP2:481) Another way of saying it is that a Third can determine a First, a Second, or a Third; a Second can determine either a First or a Second; and a First can determine only a First. EDWINA: Well, here, I'm not so sure. I don't accept that 'would be' has any reality. I acknowledge that it certainly has no existence, but, I'm not sure that one could even declare that it has a reality. That, to me, is too deterministic and I feel you are moving into Platonism, and the point of evolution is that it is OPEN, adaptive, unknown..and NOT final or determined. JON: Not Platonism, but Peircean extreme realism. My understanding is that Peirce held that would-bes are REAL, but only Actuals EXIST. For example, ... the external world ... does not consist of existent objects merely, nor merely of these and their reactions; but on the contrary, its most important reals have the mode of being of what the nominalist calls 'mere' words, that is, general types and would-bes. (CP8.191) Even more to the point, ... a true 'WOULD BE' is as real as an actuality. For what is it for a thing to be Real? ... To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of it would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled ... I call 'truth' the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which WOULD ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that particular direction. (EP2:456-457) Per Ben Udell, Peirce's use of predestinate here is one piece of evidence that destinate interpretant is another name for final interpretant; which leads to ... EDWINA: Obviously, these are within the three modal categories. Now - you ask IF the Final Interpretant, which I consider as operating only within 'mind-analysis' and using reason (the mode of Thirdness) , is in a mode of Secondness (and thus, 'tinged' with action) and, since it is linked to the earlier two Interpretants - then, this could be Thirdness-as-Secondness. So, you ask if the earlier Dynamic Interpretant in this same situation can be in a mode of Firstness? Yes, it could be in Thirdness-as-Firstness or Thirdness-as-Secondness. And the Immediate Interpretant, still linked to that Final Interpretant in its mode of Thirdness-as-Secondness, could be in a mode of 3-1 or 3-2. But most certainly not in pure Thirdness or 'Significative' or 'Relative'. That is, the earlier Interpretants cannot contain MORE information than the later ones. They can contain MORE ambiguity than the later ones. Just as the Immediate Object cannot contain MORE information than the external Dynamic Object - but it can exhibit MORE ambiguity...and usually, almost always, does just that. After all, as Peirce says, we can't know our external world directly! JON: This actually suggests the reverse order from my guess based on your last message. You are saying that if the final interpretant is a Second (to produce action), then the dynamic interpretant can only be a First (sympathetic/congruentive) or a Second (shocking/percussive), and likewise the immediate interpretant can only be a First (hypothetic) or a Second (categorical). Would you also say that if the final interpretant is a Second (to produce action) and the dynamic interpretant is a First (sympathetic/congruentive), then the immediate interpretant must also be a First? I think so, but I want to make sure. If so, then that means IfIdIi, and the rationale is similar to those offered by Ralf Mueller in 1994 and Bernard Morand in 2009 ( http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16954). It is also consistent with Peirce's own ordering (EP2:481), assuming that
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Now I see why there was confusion before--we are talking about two different things. You are describing a modified version of Peirce's (well-established) 3-trichotomy, 10-sign taxonomy; I am asking about his (unfinished) 10-trichotomy, 66-sign taxonomy. I say that your version is modified because (1) you seem to be making the third trichotomy about the interpretant itself, rather than its relation to the sign; and (2) you are aligning the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants with rheme/dicent/argument, rather than the relation of sign to the final interpretant only. Regards, Jon On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Right. No, I don't think that all Signs have all three Interpretants. If you look at the ten classes of signs 2.254-6 in the CP collection, you'll see that only ONE sign actually operates with the Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness - which would mean that particular Sign was involved in the Final Interpretant, looking for a 'logical truth-result'. But, not all Signs in our experience function as having reached that 'truthful' final analysis. Most of our experience, as you will see from the ten classes of Signs, revolves around interpretations that are quite subjective and qualitativethe semiosic experience ends with the Immediate Interpretant. There are SIX Signs of the ten that do this (rhematic). And only three end with the Dynamic Interpretant or a mode of Secondness (Dicent). Again, most of our semiosic experience is quite personal, subjective, local, 'felt' and doesn't move to the analytic logical phase. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See my comments below: - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2015 4:24 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. Edwina: Here, I disagree; as I said before, I don't see that each Representamen must have all three Interpretants. --- JON: The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by 'distinct'. As Peirce says, the immediate object is defined 'according to the Mode of Presentation (EP2:p 482, CP 8:344). So, the Immediate Object differs from the Dynamic Object because the DO functions according to its mode of Being (it IS an external sense, while the Immediate Object is an internal sense). Jon: However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. EDWINA: Peirce's analysis in these sections, eg, the list of ten..cp 8.344, doesn't, as far as I can see, divide each, eg, Interpretant into three further divisions, which is what you seem to be saying. For example, in this list, he refers to the Sign or Representamen as defined/functional within: its mode of apprehension; then, the Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object; then, the Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant; then, the Relation of the Sign to the Normal (Final) Interpretant; and, the Triadic Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object and to its Normal (Final ) Interpretant. Then, he goes on to examine these five functions of the Sign/Representamen in more detail. With regard to the Immediate Object, he refers to its mode of Presentation. That's it. With regard to the Dynamical Object, he refers to its Mode of Being[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign to that Dynamical Object). With regard to the Immediate Interpretant - he refers only to its 'mode of Presentation'. Similar to the Immediate Object'. With regard to the Dynamical Interpretant - he refers to its Mode of Being ..[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant] With regard to the normal/Final Interpretant, he refers to the Nature of this Interpretant..[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign to this Interpretant'. And finally - he considers the Relation of the Sign/Representamen to its Dyn. Object and its Normal/Final Interpretant. So- I don't see where EACH Interpretant is further, in itself, divided into three. Hence there are ten trichotomies and 66 classes of signs once the rule of determination is applied--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. See EP2:481-490 for all of this, which I thought was pretty basic stuff in Peirce. Jon: My original question pertains to the proper ordering of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination. Since Peirce gave this order as destinate, then effective, then explicit (EP2:481), it is not clear whether he meant IiIdIf (as commonly assumed) or IfIdIi (as argued by Mueller, Morand, and Udell). The whole issue is meaningless if the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy is rejected in favor of a modified 3-trichotomy, 10-class taxonomy in which immediate/dynamic/final is the trichotomy for the (one) interpretant--something that I have not come across in any of Peirce's own writings or the secondary literature so far. EDWINA: But - I'm not saying that there is ONE Interpretant. There are three - but not all are functional within a particular Sign (I refer to the Sign, capital S, to mean the Object-Representamen-Interpretant). ... What you seem to be saying, if I uderstand you correctly, is that each Interpretant is further divided into 3 - and I don't see that. The way I read Peirce - is that there are THREE very different Interpretants - but, again, not all three appear in all Signs. Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 9:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon: I think that there has to be some clarification of terms. 1) You use the term 'sign' to mean both the triad of Object
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: I referenced EP2:481-490, not just EP2:482. Page 483 introduces The Ten Main Trichotomies of Signs, and the first three are explained in some detail through page 489; the other seven are only given as sets of three terms on pp. 489-490, which presumably correspond to Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Here is the entire list. 1. Mode of Presentation of the Sign - Potisign, Actisign, Famisign. 2. Mode of Presentation of the (Immediate) Object - Descriptive, Designative, Copulant. 3. Nature of the Dynamic Object - Abstractive, Concretive, Collective. 4. Relation of the Sign to Its Object - Icon, Index, Symbol. 5. Nature of the Immediate Interpretant - Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative. 6. Nature of the Dynamic Interpretant - Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual. 7. Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Interpretant - Suggestive, Imperative, Indicative. 8. Purpose of the Eventual (Final) Interpretant - Gratific, To produce action, To produce self-control. 9. Nature of the Influence of the Sign - Seme, Pheme, Delome. 10. Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance - Instinct, Experience, Form. Based on the bare list that you referenced, #7 is the relation of the sign to its dynamic interpretant, #9 is the relation of the sign to its final interpretant, and #10 is the triadic relation of the sign to its dynamic object and final interpretant. #5, #6, and #8 are the three interpretants, each of which is indeed divided into a trichotomy by Peirce. What I am seeking is the proper order of determination for these three; the order given here is categorial. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See my comments below: - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2015 9:37 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: I referenced EP2:481-490, not just EP2:482. Page 483 introduces The Ten Main Trichotomies of Signs, and the first three are explained in some detail through page 489; the other seven are only given as sets of three terms on pp. 489-490, which presumably correspond to Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Here is the entire list. 1. Mode of Presentation of the Sign - Potisign, Actisign, Famisign. EDWINA: He later changes these to: Mark, Token, Type. The above refers to the Representamen alone, in itself, in, as you note, the three modal categories. 2. Mode of Presentation of the (Immediate) Object - Descriptive, Designative, Copulant. EDWINA: He later changed these to: Descriptive, Denominative and Distributive. The Immediate Object is internal. I note that Peirce did not, in his description of the above terms, refer to them as the 'Immediate Object'. He used only the term 'Objects'. Can the Immediate Object- which is internal - be a physical existentiality, akin to the external Dynamic Object? I can't agree with you that the above terms refer to the Immediate Object, seemingly in a separate existentiality for the mere fact of its being internal in 'an Other' means that it has no longer any separate existentiality. And Peirce notes, in 8.367, that the Immediate Object is in the same categorical mode as the Dynamical Object. 3. Nature of the Dynamic Object - Abstractive, Concretive, Collective. 4. Relation of the Sign to Its Object - Icon, Index, Symbol. EDWINA: Peirce refers to the above in 3, as how the Sign/Representamen 'represents' that Dynamic Object but these are directly linked to the Relation between the Representamen and the Object - see 4. An iconic Relation will present an abstract image; an indexical Relation presents a physical existentiality...Again, I don't see the functionality of such a micro-distinction between defining the 'noun' so to speak and the 'relation' within which that 'noun' exists. 5. Nature of the Immediate Interpretant - Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative. EDWINA: The above is the 'physical' internal expression of the Interpretant. As internal, even though moving from a mere sensate utterance to assertion to some form of cognition..it remains bonded to the Representamen and the Immediate Object. 6. Nature of the Dynamic Interpretant - Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual. 7. Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Interpretant - Suggestive, Imperative, Indicative. EDWINA: Again, the three forms that the DI can take in their expression...Both the 'Nature' and 'Manner of Appeal' are similar except that one can be called a 'noun' and the other a 'relation or verb'and I see no functionality in such a micro-analytic differentiation. 8. Purpose of the Eventual (Final) Interpretant - Gratific, To produce action, To produce self-control. 9. Nature of the Influence of the Sign - Seme, Pheme, Delome. 10. Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance - Instinct, Experience, Form. Based on the bare list that you referenced, #7 is the relation of the sign to its dynamic interpretant, #9 is the relation of the sign to its final interpretant, and #10 is the triadic relation of the sign to its dynamic object and final interpretant. #5, #6, and #8 are the three interpretants, each of which is indeed divided into a trichotomy by Peirce. What I am seeking is the proper order of determination for these three; the order given here is categorial. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon, Edwina, lists, We went over this issue several times on these lists. I think Edwina is right that Peirce used the term sign in dual meanings, which can be explained graphically thus: fg Object Representamen --- Interpretant | ^ | | |__| h Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the triadic sign of Peirce. In words, this diagram states that Object determines Representamen which in turn determines Intepretant in such a way that Interpretant is related to Object in the same way that Representamen is related to it. Now the confusion arises because Peirce often replaced Representamen with Sign, i.e., used Sign and Representamen interachangeably: f g Object - Sign Interpretant | ^ || |__| h Figure 2. A diagrammatic representation of the definition of the triadic sign of Peirce in which the term, i.e., sign, being defined appears as a part of the definition itself. The definition of the triadic sign given in Figure 2 is reminiscent of the recursive definition widely occurring in computer science and mathematics: A recursive definition of a function defines values of the functions for some inputs in terms of the values of the same function for other inputs. For example, the factorial https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factorial function *n*! is defined by the rules . . . (*n*+1)! = (*n*+1)·*n*! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursive_definition *Recursion* is the process of repeating items in a self-similar https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-similarity way. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursion To distinguish between these two kinds of signs, it may be rational and economical (in terms of avoiding the waste of time caused by terminological confusions) to designate the former with the capital S (as suggested by Edwina) and the latter with the lower case S, i.e., Sign vs. sign. Or, in words, Sign may be referred to as the triadic sign (in that it requires three arrows to be defined; Figure 1) and the sign as the dyadic sign since its definition requires only two arrows (Figure 2). All the best. Sung On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com wrote: Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. Hence there are ten trichotomies and 66 classes of signs once the rule of determination is applied--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. See EP2:481-490 for all of this, which I thought was pretty basic stuff in Peirce. My original question pertains to the proper ordering of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination. Since Peirce gave this order as destinate, then effective, then explicit (EP2:481), it is not clear whether he meant IiIdIf (as commonly assumed) or IfIdIi (as argued by Mueller, Morand, and Udell). The whole issue is meaningless if the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy is rejected in favor of a modified 3-trichotomy, 10-class taxonomy in which immediate/dynamic/final is the trichotomy for the (one) interpretant--something that I have not come across in any of Peirce's own writings or the secondary literature so far. Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 9:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon: I think that there has to be some clarification of terms. 1) You use the term 'sign' to mean both the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, which I always clarify by capitalizing as *S*ign. And you also use the same term, if I understand you correctly, to refer to only the mediating process in the triad, the Representamen. [Peirce did the same thing - but I think one has
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. Hence there are ten trichotomies and 66 classes of signs once the rule of determination is applied--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. See EP2:481-490 for all of this, which I thought was pretty basic stuff in Peirce. My original question pertains to the proper ordering of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination. Since Peirce gave this order as destinate, then effective, then explicit (EP2:481), it is not clear whether he meant IiIdIf (as commonly assumed) or IfIdIi (as argued by Mueller, Morand, and Udell). The whole issue is meaningless if the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy is rejected in favor of a modified 3-trichotomy, 10-class taxonomy in which immediate/dynamic/final is the trichotomy for the (one) interpretant--something that I have not come across in any of Peirce's own writings or the secondary literature so far. Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 9:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon: I think that there has to be some clarification of terms. 1) You use the term 'sign' to mean both the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, which I always clarify by capitalizing as *S*ign. And you also use the same term, if I understand you correctly, to refer to only the mediating process in the triad, the Representamen. [Peirce did the same thing - but I think one has to mull through his writings to see what he exactly meant]. 2) You yourself brought up the three-phase actions of the Interpretant, so, I'm confused now..for after all, the Interpretant, in all its phases, is in a Relation with the Representamen (which you term as 'sign']. 3) You write: you are aligning the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants with rheme/dicent/argument, rather than the relation of sign to the final interpretant only. Now, if I understand you in the above, you are focusing on the relation of the *Representamen* to the final interpretant'. I don't see that it is possible for the semiosic triad to exclude, in its semiosic process, the two less complex Interpretants; namely, the immediate and dynamic. All three are, in my view, in a Relation with the Representamen. So - what am I misunderstanding in your questions? 4) I don't see that the Peircean sign moves away from the basic triad; there's no 'ten-trichotomy'. There are microphases of the triad: dynamic object-immediate object - Representamen - and the Immediate, Dynamic and Final Interpretants ..which brings us to only six microparts. And you can then add in the modes which increases the complexity - where the Dynamic Object can be in any one of the three modes; and the Representamen can be in any one of the three modes. BUT - although this increases the *internal* complexity of the Sign, as you point out, I'm not sure how it moves away from the basic format of the triad. I would say that this internal complexity increases the ability of matter to adapt to environmental stimuli. So- I am obviously missing something in your argument! Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon, Lists I believe that, at one level of the semiotic process, we can treat the sign as one of the three relata in the triad. Of course, at the next stage of interpretation, the interpretant may itself function as a sign. Are there any restrictions on having some combination of interpretant, sign and object serving as a sign at the next stage of interpretation? Once the three are combined into a triad, I would think that all three could then serve as sign in relation to some further interpretant. Let's consider some an example drawn from Peirce's discussion of perception. Starting with the basic kind of case, we have an iconic rhematice qualisign (say, an abstraction of a feeling of a color of yellow) that serves as a sign, and that is brought into relation to an immediate object (e.g., a percept of a yellow chair with a green cushion) and an immediate interpretant (e.g., a skeleton set of the relations between the color and the object). It is clear that, at the next level, the immediate interpretant can serve as a sign that is brought into relation to a dynamical object (e.g. the really efficient chair that I bump against when walking around the room) and the dynamical interpretant (e.g., the action of sitting down on the chair). Is there any reason to think that the immediate interpretant doesn't bring along with it, as it were, the qualisign and the immediate object--which also serve as part of the sign along with the immediate interpretant? For my part, I don't see how a coherent explanation can be given of the process of how the percepts and skeleton sets form the parts of our conceptions, and how concepts form the parts of propositions, and how propositions form the parts of our arguments unless all of these parts are combined together and are treated as richer kinds of signs that are then interpreted further in relation to richer objects and interpretants. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2015 1:24 PM To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. Hence there are ten trichotomies and 66 classes of signs once the rule of determination is applied--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. See EP2:481-490 for all of this, which I thought was pretty basic stuff in Peirce. My original question pertains to the proper ordering of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination. Since Peirce gave this order as destinate, then effective, then explicit (EP2:481), it is not clear whether he meant IiIdIf (as commonly assumed) or IfIdIi (as argued by Mueller, Morand, and Udell). The whole issue is meaningless if the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy is rejected in favor of a modified 3-trichotomy, 10-class taxonomy in which immediate/dynamic/final is the trichotomy for the (one) interpretant--something that I have not come across in any of Peirce's own writings or the secondary literature so far. Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 9:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.camailto:tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon: I think that there has to be some clarification of terms. 1) You use the term 'sign' to mean both the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, which I always clarify by capitalizing as Sign. And you also use the same term, if I understand you correctly, to refer to only the mediating process in the triad, the Representamen. [Peirce did the same thing - but I think one has to mull through his writings to see what he exactly meant]. 2) You yourself brought up the three-phase actions of the Interpretant, so, I'm confused now..for after all, the Interpretant, in all its phases, is in a Relation with the Representamen (which you term as 'sign']. 3) You write: you are aligning the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants with rheme/dicent/argument, rather than
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Right. No, I don't think that all Signs have all three Interpretants. If you look at the ten classes of signs 2.254-6 in the CP collection, you'll see that only ONE sign actually operates with the Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness - which would mean that particular Sign was involved in the Final Interpretant, looking for a 'logical truth-result'. But, not all Signs in our experience function as having reached that 'truthful' final analysis. Most of our experience, as you will see from the ten classes of Signs, revolves around interpretations that are quite subjective and qualitativethe semiosic experience ends with the Immediate Interpretant. There are SIX Signs of the ten that do this (rhematic). And only three end with the Dynamic Interpretant or a mode of Secondness (Dicent). Again, most of our semiosic experience is quite personal, subjective, local, 'felt' and doesn't move to the analytic logical phase. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, August 15, 2015 7:11 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: I have to run, but it sounds like you are saying that a Rheme only has an immediate interpretant, a Dicent has both a dynamic interpretant and an immediate interpretant, and an Argument has all three interpretants. Is that right? If so, I have not seen anyone make that claim before; I have always been under the impression that all signs have all three interpretants--just like all signs have both objects--and that each can be divided into First, Second, and Third. Hence Peirce's terminology of Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative for Ii, Sympathetic/Shocking/Usual for Id, and Gratific/To produce action/To product self-control for If. What am I missing? Regards, Jon On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 5:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: I'm not sure what you mean by the 'three divisions of each'. Are you saying that, for example, the Dynamic Interpretant, which is in a categorical mode of Secondness, and is an 'actuality'...is also...in 'three divisions'...by which I am guessing you mean, in the three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness? I don't see that. I can see that a triadic Sign can be made up of all three categories, but I don't see how ONE Relation (eg, that between the Representamen and the Immediate Interpretant)...can be made up of all three categories. The triadic Sign might, for example, not include any more intensive interpretation than the Immediate Interpretant (a rheme). Or, it might include TWO Interpretants - with the first one, the Immediate, being a rheme in Firstness and the next one, the Dynamic, being a dicent in Secondness...and it might not continue on to a Final Interpretant. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: I guess I am confused about your comment stating that you are confused by my comment! Perhaps my difficulty stems from the different (but related) notions of mode and modal in this context--Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness, Possible/Actual/Necessitant, Feeling/Action/Thought. If Ii=Possible, Id=Actual, and If=Necessitant, then what are the three divisions of each? My guess, following Short, was Feeling/Action/Thought, which seems pretty consistent with L463 for Ii and EP2:489-490 for Id and If. But if Ii=Possible=Feeling, Id=Actual=Action, and If=Necessitant=Thought, then what are the three divisions of each? How can Ii itself be a Possible and a Feeling, yet still be classified as Categorical or Relative? Thanks, Jon On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 3:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon - I'm confused by your comment! I don't see a 'trichotomy of each one'. The order of the three Interpretants is within the modal sense: Feeling/Action/Thought (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) and the terms for the Interpretant in this mode are: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. I've also seen the terms of Emotional, Energetic, Logical, and Possible, Actual, Habitual, for the same three Interpretants. And, Explicit, Effective, Destinate. But it's all the same: they operate within the three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: I have to run, but it sounds like you are saying that a Rheme only has an immediate interpretant, a Dicent has both a dynamic interpretant and an immediate interpretant, and an Argument has all three interpretants. Is that right? If so, I have not seen anyone make that claim before; I have always been under the impression that all signs have all three interpretants--just like all signs have both objects--and that each can be divided into First, Second, and Third. Hence Peirce's terminology of Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative for Ii, Sympathetic/Shocking/Usual for Id, and Gratific/To produce action/To product self-control for If. What am I missing? Regards, Jon On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 5:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: I'm not sure what you mean by the 'three divisions of each'. Are you saying that, for example, the Dynamic Interpretant, which is in a categorical mode of Secondness, and is an 'actuality'...is also...in 'three divisions'...by which I am guessing you mean, in the three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness? I don't see that. I can see that a triadic Sign can be made up of all three categories, but I don't see how ONE Relation (eg, that between the Representamen and the Immediate Interpretant)...can be made up of all three categories. The triadic Sign might, for example, not include any more intensive interpretation than the Immediate Interpretant (a rheme). Or, it might include TWO Interpretants - with the first one, the Immediate, being a rheme in Firstness and the next one, the Dynamic, being a dicent in Secondness...and it might not continue on to a Final Interpretant. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Ben, List, You're welcome, Ben. I know you like to keep up with such matters. Looking for Lalor's paper, I also looked around the Arisbe site as I occasionally do. For those who haven't been there recently, do check it out. Just Google 'Arisbe' and it's at the top of the page. http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ Ben keeps enhancing the site, adding more and more material, streamlining what is there, and generally propelling Joe's work towards developing a gateway site to all things Peircean further and further. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 4:06 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Thanks, Gary, link repaired. They changed the URL slightly. (Just in case, I also have an older more-different URL from which it's stored at the Wayback Machine!) Best, Ben *On 8/15/2015 3:50 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:* See: The Classification of Peirce's Interpretants, Brendan Lalor. Semiotica 114-1/2, 31-40, 1997. https://philosophy.thereitis.org/the-classification-of-peirces-interpretants/ (Note to Ben: the link at Arisbe doesn't take one to this paper.) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon - I'm confused by your comment! I don't see a 'trichotomy of each one'. The order of the three Interpretants is within the modal sense: Feeling/Action/Thought (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) and the terms for the Interpretant in this mode are: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. I've also seen the terms of Emotional, Energetic, Logical, and Possible, Actual, Habitual, for the same three Interpretants. And, Explicit, Effective, Destinate. But it's all the same: they operate within the three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. I think your selection below is quite clear:..and fits the three modes (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness)..and Peirce's analysis of these three categorical modes. Ii = Mode of Presentation = Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative. Id = Mode of Being = Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual. If = Nature or Purpose = Gratific, To produce action, To produce self-control. And your comment below is equally quite clear, as representing the three categorical modes: Ii is often defined as a sign's interpretability, the effect that it may have (Possible); Id as any effect that it does have (Actual); and If as the effect that it would eventually have (Necessitant). Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, August 15, 2015 4:19 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: I alluded to that at the end of my post. If Ii is always a Possible, Id is always an Actual, and If is always a Necessitant, how can there be a trichotomy of each one and a specific order of determination among them? It seems like that would drive us back to Short's thesis and make the three trichotomies all varieties of Feeling/Action/Thought, rather than Possible/Actual/Necessitant. Thanks, Jon On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Just a brief response as I have little time, but I don't think that the Immediate Interpretant is an 'actual' (ie in a mode of Secondness); I'd say it's a 'felt' possible or potential. The dynamic interpretant is an actual (external, no longer purely subjective, cognitive, known, articulated)...and the Final Interpretant would be the truth. Edwina Taborsky - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Greetings! I am by no means a Peirce scholar--I am a professional engineer and amateur philosopher--but I became interested in his ideas a few months ago for various reasons. I have read a considerable amount of the secondary literature since then, as well as EP1 and portions of EP2 (still in progress). I have also been looking through the list archives and monitoring some of the recent discussions. In one of the latter, Ben Udell made this comment that caught my eye: QUOTE Ben Udell, 08/06/2015, http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16922 To top it off, years ago at peirce-l, I harshly and wrong-headedly criticized Atkin's account of Peirce's immediate, dynamical, and final/normal interpretants, as regards certain points about which Atkin was in fact quite correct (the final/normal interpretant determines the dynamical interpretant, and those interpretants determine the immediate interpretant). END QUOTE Ben and I exchanged a few e-mails about this, which led us to the discovery that his memory was mistaken--his criticism had actually been directed at what Atkin wrote about the alignment of the three interpretants with the three grades of clarity. However, I was still surprised by what Ben said about the determination of the interpretants (IfIdIi); my previous readings had pretty consistently indicated the reverse order (IiIdIf). Digging further into the list archives led me to a 2008 post in which Ben cited this passage: QUOTE Peirce, 12/23/1908, EP2:481 It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... END QUOTE Ben then added this comment: QUOTE Ben Udell, 10/28/2008, http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/4881 (It seems fair to take Destinate Interpretant, Effective Interpretant, and Explicit Interpretant as, respectively, Final Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant, and Immediate Interpretant.) END QUOTE Apparently, Peirce never spelled out how he would map the destinate/effective/explicit interpretants to the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants. Ben matched them up based on Peirce's usage elsewhere of destined, predestinate, and similar terms, along with the fact that explicit can simply mean expressed. On the other hand, I pointed out that destinate can also mean set apart for or intended, while explicit can also mean fully revealed or expressed without vagueness or fully developed or formulated. However, it really comes down to Peirce's first sentence quoted above. If the immediate interpretant is an Actual, which can the final interpretant be--a Possible (Ii determines If) or a Necessitant (If determines Ii)? Same question regarding Ii/Id and Id/If. Unfortunately, Peirce did not provide clear answers and explanations like he did for OdOiS (EP2:480-481,485-489, 1908), as well as S-IfS-Id (L463, 1904). The bare terminology from EP2:482-483,489-490 (1908) is not terribly illuminating: Ii = Mode of Presentation = Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative. Id = Mode of Being = Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual. If = Nature or Purpose = Gratific, To produce action, To produce self-control. Alternatively, L463 indicates Ii = qualities of feelings or appearances, actual experiences, thoughts or other signs of the same kind in infinite series. This seems consistent with Short's thesis that all three interpretants can be emotional, energetic, or logical; but it is not much help in sorting out the order of determination. To muddy the waters further, Ii is often defined as a sign's interpretability, the effect that it *may *have (Possible); Id as any effect that it *does *have (Actual); and If as the effect that it *would *eventually have (Necessitant). I would be grateful for some assistance with all this, especially specific illustrative examples, which I have had a hard time formulating myself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Just a brief response as I have little time, but I don't think that the Immediate Interpretant is an 'actual' (ie in a mode of Secondness); I'd say it's a 'felt' possible or potential. The dynamic interpretant is an actual (external, no longer purely subjective, cognitive, known, articulated)...and the Final Interpretant would be the truth. Edwina Taborsky - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, August 15, 2015 2:19 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Greetings! I am by no means a Peirce scholar--I am a professional engineer and amateur philosopher--but I became interested in his ideas a few months ago for various reasons. I have read a considerable amount of the secondary literature since then, as well as EP1 and portions of EP2 (still in progress). I have also been looking through the list archives and monitoring some of the recent discussions. In one of the latter, Ben Udell made this comment that caught my eye: QUOTE Ben Udell, 08/06/2015, http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16922 To top it off, years ago at peirce-l, I harshly and wrong-headedly criticized Atkin's account of Peirce's immediate, dynamical, and final/normal interpretants, as regards certain points about which Atkin was in fact quite correct (the final/normal interpretant determines the dynamical interpretant, and those interpretants determine the immediate interpretant). END QUOTE Ben and I exchanged a few e-mails about this, which led us to the discovery that his memory was mistaken--his criticism had actually been directed at what Atkin wrote about the alignment of the three interpretants with the three grades of clarity. However, I was still surprised by what Ben said about the determination of the interpretants (IfIdIi); my previous readings had pretty consistently indicated the reverse order (IiIdIf). Digging further into the list archives led me to a 2008 post in which Ben cited this passage: QUOTE Peirce, 12/23/1908, EP2:481 It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... END QUOTE Ben then added this comment: QUOTE Ben Udell, 10/28/2008, http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/4881 (It seems fair to take Destinate Interpretant, Effective Interpretant, and Explicit Interpretant as, respectively, Final Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant, and Immediate Interpretant.) END QUOTE Apparently, Peirce never spelled out how he would map the destinate/effective/explicit interpretants to the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants. Ben matched them up based on Peirce's usage elsewhere of destined, predestinate, and similar terms, along with the fact that explicit can simply mean expressed. On the other hand, I pointed out that destinate can also mean set apart for or intended, while explicit can also mean fully revealed or expressed without vagueness or fully developed or formulated. However, it really comes down to Peirce's first sentence quoted above. If the immediate interpretant is an Actual, which can the final interpretant be--a Possible (Ii determines If) or a Necessitant (If determines Ii)? Same question regarding Ii/Id and Id/If. Unfortunately, Peirce did not provide clear answers and explanations like he did for OdOiS (EP2:480-481,485-489, 1908), as well as S-IfS-Id (L463, 1904). The bare terminology from EP2:482-483,489-490 (1908) is not terribly illuminating: Ii = Mode of Presentation = Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative. Id = Mode of Being = Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual. If = Nature or Purpose = Gratific, To produce action, To produce self-control. Alternatively, L463 indicates Ii = qualities of feelings or appearances, actual experiences, thoughts or other signs of the same kind in infinite series. This seems consistent with Short's thesis that all three interpretants can be emotional, energetic, or logical; but it is not much help in sorting out the order of determination. To muddy the waters further, Ii is often defined as a sign's interpretability, the effect that it may have (Possible); Id as any effect that it does have (Actual); and If as the effect that it would eventually have (Necessitant). I would be grateful for some assistance with all this, especially specific illustrative examples, which I have had a hard
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon, Ben, List, Thanks for this most intriguing post which, helpfully, rehearses your discussions with Ben Udell. I'm afraid I haven't much to offer, especially as regards specific illustrative examples. But your post brought to mind a paper published some years ago in *Semiotica*, a response by the author to a critique of his ideas--regarding the relationship of the 1906 division of interpretants to the 1909 division--by Tom Short in *Transactions.* (1996, “Interpreting Peirce’s Interpretant: A Response to Lalor, Liszka, and Meyers,” http://www.peircesociety.org/contents.html 32:4, pp. 488-541) *.* See: The Classification of Peirce's Interpretants, Brendan Lalor. *Semiotica* 114-1/2, 31-40, 1997. https://philosophy.thereitis.org/the-classification-of-peirces-interpretants/ (Note to Ben: the link at Arisbe doesn't take one to this paper.) I tended at the time--and since--to agree with him contra Tom Short regarding his principal thesis. Here's his abstract followed by the paper's concluding two paragraphs. *Abstract.* After characterizing the role of the interpretant in semiosis, I consider two passages in which Peirce makes a threefold division of interpretants, one from 1906, one from 1909. Then I suggest that Thomas Short and others are wrong in holding that in the two passages, Peirce put forward two completely separate trichotomies. Instead, I argue that the 1906 trichotomy is in fact a special case of that put forward by Peirce in the 1909 passage, not a separate trichotomy. I then explain more specifically how we ought to conceive the relationship between these two classifications. [The concluding two paragraphs of the paper] One might argue that even if my view is right, Short’s view, that the two trichotomies of interpretant intersect yielding nine types in all, could be right as well, in the following sense. Perhaps what at one level of analysis is an immediate interpretant, could turn out to supervene on what at a lower level of analysis are emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants — and likewise in the case of dynamic and final interpretants. In this way, for example, perhaps a dynamic interpretant could in a sense also be said to be a logical interpretant. However, Short is committed to the conceptual clarity of the proposition, ‘this dynamic interpretant *is *a logical interpretant’. This is quite different from what my view asserts as conceptually clear: i.e. that ‘this dynamic interpretant *in part*supervenes on a logical interpretant’ — not that it *is* one. I will not make a judgment here about the prospects for working out some unnoticed way of showing that *something like *Short’s view is conceptually clear after all. If such a partial vindication is possible, however, I fail to see how it can be made apart from exploiting the notion of coarser- and finer-grained levels of semiotic analysis. While I have not analyzed the other two kinds of interpretant, I want to comment on the last kind, the ‘final interpretant’ of 1909. By defining it as ‘the one Interpretive result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the sign is sufficiently considered’ (Hardwick 1977: 111), Peirce’s general 1909 presentation of the theory provides a context for discourse about the *truth *of an interpretant. Such an interpretant would be a true, precise representation of the dynamical object mentioned above. Even though we have pointed out in the first section of this paper that no interpretant is informationally determinate in every respect, the human version of the final interpretant is for us an ideal. It would result from an indefinite series of interpretations of signs, perhaps by sign processing beings with fewer ‘incapacities’ than human beings. To say that the final interpretant is within our possible reach is the expression of a hope. The 1906 presentation, on the other hand, specifies the context as that of human semiosis, in which discourse about the ultimate logical interpretant is about *meaning,*not necessarily truth. The hope of science is that eventually the ultimate logical interpretant — that Homo sapien version of the final interpretant — will perfectly correspond to the final interpretant itself. Then we will have carved the world at its joints.[ 12 https://thereitis.org/index.php?module=ContentExpressfunc=displayceid=8meid=#fn12 ] This is, as Pape (1991) put it, ‘the intellectual hope that the sequence of interpretations — perhaps there are infinitely many of them and we are connecting one infinity with another — will ultimately represent reality’ (174). This short paper is, I think, well worth reading. But I'll have to reread it as my memory is quite fuzzy as to its details. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 718%20482-5690* On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 2:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com wrote:
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Thanks, Gary, link repaired. They changed the URL slightly. (Just in case, I also have an older more-different URL from which it's stored at the Wayback Machine!) Best, Ben *On 8/15/2015 3:50 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:* See: The Classification of Peirce's Interpretants, Brendan Lalor. Semiotica 114-1/2, 31-40, 1997. https://philosophy.thereitis.org/the-classification-of-peirces-interpretants/ (Note to Ben: the link at Arisbe doesn't take one to this paper.) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: I alluded to that at the end of my post. If Ii is always a Possible, Id is always an Actual, and If is always a Necessitant, how can there be a trichotomy of each one and a specific order of determination among them? It seems like that would drive us back to Short's thesis and make the three trichotomies all varieties of Feeling/Action/Thought, rather than Possible/Actual/Necessitant. Thanks, Jon On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Just a brief response as I have little time, but I don't think that the Immediate Interpretant is an 'actual' (ie in a mode of Secondness); I'd say it's a 'felt' possible or potential. The dynamic interpretant is an actual (external, no longer purely subjective, cognitive, known, articulated)...and the Final Interpretant would be the truth. Edwina Taborsky - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Gary, List: As it happens, I just read Short's 1996 response yesterday, after joining the CSP Society and thus gaining online access to its *Transactions*. I was planning to look for Lalor's paper in the near future, but you have saved me the trouble, for which I sincerely thank you. Unfortunately, though, neither sheds much further light on the particular questions that I am trying to answer. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon, Ben, List, I'm adding two short passages from Lalor's paper which, I hope,help clarify the distinction he is making between the 1906 1909 divisions of the interpretant. He writes: [I]t should be no surprise that his 1906 classification of the interpretants as emotional, energetic, and logical, reflects an anthropomorphic way of looking at semiosis. The 1909 trichotomy lays down a general structural pattern which Peirce believed can be found in all kinds of semiosis. The 1906 taxonomy applies specifically to the way in which human semiosis manifests that structure. So the 1906 division is one which explicates this important aspect of human semiosis. Later in the paper he writes. To point to a few implications, the distinction between the emotional and immediate interpretants is not one of kind, then, but one of level of analysis. The 1909 trichotomy can be used to characterize semiosis which is finer-grained or coarser-grained than that to which the 1906 trichotomy applies. It allows the individuation of interpretants to be indefinitely narrower (as may suit theorizing about pre-conscious mental activity), or indefinitely wider (as may suit theorizing about public communication,[ 11 https://thereitis.org/index.php?module=ContentExpressfunc=displayceid=8meid=#fn11 ] or economics). Thus, it is more general in applicability, since unlike the emotional interpretant, the immediate interpretant does *not specify one perspective or principle of individuation. *It only characterizes the structural pattern to be found. Also, my view explicitly allows for the supervenience of one type of semiosis on another. Thus, the 1909 division is here considered a generalization of the 1906 division now applicable to all sorts of semiosis. Finally, those who followed the seminar on Stjernfelt's *Natural Propositions* may find Lalor's analysis to make good sense. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 3:50 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Jon, Ben, List, Thanks for this most intriguing post which, helpfully, rehearses your discussions with Ben Udell. I'm afraid I haven't much to offer, especially as regards specific illustrative examples. But your post brought to mind a paper published some years ago in *Semiotica*, a response by the author to a critique of his ideas--regarding the relationship of the 1906 division of interpretants to the 1909 division--by Tom Short in *Transactions.* (1996, “Interpreting Peirce’s Interpretant: A Response to Lalor, Liszka, and Meyers,” http://www.peircesociety.org/contents.html 32:4, pp. 488-541)*.* See: The Classification of Peirce's Interpretants, Brendan Lalor. *Semiotica* 114-1/2, 31-40, 1997. https://philosophy.thereitis.org/the-classification-of-peirces-interpretants/ (Note to Ben: the link at Arisbe doesn't take one to this paper.) I tended at the time--and since--to agree with him contra Tom Short regarding his principal thesis. Here's his abstract followed by the paper's concluding two paragraphs. *Abstract.* After characterizing the role of the interpretant in semiosis, I consider two passages in which Peirce makes a threefold division of interpretants, one from 1906, one from 1909. Then I suggest that Thomas Short and others are wrong in holding that in the two passages, Peirce put forward two completely separate trichotomies. Instead, I argue that the 1906 trichotomy is in fact a special case of that put forward by Peirce in the 1909 passage, not a separate trichotomy. I then explain more specifically how we ought to conceive the relationship between these two classifications. [The concluding two paragraphs of the paper] One might argue that even if my view is right, Short’s view, that the two trichotomies of interpretant intersect yielding nine types in all, could be right as well, in the following sense. Perhaps what at one level of analysis is an immediate interpretant, could turn out to supervene on what at a lower level of analysis are emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants — and likewise in the case of dynamic and final interpretants. In this way, for example, perhaps a dynamic interpretant could in a sense also be said to be a logical interpretant. However, Short is committed to the conceptual clarity of the proposition, ‘this dynamic interpretant *is *a logical interpretant’. This is quite different from what my view asserts as conceptually clear: i.e. that ‘this dynamic interpretant *in part*supervenes on a logical interpretant’ — not that it *is* one. I will not make a judgment here about the prospects for working out some unnoticed way of showing that *something like *Short’s view is conceptually clear after all. If such a partial vindication is possible, however, I fail to see how it can be made apart from
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon, Ben, List Well I'm glad that I saved you some time in finding Lalor's paper. I hope others here can help put light on your particular question, Jon. However, as suggested by the last line my post just preceding this, I would be interested in discussing this idea of the generalization of the 1906 'anthropological' division to the 1909 'highly generalized' division in consideration of Stjernfelt's thesis. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 4:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com wrote: Gary, List: As it happens, I just read Short's 1996 response yesterday, after joining the CSP Society and thus gaining online access to its *Transactions*. I was planning to look for Lalor's paper in the near future, but you have saved me the trouble, for which I sincerely thank you. Unfortunately, though, neither sheds much further light on the particular questions that I am trying to answer. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
