Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,


I do not see from your quote of Edwina that she states that the logical and the 
final interpretant are the same. 

And just repeating quotes does not solve interprative difficulties.

best,

Auke





> Op 16 juni 2020 om 19:32 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > JAS:  As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I 
> do not consider the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same 
> as the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.
> > 
> > AvB:  I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did 
> > not notice somebody else doing so in our exchanges.
> > 
> > > 
> Edwina suggested that they are the same, or at least that the logical and 
> final interpretants are the same.
> 
> 
> > > ET:  I question whether every sign has, necessarily, a 
> final interpretant. I refer to Peirce's comment that "not all signs have 
> logical interpretants, but only intellectual concepts and the like" ...
> > My point is that, as Peirce points out, not every sign has a final 
> > interpretant, conditional or not. Only intellectual concepts.
> > 
> > > 
> Peirce does not point out that only intellectual concepts have final 
> interpretants, he points out that only intellectual concepts (and the like; 
> i.e., symbols) have logical interpretants.  He even goes on to distinguish a 
> logical interpretant from a final or ultimate logical interpretant, which is 
> a habit (EP 2:418, 1907) or a habit-change (CP 5.476, 1907).
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  But, is not the sense of comprehending the meaning 
> of the sign a sign of reassurance?
> > 
> > > 
> No, it seems to me that "the sense of comprehending the meaning of the 
> sign" is (or includes) a feeling of reassurance, rather than being a sign of 
> reassurance.  In any case, Peirce clearly draws the same distinction that I 
> am making.
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and 
> an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the 
> Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to 
> an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 
> 4.536, 1906)
> > 
> > > 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 2:57 AM Auke van Breemen < 
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Jon Alen,
> > 
> > Just to avoid misunderstanding.
> > 
> > JAS: As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not 
> > consider the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as 
> > the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants. 
> > 
> > I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did not 
> > notice somebody else doing so in our exchanges. Neither did I read any 
> > remark to the extend that you do regard them the same.
> > 
> > The most curious part of your response however is that according to 
> > you a feeling is not a sign. While at the same time you quote Peirce
> > 
> > JAS: "In all cases, it [the interpretant] includes feelings; for 
> > there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign" 
> > (EP 2:409, 1907).
> > 
> > But, is not the sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign a 
> > sign of reassurance?
> > 
> > Best,
> > 
> > Auke 
> > 
> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[John F. Sowa]

Terry,  
That's a good way to explain the issues -- especially
because you and Peirce illustrate your interpretations with concrete
examples.  A definition or discussion of  any new term must have one or
more examples to show (1) that the term is not vacuous, and (2) the kinds
of features or characteristics a typical instance may have.

Examples from astronomy illustrate the issues very clearly.  
Immediately after the Big Bang, the universe was too hot for any living
things to exist.  But today, astronomers are routinely seeing and
interpreting marks from billions of years ago as tokens of various types. 

Historians and anthropologists  have shown how people from
different cultures have interpreted similar marks in the sky as tokens of
very different types.  Although some of their interpretations may have
been fanciful, much of what they said was true as far as it was tested in
practice.
The Polynesians, for example, were using the stars to
guide their travels across the Pacific for centuries before the Europeans
ventured far from
shore.
John
TLR> I find it helpful to 
think of at least some
“possible signs” or “protosigns” or “pre-incarnate signs” as being
cognitively incomplete signs. Familiar example from PWP 104 &
CP 2.304: 
An index is a sign
which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its
object were removed, but would not lose that character if there were no
interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece
 of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not.
 

Another striking (pun intended) example are the
gravity waves emitted by the inspiral collision of two neutron stars
identified in B. P. Abbot, et al.,“GW170817: Observation of
Gravitational Waves from a Binary Neutron Star Inspiral.” Physical
 Review Letters 119, no. 161101 (October 16, 2017): 1-18. The shot
and hole in the mould thus are manifest or incarnate causal-indexical
signs but they remain cognitively incomplete unless and until “somebody
has the sense to attribute it to a shot,” So
 too are the gravity waves and the inspiral collision of neutron stars
that caused them manifest incarnate empirical signs until – 130 million
years later and 780 quintillion miles away – astronomers on Earth “had
the sense” to detect the waves and attribute
 them to that inspiral collision, thus cognitively completing those
causal-indexical empirical signs as manifest, incarnate, actual
interpretants in the mind of an Interpreter.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

RM:  Such an "unreal" sign cannot determine anything real since it is not
determined. How could he determine a final interpreter as a change of habit
if anyone's habits are not affected by his incarnation in the real world,
and therefore by the prior perception of an updated sign?


This reflects once again our disagreement about the meaning of "determines"
within the process of semeiosis.  In my view, it only means "efficiently
causes" when a dynamical object determines an indexical sign and when a
sign token determines a dynamical interpretant (actuality).  It means
"formally causes" when a dynamical object determines an iconic sign and
when a sign type determines an immediate interpretant (possibility).  It
means "finally causes" when a dynamical object determines a symbolic sign
and when a final interpretant (conditional necessity) determines a
dynamical interpretant.  A sign that never *actually* determines a
dynamical interpretant can still be real and have a final interpretant
because it *would *produce that effect under ideal circumstances, just as a
diamond that never *actually *gets rubbed with corundum nevertheless is
really hard because it *would *resist scratching under those circumstances
(CP 5.457, EP 2:356-357, 1905).

RM:  The representamen should therefore be rehabilitated in order to
confine it to the universe of possibilities and the term sign should be
reserved to the incarnate form.


No, this would not be consistent at all with Peirce's terminology.  For a
time he defines a "sign" as "a Representamen with a mental Interpretant"
(CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903) and "a Representamen of which some Interpretant
is a cognition of a mind" (CP 2.242, EP 2:291, 1903), such that
"representamen" is a *generalization *of "sign."  However, two years later
he describes "sign" as "a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very
broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition" and
acknowledges that he "formerly preferred the word representamen. But there
was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193, 1905) because
"representamen" and "sign" are now effectively synonymous.  Instead, it is
a sign *type* as "a definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537, 1906) that
belongs to "the universe of possibilities," although Peirce admittedly
assigns it to the universe of necessitants; and it is a sign *token *as "a
Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of
time" (ibid) that is "the incarnate form."

RM:  The form can only be represented by becoming a sensitive form in the
real world and be perceived to be communicated.


I agree that a sign *type *must be embodied in a sign *token* in order for
the sign itself to *act *by determining a dynamical interpretant.  This is
the sense in which "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as
to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303, 1904).  It is also the sense in which "a
Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP
2:544n22, 1906).

RM:  This shows how literalism can function as an obstacle to a truly
scientific approach, disconnecting Peirce's semiotics from its pragmatism
through conceptualist arguments and offering alternatives devoid of
practical applications.


On the contrary, it shows how deviating from Peirce's carefully chosen
terminology and his corresponding conceptual framework can result in
misunderstanding and misapplication of his ideas; most notably, the
rejection of final causation, which he explicitly affirms..  Moreover, my
arguments are robustly realist rather than conceptualist (or nominalist),
recognizing that reality includes some possibilities (may-bes) and
conditional necessities (would-bes) rather than being confined to
actualities.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 4:19 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Jon Alan, List
>
> We are at this point at the heart of our differences. That a sign cannot
> have a transmitter or interpreter is of great banality. Just consider the
> tides, the many pareidolia [1]
> <#m_3023044804399113558_m_7008256178111926644_m_4028518753449587719_m_5974681334274207485_m_-2178071239835973149_m_5240091734395543262_m_-5246159053361251967__ftn1>
>   for
> the former and for the latter think about the possible effects of global
> warming that no one has yet perceived. As for the signs produced in the
> space of the possibles by a human their interpretation can only be a "*vague
> view of the mind".* A view of the mind is completely unusable because of
> its indeterminacy and cannot have practical consequences without being
> updated. Such an "unreal" sign cannot determine anything real since it is
> not determined. How could he determine a final interpreter as a change of
> habit if anyone's habits are not affected by his incarnation in the real
> world, and therefore by the prior 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

JAS:  As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider
the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.

AvB:  I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did not notice
somebody else doing so in our exchanges.


Edwina suggested that they are the same, or at least that the logical and
final interpretants are the same.

ET:  I question whether every sign has, necessarily, a final interpretant.
I refer to Peirce's comment that "not all signs have logical interpretants,
but only intellectual concepts and the like" ...
My point is that, as Peirce points out, not every sign has a final
interpretant, conditional or not. Only intellectual concepts.


Peirce does not point out that only intellectual concepts have *final
*interpretants,
he points out that only intellectual concepts (and the like; i.e., symbols)
have *logical *interpretants.  He even goes on to distinguish a logical
interpretant from a *final *or *ultimate *logical interpretant, which is a
habit (EP 2:418, 1907) or a habit-change (CP 5.476, 1907).

AvB:  But, is not the sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign a sign
of reassurance?


No, it seems to me that "the sense of comprehending the meaning of the
sign" is (or includes) a *feeling* of reassurance, rather than being a *sign
*of reassurance.  In any case, Peirce clearly draws the same distinction
that I am making.

CSP:  I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the
Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a
Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536, 1906)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 2:57 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Jon Alen,
>
> Just to avoid misunderstanding.
>
> JAS: As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider
> the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the
> immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.
>
> I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did not notice
> somebody else doing so in our exchanges. Neither did I read any remark to
> the extend that you do regard them the same.
>
> The most curious part of your response however is that according to you a
> feeling is not a sign. While at the same time you quote Peirce
>
> JAS: "In all cases, it [the interpretant] includes feelings; for there
> must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign" (EP
> 2:409, 1907).
>
> But, is not the sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign a sign of
> reassurance?
>
> Best,
>
> Auke
>
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, John, list

I very much like the concept of the representamen referring to the
'universe of possibilities' [which I refer to in my own work as
non-local semiosic processes] - while the 'sign' refers to the
'incarnate form' - ie, the local semiosic process.

And again, as Robert points out, the principle of indeterminacy
means that an 'unreal sign' cannot determine anything since it is, in
itself, confined to 'being possible' - which means, 'not open to the
principle of contradiction'. 

And yes, as John points out, moving from the possible to the actual
will result in s loss of information - at this time, in this context.
A different interaction might produce a different actualization. 

And I think it's an excellent point to suggest that the Final
Interpretant, which JAS puts as a primal logical force before the
Immediate and Dynamic, sets up a situation where the FI has no
'information' gathered from the semiosic experiences of the Immediate
and Dynamic Interpretants, on which to work - and thus - change its
habits. The Final Interpretant has to be seen, not as an a priori
Platonic Pure Form which logically guides the less competent
Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants -- , but as an evolving habit
which learns from experience.

Edwina
 On Tue 16/06/20 11:33 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Robert,

That's an excellent summary of the issues.  For my comments, I
divided it in three parts:
 > The representamen should therefore be rehabilitated in order to
confine it to the universe of possibilities andthe term sign should
be reserved to the incarnate form. This is the reason why in my
formalization process, I called these possible signs "protosigns".
Protosigns are the a priori forms of all possible signs and the
distinction must be made carefully with the "actual" signs that are
these incarnate signs.

And it's essential to note that the possible signs include all the
hypotheses (patterns) in Peirce's universe of possibilities.  Because
of continuity, that universe is uncountably infinite.  But the set of
available words for incarnating signs is finite.  Therefore, the
process of incarnating signs will always lose information:   a many
to one mapping cannot preserve distinctions among the many.

> The question will be: "Are we talking about the forms a priori in
the universe of possibilities or of  these same forms inscribed in
the real world"?  The form can only be represented by becoming a
sensitive form in the real world and be perceived to be communicated.

Yes.  And that communication depends on a mapping from an
uncountable infinity to a finite set of words.  The exact meaning in
any particular context depends on an open-ended variety of
"collateral experience" shared by the speaker and listener in any
particular context.  Since no two contexts and the people in them can
be identical, discrepancies are inevitable.  (The metaphor of "mind
fusion" is too vague to be useful in this discussion.)

> This shows how literalism can function as an obstacle to a truly
scientific approach, disconnecting Peirce's semiotics from its
pragmatism through conceptualist arguments and offering alternatives
devoid of practical applications.

Yes.  The principle of "charity" implies that the listener must make
some allowance for the inevitable ambiguities.  That allowance is some
implicit, context-dependent proposition.  But no two occurrences of a
word have exactly the same context, even in a single document.  If 
we're lucky, those implicit propositions may be small enough to be
irrelevant.  But when the sentences occur in different documents,
written on different occasions for different purposes, we can't
depend on luck.

Fundamental principle:  The meanings of words depend on context. 
Charity may provide some useful background information, but there is
no guarantee that the charitable information will be identical for
different sentences, even in the same document.  For different
documents, written on different days, months, years, differences are
inevitable.  Any information contributed by charity must be made
explicit, and it must be carefully analyzed for relevance and
reliability.

John 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[John F. Sowa]

Robert,
That's an excellent summary of the issues.  For my comments,
I divided it in three parts:

> The representamen should
therefore be rehabilitated in order to confine it to the universe of
possibilities andthe term sign should be reserved to the incarnate form.
This is the reason why in my formalization process, I called these
possible signs "protosigns". Protosigns are the a priori forms
of all possible signs and the distinction must be made carefully with the
"actual" signs that are these incarnate signs.
And it's
essential to note that the possible signs include all the hypotheses
(patterns) in Peirce's universe of possibilities.  Because of continuity,
that universe is uncountably infinite.  But the set of available words for
incarnating signs is finite.  Therefore, the process of incarnating signs
will always lose information:   a many to one mapping cannot preserve
distinctions among the many.
> The question will be: "Are we
talking about the forms a priori in the universe of possibilities or of 
these same forms inscribed in the real world"?  The form can only be
represented by becoming a sensitive form in the real world and be
perceived to be communicated.
Yes.  And that communication depends
on a mapping from an uncountable infinity to a finite set of words.  The
exact meaning in any particular context depends on an open-ended variety
of "collateral experience" shared by the speaker and listener in
any particular context.  Since no two contexts and the people in them can
be identical, discrepancies are inevitable.  (The metaphor of "mind
fusion" is too vague to be useful in this discussion.)
>
This shows how literalism can function as an obstacle to a truly
scientific approach, disconnecting Peirce's semiotics from its pragmatism
through conceptualist arguments and offering alternatives devoid of
practical applications.
Yes.  The principle of "charity"
implies that the listener must make some allowance for the inevitable
ambiguities.  That allowance is some implicit, context-dependent
proposition.  But no two occurrences of a word have exactly the same
context, even in a single document.  If  we're lucky, those implicit
propositions may be small enough to be irrelevant.  But when the sentences
occur in different documents, written on different occasions for different
purposes, we can't depend on luck.
Fundamental principle:  The
meanings of words depend on context.  Charity may provide some useful
background information, but there is no guarantee that the charitable
information will be identical for different sentences, even in the same
document.  For different documents, written on different days, months,
years, differences are inevitable.  Any information contributed by charity
must be made explicit, and it must be carefully analyzed for relevance and
reliability.
John
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,

Just to avoid misunderstanding.

JAS: As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider the 
emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the 
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants. 

I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did not notice somebody 
else doing so in our exchanges. Neither did I read any remark to the extend 
that you do regard them the same.

The most curious part of your response however is that according to you a 
feeling is not a sign. While at the same time you quote Peirce

JAS: "In all cases, it [the interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at 
least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign" (EP 2:409, 1907).

But, is not the sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign a sign of 
reassurance?


Best,

Auke 




> Op 16 juni 2020 om 2:55 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Edwina, Auke, List:
> 
> As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider the 
> emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the 
> immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.  On the contrary, in my view these 
> two trichotomies are orthogonal to each other--emotional/energetic/ logical 
> describe the nature of the sign's effect as either a feeling (1ns), an 
> exertion (2ns), or a further sign (3ns); while immediate/dynamical/final 
> correspond to the possible effects of a general type, the actual effect of an 
> individual token, and the conditionally necessary effect of the sign itself.
> 
> That being the case, I agree that only intellectual concepts and other 
> symbols have logical interpretants; but I hold that all signs have immediate 
> and final interpretants, regardless of whether they ever determine a 
> dynamical interpretant.  I also agree that all signs have emotional 
> interpretants; as Peirce wrote, "In all cases, it [the interpretant] includes 
> feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning 
> of the sign" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Logical interpretants are further signs (3ns) 
> that involve exertions (2ns) and feelings (1ns), while energetic 
> interpretants are exertions (2ns) that involve feelings (1ns).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 9:43 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > With regard to this particular sentence of JAS:
> > 
> > "Every sign has a conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and 
> > thus a possible (immediate) interpretant, even if it never has an actual 
> > (dynamical) interpretant because there does not happen to be an interpreter 
> > present to be determined by it. "
> > 
> > In addition to my post concerning my interpretation that the sign 
> > is irreducibly triadic, and includes an interpretant even without an 
> > 'interpreter' - [unless one assigns that function of interpreter to the 
> > entity, such as the human body's immune system is the interpreter of the 
> > virus [object] entering it - and the interpretant is the effects of that 
> > intrusioin [rash, fever]…..In this case, the interpreter is equivalent to 
> > the mediative representamen/sign.
> > 
> > But- my question concerns the comment by JAS above - and I question 
> > whether every sign has, necessarily, a final interpretant. I refer to 
> > Peirce's comment that "not all signs have logical interpretants, but only 
> > intellectual concepts and the like; and these are all either general or 
> > intimately connected with generals, as it seems to me. This shows that the 
> > species of future tense of the logical interpretant is that of the 
> > conditional mood, the 'would-be'" EP p 410.
> > 
> > My point is that, as Peirce points out, not every sign has a final 
> > interpretant, conditional or not. Only intellectual concepts. So - that 
> > measles, that wind-on-the-water, that weathercock - which are all 
> > functioning as triads - don't have final interpretants.
> > 
> > As for the concept that the triad has an immediate/emotional 
> > interpretant but not necessarily an actual/dynamic interpretant - I'd agree 
> > with that. But not for the reason outlined by JAS, which requires that 
> > 'interpreter present to be determined by it'.  I'd say that the interpreter 
> > IS present. In the case of measles, the interpreter is the human body's 
> > immune system; in the case of the weathercock, it's the metal/wooden stand; 
> > in the case of the water ripples, it's the water.
> > 
> > Now - there may not be an active, dynamic interpretant resulting 
> > from the stimulus from the Dynamic Object. There might instead be an 
> > interpretant which is below the 'critical threshold' for an actuality, a 
> > dynamic 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Auke, List:

As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider the
emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.  On the contrary, in my view these
two trichotomies are orthogonal to each other--emotional/energetic/logical
describe the *nature *of the sign's effect as either a feeling (1ns), an
exertion (2ns), or a further sign (3ns); while immediate/dynamical/final
correspond to the *possible* effects of a general type, the *actual* effect
of an individual token, and the conditionally *necessary* effect of the
sign itself.

That being the case, I agree that only intellectual concepts and other
symbols have *logical *interpretants; but I hold that all signs have *immediate
*and *final *interpretants, regardless of whether they ever determine
a *dynamical
*interpretant.  I also agree that all signs have *emotional* interpretants;
as Peirce wrote, "In all cases, it [the interpretant] includes feelings;
for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the
sign" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Logical interpretants are further signs (3ns)
that *involve
*exertions (2ns) and feelings (1ns), while energetic interpretants are
exertions (2ns) that *involve* feelings (1ns).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 9:43 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> With regard to this particular sentence of JAS:
>
> "Every sign has a conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and thus a
> possible (immediate) interpretant, even if it never has an actual
> (dynamical) interpretant because there does not happen to be an interpreter
> present to be determined by it. "
>
> In addition to my post concerning my interpretation that the sign is
> irreducibly triadic, and includes an interpretant even without an
> 'interpreter' - [unless one assigns that function of interpreter to the
> entity, such as the human body's immune system is the interpreter of the
> virus [object] entering it - and the interpretant is the effects of that
> intrusioin [rash, fever]…..In this case, the interpreter is equivalent to
> the mediative representamen/sign.
>
> But- my question concerns the comment by JAS above - and I question
> whether every sign has, necessarily, a final interpretant. I refer to
> Peirce's comment that "not all signs have logical interpretants, but only
> intellectual concepts and the like; and these are all either general or
> intimately connected with generals, as it seems to me. This shows that the
> species of future tense of the logical interpretant is that of the
> conditional mood, the 'would-be'" EP p 410.
>
> My point is that, as Peirce points out, not every sign has a final
> interpretant, conditional or not. Only intellectual concepts. So - that
> measles, that wind-on-the-water, that weathercock - which are all
> functioning as triads - don't have final interpretants.
>
> As for the concept that the triad has an immediate/emotional interpretant
> but not necessarily an actual/dynamic interpretant - I'd agree with that.
> But not for the reason outlined by JAS, which requires that 'interpreter
> present to be determined by it'.  I'd say that the interpreter IS present.
> In the case of measles, the interpreter is the human body's immune system;
> in the case of the weathercock, it's the metal/wooden stand; in the case of
> the water ripples, it's the water.
>
> Now - there may not be an active, dynamic interpretant resulting from the
> stimulus from the Dynamic Object. There might instead be an interpretant
> which is below the 'critical threshold' for an actuality, a dynamic
> interpretant to emerge. So, as Auke points out, the result would only be an
> emotional interpretant. For example, the virus would infect the body but
> would be 'asymptomatic'. If the immune system broke down, then, the
> critical threshold would be lowered and symptoms would appear.  The wind
> would affect the weathercock but not enough to move it. And so on.
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}With regard to this particular sentence of JAS: 

"Every sign has a conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and
thus a possible (immediate) interpretant, even if it never has an
actual (dynamical) interpretant because there does not happen to be
an interpreter present to be determined by it. "

In addition to my post concerning my interpretation that the sign is
irreducibly triadic, and includes an interpretant even without an
'interpreter' - [unless one assigns that function of interpreter to
the entity, such as the human body's immune system is the interpreter
of the virus [object] entering it - and the interpretant is the
effects of that intrusioin [rash, fever]…..In this case, the
interpreter is equivalent to the mediative representamen/sign.

But- my question concerns the comment by JAS above - and I question
whether every sign has, necessarily, a final interpretant. I refer to
Peirce's comment that "not all signs have logical interpretants, but
only intellectual concepts and the like; and these are all either
general or intimately connected with generals, as it seems to me.
This shows that the species of future tense of the logical
interpretant is that of the conditional mood, the 'would-be'" EP p
410.

My point is that, as Peirce points out, not every sign has a final
interpretant, conditional or not. Only intellectual concepts. So -
that measles, that wind-on-the-water, that weathercock - which are
all functioning as triads - don't have final interpretants. 

As for the concept that the triad has an immediate/emotional
interpretant but not necessarily an actual/dynamic interpretant - I'd
agree with that. But not for the reason outlined by JAS, which
requires that 'interpreter present to be determined by it'.  I'd say
that the interpreter IS present. In the case of measles, the
interpreter is the human body's immune system; in the case of the
weathercock, it's the metal/wooden stand; in the case of the water
ripples, it's the water. 

Now - there may not be an active, dynamic interpretant resulting
from the stimulus from the Dynamic Object. There might instead be an
interpretant which is below the 'critical threshold' for an
actuality, a dynamic interpretant to emerge. So, as Auke points out,
the result would only be an emotional interpretant. For example, the
virus would infect the body but would be 'asymptomatic'. If the
immune system broke down, then, the critical threshold would be
lowered and symptoms would appear.  The wind would affect the
weathercock but not enough to move it. And so on.

Edwina
 On Sun 14/06/20  8:30 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Auke, List:
 That is my concise summary of my understanding of Peirce's opinion
as expressed in his writings.  I provided some supporting quotes in
this same thread a few days ago, as follows (Robert, please forgive
the repetition).
  RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be
sign it must be perceived
 JAS:  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain
statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a
'would be,' i.e., is what it  would determine in the interpreter if
there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in
order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a
dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an immediate interpretant,
"its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter" (SS
111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the effect the Sign would
produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to
work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909). 
  In fact,  several years earlier Peirce already seems to recognize
that an actual interpretant is not necessary, instead repeatedly
calling it merely "possible."
 CSP:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its  Interpretant, by which triadic relation
the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of
the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible
Interpretant. (CP , EP 2:290, 1903, bold added)
 Later he explicitly affirms that "there must be a sign without an
utterer and a sign without an interpreter" (EP 2:404, 1907).  Kinds
of "signs without utterers" include "symptoms of disease, signs of
the weather, groups of experiences serving as premisses, etc." 
"Signs without interpreters" include pictures woven by a Jacquard
loom that catch fire and are "consumed before anyone can see them,"
"conditions and results" of experiments with model boats that are 
"automatically recorded" but "nobody takes the trouble to study," and
"the books of a bank" when a balance sheet is not drawn up from them. 
An example of my own is that ripples on the surface of a remote lake
at night are a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,

I don't fight your: Moreover, my point continues to be that it is not necessary 
for something to be actually perceived in order to qualify as a sign.

I saw those quotes, but I know the scope of the pragmatism article which is the 
meaning of intellectual concepts and a quasi mind is assumed. In a quasi mind 
we may abstract from the apprehension of the sign as an object.

At p. 410 in EP I read: "In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object 
and emotional interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are 
"subjective"; both, too, appertain to all signs without exeption."(emphasis 
AvB). 

It is the difference between a potential sign and a sign in actu. The example 
in the footnote on p. 413 (Herbert Peirce extinguishing a dress on fire and 
telling afterwards that he often in his imagination went through what ought to 
be done in such cases after he heard of such a thing happened to ms Longfellow) 
works with maybe's as a play in the imagination. 

A sign must be able to arouse a feeling (emotional interpretant). in oder to 
qualify as a sign. That is a requisite for your (1). Leaving this context out 
or just implied hides an important aspect of Peirce's semiotics. 

JAS: It is sufficient that (1) it may determine a dynamical interpretant under 
various circumstances by virtue of having animmediate interpretant, and (2) it 
would determine a dynamical interpretant under ideal circumstances by virtue of 
having a final interpretant.

Best,

Auke

> Op 15 juni 2020 om 2:30 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> That is my concise summary of my understanding of Peirce's opinion as 
> expressed in his writings.  I provided some supporting quotes in this same 
> thread a few days ago, as follows (Robert, please forgive the repetition).
> 
> 
> > > RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents 
> because to be sign it must be perceived
> > 
> > > 
> 
> > > JAS:  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's 
> plain statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 
> 'would be,' i.e., is what it would determine in the interpreter if there were 
> one" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify 
> as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a dynamical interpretant 
> by virtue of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability 
> before it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, 
> "the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which circumstances 
> should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).
> > 
> > > 
>  In fact, several years earlier Peirce already seems to recognize that an 
> actual interpretant is not necessary, instead repeatedly calling it merely 
> "possible."
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic 
> relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible 
> Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the 
> possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same 
> triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 
> , EP 2:290, 1903, bold added)
> > 
> > >  
> 
> Later he explicitly affirms that "there must be a sign without an utterer 
> and a sign without an interpreter" (EP 2:404, 1907).  Kinds of "signs without 
> utterers" include "symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of 
> experiences serving as premisses, etc."  "Signs without interpreters" include 
> pictures woven by a Jacquard loom that catch fire and are "consumed before 
> anyone can see them," "conditions and results" of experiments with model 
> boats that are "automatically recorded" but  "nobody takes the trouble to 
> study," and "the books of a bank" when a balance sheet is not drawn up from 
> them.  An example of my own is that ripples on the surface of a remote lake 
> at night are a sign of the direction of the wind, despite there being no one 
> there to observe them.
> 
> Consequently, "neither an utterer, nor even, perhaps, an interpreter is 
> essential to a sign" (ibid).  Peirce proceeds to "inquire whether there be 
> not some ingredient of the utterer and some ingredient of the interpreter 
> which not only are so essential, but are even more characteristic of signs 
> than the utterer and the interpreter themselves."  He takes several pages to 
> identify the essential ingredient of the utterer as the object (EP 2:404-409) 
> and just two paragraphs to identify the essential ingredient of the 
> interpreter as the interpretant (EP 2:409-410).  Every sign has a 
> conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and thus a possible (immediate) 
> interpretant, even if it never has an actual (dynamical) interpretant because 
> there does not happen to be an interpreter present to be determined by it. 
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
think there's a confusion here between an Interpretant and an
Interpreter. 

The Interpretant is a basic component of the Sign triad which is, as
we know, irreducible. [O-R-I]. There is no additional need for an
observer or interpreter. Perception need not be conscious but can be
understood as the Mind within the habits of the entity, reacting to
the external stimuli from the Dynamic Object. This reaction is the
Interpretant. 

The example of 'symptoms of disease' is in itself, a triadic
semiosis. The Object, both DO and IO, would be the virus that enters
the body. The body's immune system is the Representamen's mediative
habits. And the Interpretant, both II and DI, would be the consequent
fever and rash.   There is no need for another Semiosic Process of an
Interpreter to say: 'That's measles'. It's a dicent.with these direct
physical interactions. The observer's comment about naming the disease
is a Legisign [I'd say a rhematic indexical legisign]. 

The weathervane is also a dicent triad, with a direct physical
interpretant - ie, the moving of the pointer. The ripples on the lake
are similar - they are a triad of a stimulus wind affecting an entity
[wind-on-water] with the resultant interpretant of 'ripples'.

These above are all triads. What is not needed is for a secondary
semiosis action, of the interpreter, to consciously observe and
comment on them. The universe is a vast semiosic system, and the
atoms and molecules, all of them in triadic interaction, function
without any human or other conscious interpreter.

Edwina
 On Sun 14/06/20  8:30 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Auke, List:
 That is my concise summary of my understanding of Peirce's opinion
as expressed in his writings.  I provided some supporting quotes in
this same thread a few days ago, as follows (Robert, please forgive
the repetition).
  RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be
sign it must be perceived
 JAS:  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain
statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a
'would be,' i.e., is what it  would determine in the interpreter if
there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in
order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a
dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an immediate interpretant,
"its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter" (SS
111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the effect the Sign would
produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to
work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909). 
  In fact,  several years earlier Peirce already seems to recognize
that an actual interpretant is not necessary, instead repeatedly
calling it merely "possible."
 CSP:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its  Interpretant, by which triadic relation
the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of
the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible
Interpretant. (CP , EP 2:290, 1903, bold added)
 Later he explicitly affirms that "there must be a sign without an
utterer and a sign without an interpreter" (EP 2:404, 1907).  Kinds
of "signs without utterers" include "symptoms of disease, signs of
the weather, groups of experiences serving as premisses, etc." 
"Signs without interpreters" include pictures woven by a Jacquard
loom that catch fire and are "consumed before anyone can see them,"
"conditions and results" of experiments with model boats that are 
"automatically recorded" but "nobody takes the trouble to study," and
"the books of a bank" when a balance sheet is not drawn up from them. 
An example of my own is that ripples on the surface of a remote lake
at night are a sign of the direction of the wind, despite there being
no one there to observe them.
 Consequently, "neither an utterer, nor even, perhaps, an interpreter
is essential to a sign" (ibid).  Peirce proceeds to "inquire whether
there be not some ingredient of the utterer and some ingredient of
the interpreter which not only are so essential, but are even more
characteristic of signs than the utterer and the interpreter
themselves."  He takes several pages to identify the essential
ingredient of the utterer as the  object (EP 2:404-409) and just two
paragraphs to identify the essential ingredient of the interpreter as
the interpretant (EP 2:409-410).  Every sign has a conditionally
necessary (final) interpretant, and thus a possible (immediate)
interpretant, even if it never has an actual (dynamical) interpretant
because there does not happen to be an interpreter present to be
determined by it. 
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

That is my concise summary of my understanding of Peirce's opinion as
expressed in his writings.  I provided some supporting quotes in this same
thread a few days ago, as follows (Robert, please forgive the repetition).

RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
must be perceived


JAS:  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement
that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e.,
is what it *would* determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP
2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a
sign, as long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by
virtue of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability
before it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant,
"the effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon which circumstances
should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).


 In fact, several years earlier Peirce already seems to recognize that
an *actual
*interpretant is not necessary, instead repeatedly calling it merely
"possible."

CSP:  A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the *possible *Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation
the *possible
*Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic
relation to the same Object, and for some *possible *Interpretant. (CP , EP
2:290, 1903, bold added)


Later he explicitly affirms that "there must be a sign without an utterer
and a sign without an interpreter" (EP 2:404, 1907).  Kinds of "signs
without utterers" include "symptoms of disease, signs of the weather,
groups of experiences serving as premisses, etc."  "Signs without
interpreters" include pictures woven by a Jacquard loom that catch fire and
are "consumed before anyone can see them," "conditions and results" of
experiments with model boats that are "automatically recorded" but "nobody
takes the trouble to study," and "the books of a bank" when a balance sheet
is not drawn up from them.  An example of my own is that ripples on
the surface of a remote lake at night are a sign of the direction of the
wind, despite there being no one there to observe them.

Consequently, "neither an utterer, nor even, perhaps, an interpreter is
essential to a sign" (ibid).  Peirce proceeds to "inquire whether there be
not some ingredient of the utterer and some ingredient of the interpreter
which not only are so essential, but are even more characteristic of signs
than the utterer and the interpreter themselves."  He takes several pages
to identify the essential ingredient of the utterer as the *object *(EP
2:404-409) and just two paragraphs to identify the essential ingredient of
the interpreter as the *interpretant *(EP 2:409-410).  Every sign has a
conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and thus a possible
(immediate) interpretant, even if it never has an actual (dynamical)
interpretant because there does not happen to be an interpreter present to
be determined by it.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 3:59 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Jon Alen,
>
> Is this your opinion or Peirce's?
>
> Moreover, my point continues to be that it is not necessary for something
> to be *actually *perceived in order to qualify as a sign.  It is
> sufficient that (1) it *may *determine a dynamical interpretant under
> various circumstances by virtue of having an *immediate *interpretant,
> and (2) it *would *determine a dynamical interpretant under ideal
> circumstances by virtue of having a *final *interpretant.
>
> I am particular interested in where to find the source.
>
> best,
>
> Auke
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

I agree with that famous quote from Peirce, and it does not refute what I
said before.

For one thing, only certain signs are "elements of concepts" that "enter
into logical thought" by being perceived and thereby determining dynamical
interpretants that are *logical *interpretants (further signs).  There are
other signs whose dynamical interpretants are instead *energetic *interpretants
(exertions) or merely *emotional *interpretants (feelings).

Moreover, my point continues to be that it is not necessary for something
to be *actually *perceived in order to qualify as a sign.  It is sufficient
that (1) it *may *determine a dynamical interpretant under various
circumstances by virtue of having an *immediate *interpretant, and (2)
it *would
*determine a dynamical interpretant under ideal circumstances by virtue of
having a *final *interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Jun 13, 2020 at 12:11 PM Robert Marty 
wrote:

> Dear Jon Alan,
>
> JAS   >  "Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign,
> as long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by
> virtue of having an immediate interpretant ... and a final interpretant ..."
>
>
> RM  > If I were a literalist, I would say this:
>
>
>
> "But against unclear and nonsensical hypotheses, [of] whatever ægis [he
> will be protected]. Pragmatism will be more essentially significant for him
> than for any other logician, for the reason that it is in action that
> logical energy returns to the uncontrolled and uncriticizable parts of the
> mind. His maxim will be this: Peirce: CP 5.212 Cross-Ref:†† *The elements
> of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and
> make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show
> its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by
> reason.* Peirce: CP 5.212 Cross-Ref:†† The digestion of such thoughts is
> slow, ladies and gentlemen; but when you come in the future to reflect upon
> all that I have said, I am confident you will find the seven hours, you
> have spent in listening to these ideas, have not been altogether wasted."
>
> Best,
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Robert Marty]

Dear Jon Alan,

JAS   >  "Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as
long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue
of having an immediate interpretant ... and a final interpretant ..."



RM  > If I were a literalist, I would say this:



"But against unclear and nonsensical hypotheses, [of] whatever ægis [he
will be protected]. Pragmatism will be more essentially significant for him
than for any other logician, for the reason that it is in action that
logical energy returns to the uncontrolled and uncriticizable parts of the
mind. His maxim will be this: Peirce: CP 5.212 Cross-Ref:†† *The elements
of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and
make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show
its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by
reason.* Peirce: CP 5.212 Cross-Ref:†† The digestion of such thoughts is
slow, ladies and gentlemen; but when you come in the future to reflect upon
all that I have said, I am confident you will find the seven hours, you
have spent in listening to these ideas, have not been altogether wasted."

Best,

Le jeu. 11 juin 2020 à 04:22, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Bernard, List:
>
> BM:  I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is pursuing.
>
>
> Thanks for clarifying this, I did not think that was your intent.
>
> BM:  Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it
> needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with Robert
> on this.
>
>
> I agree that a sign must be perceived in order to *act *as such--i.e., it
> must be embodied in an *actual *token that determines an *actual *(dynamical)
> interpretant--but that is not what Robert stated.  Here is the relevant
> part of our exchange again.
>
> RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
> must be perceived
>
> JAS:  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as
> long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue
> of having an immediate interpretant ... and a final interpretant ...
>
>
> My point was that a sign need not be perceived in order to *be *a sign.
>
> BM:  If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without referring
> explicitly to their technical definitions, what does it mean to practice
> "applied semiotics"?
>
>
> This is an excellent question for those who routinely complain about the
> supposedly excessive emphasis on semeiotic theory in List discussions.  We
> cannot properly *apply *Peirce's ideas to today's problems unless we
> first establish *what *those ideas were, which requires paying careful
> attention to his technical definitions of the relevant terms.
>
> BM:  If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a sign himself?
>
>
> Indeed, as I have noted previously, Peirce often uses "quasi-mind" in lieu
> of "mind" when referring to both the utterer and the interpreter of a sign;
> and he says that "every sign even if external to all minds must be a
> determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
> determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Le 10/06/2020 à 18:08, John F. Sowa a écrit :
>> >
>> > Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this debate in one
>> sentence plus one image:
>> >
>> > BM> In place of the old, often recurring debates on this subject I
>> propose to muse over a painting from René Magritte entitled "Le sens
>> > des réalités"
>> >
>> > That image, which shows a large boulder suspended in the middle of the
>> clouds, is an excellent illustration of the way JAS assembles
>> > "fireworks of quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a hypothesis (AKA
>> guess) and defend as if it were gospel truth.
>> >
>> John, List
>>
>> I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is persuing.
>>
>> I wanted to ask by means of the painting: what does "Real" mean ? With
>> the consequence: What is "Real" in the nature of signs?
>>
>> This latter question seems to me to be at the core of the Peirce's way of
>> thinking.
>>
>> Going back to the Magritte's painting, I think impossible that the
>> boulder may be "suspended in the middle of the clouds" as John see it.
>>
>> Because it would be a manifest violation of the law of universal
>> gravitation. The boulder is falling down to the earth that we see
>> distinctly on the lower part of the image, may be it is some kind of
>> meteorite.
>>
>> So we have from the beginning an image of the Reality: that which will
>> hurt you -and perhaps kill you-  if you stay under the boulder.
>>
>> But we can imagine some other senses of realities apart this one that has
>> been derived from the necessity of law.
>>
>> The boulder 

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 I think that we continue ignoring that Peirce had multiple uses and
therefore definitions of his terms - and there is not ONE definition
that is 'the truth', but, as Auke points out - the context wherein
that term is used defines the meaning:
"Auke:Isn't our duscussion about the meaning of a particular term,
i.e. commens? And, my contribution, about the need to look at the
wider context in order to grasp the direction of a thought?"

For example - as I have pointed out, there are at least three
specific uses and therefore definitions of the term 'sign'. And at
least as many for the term 'mind'. None of them contradict each
other; all of them instead, examine the complexity of the reality to
which they refer. 

Since Peirce considered that semiosis functions within the inorganic
and organic realms of reality - and not just within the symbolic realm
of mankind - then, I think we should consider that ALL morphological
entities are 'Signs', which is to say, that ALL exist within a
triadic semiosic interaction. So, as Peirce points out, that crystal,
that bee, that protoplasm - are all engaged in semiosic interactions.
And therefore, as instances of semiosis, ie, as units in a mode of
Secondness - as well as Thirdness [mind/habits] - they are, in
themselves, Signs. In semiosic interaction with other Signs. 

Therefore - to attempt to set up a thesaurus focused only on a
single, ultimate meaning of a term, in my view, ignores this
complexity. 

It is perhaps an unfortunate reality that our species, homo sapiens,
functions so heavily within the symbolic realm. This enables man to,
of course, invent new technologies etc, but, it also can alienate him
from reality - such that he can set up ideologies and belief systems
that are pure rhetoric, unattached to the objective world of reality.
[To prevent this, Peirce insisted that his theories were not operating
within 'idealism' but within 'objective idealism'. He firmly grounded
his theories within the pragmatic world, not of words, but of 'real
material things']. That's why it's not enough to simply examine his
theories within words, but to examine them within the objective
world.

Edwina
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Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,


> That is an opinion, and even if valid, it does not change the fact that 
> Peirce invented and defined "the commens."  I find it misleading to use his 
> peculiar term to mean something else.
>  
> 

Isn't our duscussion about the meaning of a particular term, i.e. commens? And, 
my contribution, about the need to look at the wider context in order to grasp 
the direction of a thought?

> 
> > > At that point, I agree that a case can sometimes be made for 
> either side; but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect his 
> more considered views, and hence should be given slightly more weight 
> accordingl
> > 
> > > 

Fine that you made clear that it is just your default assumption and not the 
nature of the case.

Look, with regard to your immediate...final interpretant, I prefer not want to 
discuss this with you. It feels like a boy coming to my shop asking for a cents 
worth of candy. I reply, which kind you would like: jelly beans, mint or 
licorice? And the boy responds: I want candy because that is all there is. 
There is no such tihng as a jelly bean, or mint or liquorice.

best,

Auke

 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Auke, JAS, list,



Could you help me work this out?



AvB:  If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we
may say that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did
err when he discarded A.



*‘man is a sign’ (1868)*

*‘the general answer to the question what is man? is that he is a symbol.’
(**CP 7.585)*



So there, (pointing), you have A and not-A, because *C A B*.



What would be a reason to say we did err, were we to discard A,

since a two (sign) cannot be a three (symbol) at the same time?



I mean what “either side” are we talking about?

Are we saying that we should only accept that man is a three because it is
the more considered view because later, and that man can no longer be a two?



JAS:  As I have said before, I believe that the proper approach--in
accordance with the hermeneutic principle of charity--is to *assume*
that *Peirce's
writings never contradict each other*, unless and until this turns out to
be untenable.

At that point, I agree that a *case can sometimes be made for either side*;
but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect his *more
considered* views, and hence should be given *slightly *more weight
accordingly.



Thanks for your time,
Jerry R

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 9:22 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Bernard, List:
>
> BM:  I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is pursuing.
>
>
> Thanks for clarifying this, I did not think that was your intent.
>
> BM:  Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it
> needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with Robert
> on this.
>
>
> I agree that a sign must be perceived in order to *act *as such--i.e., it
> must be embodied in an *actual *token that determines an *actual *(dynamical)
> interpretant--but that is not what Robert stated.  Here is the relevant
> part of our exchange again.
>
> RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
> must be perceived
>
> JAS:  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as
> long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue
> of having an immediate interpretant ... and a final interpretant ...
>
>
> My point was that a sign need not be perceived in order to *be *a sign.
>
> BM:  If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without referring
> explicitly to their technical definitions, what does it mean to practice
> "applied semiotics"?
>
>
> This is an excellent question for those who routinely complain about the
> supposedly excessive emphasis on semeiotic theory in List discussions.  We
> cannot properly *apply *Peirce's ideas to today's problems unless we
> first establish *what *those ideas were, which requires paying careful
> attention to his technical definitions of the relevant terms.
>
> BM:  If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a sign himself?
>
>
> Indeed, as I have noted previously, Peirce often uses "quasi-mind" in lieu
> of "mind" when referring to both the utterer and the interpreter of a sign;
> and he says that "every sign even if external to all minds must be a
> determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
> determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Le 10/06/2020 à 18:08, John F. Sowa a écrit :
>> >
>> > Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this debate in one
>> sentence plus one image:
>> >
>> > BM> In place of the old, often recurring debates on this subject I
>> propose to muse over a painting from René Magritte entitled "Le sens
>> > des réalités"
>> >
>> > That image, which shows a large boulder suspended in the middle of the
>> clouds, is an excellent illustration of the way JAS assembles
>> > "fireworks of quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a hypothesis (AKA
>> guess) and defend as if it were gospel truth.
>> >
>> John, List
>>
>> I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is persuing.
>>
>> I wanted to ask by means of the painting: what does "Real" mean ? With
>> the consequence: What is "Real" in the nature of signs?
>>
>> This latter question seems to me to be at the core of the Peirce's way of
>> thinking.
>>
>> Going back to the Magritte's painting, I think impossible that the
>> boulder may be "suspended in the middle of the clouds" as John see it.
>>
>> Because it would be a manifest violation of the law of universal
>> gravitation. The boulder is falling down to the earth that we see
>> distinctly on the lower part of the image, may be it is some kind of
>> meteorite.
>>
>> So we have from the beginning an image of the Reality: that which will
>> hurt you -and perhaps kill you-  if you stay under the boulder.
>>
>> But we can imagine some other senses of realities apart 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Bernard, List:

BM:  I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is pursuing.


Thanks for clarifying this, I did not think that was your intent.

BM:  Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it
needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with Robert
on this.


I agree that a sign must be perceived in order to *act *as such--i.e., it
must be embodied in an *actual *token that determines an *actual *(dynamical)
interpretant--but that is not what Robert stated.  Here is the relevant
part of our exchange again.

RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
must be perceived

JAS:  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as
long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue
of having an immediate interpretant ... and a final interpretant ...


My point was that a sign need not be perceived in order to *be *a sign.

BM:  If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without referring
explicitly to their technical definitions, what does it mean to practice
"applied semiotics"?


This is an excellent question for those who routinely complain about the
supposedly excessive emphasis on semeiotic theory in List discussions.  We
cannot properly *apply *Peirce's ideas to today's problems unless we first
establish *what *those ideas were, which requires paying careful attention
to his technical definitions of the relevant terms.

BM:  If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a sign himself?


Indeed, as I have noted previously, Peirce often uses "quasi-mind" in lieu
of "mind" when referring to both the utterer and the interpreter of a sign;
and he says that "every sign even if external to all minds must be a
determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand 
wrote:

>
> Le 10/06/2020 à 18:08, John F. Sowa a écrit :
> >
> > Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this debate in one
> sentence plus one image:
> >
> > BM> In place of the old, often recurring debates on this subject I
> propose to muse over a painting from René Magritte entitled "Le sens
> > des réalités"
> >
> > That image, which shows a large boulder suspended in the middle of the
> clouds, is an excellent illustration of the way JAS assembles
> > "fireworks of quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a hypothesis (AKA
> guess) and defend as if it were gospel truth.
> >
> John, List
>
> I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is persuing.
>
> I wanted to ask by means of the painting: what does "Real" mean ? With the
> consequence: What is "Real" in the nature of signs?
>
> This latter question seems to me to be at the core of the Peirce's way of
> thinking.
>
> Going back to the Magritte's painting, I think impossible that the boulder
> may be "suspended in the middle of the clouds" as John see it.
>
> Because it would be a manifest violation of the law of universal
> gravitation. The boulder is falling down to the earth that we see
> distinctly on the lower part of the image, may be it is some kind of
> meteorite.
>
> So we have from the beginning an image of the Reality: that which will
> hurt you -and perhaps kill you-  if you stay under the boulder.
>
> But we can imagine some other senses of realities apart this one that has
> been derived from the necessity of law.
>
> The boulder is really an event, here and there on the painted scene, -it
> is an intrusion- and as such it causes an effect of surprise for the
> audience (this effect is also initiated by Magritte himself to make the
> spectator think about the scene). This intrusive event is also a sense of
> realities: to be able of observation.
>
> Finally one latter sense of reality may consist in the consideration of
> the painting as recalling to our memories the extinction of the dinosaurs.
> A possibility already envisaged by scientists.
>
> Sure, all of this comment of the Magritte painting is highly problematic.
> Many more stories could be presented in illustration of the painting,
> probably as much as people commenting it.
>
> Sure, there is in this example nothing which proves that Peirce's semiotic
> is a truth. As a matter of fact common sense has already recognized that
> "an example is not a proof".
>
> Nevertheless one can see that his semiotic elementary distinctions
> -immediate and dynamic object, immediate dynamic normal interpretant, sign-
> are there, behind. I just choose to escape technical terms in this mail.
>
> Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it needs
> to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with Robert on
> this.
>
> I finish with two questions of which I have quite no answer:
>
> 1) If it is 

Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if
only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect
understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count
heavier for Peirce?


Reality, of course; but this misses my point.  I already acknowledged
(twice) that there may very well be something in reality that conforms to
Robert's description; but if so, it is plainly *not* what Peirce calls "the
commens" (EP 2:478, 1906).

AvB:  man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture
and, as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which
the commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits.


The implication here that "the commens" is synonymous with "culture" is
likewise inconsistent with Peirce's definition.

AvB:  The commens for Peirce is, in short, too much colored by his
preoccupation with truth and too little with everyday business where the
truth seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other
motives.


That is an opinion, and even if valid, it does not change the fact that
Peirce invented and defined "the commens."  I find it misleading to use his
peculiar term to mean something else.

AvB:  If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we
may say that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did
err when he discarded A.


As I have said before, I believe that the proper approach--in accordance
with the hermeneutic principle of charity--is to assume that Peirce's
writings *never *contradict each other, unless and until this turns out to
be untenable.  At that point, I agree that a case can sometimes be made for
either side; but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect
his *more considered* views, and hence should be given *slightly *more
weight accordingly.

AvB:  Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this
promising road of inquiry?


Peirce tells us in his Logic Notebook why he abandons the "intentional" (or
"intended") interpretant.  Again, I believe that he was experimenting with
different terminology and (to a lesser extent) different conceptualizations
for the *three *interpretants that he perceived to be *logically necessary*
counterparts of the one sign and its two objects, as demonstrated by
Robert's podium diagram and accompanying analysis.
Intentional/effectual/communicational was only one such attempt, and he
evidently found it unsatisfactory, perhaps precisely because it is too
specific to *human *semeiosis--like his later "sop to Cerberus" (EP 2:478,
1908).  Immediate/dynamical/final seems to be more readily generalizable.

AvB:  As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and coming from
all kinds of directions.


I agree, which is why I sometimes go beyond his ideas myself; but I always
try to acknowledge when and how I am doing so.  All I ask is that others do
the same.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 5:58 AM  wrote:

> Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,
>
> RM:  We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and
> therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of
> minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout
> our lives.
>
> JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains
> all these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it
> is *not* what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines
> it as a "mind" that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds.
> Moreover, Peirce's concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of
> *individual* minds, perhaps even encompassing what you are describing.
> As Andre De Tienne has written
> , "Peirce in
> many places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a
> technical phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind'
> is only a special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that
> logic, or semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but
> those of that much more general entity" (p. 40).
>
> Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if
> only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect
> understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count
> heavier for Peirce?
>
> In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural.
> Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant
> la lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find
> terms that are at odds with later developments.  I think the commens is
> such a term. Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Bernard, list,



I’m surprised you do not have answers to your own questions, since this is,
after all, a Peirce list, and of course, a Peirce list is about ‘*what
Peirce actually wrote’* regards *‘Peirce’s way of thinking’*.



And Peirce said this:



‘This is man,’



I mean, *everybody* knows that,

that is, if one is able to entertain the thought that *everybody* is
hypostatically the same ego.



Besides, would Peirce even be a philosopher,

if he failed to recognize and treat the question of ‘*Man is a Sign*’?



For we all know, and Peirce has even said, that

“All Men are equal in their political rights.”

Hence, that must be *true* because Peirce said it.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand 
wrote:

>
> Le 10/06/2020 à 18:08, John F. Sowa a écrit :
> >
> > Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this debate in one
> > sentence plus one image:
> >
> > BM> In place of the old, often recurring debates on this subject I
> > propose to muse over a painting from René Magritte entitled "Le sens
> > des réalités"
> >
> > That image, which shows a large boulder suspended in the middle of the
> > clouds, is an excellent illustration of the way JAS assembles
> > "fireworks of quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a hypothesis (AKA
> > guess) and defend as if it were gospel truth.
> >
> John, List
>
> I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is persuing.
>
> I wanted to ask by means of the painting: what does "Real" mean ? With
> the consequence: What is "Real" in the nature of signs?
>
> This latter question seems to me to be at the core of the Peirce's way
> of thinking.
>
> Going back to the Magritte's painting, I think impossible that the
> boulder may be "suspended in the middle of the clouds" as John see it.
>
> Because it would be a manifest violation of the law of universal
> gravitation. The boulder is falling down to the earth that we see
> distinctly on the lower part of the image, may be it is some kind of
> meteorite.
>
> So we have from the beginning an image of the Reality: that which will
> hurt you -and perhaps kill you-  if you stay under the boulder.
>
> But we can imagine some other senses of realities apart this one that
> has been derived from the necessity of law.
>
> The boulder is really an event, here and there on the painted scene, -it
> is an intrusion- and as such it causes an effect of surprise for the
> audience (this effect is also initiated by Magritte himself to make the
> spectator think about the scene). This intrusive event is also a sense
> of realities: to be able of observation.
>
> Finally one latter sense of reality may consist in the consideration of
> the painting as recalling to our memories the extinction of the
> dinosaurs. A possibility already envisaged by scientists.
>
> Sure, all of this comment of the Magritte painting is highly
> problematic. Many more stories could be presented in illustration of the
> painting, probably as much as people commenting it.
>
> Sure, there is in this example nothing which proves that Peirce's
> semiotic is a truth. As a matter of fact common sense has already
> recognized that "an example is not a proof".
>
> Nevertheless one can see that his semiotic elementary distinctions
> -immediate and dynamic object, immediate dynamic normal interpretant,
> sign- are there, behind. I just choose to escape technical terms in this
> mail.
>
> Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it
> needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with
> Robert on this.
>
> I finish with two questions of which I have quite no answer:
>
> 1) If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without referring
> explicitely to their technical definitions, what does it mean to pratice
> "applied semiotics"?
>
> 2) If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a sign himself?
>
> Regards
>
>
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Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: The relation between the DO and the sign is, that the sign denotes the DO, and the DO dertermines the sign. Apart from a true index, the DO determines the sign indirectly, by a bypass, via the shared memory of the commens. You are debating, whether this commens is a fusion merely of the minds of the utterer and the interpreter, or of other minds too. I think, both the minds of the utterer and the interpreter share same memories caused by other minds, which are not "on air" so to say, at the moment. But in the fusion process, these same memories, so the other minds, are somehow vitalised, brought "on air". So I can see your (Robert) broader concept of commens. But maybe the fusion quality between the utterer´s and interpreter´s minds is different from the fusion quality with the other, representationally resurrected, minds. The first is an actual (real) event, and the latter a representation.



Robert, List,

 


yes, your post answers a lot of questions I had in the post I wrote that appeared after yours, but I had written before I had read yours. Thank you! I had felt, that representation is something quite different from event, two different ways of looking at a sign, but it is a matter of type, token, tone, resp. symbol, index, icon. A symbol includes an index and an icon, so I guess that in the Peircean analysis these two things, that have seemed to me as having to be analysed apartly, are blended. There are still many aspects I do not see, e.g. when you have a symbol, the included index is not about the DO, but the sign class. So I still do not see the relation between the DO and the sign, but let me think and read myself, I am sure I am wrong and Peirce is right.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 

10. Juni 2020 um 11:25 Uhr
 "robert marty" 
 



Jon Alan, List

I sent a specific message to Helmut. I sincerely thought he was answering his questions. He has not yet reacted that already you have set off your usual firework  of quotations against my arguments, distorting them somewhat. I'm not denying you that right, but maybe we should let him live? What are you afraid of?

Best regards,


 


Le mer. 10 juin 2020 à 04:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  a écrit :



Helmut, Robert, List:

 

Returning to substantive matters ...

 




HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did?




 

Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions tend to focus on topics about which he did write.

 




HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.




 

Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

 




HR:  I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter.




 

The distinction is between the sign in itself, which is "not a real thing," versus a sign token, which is a real thing that conforms to a sign type and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a dynamical interpretant.

 




RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived




 

This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904).  To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the reality of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete thing apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens).  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it would determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an 

Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Helmut Raulien]

Robert, List,

 


yes, your post answers a lot of questions I had in the post I wrote that appeared after yours, but I had written before I had read yours. Thank you! I had felt, that representation is something quite different from event, two different ways of looking at a sign, but it is a matter of type, token, tone, resp. symbol, index, icon. A symbol includes an index and an icon, so I guess that in the Peircean analysis these two things, that have seemed to me as having to be analysed apartly, are blended. There are still many aspects I do not see, e.g. when you have a symbol, the included index is not about the DO, but the sign class. So I still do not see the relation between the DO and the sign, but let me think and read myself, I am sure I am wrong and Peirce is right.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 

10. Juni 2020 um 11:25 Uhr
 "robert marty" 
 



Jon Alan, List

I sent a specific message to Helmut. I sincerely thought he was answering his questions. He has not yet reacted that already you have set off your usual firework  of quotations against my arguments, distorting them somewhat. I'm not denying you that right, but maybe we should let him live? What are you afraid of?

Best regards,


 


Le mer. 10 juin 2020 à 04:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  a écrit :



Helmut, Robert, List:

 

Returning to substantive matters ...

 




HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did?




 

Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions tend to focus on topics about which he did write.

 




HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.




 

Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

 




HR:  I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter.




 

The distinction is between the sign in itself, which is "not a real thing," versus a sign token, which is a real thing that conforms to a sign type and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a dynamical interpretant.

 




RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived




 

This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904).  To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the reality of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete thing apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens).  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it would determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).

 




RM:  It has led you to internalize a convention shared by billions of individuals that is a reality in the shared social space, independent of these billions of minds, what I think Peirce calls the commens.




 

There may very well be such a "shared social space, independent of these billions of minds," but it is not what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines "the commens" (or "the commind") as "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place," which "consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, 

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Ii think, again, that some of the debates are due to the multiple
meanings of terms. I'm not going to back up my lists with quotations
since most of us, I am assuming, already know them. [And - I don't
have the time at the moment]. 

1] I tried to show that the term of 'sign' has several meanings. 

=It can mean the mediative middle term in the triad of O-R-I. In
this situation, its function can be, if it's in a mode of 2ns, to
simply transfer input data to output interpretation. If it's in a
mode of 3ns, it will add its stored general habits to that input data
and actually transform that data into an new output interpretation.
You can see this in the ten classes. 

- The term can be used as an agential force, where it acts, first,
to actively interact with the external world. This seems to be the
most common use on this list.

- It can be used, as I also use it, to refer to the morphological
result of the triadic semiosic process, the Interpretant,  [which as
Peirce noted, is also a sign]...and thus, can itself as a new triad, 
interact with the external world.

2] The same multiple uses can be found in the use of Mind. 

- since all semiosis is, as Peirce noted, dialogic or interactional,
then, the mind or quasi-mind can be that 'welding'  of at least two or
more minds-which-are-run-by-the-habits-of-Thirdness. This is that
'commens'. It should be noted that apart from this dialogic
interaction, the two or more minds remain distinct. [see 4.551]. 

- Then, as Robert has noted, Mind can also be understood as the
stored, ongoing,  collective and synchronic habits of a group -
whether it be an ethnic group of humans as referred to by Auke, or
the genetic code of a biological species. 

- and, as I keep referring to - in one of my favourite quotes, 4.551

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world. "

In this example, Mind can be understood as the underlying principle
of rationality and logical interactions that is evident in the
universe. Needless to say - I attribute no theistic agency to this
Mind Principle. Indeed, I consider it a basic necessary process - to
prevent the dissipation of Matter/Energy by organizing it within the
principles of Mind.

Edwina
 On Wed 10/06/20  6:57 AM , a.bree...@chello.nl sent:
Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,
RM:  We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and
therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is
out of minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it
throughout our lives.

JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that
"contains all these conventions," which we "internalize throughout
our lives," but it is  not what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again,
he explicitly defines it as a "mind" that results from the fusing or
welding of distinct minds.  Moreover, Peirce's concept of "mind" is
much broader than the notion of individual minds, perhaps even
encompassing what you are describing.  As Andre De Tienne has written
[1], "Peirce in many places ... prefers to talk about the
'quasi-mind,' and this is a technical phrase used expressly to
indicate that the more familiar 'mind' is only a special
instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that logic, or
semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but
those of that much more general entity" (p. 40).  
Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one
runs if only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a.
an incorrect understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the
two would count heavier for Peirce?

In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the
natural. Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If
a person avant la lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be
no surprise to find terms that are at odds with later developments. 
I think the commens is such a term. Especially the concept of culture
in the antropological sense was lacking, but arising. And when it did
arise in the early 1900's it was taken as a monilitic concept, even
by cultural relativists like Boas.  

Peirce's commens fits in with this development and there are
striking similarities with this first cultural antropological
movement: 

1. man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common
culture and, as a person, not an individual, only survives in the
measure in which the commens or culture is enriched with interpretive
habits.  

 2. The monolitic character of the commens. Peirce, I side with
Short here,  was so much occupied with the project of science that it
hindered him in completing his system. The commens for Peirce is, in
short, to much colored by his preoccupation with truth and to little
with everyday 

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[John F. Sowa]

Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this debate in one
sentence plus one image: 
BM> In place of the old, often
recurring debates on this subject I propose to muse over a painting from
René Magritte entitled "Le sens des réalités"
That image,
which shows a large boulder suspended in the middle of the clouds, is an
excellent illustration of the way JAS assembles "fireworks of
quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a hypothesis (AKA guess) and
defend as if it were gospel truth.
JAS does some useful work in
assembling a collection of quotations about some topic.  I have found many
of his assemblies interesting and thought provoking.  JAS has every right
to state his own opinions about how those quotations are related.  But
other people may have different opinions that are equally interesting and
thought provoking.
But all those opinions are just hypotheses (AKA
abductions, AKA guesses).  For them to be considered as more than a wild
guess, much more work must be done.

JAS> as I have pointed
out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings he used
"commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all
three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906
letter... he explicitly defines it as a "mind" that results from
the fusing or welding of distinct minds...
First point:  There  is a
huge difference between a metaphor and a definition.  The verbs 'fuse' and
'weld' state actions that are performed on solid objects of metal or glass
that are heated to the point where they begin to melt.  Then the objects
are forced together and allowed to cool.  As a result, they stick together
as one object. 
Second:  Minds are not solid objects, and the verbs
'fuse', 'weld', 'heat','force', 'cool', and 'stick' can't be applied,
literally, to minds.  Whatever meaning Peirce may have intended is at best
a rather vague, but colorful metaphor.
Third:  Peirce was a
logician, mathematician, scientist,  and engineer.  He knew how to state
precise definitions, use them in complex reasoning, and solve theoretical
as well as practical problems.
Fourth:  The fact that Peirce used
that metaphor in just two paragraphs of a single letter indicates that he
did not consider it to be an important part of his system of logic or
semiotic. Therefore, the opinion JAS stated is a dubious hypothesis about
a minor comment by Peirce.
Therefore, in this tiresome thread, JAS
is the guilty party who has extended it beyond any reasonable length. 
Unfortunately, this is just one of many such threads
John
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Fwd: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[a . breemen]

Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,


RM:  We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and therefore 
it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of minds. We 
discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our lives.

JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains all 
these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it is not 
what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines it as a "mind" 
that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds.  Moreover, Peirce's 
concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of individual minds, perhaps 
even encompassing what you are describing.  As Andre De Tienne has written 
https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf , "Peirce in many 
places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a technical 
phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind' is only a 
special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that logic, or 
semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but those of that 
much more general entity" (p. 40).


Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if only 
the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect 
understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count 
heavier for Peirce?

In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural. 
Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant la 
lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find terms 
that are at odds with later developments.  I think the commens is such a term. 
Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense was lacking, but 
arising. And when it did arise in the early 1900's it was taken as a monilitic 
concept, even by cultural relativists like Boas.

Peirce's commens fits in with this development and there are striking 
similarities with this first cultural antropological movement:

1. man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture and, 
as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which the 
commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits.  

2. The monolitic character of the commens. Peirce, I side with Short here,  was 
so much occupied with the project of science that it hindered him in completing 
his system. The commens for Peirce is, in short, to much colored by his 
preoccupation with truth and to little with everyday bussiness where the truth 
seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other motives.

It was in 1946 that the concept of plural culture was coined by Furnivall. Even 
that idea did pass Peirce's mind, but only at some moments and not persued for 
longer periods as to its concequences. It was when he was contemplating the 
intended, effectual en cominterpretant. You summerize what I wrote above with 
Peirce quote's:

JAS: Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of 
writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three 
occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is 
also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and 
"communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or 
"intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from 
around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he 
explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the 
Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so 
betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the 
interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

--

If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we may say that 
he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did err when he 
discarded A. I do side with Robert in this case.

Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this promissing road of 
inquiry? Probably his devotion to logic in which the apprehension of the sign 
as an object is of no importance and where we assume a quasi mind. So, probably 
his discarding of a may have been done in a specific context and a particular 
line of thought. As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and 
comming from all kinds of directions.  

Best,

Auke 

Op 10 juni 2020 om 4:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt : 


Helmut, Robert, List:

Returning to substantive matters ...

HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so 
much, but other writers did?

Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions tend 
to focus on topics about which he did write.

HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, 
which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the 
dictionary, 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,


> RM:  We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and 
> therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of 
> minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our 
> lives.
> 

JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains all 
these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it is not 
what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines it as a "mind" 
that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds.  Moreover, Peirce's 
concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of individual minds, perhaps 
even encompassing what you are describing.  As Andre De Tienne has written 
https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf , "Peirce in many 
places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a technical 
phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind' is only a 
special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that logic, or 
semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but those of that 
much more general entity" (p. 40).


Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if only 
the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect 
understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count 
heavier for Peirce?

In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural. 
Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant la 
lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find terms 
that are at odds with later developments.  I think the commens is such a term. 
Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense was lacking, but 
arising. And when it did arise in the early 1900's it was taken as a monilitic 
concept, even by cultural relativists like Boas.

Peirce's commens fits in with this development and there are striking 
similarities with this first cultural antropological movement:

1. man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture and, 
as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which the 
commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits.  

2. The monolitic character of the commens. Peirce, I side with Short here,  was 
so much occupied with the project of science that it hindered him in completing 
his system. The commens for Peirce is, in short, to much colored by his 
preoccupation with truth and to little with everyday bussiness where the truth 
seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other motives.

It was in 1946 that the concept of plural culture was coined by Furnivall. Even 
that idea did pass Peirce's mind, but only at some moments and not persued for 
longer periods as to its concequences. It was when he was contemplating the 
intended, effectual en cominterpretant. You summerize what I wrote above with 
Peirce quote's:

JAS: Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of 
writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three 
occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is 
also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and 
"communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or 
"intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from 
around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he 
explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the 
Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so 
betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the 
interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

--

If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we may say that 
he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did err when he 
discarded A. I do side with Robert in this case.

Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this promissing road of 
inquiry? Probably his devotion to logic in which the apprehension of the sign 
as an object is of no importance and where we assume a quasi mind. So, probably 
his discarding of a may have been done in a specific context and a particular 
line of thought. As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and 
comming from all kinds of directions.  

Best,

Auke 


> Op 10 juni 2020 om 4:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Helmut, Robert, List:
> 
> Returning to substantive matters ...
> 
> 
> > > HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which 
> Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did?
> > 
> > > 
> Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions 
> tend to focus on topics about which he did write.
> 
> 
> > > HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is 
> named 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List

I sent a specific message to Helmut. I sincerely thought he was answering
his questions. He has not yet reacted that already you have set off your
usual firework  of quotations against my arguments, distorting them
somewhat. I'm not denying you that right, but maybe we should let him live?
What are you afraid of?

Best regards,

Le mer. 10 juin 2020 à 04:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Helmut, Robert, List:
>
> Returning to substantive matters ...
>
> HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write
> so much, but other writers did?
>
>
> Yes, of course; but this is a *Peirce *list, so in general our
> discussions tend to focus on topics about which he *did *write.
>
> HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the
> commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look
> it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"),
> and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that
> accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.
>
>
> Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of
> writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all
> three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906
> letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual"
> interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").
> The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his
> Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a
> few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the
> intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate
> Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant
> of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that*
> sign" (R 339:414[276r]).
>
> HR:  I still am struggeling with the two concepts of
> sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event,
> which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and
> interpreter.
>
>
> The distinction is between the sign *in itself*, which is "not a real
> thing," versus a sign *token*, which is a real thing that conforms to a
> sign *type* and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a
> dynamical interpretant.
>
> RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
> must be perceived
>
>
> This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign
> is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP
> 2:303, 1904).  To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the
> *reality* of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete
> *thing *apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens).  This
> assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a
> sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it
> *would* determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409,
> 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as
> long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue
> of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability before
> it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the
> effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon which circumstances
> should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).
>
> RM:  It has led you to internalize a convention shared by billions of
> individuals that is a reality in the shared social space, independent of
> these billions of minds, what I think Peirce calls the commens.
>
>
> There may very well be such a "shared social space, independent of these
> billions of minds," but it is *not *what Peirce calls "the commens."
> Again, he explicitly defines "the commens" (or "the commind") as "that mind
> into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order
> that any communication should take place," which "consists of all that is,
> and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
> outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function" (EP
> 2:478, 1906).  Taking the statue that stands in New York Harbor as "the
> sign in question," the otherwise distinct minds of its utterer--presumably
> the sculptor, Frédéric Bartholdi--and each interpreter "are at one (i.e.,
> are one mind) in the sign itself ... In the Sign they are, so to say,
> *welded*" (CP 4.551, 1906).  The result is that the idea of liberty is 
> *communicated
> *from the utterer to all the different interpreters.
>
> RM:  I will quote just three that support my point, it seems to me, but it
> is up to you to judge.
>
>
> The quoted passage (CP 3.359-362) is from 1885--coincidentally, the same
> year in which the disassembled Statue of Liberty arrived in New York from
> France.  Although generally 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, Robert, List:

Returning to substantive matters ...

HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write
so much, but other writers did?


Yes, of course; but this is a *Peirce *list, so in general our discussions
tend to focus on topics about which he *did *write.

HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the
commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look
it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"),
and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that
accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.


Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of
writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all
three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906
letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual"
interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").
The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his
Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a
few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the
intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate
Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant
of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that*
sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

HR:  I still am struggeling with the two concepts of
sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event,
which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and
interpreter.


The distinction is between the sign *in itself*, which is "not a real
thing," versus a sign *token*, which is a real thing that conforms to a
sign *type* and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a
dynamical interpretant.

RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
must be perceived


This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign
is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP
2:303, 1904).  To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the
*reality* of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete
*thing *apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens).  This assertion
also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a sign has no
interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it *would*
determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907).
Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as
it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having
an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability before it gets
any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the effect the
Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit
it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).

RM:  It has led you to internalize a convention shared by billions of
individuals that is a reality in the shared social space, independent of
these billions of minds, what I think Peirce calls the commens.


There may very well be such a "shared social space, independent of these
billions of minds," but it is *not *what Peirce calls "the commens."
Again, he explicitly defines "the commens" (or "the commind") as "that mind
into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order
that any communication should take place," which "consists of all that is,
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function" (EP
2:478, 1906).  Taking the statue that stands in New York Harbor as "the
sign in question," the otherwise distinct minds of its utterer--presumably
the sculptor, Frédéric Bartholdi--and each interpreter "are at one (i.e.,
are one mind) in the sign itself ... In the Sign they are, so to say,
*welded*" (CP 4.551, 1906).  The result is that the idea of liberty is
*communicated
*from the utterer to all the different interpreters.

RM:  I will quote just three that support my point, it seems to me, but it
is up to you to judge.


The quoted passage (CP 3.359-362) is from 1885--coincidentally, the same
year in which the disassembled Statue of Liberty arrived in New York from
France.  Although generally consistent with Peirce's later writings about
semeiotic, we need to interpret it carefully in light of those many
subsequent texts.  It is especially important to recognize that what he
means by "tokens" in CP 3.359 are what he eventually calls "symbols."  From
1906 on, he instead uses "tokens" for the concrete embodiments of signs,
which he calls "sinsigns" and "replicas" in 1903-5.

RM:  So a sign, a thing conceived by convention (what does convention
mean?) or even arbitrarily can represent an idea.


"By convention" and "arbitrarily" are almost synonymous 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Mike Bergman]

John,

I find your last two posts informative and in keeping with how I try to 
understand Peirce. I agree strongly about the intimate link with action 
(actually, in my view it translates into the wellspring of Peirce's 
thoughts about belief). The importance of quantification as a basis for 
the emergence of science and a re-discovery of Aristotle also resonates. 
Thanks for citing others and less emphasis on your own writings.


But I think it is time to be pragmatic about this ongoing debate. Jon 
and the Gary's, and I'm sure many others on the list, appreciate the 
assembly of quotes and the inspection of literal interpretations. I have 
learned much at times and discovered gems of quotation from these 
contributions. You may argue, I sometimes do, that context and 
application in the real world needs to be brought into the discussion, 
but that is not their approach, not their 'methodology'. The mindsets or 
worldviews of these disparate camps can not be argued, I believe, into 
confluence. Excoriating the 'other side' for its lack of a 'true' 
understanding of Peirce's real meanings or even an appreciation for the 
methodeutic, I think we have seen clearly, is not achieving actual 
understanding nor comity.


Not all of us have equivalent time (or interest) to contribute to this 
list. It takes time and effort to marshal the evidence, assemble the 
quotes, write the narrative, to be a voice on this list. For me, 
personally, I have come to the conclusion that I will contribute when it 
is important to me, and I will ignore when it is not (or at least not 
actively participate). In effect, I realize this means the list is often 
dominated by voices and viewpoints of lesser interest to me. I sincerely 
doubt that Peirce would, today, find social media and mailing lists to 
correspond to the community he so often spoke of as being the decider of 
the progress toward truth. If we put ourselves 100 years into the 
future, what sources will our successors look to as the basis of truth? 
My guess it will not be mailing lists and social media.


I think James is a great example. Despite that James did not appear to 
ever really, truly grok Peirce, he also was one of his most public 
defenders and providers of financial support when in need. It seems like 
Peirce must have managed that relationship with James pretty darn well. 
Or been such a genius that he was a force not to be denied . . . . In 
the end, we will never really know, will we? The only basis we have to 
judge is the information left behind to posterity. My bet is that 
mailing lists will not rank high.


Best, Mike


On 6/9/2020 5:50 PM, John F. Sowa wrote:


Jon AS,  Gary F,  and Edwina,

No two people think alike, and anybody as complex and insightful as 
Peirce has a wide range of different ways of thinking.  I agree that 
discussions about methodologies outside of any particular context are 
of minor interest to this list. But the most important methodologies 
that are relevant to the interpretation of Peirce's writings are 
Peirce's own.


The interpretation of what any author said or did depends critically 
on "collateral knowledge" about that author's way of thinking.   I 
won't attempt to explain Peirce's metaphor of "mind fusion", but it 
certainly includes much more than a list of quotations.

.
GF>  The only 'method' I've seen that JAS outlines, is to provide 
quotations from Peirce texts.


Unfortunately, that's true.  Peirce drew a distinction between a 
naturalist and a scientist.  A naturalist describes appearances and 
classifies specimens on the basis of their resemblance to other 
specimens.  Jon processes quotations as if they were butterflies -- 
sticking pins through them and displaying them in a sample tray.


ET> When some of us, for example, ask repeatedly for real world 
examples of the interpretations offered - and don't get them, are we 
supposed to accept that the conclusions of this rather authoritarian 
method... must be accepted as valid?


That's my primary complaint. Naturalists provide an important service 
in collecting data. But scientists take the next steps of induction 
and abduction to develop theories.  Even more important than the 
theories is the testing by deduction, prediction, and observation of 
multiple *examples*. Without testing, the theories are unfounded 
hypotheses.


GF> newer members of the list who may not immediately recognize the 
futility [of some of these debates].  They deserve more substantial 
content on the Peirce list, and indeed require it if they are going to 
learn as much from participation


Absolutely!  We have to demonstrate that studying Peirce involves much 
more work than just butterfly collecting. He wrote many articles about 
methodology, and they all involve the fundamental issues of relating 
perception to action -- and the intermediate steps of induction, 
abduction, deduction, testing, observation, and repeat.  That kind of 
hard work can only be demonstrated 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[John F. Sowa]

Jon AS,  Gary F,  and Edwina,
No two people think alike, and
anybody as complex and insightful as Peirce has a wide range of different
ways of thinking.  I agree that discussions about methodologies outside of
any particular context are of minor interest to this list. But the most
important methodologies that are relevant to the interpretation of
Peirce's writings are Peirce's own.
The interpretation of what any
author said or did depends critically on "collateral knowledge"
about that author's way of thinking.   I won't attempt to explain Peirce's
metaphor of "mind fusion", but it certainly includes much more
than a list of quotations.
. 
GF>  The only 'method' I've
seen that JAS outlines, is to provide quotations from Peirce
texts.
Unfortunately, that's true.  Peirce drew a distinction
between a naturalist and a scientist.  A naturalist describes appearances
and classifies specimens on the basis of their resemblance to other
specimens.  Jon processes quotations as if they were butterflies --
sticking pins through them and displaying them in a sample
tray.
ET> When some of us, for example, ask repeatedly for real
world examples of the interpretations offered - and don't get them, are we
supposed to accept that the conclusions of this rather authoritarian
method... must be accepted as valid?
That's my primary complaint. 
Naturalists provide an important service in collecting data.   But
scientists take the next steps of induction and abduction to develop
theories.  Even more important than the theories is the testing by
deduction, prediction, and observation of multiple *examples*.  Without
testing, the theories are unfounded hypotheses.
GF> newer members
of the list who may not immediately recognize the futility [of some of
these debates].  They deserve more substantial content on the Peirce list,
and indeed require it if they are going to learn as much from
participation
Absolutely!  We have to demonstrate that studying
Peirce involves much more work than just butterfly collecting.  He wrote
many articles about methodology, and they all involve the fundamental
issues of relating perception to action -- and the intermediate steps of
induction, abduction, deduction, testing, observation, and repeat.  That
kind of hard work can only be demonstrated and *learned* by applying
Peirce's ideas to serious problems.
JAS>  I continue to find
these strictly methodological criticisms tiresome... The only way to
ascertain Peirce's way of thinking in the first place is interpret his
words according to is way of thinking.
It's certainly tiresome.  We
have to get out of this rut of  just butterfly collecting.  William James
spent half a century listening to and reading Peirce's words, and he never
grasped the principles that Peirce spent years in trying to teach him. 
The reason why James couldn't understand the words is that he never worked
his way through the words to the thinking behind them.
JAS>
quoting Peirce's own words is the best--really, the only--method for
supporting one's interpretations of his writings
No  That
statement shows a hopelessly misguided interpretation of everything Peirce
wrote.  His words are necessary as the starting point.  But if they were
sufficient, William James would have been the world's leading expert on
Peirce.
It's impossible to understand any text on logic,
mathematics, or science of any kind without doing the homework -- the
exercises at the end of each chapter of a textbook or the detailed
analysis of the mathematics in a research paper.   Peirce did that kind of
work on every subject he studied from childhood to the end.
Peirce
developed his ideas through a lifetime of working on difficult problems in
mathematics, science, logic, and engineering -- starting with his father
in early childhood, with his Sunday dinners with the leading intellectuals
who visited Harvard,  his 30 years of science and engineering with USCGS,
his teaching at JHU, and his various lectures and discussions with
colleagues. 
Since you are an engineer, you must have done a similar
kind of homework to earn a degree.  Since then, you must have done some
related work on the job.  I'm sure that you learned much more by finishing
a difficult engineering problem than you knew by just reading  a book.

The same principle is true in studying Peirce.  Just reading his
words is sufficient for a superficial knowledge -- the ability to parrot
the words.  But understanding requires serious work in applying his
writings to some challenging problems.
I've been doing that in
books, articles, and lectures  for years.  Following is the most recent
lecture in which I applied some of Peirce's ideas: 
http://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf . The last page of eswc.pdf has more
references to articles that apply Peirce's ideas to various problems in
logic, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and computer
software.
John

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to 

RE: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[gnox]

Helmut, you wrote,

“Peirce did not write much about interpreters.”

A quick search of Peirce texts gives over 100 hits for “interpreter”.

 

Of course it is not a waste of time to read writers other than Peirce. What I 
said was that it’s a waste of time to debate about “Peirce’s way of thinking” 
with people who don’t want to discuss what Peirce actually wrote, but prefer 
their own versions of what Peirce thought over his versions.

 

If you want to discuss a “sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and 
include the real things utterer and interpreter” whatever that is, go ahead. 
But if you want to know what Peirce thought about it, then find what he wrote 
about it (if you can) and read it. And let us know what you find.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 9-Jun-20 12:34
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and 
Analysis of Semeiosis)

 

Gary F., Edwina, List,

 

Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, 
but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named 
after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you 
look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), 
and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that 
accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.

 

Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to 
compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I 
think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic with 
other mathematics.

 

So I think, it is not a waste of time for new list members to not only read 
Peirce, but- not "advance" and "channel", but compare his thoughts with the 
thoughts of others. Because new list members may know other philosophers from 
school or from voluntary reading, and not yet Peirce so well. 

 

I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which 
is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and 
include the real things utterer and interpreter. I am close to asking myself, 
is the more or less complete ignorance of the latter concept not a hidden form 
of dualism??

 

Best,

Helmut

  

  

 09. Juni 2020 um 16:57 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> >
wrote:

Gary F,

I'll disagree with you. I think that debates about method are important. The 
only 'method' I've seen that JAS outlines, is to provide quotations from Peirce 
texts. But does interpretation of these texts consist only of repeating them 
and declaring that 'it means this'? Rather Saussurian. Is such a method enough 
to validate that particular interpretation? As some of us have been saying, as 
a method - it is weak, and requires real life pragmatics [Secondness] examples. 
Therefore - methodology is important.

So- one can have one's own ideology about semiosis - and, quite frankly, one 
can support this personal ideology with many quotations from Peirce. BUT, these 
quotations can be a complete misinterpretation of what Peirce was really 
saying, because the quotations, lifted from the page, can take on a new meaning 
in this 'new page'. That is - a lot of what we see here is all about 'special 
interests' .. Now - who can evaluate whether these 'interpretations' are valid 
to Peirce, or  valid for the personal 'special interest' ideology? That's not a 
simple task.

When some of us, for example, ask repeatedly for real world examples of the 
interpretations offered - and don't get them, are we supposed to accept that 
the conclusions of this rather authoritarian method [I say this, and so, it is 
so] - must be accepted as valid? Jon Awbrey's recent outline of methods was, I 
felt, rather important and relevant to this situation.

With regard to the debate between Robert and JAS - I don't see that it came to 
a 'natural end' [whatever that means]. It ended because the two participants 
have extremely different views both on Peircean semiosis, and on the methods of 
arriving at those views - and could come to no common ground. Yes, they were 
civil about it, and nodded graciously and said nice things about each other - 
but the real issue was: two completely different views on Peircean semiosis AND 
methodology.

Edwina



 

On Tue 09/06/20 10:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

Jon A.S., list,

I can’t speak for Gary the moderator or anyone else on the list, but I think 
the principles you’ve outlined here are pretty much self-evident for any 
serious Peirce scholarship, and I would certainly prefer not to be subjected to 
further debates about them. If a list member feels that he or she can advance 
the understanding of Peirce’s thought by somehow ‘channeling’ him instead of 
carefully reading and quoting what he actually wrote (and citing its 

Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

 

you wrote:


 "Think of semiosis not as a mechanical action but as a process of the actual generation of information". But information is a mechanical process. There is no habit without a memory, and a memory is a solid state apparatus, or a quasi-solid equilibrial attractor like a biotop, a chromosom, a visual cortex or a SD-chip.

Mechanical action versus information process, I think, these again are the two concepts, which Peirce does not combine. Or it is relatio rationis versus relatio naturalis. DO and S have a relatio rationalis with each other. The relatio naturalis is between the memory about the DO and the sign. The DO could justifiedly say: "We don´t have a real relation, sign, it is all in your mind, you are stalking me". Peirce writes at some places about the natural relation/the mechanical action. The said quote about commens, and also about consciousness: Primisense, Altersense, Medisense. But in the whole semiotics this is not relevant. The three interpretants intentional, effectual, communicational do not play a role in semiotics either (or?) To me it seems like Peirce from time to time mentions reality, but does not integrate or interweave it with the theory of (not real) signs. To from time to time say things like a human too is a sign, or an object is a sign too, or matter is effete mind, is not enough to undualize it (the theory) and make it a monism. Neither the tychism-move as an attempt to present the whole reality as unreal. It does not work for me. It would, if it was hypothized as a scale matter, like, if something appears as matter or as mind, as real or unreal, as a DO or a sign, depends on the temporal and spatial scale of a system in a systems hierarchy. But for this topic other writers would have to be taken in account.


 

The hexad I do not understand. A hexad must be reducible. Peirce has proved, that only triads are not reducible.

 

Best,

 

Helmut


09. Juni 2020 um 20:57 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - Personally I think that a lot of the confusion to which you allude.

"two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter. "

...is due to the lack of clarity in the use of the term 'sign' on this list.

That is - the term of 'sign' can be used to refer just to the mediative node in the triadic [or hexadic] semiosic process. To be clear about this, I refer to that mediative node as the Representamen. But the term 'sign' is also used to refer to the agential power, so to speak. of the semiosic process and the focus is on the 'sign' as having this power. This is what seems to be the most common use on this list.

And there's a third use, which I use, which refers to the triad or hexad in full, as the Sign, and views this full process as a morphological instance of semiosis. The reason I do this, is because I consider that the triad/hexad is irreducible, and to refer only to the sign alone [that mediative node] denies this irreducible reality. That mediative node never, ever, exists 'as such'; it is not 'on its own', so to speak.

  Think of semiosis not as a mechanical action but as a process of the actual generation of information, taking raw data from objective reality as input and, using a developed knowledge base, transforming that raw data into a morphological actuality as a result. This result could be a molecule, a cell, an insect,  the meaning of strange sounds, an understanding of a map.

To achieve this result - there are three-six 'nodes' or sites for the transmission/transformation of data. You know them already:

The DO, IO, R, II, DI, FI Not all are involved [usually the FI is not part of the normal experience]…

The sign-as-representation, if I understand you correctly, would be the mediative node - but, which is often defined as having agential power to represent-the-input-data. The sign-as-event, again, if I understand you correctly, would be the full hexadic process.

And I'm sure that there are plenty of people on this list who disagree with me - but- that's not a problem.

Edwina
 

On Tue 09/06/20 12:34 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Gary F., Edwina, List,

 

Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.

 

Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic with other mathematics.

 

So I think, it is 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Robert Marty]

Helmut, List

If I can tell Helmut there are no two concepts. A sign is always a real
thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived ... Why
wouldn't a sign as a representation" be a real thing? Let's look at the
statue that is at the entrance to New York Harbor ... Isn't that an
existing thing so a real thing? And yet when you perceive it your mind is
occupied by the idea of Liberty (and more but we will leave it at that).
Why would you do that? As a result of your collateral experience that is
earlier and external at the time of perception. It has led you to
internalize a convention shared by billions of individuals that is a
reality in the shared social space, independent of these billions of minds,
what I think Peirce calls the commens. I have already made arguments for
that and I will give more. However, the experience of my debates has taught
me at least one thing is that one cannot make an assertion involving Peirce
without a few quotations. I will quote just three that support my point, it
seems to me, but it is up to you to judge.



Let's go to CP 3.359:



*CP 3.359"**A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to
the mind. If this triple relation is not of a degenerate species, the sign
is related to its object only in consequence of a mental association, and
depends upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and general, because
habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They
are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general
words, the main body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For
the sake of brevity I will call them tokens."*



What is  described here is the sign as representation that concerns you.



So a sign, a  thing conceived by convention (what does convention mean?) or
even arbitrarily can represent an idea. We need the commens here to
"contain" all these conventions and therefore it cannot depend on the only
minds that communicate; it is  out of minds. We discover it when we are
born and then internalize it throughout our lives. That was the substance
of my direct debate with Jon Alan and perhaps indirect with a few others.



We continue:



*CP 3.361  But if the triple relation between the sign, its object, and the
mind, is degenerate, then of the three pairs sign object sign mind object
mind two at least are in dual relations which constitute the triple
relation. One of the connected pairs must consist of the sign and its
object, for if the sign were not related to its object except by the mind
thinking of them separately, it would not fulfill the function of a sign at
all. Supposing, then, the relation of the sign to its object does not lie
in a mental association, there must be a direct dual relation of the sign
to its object independent of the mind using the sign. In the second of the
three cases just spoken of, this dual relation is not degenerate, and the
sign signifies its object solely by virtue of being really connected with
it. Of this nature are all natural signs and physical symptoms. I call such
a sign an index, a pointing finger being the type of the class.*



What is described here is " sign-as-event, which would be a real thing"
that you also care about."



Are you afraid of some dualism? No, because there's another case.



*CP 362. The third case is where the dual relation between the sign and its
object is degenerate and consists in a mere resemblance between them. I
call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an
icon. *



In this case it is a quality of "the concrete thing that represents" that
makes the sign; as a red thing to represent the quality of being red, or
the blood of a person represented by a trace or the communism on the flag
of China.



If you continue reading you will find some very interesting things about
algebraic notations...

Best regards,

Robert

Le mar. 9 juin 2020 à 18:35, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Gary F., Edwina, List,
>
> Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so
> much, but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary"
> is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last
> discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one
> entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual,
> intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters
> utterer, interpreter, and both combined.
>
> Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to
> compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I
> think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic
> with other mathematics.
>
> So I think, it is not a waste of time for new list members to not only
> read Peirce, but- not "advance" and "channel", but compare his thoughts
> with the thoughts of others. Because new list members may know other
> philosophers from school or from voluntary 

Re: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - Personally I think that a lot of the confusion to which you
allude.

"two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing"
versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real
things utterer and interpreter. "

...is due to the lack of clarity in the use of the term 'sign' on
this list. 

That is - the term of 'sign' can be used to refer just to the
mediative node in the triadic [or hexadic] semiosic process. To be
clear about this, I refer to that mediative node as the
Representamen. But the term 'sign' is also used to refer to the
agential power, so to speak. of the semiosic process and the focus is
on the 'sign' as having this power. This is what seems to be the most
common use on this list. 

And there's a third use, which I use, which refers to the triad or
hexad in full, as the Sign, and views this full process as a
morphological instance of semiosis. The reason I do this, is because
I consider that the triad/hexad is irreducible, and to refer only to
the sign alone [that mediative node] denies this irreducible reality.
That mediative node never, ever, exists 'as such'; it is not 'on its
own', so to speak. 

  Think of semiosis not as a mechanical action but as a process of
the actual generation of information, taking raw data from objective
reality as input and, using a developed knowledge base, transforming
that raw data into a morphological actuality as a result. This result
could be a molecule, a cell, an insect,  the meaning of strange
sounds, an understanding of a map.

To achieve this result - there are three-six 'nodes' or sites for
the transmission/transformation of data. You know them already:

The DO, IO, R, II, DI, FI Not all are involved [usually the FI
is not part of the normal experience]…
The sign-as-representation, if I understand you correctly, would be
the mediative node - but, which is often defined as having agential
power to represent-the-input-data. The sign-as-event, again, if I
understand you correctly, would be the full hexadic process.

And I'm sure that there are plenty of people on this list who
disagree with me - but- that's not a problem.

Edwina
 On Tue 09/06/20 12:34 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
 Gary F., Edwina, List,   Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about
which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did? For
example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens,
which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it
up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the
"commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional,
communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer,
interpreter, and both combined.   Peirce did not write much about
interpreters. So I think it is useful to compare him with e.g.
Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I think it also
is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic with
other mathematics.   So I think, it is not a waste of time for new
list members to not only read Peirce, but- not "advance" and
"channel", but compare his thoughts with the thoughts of others.
Because new list members may know other philosophers from school or
from voluntary reading, and not yet Peirce so well.I still am
struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is
"not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing
and include the real things utterer and interpreter. I am close to
asking myself, is the more or less complete ignorance of the latter
concept not a hidden form of dualism??   Best, Helmut   09. Juni
2020 um 16:57 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

Gary F, 

I'll disagree with you. I think that debates about method are
important. The only 'method' I've seen that JAS outlines, is to
provide quotations from Peirce texts. But does interpretation of
these texts consist only of repeating them and declaring that 'it
means this'? Rather Saussurian. Is such a method enough to validate
that particular interpretation? As some of us have been saying, as a
method - it is weak, and requires real life pragmatics [Secondness]
examples. Therefore - methodology is important. 

So- one can have one's own ideology about semiosis - and, quite
frankly, one can support this personal ideology with many quotations
from Peirce. BUT, these quotations can be a complete
misinterpretation of what Peirce was really saying, because the
quotations, lifted from the page, can take on a new meaning in this
'new page'. That is - a lot of what we see here is all about 'special
interests' .. Now - who can evaluate whether these 'interpretations'
are valid to Peirce, or  valid for the personal 'special interest'
ideology? That's not a simple task. 

When some of us, for example, ask repeatedly for real world examples
of the interpretations offered - and don't get 

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F., Edwina, List,

 

Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.

 

Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic with other mathematics.

 

So I think, it is not a waste of time for new list members to not only read Peirce, but- not "advance" and "channel", but compare his thoughts with the thoughts of others. Because new list members may know other philosophers from school or from voluntary reading, and not yet Peirce so well. 

 

I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter. I am close to asking myself, is the more or less complete ignorance of the latter concept not a hidden form of dualism??

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 09. Juni 2020 um 16:57 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Gary F,

I'll disagree with you. I think that debates about method are important. The only 'method' I've seen that JAS outlines, is to provide quotations from Peirce texts. But does interpretation of these texts consist only of repeating them and declaring that 'it means this'? Rather Saussurian. Is such a method enough to validate that particular interpretation? As some of us have been saying, as a method - it is weak, and requires real life pragmatics [Secondness] examples. Therefore - methodology is important.

So- one can have one's own ideology about semiosis - and, quite frankly, one can support this personal ideology with many quotations from Peirce. BUT, these quotations can be a complete misinterpretation of what Peirce was really saying, because the quotations, lifted from the page, can take on a new meaning in this 'new page'. That is - a lot of what we see here is all about 'special interests' .. Now - who can evaluate whether these 'interpretations' are valid to Peirce, or  valid for the personal 'special interest' ideology? That's not a simple task.

When some of us, for example, ask repeatedly for real world examples of the interpretations offered - and don't get them, are we supposed to accept that the conclusions of this rather authoritarian method [I say this, and so, it is so] - must be accepted as valid? Jon Awbrey's recent outline of methods was, I felt, rather important and relevant to this situation.

With regard to the debate between Robert and JAS - I don't see that it came to a 'natural end' [whatever that means]. It ended because the two participants have extremely different views both on Peircean semiosis, and on the methods of arriving at those views - and could come to no common ground. Yes, they were civil about it, and nodded graciously and said nice things about each other - but the real issue was: two completely different views on Peircean semiosis AND methodology.

Edwina



 

On Tue 09/06/20 10:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:




Jon A.S., list,

I can’t speak for Gary the moderator or anyone else on the list, but I think the principles you’ve outlined here are pretty much self-evident for any serious Peirce scholarship, and I would certainly  prefer not to be subjected to further debates about them. If a list member feels that he or she can advance the understanding of Peirce’s thought by somehow ‘channeling’ him instead of carefully reading and quoting what he actually wrote (and citing its context), they are free to say so and to apply the results to whatever special interests they have; but the rest of us are free to ignore such posts  and any threads that may result from them. 

Personally I’d like to extend this a bit further and suggest that experienced list members are obligated to ignore the kind of “methodological criticisms” you refer to. I hope, in other words, that list members who feel drawn into debate on such issues do their debating offlist, as you suggest, and save the rest of us the trouble of skimming and deleting such debates. 

I suggest this because such debates are a complete waste of time, not so much for those of us who ignore and delete them, but especially for newer members of the list who may not immediately recognize their futility. They deserve more substantial content on the Peirce list, and indeed require it if they are going to learn as much from participation onlist as you and I did in our early years with it. Your recent exchange with Robert, for instance, did feature some substantial content, and didn’t get drowned 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, 

I'll disagree with you. I think that debates about method are
important. The only 'method' I've seen that JAS outlines, is to
provide quotations from Peirce texts. But does interpretation of
these texts consist only of repeating them and declaring that 'it
means this'? Rather Saussurian. Is such a method enough to validate
that particular interpretation? As some of us have been saying, as a
method - it is weak, and requires real life pragmatics [Secondness]
examples. Therefore - methodology is important. 

So- one can have one's own ideology about semiosis - and, quite
frankly, one can support this personal ideology with many quotations
from Peirce. BUT, these quotations can be a complete
misinterpretation of what Peirce was really saying, because the
quotations, lifted from the page, can take on a new meaning in this
'new page'. That is - a lot of what we see here is all about 'special
interests' .. Now - who can evaluate whether these 'interpretations'
are valid to Peirce, or  valid for the personal 'special interest'
ideology? That's not a simple task. 

When some of us, for example, ask repeatedly for real world examples
of the interpretations offered - and don't get them, are we supposed
to accept that the conclusions of this rather authoritarian method [I
say this, and so, it is so] - must be accepted as valid? Jon Awbrey's
recent outline of methods was, I felt, rather important and relevant
to this situation. 

With regard to the debate between Robert and JAS - I don't see that
it came to a 'natural end' [whatever that means]. It ended because
the two participants have extremely different views both on Peircean
semiosis, and on the methods of arriving at those views - and could
come to no common ground. Yes, they were civil about it, and nodded
graciously and said nice things about each other - but the real issue
was: two completely different views on Peircean semiosis AND
methodology. 

Edwina
 On Tue 09/06/20 10:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Jon A.S., list,

I can’t speak for Gary the moderator or anyone else on the list,
but I think the principles you’ve outlined here are pretty much
self-evident for any serious Peirce scholarship, and I would
certainly  prefer not to be subjected to further debates about them.
If a list member feels that he or she can advance the understanding
of Peirce’s thought by somehow ‘channeling’ him instead of
carefully reading and quoting what he actually wrote (and citing its
context), they are free to say so and to apply the results to
whatever special interests they have; but the rest of us are free to
ignore such posts  and any threads that may result from them. 

Personally I’d like to extend this a bit further and suggest that
experienced list members are obligated to ignore the kind of
“methodological criticisms” you refer to. I hope, in other words,
that list members who feel drawn into debate on such issues do their
debating offlist, as you suggest, and save the rest of us the trouble
of skimming and deleting such debates. 

I suggest this because such debates are a complete waste of time,
not so much for those of us who ignore and delete them, but
especially for newer members of the list who may not immediately
recognize their futility. They deserve more substantial content on
the Peirce list, and indeed require it if they are going to learn as
much from participation onlist as you and I did in our early years
with it. Your recent exchange with Robert, for instance, did feature
some substantial content, and didn’t get drowned out with
irrelevant debates — and came to a natural end before devolving
into fruitless repetition. For the sake of those relatively new to
the list, I’d like to see more of that. And for my part, I’ll
pledge not to make any more meta-posts like this one. 

Gary f.

} Entering is the source, and the source means from beginning to
end. [Dogen] {

 http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ living the transition 
From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
 Sent: 8-Jun-20 20:51
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and
Analysis of Semeiosis)
 John, List:
I will spell out my position one more time, but I continue to find
these strictly methodological criticisms tiresome, and I suspect that
many others on the List would prefer not to be subjected to further
debates about them.  I respectfully request that in the future any
such exchanges be kept off-List. 
JFS:  But when trying to understand what Peirce wrote, it's
essential to interpret his words according to his way of thinking.
The only way to ascertain Peirce's way of thinking in the first
place is by interpreting his words.
JFS:  The reason why you always agree with Jon is that you both
happen to think in the same way. 
Gary R. does not always agree with me, and we do not think in
exactly the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[gnox]

Jon A.S., list,

I can’t speak for Gary the moderator or anyone else on the list, but I think 
the principles you’ve outlined here are pretty much self-evident for any 
serious Peirce scholarship, and I would certainly prefer not to be subjected to 
further debates about them. If a list member feels that he or she can advance 
the understanding of Peirce’s thought by somehow ‘channeling’ him instead of 
carefully reading and quoting what he actually wrote (and citing its context), 
they are free to say so and to apply the results to whatever special interests 
they have; but the rest of us are free to ignore such posts and any threads 
that may result from them. 

Personally I’d like to extend this a bit further and suggest that experienced 
list members are obligated to ignore the kind of “methodological criticisms” 
you refer to. I hope, in other words, that list members who feel drawn into 
debate on such issues do their debating offlist, as you suggest, and save the 
rest of us the trouble of skimming and deleting such debates.

I suggest this because such debates are a complete waste of time, not so much 
for those of us who ignore and delete them, but especially for newer members of 
the list who may not immediately recognize their futility. They deserve more 
substantial content on the Peirce list, and indeed require it if they are going 
to learn as much from participation onlist as you and I did in our early years 
with it. Your recent exchange with Robert, for instance, did feature some 
substantial content, and didn’t get drowned out with irrelevant debates — and 
came to a natural end before devolving into fruitless repetition. For the sake 
of those relatively new to the list, I’d like to see more of that. And for my 
part, I’ll pledge not to make any more meta-posts like this one.

Gary f.

} Entering is the source, and the source means from beginning to end. [Dogen] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the transition 

 

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 8-Jun-20 20:51
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of 
Semeiosis)

 

John, List:

 

I will spell out my position one more time, but I continue to find these 
strictly methodological criticisms tiresome, and I suspect that many others on 
the List would prefer not to be subjected to further debates about them.  I 
respectfully request that in the future any such exchanges be kept off-List.

 

JFS:  But when trying to understand what Peirce wrote, it's essential to 
interpret his words according to his way of thinking.

 

The only way to ascertain Peirce's way of thinking in the first place is by 
interpreting his words.

 

JFS:  The reason why you always agree with Jon is that you both happen to think 
in the same way.

 

Gary R. does not always agree with me, and we do not think in exactly the same 
way.  What we do have in common are certain methodological principles for 
interpreting Peirce or any other author, which are very widely accepted within 
the entire community of scholars.

 

JFS:  Robert and I are not claiming that your way is a bad way.  We're just 
saying that it's not the way Peirce was thinking.  Therefore, it's unreliable 
as a method for deriving any conclusions from his writings.

 

Robert can speak for himself, and no one can authoritatively declare what is 
and is not "the way Peirce was thinking" except by quoting his own words.  
Again, his writings constitute the only definitive evidence available, so we 
must appeal to them when making our respective cases.

 

JFS:  I strongly agree with Robert's objections to a "literalist' method of 
just quoting words.

 

Robert raised no particular objections, he simply made an offhand reference to 
my alleged "incessant 'literalist' activism."  In any case, what alternative 
would somehow better support one's interpretations of Peirce's writings than 
quoting his own words?  After all, someone once  
 asserted 
(albeit without textual warrant) that "Peirce would cringe at most, if not all 
attempts to paraphrase his thoughts," and then later  
 claimed never 
to have "seen any paraphrase of Peirce's words that was clearer or more precise 
than his own."  If both quotes and paraphrases are disallowed, then what else 
is left?  No reputable scholar would seriously advocate such an impossibly 
restrictive approach.

 

JFS:  Since Jon has an engineering background, he would have had enough 
training in science and mathematics that he could learn to appreciate Peirce's 
way of thinking.

 

I have indeed learned to appreciate Peirce's way of thinking, which is why I 
have spent so much time contemplating it and then writing about it, both here 
and in various publications.  In particular, my series of articles on "The 
Logic of Ingenuity" (beginning  

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

I will spell out my position one more time, but I continue to find these
strictly methodological criticisms tiresome, and I suspect that many others
on the List would prefer not to be subjected to further debates about
them.  I respectfully request that in the future any such exchanges be kept
off-List.

JFS:  But when trying to understand what Peirce wrote, it's essential to
interpret his words according to his way of thinking.


The only way to ascertain Peirce's way of thinking in the first place is by
interpreting his words.

JFS:  The reason why you always agree with Jon is that you both happen to
think in the same way.


Gary R. does not *always *agree with me, and we do not think in *exactly*
the same way.  What we do have in common are certain methodological
principles for interpreting Peirce or any other author, which are very
widely accepted within the entire community of scholars.

JFS:  Robert and I are not claiming that your way is a bad way.  We're just
saying that it's not the way Peirce was thinking.  Therefore, it's
unreliable as a method for deriving any conclusions from his writings.


Robert can speak for himself, and no one can authoritatively declare what
is and is not "the way Peirce was thinking" except by quoting his own
words.  Again, his writings constitute the only *definitive *evidence
available, so we must appeal to them when making our respective cases.

JFS:  I strongly agree with Robert's objections to a "literalist' method of
just quoting words.


Robert raised no particular objections, he simply made an offhand reference
to my alleged "incessant 'literalist' activism."  In any case, what
alternative would somehow *better *support one's interpretations of
Peirce's writings than quoting his own words?  After all, someone once
asserted 
(albeit
without textual warrant) that "Peirce would cringe at most, if not all
attempts to paraphrase his thoughts," and then later claimed
 never to
have "seen any paraphrase of Peirce's words that was clearer or more
precise than his own."  If both quotes and paraphrases are disallowed, then
what else is left?  No reputable scholar would seriously advocate such an
impossibly restrictive approach.

JFS:  Since Jon has an engineering background, he would have had enough
training in science and mathematics that he could learn to appreciate
Peirce's way of thinking.


I have indeed learned to appreciate Peirce's way of thinking, which is why
I have spent so much time contemplating it and then writing about it, both
here and in various publications.  In particular, my series of articles on
"The Logic of Ingenuity" (beginning here
, with links to the other three
parts) is a direct application of it to the way of thinking that we
engineers routinely employ.  Peirce even did some structural calculations
himself in the mid-1890s, for George S. Morison's proposed (but never
constructed) bridge over the Hudson River (see here
 and here
).

JFS:  Unfortunately, Peirce's late writings present his conclusions without
going into the details of how he derived his results.  Those writings are
good for learning Peirce's conclusions, but they don't show how to draw any
further inferences from them.


I strongly disagree.  Since most of those late writings are in various
manuscripts and letters, including unsent drafts, they do not merely
"present his conclusions," they *embody *his way of thinking.  The images
of his original pages are especially enlightening, showing his
self-corrections, marginal notes, and various false starts.  Like me and
many others, Peirce wrote to find out what he thought, going so far as to
state that his inkstand was as essential to his thinking as any lobe of his
brain.  Oops, that is a paraphrase, so here is a quote of the relevant
passage for good measure.

CSP:  A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (*nihil animale me alienum
puto*) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, "You see
your faculty of language was localized in that lobe." No doubt it was; and
so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to continue
my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not
come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my
inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two
places at once. On the theory that the distinction between psychical and
physical phenomena is the distinction between final and efficient
causation, it is plain enough that the inkstand and the brain-lobe have the
same general relation to the functions of the mind. (CP 7.366, 1902)


Studying Peirce's own words is the best--really, the only--method for
learning his way of thinking.  Accordingly, quoting Peirce's own words