Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Jeff - I think that you misunderstand Monod. 
You seem to take the title of his book 'Chance and Necessity' to
define his views of evolution as being due to either chance or
'necessity'. [tychism and anancasm].  The term of 'necessity' seems
to me, to mean 'predetermined' i.e., 'the principle according to
which something must be so, by virtue or logic or natural law'. I use
the term 'predetermined' because it was a key topic on the thread of
'destinate interpretant and predestinate opinion'. 
As for Monod, he was a key figure in the development of the
biological theories of self-organization - iwhich rejects
predestinate morphologies. 
Edwina
 On Tue 26/05/20  4:15 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, List, 
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie,
'that life is predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence
of man is predetermined...and after all, Peirce's  cosmology does
begin with chance'.
Note that I did not use the term "predetermined." Neither did Monod
in the passage I cited.  
Is there some reason that you decided to reframe the assertions
Monod made and the questions I was raising in terms of the conception
of what is or isn't "predetermined"? 
Yours, 
Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Edwina Taborsky 
 Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 2:21 PM
 To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate
Opinion (was To put an end ...) 

Jeff, list 
I'm not here to defend or promote Monod - but I think that your
description of him differs greatly from my own interpretation and use
of him in my own work in semiotics.  
1] You write: 

 JEFF: "Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting
forward: "The  universe is not pregnant with life nor the
biosphere with man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the
unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged only by
chance." (180) 
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can
see, Peirce entertains each of the assertions as  hypotheses and
rejects each as implausible. " 
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie,
'that life is predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence
of man is predetermined...and after all, Peirce's  cosmology does
begin with chance'. 1.412.. I think it's fairly obvious that Monod is
rejecting predetermined morphologies, ie, the predetermined
actualities of life. Instead, he posits self-organized evolution
based on chance, freedom, choice and collaboration   [ie, agapistic
evolution]. 

...which means...that the laws are evolving and self-organized
rather than predetermined. That is, he includes chance within his
notion of evolutionary freedom where a regulatory molecule "need bear
no resemblance to the substrates or products of  the enzyme {Kauffamn;
, S. The Origins of Order. 1993; 11].  He includes functional
self-regulation which produces novel molecules which, however, fit
into the current infrastructure and permit functional rather than
deviant adaptation.   
It seems to me, from my reading and use of Monod - that he's quite
similar to Peirce's agapasm! You are reducing him to tychism and
anacasm but I disagree.  
Edwina 
 On Sun 24/05/20 3:44 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List, 
The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good
methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing
metaphysical claims into the discussion of the normative  theory of
semiotics.  
Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are
hard to make out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He 
does a lot of hand waving and gesturing towards various sorts of
positions as he tries to locate his view within the larger conceptual
landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the  many gaps in what he
says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics, logic
and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly. 
Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is
interested in looking more closely his monograph: 
https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf

Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward:
"The  universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with
man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity
of the universe, out of which he 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, List,


EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie, 'that life is 
predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence of man is 
predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does begin with chance'.


Note that I did not use the term "predetermined." Neither did Monod in the 
passage I cited.


Is there some reason that you decided to reframe the assertions Monod made and 
the questions I was raising in terms of the conception of what is or isn't 
"predetermined"?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 2:21 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To 
put an end ...)


Jeff, list


I'm not here to defend or promote Monod - but I think that your description of 
him differs greatly from my own interpretation and use of him in my own work in 
semiotics.


1] You write:

 JEFF: "Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward:
 "The universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at 
last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of 
which he emerged only by chance." (180)


It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce 
entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as 
implausible. "


EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie, 'that life is 
predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence of man is 
predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does begin with chance'. 
1.412.. I think it's fairly obvious that Monod is rejecting predetermined 
morphologies, ie, the predetermined actualities of life. Instead, he posits 
self-organized evolution based on chance, freedom, choice and collaboration  
[ie, agapistic evolution].

...which means...that the laws are evolving and self-organized rather than 
predetermined. That is, he includes chance within his notion of evolutionary 
freedom where a regulatory molecule "need bear no resemblance to the substrates 
or products of the enzyme {Kauffamn; , S. The Origins of Order. 1993; 11].  He 
includes functional self-regulation which produces novel molecules which, 
however, fit into the current infrastructure and permit functional rather than 
deviant adaptation.


It seems to me, from my reading and use of Monod - that he's quite similar to 
Peirce's agapasm! You are reducing him to tychism and anacasm but I disagree.


Edwina






On Sun 24/05/20 3:44 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List,


The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good 
methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing metaphysical 
claims into the discussion of the normative theory of semiotics.


Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are hard to make 
out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He does a lot of hand waving 
and gesturing towards various sorts of positions as he tries to locate his view 
within the larger conceptual landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the many 
gaps in what he says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics, 
logic and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly.


Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is interested in 
looking more closely his monograph:  
https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf


Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward: "The 
universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at last 
knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which 
he emerged only by chance." (180)


It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce 
entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as implausible.


Teleological explanations and causes involve pretty broad conceptions that have 
a long history. As a person who regularly teaches Plato and Aristotle, I tend 
to start there in my discussion of the nest of questions that typically surface 
in discussions of these large ideas. Setting aside all of the details that 
would be needed to make sense of how Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses fit into 
the larger historical story, my sense is that one central question that Monod 
seems largely to be ignoring is the following:  what kind of explanation can be 
given for the laws of physics, chemistry and biology? Why do the laws that 
appear to govern these natural systems take the shape that they do at this 
point in the evolution of the cosmos? Peirc

Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[robert marty]

Part of my post remained in French. I apologize for that.
"I consider that the text below is fundamental to justify the use of a new
concept that will fulfill this function of "social counter-reaction" of
individual semiosis:"
Best,
RM

Le lun. 25 mai 2020 à 12:19, robert marty  a
écrit :

> Edwina, Jon Alan, Helmut, List
>
> Most of the discussions on the list have focused philosophical questions
> on final causes, efficient causes, goals, etc. ... and many disagreements
> have been found ... I would point out that these discussions focus on
> what is happening in the interpretants of the hexadic sign and I have even
> seen that a subject on their plethora -which I have not yet been able to
> consult- has been created. But on what happens before, apart from a
> consensus on the Od-Oi-S sequence that no one questions, there is very
> little. I mentioned it necessarily in the parable value example in response
> to Jon Alan in which I mentioned that the utterers  of the sign could do
> nothing but  mark the sign of its subjectivity. Even when he utters the
> word "pipe" he mobilizes his own conception of the concept of "pipe", most
> likely consistent with what is in the mind of most potential receivers. 
> However,
> in all cases whether it is the concept itself (for example in a discussion
> about the harmfulness  of pipes), a real pipe or a painful experience
> related to a pipe,,  it will be necessary to verify that it is indeed a
> pipe. And if I chose pipe" everyone will have understood that it is to
> ensure the reinforcement of René Magritte.
>
> What I want to emphasize here is that it may not be a good methodology to
> give such a preference for interpretation in semiosis without focusing the
> analysis on the whole process. And I come to Edwina's question: "Comment?"
> I read it in French but I could have read it in English ... and probably
> the ambiguity was it intended ...
>
> I rephrase it this way: how individual semiosis articulates with global
> semiosis ? Edwina provided an interactionist response that would result in
> a final interpretant that will obviously be historically dated as a
> provisional result of these multiple interactions. For my part I proposed a
>  slightly different conceptualization that takes into account the fact that
> the signs being obligated interfaces  (a medium for the communication of a
> form for example)  between the outside world and the inner world it is
> necessary to grasp by "a same movement of thought", the before-sign and the
> after-sign with the physiological perception of the sign as a connection
> between these two worlds. Otherwise we run the risk of introducing
> unsuspected biases that lead to questions that do not arise or that arise
> in other words, such as those I mentioned at the beginning of this post.
>
> Je considère que le texte ci-dessous est fondamental pour justifier
> l'emploi d'un nouveau concept qui remplira cette fonction de
> "contre-réaction sociale" des  semiosis individuelles :
>
> *" But while I say this, it must not be inferred that I regard
> consciousness as a mere "epiphenomenon"; though I heartily grant that the
> hypothesis that it is so has done good service to science. To my
> apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that congeries of
> non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality and in intensity, which
> are symptomatic of the interaction of the outer world -- the world of those
> causes that are exceedingly compulsive upon the modes of consciousness,
> with general disturbance sometimes amounting to shock, and are acted upon
> only slightly, and only by a special kind of effort, muscular effort -- and
> of the inner world, apparently derived from the outer, and amenable to
> direct effort of various kinds with feeble reactions; the interaction of
> these two worlds chiefly consisting of a direct action of the outer world
> upon the inner and an indirect action of the inner world upon the outer
> through the operation of habits. If this be a correct account of
> consciousness, i.e., of the congeries of feelings, it seems to me that it
> exercises a real function in self-control, since without it, or at least
> without that of which it is symptomatic, the resolves and exercises of the
> inner world could not affect the real determinations and habits of the
> outer world. I say that these belong to the outer world because they are
> not mere fantasies but are real agencies." **CP (5.493 ,Pragmatism, 1906)*
>
> But this fundamental text alone does not solve the question posed by
> Edwina because it obviously lacks the  commens, this concept that dominates
> both the emission of signs and their receptions. A concept that is added to
> this text allows us to situate Peirce's semiotics in the social field, his
> study in sociology and his practice among social practices. But the commens
> as Peirce presents it is a general framework in which individual signs are
> supposed to cooperate to arrive at a kind of 

Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[robert marty]

Edwina, Jon Alan, Helmut, List

Most of the discussions on the list have focused philosophical questions on
final causes, efficient causes, goals, etc. ... and many disagreements have
been found ... I would point out that these discussions focus on what is
happening in the interpretants of the hexadic sign and I have even seen
that a subject on their plethora -which I have not yet been able to
consult- has been created. But on what happens before, apart from a
consensus on the Od-Oi-S sequence that no one questions, there is very
little. I mentioned it necessarily in the parable value example in response
to Jon Alan in which I mentioned that the utterers  of the sign could do
nothing but  mark the sign of its subjectivity. Even when he utters the
word "pipe" he mobilizes his own conception of the concept of "pipe", most
likely consistent with what is in the mind of most potential
receivers. However,
in all cases whether it is the concept itself (for example in a discussion
about the harmfulness  of pipes), a real pipe or a painful experience
related to a pipe,,  it will be necessary to verify that it is indeed a
pipe. And if I chose pipe" everyone will have understood that it is to
ensure the reinforcement of René Magritte.

What I want to emphasize here is that it may not be a good methodology to
give such a preference for interpretation in semiosis without focusing the
analysis on the whole process. And I come to Edwina's question: "Comment?"
I read it in French but I could have read it in English ... and probably
the ambiguity was it intended ...

I rephrase it this way: how individual semiosis articulates with global
semiosis ? Edwina provided an interactionist response that would result in
a final interpretant that will obviously be historically dated as a
provisional result of these multiple interactions. For my part I proposed a
 slightly different conceptualization that takes into account the fact that
the signs being obligated interfaces  (a medium for the communication of a
form for example)  between the outside world and the inner world it is
necessary to grasp by "a same movement of thought", the before-sign and the
after-sign with the physiological perception of the sign as a connection
between these two worlds. Otherwise we run the risk of introducing
unsuspected biases that lead to questions that do not arise or that arise
in other words, such as those I mentioned at the beginning of this post.

Je considère que le texte ci-dessous est fondamental pour justifier
l'emploi d'un nouveau concept qui remplira cette fonction de
"contre-réaction sociale" des  semiosis individuelles :

*" But while I say this, it must not be inferred that I regard
consciousness as a mere "epiphenomenon"; though I heartily grant that the
hypothesis that it is so has done good service to science. To my
apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that congeries of
non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality and in intensity, which
are symptomatic of the interaction of the outer world -- the world of those
causes that are exceedingly compulsive upon the modes of consciousness,
with general disturbance sometimes amounting to shock, and are acted upon
only slightly, and only by a special kind of effort, muscular effort -- and
of the inner world, apparently derived from the outer, and amenable to
direct effort of various kinds with feeble reactions; the interaction of
these two worlds chiefly consisting of a direct action of the outer world
upon the inner and an indirect action of the inner world upon the outer
through the operation of habits. If this be a correct account of
consciousness, i.e., of the congeries of feelings, it seems to me that it
exercises a real function in self-control, since without it, or at least
without that of which it is symptomatic, the resolves and exercises of the
inner world could not affect the real determinations and habits of the
outer world. I say that these belong to the outer world because they are
not mere fantasies but are real agencies." **CP (5.493 ,Pragmatism, 1906)*

But this fundamental text alone does not solve the question posed by Edwina
because it obviously lacks the  commens, this concept that dominates both
the emission of signs and their receptions. A concept that is added to this
text allows us to situate Peirce's semiotics in the social field, his study
in sociology and his practice among social practices. But the commens as
Peirce presents it is a general framework in which individual signs are
supposed to cooperate to arrive at a kind of social semiosis whose dynamics
feed on individual variations. These are mostly the result of material
changes in the outside world as a result of the development of science and
technology, their impact on the environment, the circulation of ideas (and
viruses...), etc.   It is not integrated  es-qualities  into the semiotic
sequence; it is just the  framework in which it unfolds. One way to
integrate it is to use the concept o

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

plaining self-controlled processes of
> reasoning. Yes. Do I agree with Peirce on these matters? Broadly speaking,
> yes. I tend to think that his hypotheses concerning the evolution of the
> laws of nature and the systems that are governed by these laws are more
> plausible than those that fit the models of A-C and F.
>
> Hope that helps.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *Sent:* Sunday, May 24, 2020 10:34 AM
> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
> *Subject:* Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and
> Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)
>
> Edwina, Jon, Robert, Jeff, List,
>
> I am wondering about the difference between Telos and Purpose: Is it so,
> that Telos is a Purpose, but not one of the individual´s mind, but of a
> mind of a system on another classificational level, or, speaking with
> Salthe, at another subsumption level? Then the individual is acting
> according to this telos or purpose of the mind of e.g. its culture,
> species, genus, life as a whole, or universe as a whole, and the telos is
> inherited. A super-telos of evolution is individuation, meaning, that
> instructions for acting shall not only come from such super-systems´ minds
> , but from the individual´s mind, meaning, that telos is more and more
> substituted by purpose, and evolution provides the means therefore, like
> brain, thinking-in-symbols-capacity, language-capacity, etc.?
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Edwina Taborsky]

at comprise the systems that are governed by such laws. He attempts
to explain the evolution of physical, chemical and biological systems
by appealing to a combination of chance  and natural necessity. 
How  might we classify Monod's explanatory strategy? Here are five
types of positions that Peirce  considers: 
 Possible relations between law and chance in explaining the cosmos.


 A holds that every feature of all facts conforms to some law. A 's
being the persons who admit the least arbitrariness. Most everything
is governed by law. Nothing happens by chance. Does A also hold that
every feature of every law is governed  by some further law of  

 B holds that the law fully determines every fact, but thinks  that
some relations of facts are accidental.  

 C holds that uniformity within its jurisdiction is perfect,  but
confines its application to certain elements of phenomena.  

 D  holds that uniformities are never absolutely exact, so that the
variety of the universe is forever increasing. At the same time we
hold that even these departures from law are  subject to a certain
law of probability, and that in the present state of the universe
they are far too small to be detected by our observations. 

 E's being those who admit the most arbitrariness (most everything 
happens by chance. Nothing is governed by law. (Variety and
Uniformity, CP 6.90) 
The position that Peirce is developing fits the mold  of D. The
position that Monod is developing seems to fit somewhere between B
and C.  
Does Peirce formulate explanations that are teleological  in
character when he explains the evolution of law? Yes, I think he
does. Does Peirce appeal to teleological explanations in explaining
self-controlled processes of reasoning. Yes. Do I agree with Peirce
on these matters? Broadly speaking, yes. I tend to think  that his
hypotheses concerning the evolution of the laws of nature and the
systems that are governed by these laws are more plausible than those
that fit the models of A-C and F. 
Hope that helps. 
--Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Helmut Raulien 
 Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 10:34 AM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Subject: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and
Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)  Edwina, Jon,
Robert, Jeff, List,   I am wondering about the difference between
Telos and Purpose: Is it so, that Telos is a Purpose, but not one of
the individual´s mind, but of a mind of a system on another
classificational level, or, speaking with Salthe, at another
subsumption level?  Then the individual is acting according to this
telos or purpose of the mind of e.g. its culture, species, genus,
life as a whole, or universe as a whole, and the telos is inherited.
A super-telos of evolution is individuation, meaning, that
instructions for  acting shall not only come from such
super-systems´ minds , but from the individual´s mind, meaning,
that telos is more and more substituted by purpose, and evolution
provides the means therefore, like brain,
thinking-in-symbols-capacity, language-capacity,  etc.?   Best,  
Helmut  Sonntag, 24. Mai 2020 um 15:10 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

Jeff, list 
I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely
different views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them
compatible. 
I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt
 he supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely
biological evolution but also the development of thought and
knowledge. . I no longer have a copy of Monod's work  in my library -
but - my recollection and quotes from old papers is that Monod most
certainly was not what one might term a 'neo-Darwinist', ie,
anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought - with
'thought' understood as the operation of Mind.  That was exactly his
point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as
Peirce said, these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This
means that interactions - as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or
haphazard but chosen for their positive  functionality 
I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is
teleological; there is no predetermined agenda or identity; all that
we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving into ever more complex and varied
morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the purpose being  the
development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin to an
ideal  [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an
open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the
'rationalization of the universe'

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

e that helps.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 10:34 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate 
Opinion (was To put an end ...)

Edwina, Jon, Robert, Jeff, List,

I am wondering about the difference between Telos and Purpose: Is it so, that 
Telos is a Purpose, but not one of the individual´s mind, but of a mind of a 
system on another classificational level, or, speaking with Salthe, at another 
subsumption level? Then the individual is acting according to this telos or 
purpose of the mind of e.g. its culture, species, genus, life as a whole, or 
universe as a whole, and the telos is inherited. A super-telos of evolution is 
individuation, meaning, that instructions for acting shall not only come from 
such super-systems´ minds , but from the individual´s mind, meaning, that telos 
is more and more substituted by purpose, and evolution provides the means 
therefore, like brain, thinking-in-symbols-capacity, language-capacity, etc.?

Best,

Helmut


Sonntag, 24. Mai 2020 um 15:10 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:

Jeff, list



I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely different 
views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them compatible.



I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt  he 
supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely biological 
evolution but also the development of thought and knowledge. . I no longer have 
a copy of Monod's work in my library - but - my recollection and quotes from 
old papers is that Monod most certainly was not what one might term a 
'neo-Darwinist', ie, anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought 
- with 'thought' understood as the operation of Mind. That was exactly his 
point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as Peirce said, 
these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This means that interactions - 
as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or haphazard but chosen for their 
positive functionality



I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is teleological; there is 
no predetermined agenda or identity; all that we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving 
into ever more complex and varied morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the 
purpose being the development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin 
to an ideal  [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an 
open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the 
'rationalization of the universe' 1.590 and 'reasonable 5.433. And above all, 
the maintenance of 'Mind-as-Matter'. This is compatible with Monod's rejection 
of teleology and to permit both chance and transformation. .."nature is 
objective and not projective' [1971;3] and self-regulating.



Edwina




On Sun 24/05/20 3:55 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Robert, Jon, List,



It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical 
hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some 
sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions 
differ on a number of points, including the following:



Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency 
for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the 
time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been 
sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry 
have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over 
those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the 
ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves.



On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating 
hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the 
grips of a metaphysical theory.  Instead, common sense tells us that the 
normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct 
that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would 
not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in 
orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry 
involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and 
reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems 
to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character 
of the conduct of inquiry.



Having said that, Monod seems to go further.  Drawing on the kinds of 
assertions that are found in Sartre's writings,

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Helmut Raulien]

cal and moral principles has been evolving for many centuries. What is more, this wisdom is possessed by the larger human community and not by any one individual. 

 

The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can help us see some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory logic rests on principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part, I think that Peirce is on a more fruitful track when it comes to the question of what should be taken as the data for a normative theory of logic. The data should be arguments that the larger community holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the test of time. It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the evaluation of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the underlying purposes and principles are based on a radically free act of choice by that individual.

 

As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting the sorts of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to offer for the sake of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or a theory of logic as semiotics.

 

Yours,

 

Jeff

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354





From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

 





Robert, Helmut, List:

 




RM:  In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's statements as an argument of authority.





 

HR:  Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he?




 

This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my intent.  I am not suggesting that there must be final causes in nature because Peirce says so, which would indeed be a fallacious appeal to authority--as would suggesting that there cannot be final causes in nature merely because Democritus and Monod say so.  I am simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly (and repeatedly) affirms that there are final causes in nature, such that denying the reality of final causes is straightforwardly disagreeing with Peirce.  I trust that no one disputes this.

 




HR:  "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it?




 

No, why suggest that?  Again, a final cause is not necessarily the purpose of an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation.  The reality of final causes would not, by itself, entail the reality of God; and atheism does not, by itself, entail the rejection of final causation.

 




RM:  Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without a final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that evolution itself is the realization of an end, which will no longer be challenged by the science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which would have provided evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I suppose) would be an old-fashioned one who can be mocked.
There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and that Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition a major scientific support ...

 




HR:  One may also assume, that evolution is continuous adaption without an end.




 

One may assume that, but for Peirce such "continuous adaptation" would not be a synonym for biological evolution.  After all, by itself random variation is insufficient; natural selection also must come into play, and it is not the brute necessity of the "necessitarianism" that Peirce routinely dismissed as untenable.  Instead, fitness for a particular environment is the telos of biological evolution--its ideal end or final cause, a "would-be" that is never perfectly realized, because if it were, then the process would cease.  This philosophical observation is perfectly consistent with not only the science of Peirce's time, but also the science of today.

 



 

 




HR:  And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind", had he forgotten then, that he had claimed that the universe has a mind?




 

No, because he did not say that a final cause may be conceived to operate without any mind at all, he said that it may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind.  Again, intentional agency is not required for final causation, and Peirce's concept of mind (and thought) is much broader than that.  "It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906).

 




HR:  The big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically proven.




 

No theory is &quo

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Edwina Taborsky]

c" because the
underlying purposes and principles are based on a radically free act 
of choice by that individual. 
As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting
the sorts of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to
offer for the sake of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or
a theory of logic  as semiotics. 
Yours, 
Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354
-----
 From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
 Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate
Opinion (was To put an end ...)   Robert, Helmut, List: 
 RM:  In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you
use CSP's statements as an argument of authority. 
  HR:  Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he?
  This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my
intent.  I am not suggesting that there must be final causes in
nature because Peirce says so, which would indeed be a fallacious
appeal to authority--as would suggesting that there cannot be final
causes in nature merely because Democritus and Monod say so.  I am
simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly (and repeatedly) affirms
that there are final causes in nature, such that denying the reality
of final causes is straightforwardly  disagreeing with Peirce.  I
trust that no one disputes this. 
 HR:  "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working
out of a definite end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it?
  No, why suggest that?  Again, a final cause is not necessarily the
purpose of an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation. 
The reality of final causes would not, by itself, entail the reality
of God; and atheism  does not, by itself, entail the rejection of
final causation. 
 RM:  Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according
to without a final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that
evolution itself is the realization of an end, which will no longer
be challenged by the science  of its time (in 1902, I presume) which
would have provided evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I
suppose) would be an old-fashioned one who can be mocked. There is
nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and that
Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition
a major scientific support ... 
 HR:  One may also assume, that evolution is continuous adaption
without an end.
  One may assume that, but for Peirce such "continuous adaptation"
would not be a synonym for biological evolution.  After all, by
itself random variation is insufficient; natural selection also must
come into play, and it  is not the brute necessity of the
"necessitarianism" that Peirce routinely dismissed as untenable. 
Instead, fitness for a particular environment is the telos of
biological evolution--its ideal end or final cause, a "would-be" that
is never perfectly realized, because if it were, then the process
would cease.  This philosophical observation is perfectly consistent
with not only the science of Peirce's time, but also the science of
today. 
 HR:  And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived to
operate without having been the purpose of any mind", had he
forgotten then, that he had claimed that the universe has a mind?
  No, because he did not say that a final cause may be conceived to
operate without any mind at all, he said that it may be conceived to
operate without having been the purpose of any mind.  Again,
intentional agency is not required for final causation, and Peirce's
concept of mind (and thought) is much broader than that.  "It appears
in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world;  and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that
the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551,
1906). 
 HR:  The big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically
proven.
  No theory is "scientifically proven" in the sense of being
absolutely definitive and infallible.  Peirce's cosmological
hypothesis is that the entire universe is constantly evolving (3ns)
at the present from being utterly indeterminate (1ns) in the infinite
past to being utterly determinate (2ns) in the infinite future.  These
are not actual states, they are ideal states that are approached but
never reached, like the asymptotes of a hyperbola. 
 HR:  Organisms who have brains apply a third kind of causation,
volitional or example causation: They remember or anticipate
something they want to get.
  This is still final causation, but it is the specific kind that
manifests as an agent having a purpose.  In my view, influenced by
what Menno Hulswit has written on the subject, formal causati

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Robert, Jon, List,


It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical 
hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some 
sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions 
differ on a number of points, including the following:


Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency 
for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the 
time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been 
sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry 
have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over 
those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the 
ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves.


On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating 
hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the 
grips of a metaphysical theory.  Instead, common sense tells us that the 
normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct 
that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would 
not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in 
orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry 
involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and 
reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems 
to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character 
of the conduct of inquiry.


Having said that, Monod seems to go further.  Drawing on the kinds of 
assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold that the 
deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be consciously selected 
by each individual in a radically free act of choice. Otherwise, the purposes 
and principles are not authentic.


Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees with these 
radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about the origins of 
meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical and moral principles has 
been evolving for many centuries. What is more, this wisdom is possessed by the 
larger human community and not by any one individual.


The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can help us see 
some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory logic rests on 
principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part, I think that Peirce is 
on a more fruitful track when it comes to the question of what should be taken 
as the data for a normative theory of logic. The data should be arguments that 
the larger community holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the 
test of time. It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of 
arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the evaluation 
of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the underlying purposes 
and principles are based on a radically free act of choice by that individual.


As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting the sorts 
of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to offer for the sake 
of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or a theory of logic as 
semiotics.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion 
(was To put an end ...)

Robert, Helmut, List:

RM:  In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's 
statements as an argument of authority.

HR:  Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he?

This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my intent.  I am 
not suggesting that there must be final causes in nature because Peirce says 
so, which would indeed be a fallacious appeal to authority--as would suggesting 
that there cannot be final causes in nature merely because Democritus and Monod 
say so.  I am simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly (and repeatedly) 
affirms that there are final causes in nature, such that denying the reality of 
final causes is straightforwardly disagreeing with Peirce.  I trust that no one 
disputes this.

HR:  "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite 
end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it?

No, why suggest that?  Again, a final cause is not necessarily the purpose of 
an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation.  The reality of final 
causes would not, by itself, entail the reality of God; and atheism does not, 
by itself, entail the rejection of final causation.

RM:  Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a propos

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, Helmut, List:

RM:  In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's
statements as an argument of authority.


HR:  Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he?


This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my intent.  I
am not suggesting that there must be final causes in nature *because *Peirce
says so, which would indeed be a fallacious appeal to authority--as would
suggesting that there *cannot *be final causes in nature merely because
Democritus and Monod say so.  I am simply pointing out that Peirce
explicitly (and repeatedly) affirms that there are final causes in nature,
such that denying the reality of final causes is straightforwardly
disagreeing with Peirce.  I trust that no one disputes this.

HR:  "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a
definite end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it?


No, why suggest that?  Again, a final cause is not necessarily the purpose
of an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation.  The reality of
final causes would not, by itself, entail the reality of God; and atheism
does not, by itself, entail the rejection of final causation.

RM:  Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without
a final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that evolution itself is
the realization of an end, which will no longer be challenged by the
science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which would have provided evidence
of it. The old notion (Democrite I suppose) would be an old-fashioned one
who can be mocked.
There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and
that Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition a
major scientific support ...

HR:  One may also assume, that evolution is continuous adaption without an
end.


One may assume that, but for Peirce such "continuous adaptation" would not
be a synonym for biological evolution.  After all, by itself random
variation is insufficient; natural selection also must come into play, and
it is not the *brute *necessity of the "necessitarianism" that Peirce
routinely dismissed as untenable.  Instead, fitness for a particular
environment is the *telos *of biological evolution--its ideal end or final
cause, a "would-be" that is never *perfectly *realized, because if it were,
then the process would cease.  This *philosophical *observation is
perfectly consistent with not only the science of Peirce's time, but also
the science of today.

HR:  And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived to operate without
having been the purpose of any mind", had he forgotten then, that he had
claimed that the universe has a mind?


No, because he did not say that a final cause may be conceived to operate
without any mind *at all*, he said that it may be conceived to operate
without having been the *purpose *of any mind.  Again, intentional agency
is not required for final causation, and Peirce's concept of mind (and
thought) is much broader than that.  "It appears in the work of bees, of
crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more
deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of
objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906).

HR:  The big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically proven.


No theory is "scientifically proven" in the sense of being absolutely
definitive and infallible.  Peirce's cosmological *hypothesis *is that the
entire universe is constantly evolving (3ns) at the present from being
utterly indeterminate (1ns) in the infinite past to being utterly
determinate (2ns) in the infinite future.  These are not *actual *states,
they are *ideal *states that are approached but never reached, like the
asymptotes of a hyperbola.

HR:  Organisms who have brains apply a third kind of causation, volitional
or example causation: They remember or anticipate something they want to
get.


This is still final causation, but it is the specific kind that manifests
as an agent having a purpose.  In my view, influenced by what Menno Hulswit
has written on the subject, formal causation corresponds to 1ns, efficient
causation to 2ns, and final causation to 3ns.  This is evident in the
division of signs according to the relation with the dynamical object--the
latter is the formal cause of an iconic sign, the efficient cause of an
indexical sign, and the final cause of a symbolic sign.  We can also see it
in the three interpretants--the efficient cause of the dynamical
(effective) interpretant is the sign token itself, while its formal cause
is the immediate (explicit) interpretant and its final cause is the final
(destinate) interpretant.

Consequently, every sign always (logically) has an immediate interpretant
(as a may-be) and a final interpretant (as a would-be), but a token is only
involved in the continuous (temporal) process of semeiosis when the
dynamical object determines it to determine a dynamical (actual)
interpretant.  This *degenerate *tr

Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

Yes - I see your point and agree. Certainly, if the FI in ONE
semiosic process was in a mode of Thirdness, then, the 'preceding'
nodes of the process could not be in any other mode than Thirdness.

But is the Final Interpretant ever due to only one semiosic process
or from one individual? I don't want to be seen as 'slithering out'
of your justified comment - but isn't the FI due to a 'commons' -
where, if we imagine a complex networked web of  semiosic
interactions from MANY individuals - where some are functioning in
1ns, some in 2ns, some in a mixture of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, and some in
3ns.that the Final Interpretant in this networked community -
would be that generalized law? Then, this community will presumably
change its habits - but - even so, a community will continue to 'be
semiosic' within all ten sign classes, so to speak - and will only
once-in-a-while develop a Final Interpretant from within its semiosic
processes. 

Comment?

Edwina
 On Sat 23/05/20  4:32 PM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina ,Helmut, List 

The final interpretant certainly is a change of habit (which may be
the preservation of habit or the return to old habits) but it can not
be only a Thirdness . If this were the case there would be only one
class of hexadics signs :  

Od3àOi3à S3àX3àY3àZ3  

in some system X,Y,Z of denominations either with Z interpretant
final ... The change in habit may or may not be a change in the
subjective theory of the receiver or a change in his physical
reaction patterns or in his modes of emotional reactions ... and then
we find the 28 classes ... 

Best regards, 

Robert
 Le sam. 23 mai 2020 à 15:38, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :
Helmut, list - I wonder if we are mixing terms.

Final cause and the final interpretant are not at all similar.

 1] Final Cause is not the same as Final Interpretant. 

 Peirce locates the three interpretants in order of, as I see it, of
emergence in the semiosic process, which does therefore insert a
temporality,  with the immediate interpretant as the individual
subjective experience of the data from the DO and IO as mediated by
the sign/representamen, and then the Dynamical Interpretant ‘which
is the actual effect which the Sign determines [again, within the
individual]  – and then the Final Interpretant…’the way in
which every mind would act’ 8.315 – which latter inserts a
commonality of understanding. 

 If we understand that logic requires a process of generality, then
the final interpretant includes that generality. That is, it includes
the category of Thirdness. But we must remember, that not all semiosic
events include this generalizing category. Indeed, most of our
semiosic interactions 'stop', so to speak, with Firstness and
Seccondness. This is why that last node in the hexadic process is not
always present to that process. Indeed - we could even say the
semiosic process is most often a five rather than six node process!

 That would actually make sense, if we understand the Final
Interpretant as a 'commonality of laws', as a Logical Interpretant,
to be engaged in expressing those habits or laws. Habit changes are
not carried out every second but with less frequency. 
2] What is final cause? To Peirce, as I understand it does not
include an agential purpose. 1.211, with final cause instead
understood, as he puts it,  as ‘the ideal or final’. But what is
this  'ideal or final'? Does it include a sense of value? Who or what
would provide this value?   Or is it instead ‘the general principle
which is regarded as the cause and the individual fact to which it is
applied is taken as the understood factor [EP 2.315-6]. What is this
general principle?

Final cause can also be understood as Thirdness, the law. This
brings in Peirce's concept of matter as mind.  As he writes, 'Mind
has its universal mode of action, namely, by final causationwith
natural selection" the theory of how forms come to be adaptive, that
is, to be governed by a quasi purpose. 1.269, The key word is
'adaptive' where organisms interact with each other and adapt.  

How does this universal law of mind operate? By, for example 'the
great law of association, an attraction between ideas' 1.270.. Or,
the universe functions within a 'law of nature, ie, the
rationalization of the universe' 1.590.  And 'the process of
evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those
generals which were just not said to be destined which is what we
strive to express in calling them reasonable' 5.433. [see also
agapistic evolution]. Note that evolution is not 'destined' but
'reasonable'.  That inserts the notion that 'matter is effete mind.
6.25 where the two 'universes' of mind and matter coincide 6.501. Or
'matter is mind hidebound with habits

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[robert marty]

Edwina ,Helmut, List

The final interpretant certainly is a change of habit (which may be the
preservation of habit or the return to old habits) but it can not be only a
Thirdness . If this were the case there would be only one class of hexadics
signs :

Od3àOi3àS3àX3àY3àZ3

in some system X,Y,Z of denominations either with Z interpretant final ...
The change in habit may or may not be a change in the subjective theory of
the receiver or a change in his physical reaction patterns or in his modes
of emotional reactions ... and then we find the 28 classes ...

Best regards,

Robert

Le sam. 23 mai 2020 à 15:38, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Helmut, list - I wonder if we are mixing terms.
>
> Final cause and the final interpretant are not at all similar.
>
> 1] Final Cause is not the same as Final Interpretant.
>
> Peirce locates the three interpretants in order of, as I see it, of
> emergence in the semiosic process, which does therefore insert a
> temporality,  with the immediate interpretant as the individual subjective
> experience of the data from the DO and IO as mediated by the
> sign/representamen, and then the Dynamical Interpretant ‘which is the
> actual effect which the Sign determines [again, within the individual]  –
> and then the Final Interpretant…’the way in which every mind would act’
> 8.315 – which latter inserts a commonality of understanding.
>
> If we understand that logic requires a process of generality, then the
> final interpretant includes that generality. That is, it includes the
> category of Thirdness. But we must remember, that not all semiosic events
> include this generalizing category. Indeed, most of our semiosic
> interactions 'stop', so to speak, with Firstness and Seccondness. This is
> why that last node in the hexadic process is not always present to that
> process. Indeed - we could even say the semiosic process is most often a
> five rather than six node process!
>
> That would actually make sense, if we understand the Final Interpretant as
> a 'commonality of laws', as a Logical Interpretant, to be engaged
> in expressing those habits or laws. Habit changes are not carried out every
> second but with less frequency.
>
>
> 2] What is final cause? To Peirce, as I understand it does not include an
> agential purpose. 1.211, with final cause instead understood, as he puts
> it,  as ‘the ideal or final’. But what is this  'ideal or final'? Does it
> include a sense of value? Who or what would provide this value?  Or is it
> instead ‘the general principle which is regarded as the cause and the
> individual fact to which it is applied is taken as the understood factor
> [EP 2.315-6]. What is this general principle?
>
> Final cause can also be understood as Thirdness, the law. This brings in
> Peirce's concept of matter as mind.  As he writes, 'Mind has its universal
> mode of action, namely, by final causationwith natural selection" the
> theory of how forms come to be adaptive, that is, to be governed by a quasi
> purpose. 1.269, The key word is 'adaptive' where organisms interact with
> each other and adapt.
>
> How does this universal law of mind operate? By, for example 'the great
> law of association, an attraction between ideas' 1.270.. Or, the universe
> functions within a 'law of nature, ie, the rationalization of the universe'
> 1.590.  And 'the process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and
> more to embody those generals which were just not said to be destined which
> is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable' 5.433. [see also
> agapistic evolution]. Note that evolution is not 'destined' but
> 'reasonable'.  That inserts the notion that 'matter is effete mind. 6.25
> where the two 'universes' of mind and matter coincide 6.501. Or 'matter is
> mind hidebound with habits' 6. 158
>
> Note, Helmut, that this definite end of final cause is not predetermined
> but operates within the objectively existent world and renders that
> world functional and adaptive; it is 'adaptation' which is the 'definite
> end' I,e.,  the generation of functional habits of Mind-as-Matter,  not
> some predetermined agential idea.
>
> Therefore - the way I see it is that the Final Interpretant is a
> not-often-realized semiosic event, where a commonality of interpretation is
> generated by a commonality of individuals [human or otherwise]. While Final
> Cause has to do with the concept of Mind-as-Matter, where Mind is
> constantly  'actualizing' itself as Matter, within a complex and dynamic
> interactional process of networked semiosis.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat 23/05/20 4:03 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Jon, List,
>
> Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he? "For evolution is nothing
> more nor less than the working out of a definite end", is theism and
> speculation, isn´t it? One may also assume, that evolution is continuous
> adaption without an end. And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived
> to operate without having

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[robert marty]

Jon Alan , List

In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's
statements as an argument of authority. Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204
states a proposal according to without a final cause there would be no
evolution, arguing that evolution itself is the realization of an end,
which will no longer be challenged by the science of its time (in 1902, I
presume) which would have provided evidence of it. The old notion
(Democrite I suppose) would be an old-fashioned one who can be mocked.



There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and
that Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition a
major scientific support; and I guess it wouldn't be sacrilege if someone
sent the compliment back to CSP, 117 years later. Moreover, his proclaimed
fallible allowed us to yet would oblige us to do so ...



CP 1.211 is still an opinion that concerns only, it seems to me, the
supporters of the final cause.



I am very grateful to you for producing a comparative analysis and I look
forward to it with great interest.



Best regards

Robert



Le sam. 23 mai 2020 à 04:14, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> Thanks for providing this creative answer to some of my questions, which I
> have been pondering carefully.  It confirms that we have very different
> theories about semeiosis, and apparently very different interpretations of
> Peirce's writings on that subject.  For one thing, he explicitly and
> repeatedly *affirms *the reality of final causes, and even points to
> biological evolution as a paradigmatic manifestation of them.
>
> CSP:  Perhaps, since phrases retain their sway over men's minds long after
> their meaning has evaporated, it may be that some reader, even at this day,
> remains imbued with the old notion that there are no final causes in
> nature; in which case, natural selection, and every form of evolution,
> would be false. For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out
> of a definite end. A final cause may be conceived to operate without having
> been the purpose of any mind ... but that definite ends are worked out none
> of us today any longer deny. Our eyes have been opened; and the evidence is
> too overwhelming. (CP 1.204, 1902)
>
>
> Notice that for Peirce final causes *do not* entail agency, theistic or
> otherwise.  He confirms this later in the same manuscript.
>
> CSP:  It is, as I was saying, a widespread error to think that a "final
> cause" is necessarily a purpose. A purpose is merely that form of final
> cause which is most familiar to our experience. (CP 1.211)
>
>
> However, I will not belabor that point any further.  Instead, for
> comparison I will try to spell out my own semeiotic analysis of my previous
> post, hopefully sometime this weekend.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 10:58 AM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon Alan, List
>>
>> I'd rather we stay on the list. I have clues that suggest that people are
>> interested; if some are embarrassed they have no obligation ...
>>
>> Today I will answer your questions using another rhetorical means, the
>> parable ...
>>
>> "*A **parable is a succinct, didactic
>>  story, in prose
>>  or verse
>> **, that illustrates one
>> or more instructive lessons or principles*" (
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable ) ...
>>
>> I assure you, it will be prose ...
>>
>>
>>
>> On 05/20/20 at a certain time, in the mind of a person living in Olathe,
>> Kansas,USA, *(the sender),* a person who has well-established and known
>> ideas from the list on the final causes, effective causes, determinations,
>> ... a subjective theory labelled "JAS" *(Od)* is formed the idea of
>> addressing questions to a member of the list in particular and also to the
>> list *(the receiver, the receivers)*… he imagines a series of questions
>> *(Oi)* that are necessarily determined by his theory which they carry
>> "in hollow" the mark ... he writes them and publishes them *(S)* … its
>> main receiver (his first name is an index perceived first) perceives this
>> text ... in the course of his reading his mind is inhabited by more or
>> less blurred mnemonic reminders of a large number of objects of previous
>> discussions, more or less interconnected, mixed - as with each of the
>> messages he received from the same sender - with this following information
>> (index) which never ceased to amaze him: "*Professional Engineer,
>> Philosopher Amateur, Lutheran Layman"*.  All this has formed in his mind
>> a kind of "interpretation guide" from which he apprehends the content of
>> the messages received from this sender, a set to which is added the one to
>> which I answer by the parabl

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list - I wonder if we are mixing terms.

Final cause and the final interpretant are not at all similar.

 1] Final Cause is not the same as Final Interpretant. 

 Peirce locates the three interpretants in order of, as I see it, of
emergence in the semiosic process, which does therefore insert a
temporality,  with the immediate interpretant as the individual
subjective experience of the data from the DO and IO as mediated by
the sign/representamen, and then the Dynamical Interpretant ‘which
is the actual effect which the Sign determines [again, within the
individual]  – and then the Final Interpretant…’the way in
which every mind would act’ 8.315 – which latter inserts a
commonality of understanding. 

 If we understand that logic requires a process of generality, then
the final interpretant includes that generality. That is, it includes
the category of Thirdness. But we must remember, that not all semiosic
events include this generalizing category. Indeed, most of our
semiosic interactions 'stop', so to speak, with Firstness and
Seccondness. This is why that last node in the hexadic process is not
always present to that process. Indeed - we could even say the
semiosic process is most often a five rather than six node process!

That would actually make sense, if we understand the Final
Interpretant as a 'commonality of laws', as a Logical Interpretant,
to be engaged in expressing those habits or laws. Habit changes are
not carried out every second but with less frequency. 
2] What is final cause? To Peirce, as I understand it does not
include an agential purpose. 1.211, with final cause instead
understood, as he puts it,  as ‘the ideal or final’. But what is
this  'ideal or final'? Does it include a sense of value? Who or what
would provide this value?  Or is it instead ‘the general principle
which is regarded as the cause and the individual fact to which it is
applied is taken as the understood factor [EP 2.315-6]. What is this
general principle?

Final cause can also be understood as Thirdness, the law. This
brings in Peirce's concept of matter as mind.  As he writes, 'Mind
has its universal mode of action, namely, by final causationwith
natural selection" the theory of how forms come to be adaptive, that
is, to be governed by a quasi purpose. 1.269, The key word is
'adaptive' where organisms interact with each other and adapt. 

How does this universal law of mind operate? By, for example 'the
great law of association, an attraction between ideas' 1.270.. Or,
the universe functions within a 'law of nature, ie, the
rationalization of the universe' 1.590.  And 'the process of
evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those
generals which were just not said to be destined which is what we
strive to express in calling them reasonable' 5.433. [see also
agapistic evolution]. Note that evolution is not 'destined' but
'reasonable'.  That inserts the notion that 'matter is effete mind.
6.25 where the two 'universes' of mind and matter coincide 6.501. Or
'matter is mind hidebound with habits' 6. 158

Note, Helmut, that this definite end of final cause is not
predetermined but operates within the objectively existent world and
renders that world functional and adaptive; it is 'adaptation' which
is the 'definite end' I,e.,  the generation of functional habits of
Mind-as-Matter,  not some predetermined agential idea. 

Therefore - the way I see it is that the Final Interpretant is a
not-often-realized semiosic event, where a commonality of
interpretation is generated by a commonality of individuals [human or
otherwise]. While Final Cause has to do with the concept of
Mind-as-Matter, where Mind is constantly  'actualizing' itself as
Matter, within a complex and dynamic interactional process of
networked semiosis.

Edwina
 On Sat 23/05/20  4:03 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
 Jon, List,   Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he? "For
evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite
end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it? One may also assume, that
evolution is continuous adaption without an end. And when he wrote "A
final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the
purpose of any mind", had he forgotten then, that he had claimed that
the universe has a mind? If it has, why should it pursue its own end?
I think doomsdayism is always theistic speculation. The big chill
too, like the big bang, is not scientifically proven.   I think, that
evolution itself has a mind, though working quite slowly.  A better
example for final cause I see in the needs of organisms, who pursue
an end to these needs. Or their DNA does it for them, which is a
memory of the mind of evolution of their species. Organisms who have
brains apply a third kind of causation, volitional or example
causation: They remember or anticipate something they want to get.
These th

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he? "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it? One may also assume, that evolution is continuous adaption without an end. And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind", had he forgotten then, that he had claimed that the universe has a mind? If it has, why should it pursue its own end? I think doomsdayism is always theistic speculation. The big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically proven. 

I think, that evolution itself has a mind, though working quite slowly. 

A better example for final cause I see in the needs of organisms, who pursue an end to these needs. Or their DNA does it for them, which is a memory of the mind of evolution of their species. Organisms who have brains apply a third kind of causation, volitional or example causation: They remember or anticipate something they want to get.

These three kinds of causation are related by analogy to the three kinds of inference.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 
 

 23. Mai 2020 um 04:14 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:




Robert, List:

 

Thanks for providing this creative answer to some of my questions, which I have been pondering carefully.  It confirms that we have very different theories about semeiosis, and apparently very different interpretations of Peirce's writings on that subject.  For one thing, he explicitly and repeatedly affirms the reality of final causes, and even points to biological evolution as a paradigmatic manifestation of them.

 




CSP:  Perhaps, since phrases retain their sway over men's minds long after their meaning has evaporated, it may be that some reader, even at this day, remains imbued with the old notion that there are no final causes in nature; in which case, natural selection, and every form of evolution, would be false. For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite end. A final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind ... but that definite ends are worked out none of us today any longer deny. Our eyes have been opened; and the evidence is too overwhelming. (CP 1.204, 1902)




 

Notice that for Peirce final causes do not entail agency, theistic or otherwise.  He confirms this later in the same manuscript.

 




CSP:  It is, as I was saying, a widespread error to think that a "final cause" is necessarily a purpose. A purpose is merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our experience. (CP 1.211)




 

However, I will not belabor that point any further.  Instead, for comparison I will try to spell out my own semeiotic analysis of my previous post, hopefully sometime this weekend.

 

Regards,

 







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt








On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 10:58 AM robert marty  wrote:


Jon Alan, List
 

I'd rather we stay on the list. I have clues that suggest that people are interested; if some are embarrassed they have no obligation ...

Today I will answer your questions using another rhetorical means, the parable ...

"A parable is a succinct, didactic story, in prose or verse, that illustrates one or more instructive lessons or principles" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable ) ... 

I assure you, it will be prose ...

 

On 05/20/20 at a certain time, in the mind of a person living in Olathe, Kansas,USA, (the sender), a person who has well-established and known ideas from the list on the final causes, effective causes, determinations, ... a subjective theory labelled "JAS" (Od) is formed the idea of addressing questions to a member of the list in particular and also to the list (the receiver, the receivers)… he imagines a series of questions (Oi) that are necessarily determined by his theory which they carry "in hollow" the mark ... he writes them and publishes them (S) … its main receiver (his first name is an index perceived first) perceives this text ... in the course of his reading his mind is inhabited by more or less blurred mnemonic reminders of a large number of objects of previous discussions, more or less interconnected, mixed - as with each of the messages he received from the same sender - with this following information (index) which never ceased to amaze him: "Professional Engineer, Philosopher Amateur, Lutheran Layman".  All this has formed in his mind a kind of "interpretation guide" from which he apprehends the content of the messages received from this sender, a set to which is added the one to which I answer by the parable - under construction before my eyes and soon under yours, i e of all those who will perceive it (read it). This receiver has therefore, with more or less accuracy, conceptualized this set. He finds himself obliged, simply to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

Thanks for providing this creative answer to some of my questions, which I
have been pondering carefully.  It confirms that we have very different
theories about semeiosis, and apparently very different interpretations of
Peirce's writings on that subject.  For one thing, he explicitly and
repeatedly *affirms *the reality of final causes, and even points to
biological evolution as a paradigmatic manifestation of them.

CSP:  Perhaps, since phrases retain their sway over men's minds long after
their meaning has evaporated, it may be that some reader, even at this day,
remains imbued with the old notion that there are no final causes in
nature; in which case, natural selection, and every form of evolution,
would be false. For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out
of a definite end. A final cause may be conceived to operate without having
been the purpose of any mind ... but that definite ends are worked out none
of us today any longer deny. Our eyes have been opened; and the evidence is
too overwhelming. (CP 1.204, 1902)


Notice that for Peirce final causes *do not* entail agency, theistic or
otherwise.  He confirms this later in the same manuscript.

CSP:  It is, as I was saying, a widespread error to think that a "final
cause" is necessarily a purpose. A purpose is merely that form of final
cause which is most familiar to our experience. (CP 1.211)


However, I will not belabor that point any further.  Instead, for
comparison I will try to spell out my own semeiotic analysis of my previous
post, hopefully sometime this weekend.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 10:58 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Jon Alan, List
>
> I'd rather we stay on the list. I have clues that suggest that people are
> interested; if some are embarrassed they have no obligation ...
>
> Today I will answer your questions using another rhetorical means, the
> parable ...
>
> "*A **parable is a succinct, didactic
>  story, in prose
>  or verse
> **, that illustrates one or
> more instructive lessons or principles*" (
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable ) ...
>
> I assure you, it will be prose ...
>
>
>
> On 05/20/20 at a certain time, in the mind of a person living in Olathe,
> Kansas,USA, *(the sender),* a person who has well-established and known
> ideas from the list on the final causes, effective causes, determinations,
> ... a subjective theory labelled "JAS" *(Od)* is formed the idea of
> addressing questions to a member of the list in particular and also to the
> list *(the receiver, the receivers)*… he imagines a series of questions
> *(Oi)* that are necessarily determined by his theory which they carry "in
> hollow" the mark ... he writes them and publishes them *(S)* … its main
> receiver (his first name is an index perceived first) perceives this text
> ... in the course of his reading his mind is inhabited by more or less
> blurred mnemonic reminders of a large number of objects of previous
> discussions, more or less interconnected, mixed - as with each of the
> messages he received from the same sender - with this following information
> (index) which never ceased to amaze him: "*Professional Engineer,
> Philosopher Amateur, Lutheran Layman"*.  All this has formed in his mind
> a kind of "interpretation guide" from which he apprehends the content of
> the messages received from this sender, a set to which is added the one to
> which I answer by the parable - under construction before my eyes and soon
> under yours, i e of all those who will perceive it (read it). This receiver
> has therefore, with more or less accuracy, conceptualized this set. He
> finds himself obliged, simply to have read this injunctive message, in
> which the sender has somehow "*printed his mark*", to modify or not his
> uncertain conceptualization in which dominates the idea of "
> *predestination*" that his studies and readings have allowed him to
> associate with Lutheranism (Calvinism too) and in general protestantism:
> It's *(If)* … in immediate reaction in his mind is recalled his own
> subjective theory which contains his long-held opinions on these issues
> *(Ie)*. He acquired them early by reading Jacques Monod's 1965 Nobel
> Prize book," Hasard and Necessity," later reinforced by reading René
> Thom's book, Medall Field of Mathematics (1958), entitled " Structural
> Stability and Morphogenesis, W. A. Benjamin, (1972)". After a quick
> confrontation between the two theories for a possible change in the way he
> considers the questions of the final causes and the efficient causes, he
> decides not to modify one iota and to communicate this decision to the
> person who asked it and to the list *(Iex)*  in the explicit form 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List

I'd rather we stay on the list. I have clues that suggest that people are
interested; if some are embarrassed they have no obligation ...

Today I will answer your questions using another rhetorical means, the
parable ...

"*A **parable is a succinct, didactic
 story, in prose
 or verse
**, that illustrates one or
more instructive lessons or principles*" (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable ) ...

I assure you, it will be prose ...



On 05/20/20 at a certain time, in the mind of a person living in Olathe,
Kansas,USA, *(the sender),* a person who has well-established and known
ideas from the list on the final causes, effective causes, determinations,
... a subjective theory labelled "JAS" *(Od)* is formed the idea of
addressing questions to a member of the list in particular and also to the
list *(the receiver, the receivers)*… he imagines a series of questions
*(Oi)* that are necessarily determined by his theory which they carry "in
hollow" the mark ... he writes them and publishes them *(S)* … its main
receiver (his first name is an index perceived first) perceives this text
... in the course of his reading his mind is inhabited by more or less
blurred mnemonic reminders of a large number of objects of previous
discussions, more or less interconnected, mixed - as with each of the
messages he received from the same sender - with this following information
(index) which never ceased to amaze him: "*Professional Engineer,
Philosopher Amateur, Lutheran Layman"*.  All this has formed in his mind a
kind of "interpretation guide" from which he apprehends the content of the
messages received from this sender, a set to which is added the one to
which I answer by the parable - under construction before my eyes and soon
under yours, i e of all those who will perceive it (read it). This receiver
has therefore, with more or less accuracy, conceptualized this set. He
finds himself obliged, simply to have read this injunctive message, in
which the sender has somehow "*printed his mark*", to modify or not his
uncertain conceptualization in which dominates the idea of "*predestination*"
that his studies and readings have allowed him to associate with
Lutheranism (Calvinism too) and in general protestantism: It's *(If)* … in
immediate reaction in his mind is recalled his own subjective theory which
contains his long-held opinions on these issues *(Ie)*. He acquired them
early by reading Jacques Monod's 1965 Nobel Prize book," Hasard and
Necessity," later reinforced by reading René Thom's book, Medall Field of
Mathematics (1958), entitled " Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, W.
A. Benjamin, (1972)". After a quick confrontation between the two theories
for a possible change in the way he considers the questions of the final
causes and the efficient causes, he decides not to modify one iota and to
communicate this decision to the person who asked it and to the list *(Iex)*
 in the explicit form that here: "*In* *his world of signs, determinations
are efficient causes and there is no need to incorporate final causes that
his own subjective theory and underlying atheism exclude*."*.*



Best,

Robert (the receiver)



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chance_and_Necessity

Le jeu. 21 mai 2020 à 04:44, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> I only have more questions at this point.  If you prefer to answer any or
> all of them off-List, that would be fine with me.
>
> Is it your view that "determines" is *always *a synonym for "efficiently
> causes"?  If so, why would it entail that the universe to which any one
> correlate belongs constrains the universe(s) to which the next correlate in
> the sequence can belong?
>
> If I may ask, why do you suspect a connection between being a "stranger to
> the final causes" and your atheism?
>
> On what basis do you believe that the destinate, effective, and explicit
> interpretants are all *actual *effects?  Do you likewise understand the
> other three correlates of the hexad to be actual?
>
> Please forgive the repetition, but what is "destinate" about the destinate
> interpretant as you define it?  And what is "explicit" about the explicit
> interpretant as you define it?
>
> Finally, how do you relate your podium diagram to the destinate,
> effective, and explicit interpretants?  Which one do you see as the genuine
> interpretant (3), which is degenerate (2/3), and which is doubly degenerate
> (1/2/3)?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 4:56 PM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon Alan, List
>>
>> To answer your questions I found it more convenient to answer in your
>> message, you'll excuse me...
>>
>> I am glad to learn that I was successful in clarifying my posi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

I only have more questions at this point.  If you prefer to answer any or
all of them off-List, that would be fine with me.

Is it your view that "determines" is *always *a synonym for "efficiently
causes"?  If so, why would it entail that the universe to which any one
correlate belongs constrains the universe(s) to which the next correlate in
the sequence can belong?

If I may ask, why do you suspect a connection between being a "stranger to
the final causes" and your atheism?

On what basis do you believe that the destinate, effective, and explicit
interpretants are all *actual *effects?  Do you likewise understand the
other three correlates of the hexad to be actual?

Please forgive the repetition, but what is "destinate" about the destinate
interpretant as you define it?  And what is "explicit" about the explicit
interpretant as you define it?

Finally, how do you relate your podium diagram to the destinate, effective,
and explicit interpretants?  Which one do you see as the genuine
interpretant (3), which is degenerate (2/3), and which is doubly degenerate
(1/2/3)?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 4:56 PM robert marty 
wrote:

> Jon Alan, List
>
> To answer your questions I found it more convenient to answer in your
> message, you'll excuse me...
>
> I am glad to learn that I was successful in clarifying my position for
> you.  Thanks for also spelling out yours, although I still have some
> theoretical comments and questions before we can start trying to discuss
> specific examples.
>
>
>
> First, you describe the succession of the destinate, effective, and
> explicit interpretants as a "process of interpretation."  To me, this
> suggests a *temporal *sequence rather than a *logical *sequence, and thus
> *efficient *causation rather than *final *causation.  In my view, when we
> say that a sign "determines" a subject's mind "to a feeling, to an
> exertion, or to a Sign" (CP 4.536, 1906), this is a *different *sense of
> "determines" than when Peirce states that the sign itself "determines the
> Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
> determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908).  Do you disagree?
>
>
>
> I disagree... the only efficient causations interest me ... I'm totally
> stranger to the final causes which is probably related to my atheism …
>
>
>
> Second, how do you relate the destinate, effective, and explicit
> interpretants to the immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants?  It
> seems like you consider the destinate, effective, and explicit
> interpretants to be three different *actual *effects of a single sign on
> a single subject.  Is that correct?
>
>
>
> Yes that's right, successive effects over time but very often reflexes so
> much they are deeply inscribed in the praxis of subjects
>
>
>
>  For me, this would make them all *dynamical *interpretants, because I
> understand the immediate interpretant as the range of *possible *effects
> of the sign (feelings/exertions/signs) and the final interpretant as the
> conditionally *necessary* effect of the sign (habit or habit-change).
>
>
>
> The notion of change of habit is for me the psychological version of the
> modification of the commens (individual habit/collective habit)
>
>
>
> Third, I am curious about the basis for your particular definitions of the
> destinate, effective, and explicit interpretants.  Are they derived from
> certain passages in Peirce's writings, developed from your own analyses
> over the years, or a combination of these?  What is "destinate" about the
> determination of each subject's mind by his/her perception of the sign as
> his/her "abstract subjective theory"?  What is "explicit" about "the result
> of this confrontation" as either retaining or modifying that theory?
>
>
>
> No there is conflict in the subject between the abstract subjective theory
> received from the utterer, which forces it into the moment of perception
> (action/reaction, see definitions of the sign with active/passive)
>
>
>
> Finally, please note that I *do not* "place the subject (someone) from
> the beginning in ideal circumstances."  Again, I hold that the *final 
> *interpretant
> is the effect that the sign *would *have under ideal circumstances, which
> may or may not ever be realized, rather than an effect that the sign
> *does* have on an individual subject on a particular occasion.  The
> latter is always a *dynamical *interpretant, and it can be different for
> different subjects who have different degrees of sign system acquaintance,
> different collateral experience/observation, and different habits of
> interpretation.  Do you disagree with this distinction?
>
>
>
> I disagree otherwise I would not have written my previous message in the
> same way!
>
>
> Best regards,
>
> Robert
>
>>
_ _ _ _ _ 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List

To answer your questions I found it more convenient to answer in your
message, you'll excuse me...

I am glad to learn that I was successful in clarifying my position for
you.  Thanks for also spelling out yours, although I still have some
theoretical comments and questions before we can start trying to discuss
specific examples.



First, you describe the succession of the destinate, effective, and
explicit interpretants as a "process of interpretation."  To me, this
suggests a *temporal *sequence rather than a *logical *sequence, and thus
*efficient *causation rather than *final *causation.  In my view, when we
say that a sign "determines" a subject's mind "to a feeling, to an
exertion, or to a Sign" (CP 4.536, 1906), this is a *different *sense of
"determines" than when Peirce states that the sign itself "determines the
Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908).  Do you disagree?



I disagree... the only efficient causations interest me ... I'm totally
stranger to the final causes which is probably related to my atheism …



Second, how do you relate the destinate, effective, and explicit
interpretants to the immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants?  It
seems like you consider the destinate, effective, and explicit
interpretants to be three different *actual *effects of a single sign on a
single subject.  Is that correct?



Yes that's right, successive effects over time but very often reflexes so
much they are deeply inscribed in the praxis of subjects



 For me, this would make them all *dynamical *interpretants, because I
understand the immediate interpretant as the range of *possible *effects of
the sign (feelings/exertions/signs) and the final interpretant as the
conditionally *necessary* effect of the sign (habit or habit-change).



The notion of change of habit is for me the psychological version of the
modification of the commens (individual habit/collective habit)



Third, I am curious about the basis for your particular definitions of the
destinate, effective, and explicit interpretants.  Are they derived from
certain passages in Peirce's writings, developed from your own analyses
over the years, or a combination of these?  What is "destinate" about the
determination of each subject's mind by his/her perception of the sign as
his/her "abstract subjective theory"?  What is "explicit" about "the result
of this confrontation" as either retaining or modifying that theory?



No there is conflict in the subject between the abstract subjective theory
received from the utterer, which forces it into the moment of perception
(action/reaction, see definitions of the sign with active/passive)



Finally, please note that I *do not* "place the subject (someone) from the
beginning in ideal circumstances."  Again, I hold that the *final *interpretant
is the effect that the sign *would *have under ideal circumstances, which
may or may not ever be realized, rather than an effect that the sign
*does* have
on an individual subject on a particular occasion.  The latter is always a
*dynamical *interpretant, and it can be different for different subjects
who have different degrees of sign system acquaintance, different
collateral experience/observation, and different habits of interpretation.  Do
you disagree with this distinction?



I disagree otherwise I would not have written my previous message in the
same way!


Best regards,

Robert

Le mer. 20 mai 2020 à 20:14, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> I am glad to learn that I was successful in clarifying my position for
> you.  Thanks for also spelling out yours, although I still have some
> theoretical comments and questions before we can start trying to discuss
> specific examples.
>
> First, you describe the succession of the destinate, effective, and
> explicit interpretants as a "process of interpretation."  To me, this
> suggests a *temporal *sequence rather than a *logical *sequence, and thus
> *efficient *causation rather than *final *causation.  In my view, when we
> say that a sign "determines" a subject's mind "to a feeling, to an
> exertion, or to a Sign" (CP 4.536, 1906), this is a *different *sense of
> "determines" than when Peirce states that the sign itself "determines the
> Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
> determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908).  Do you disagree?
>
> Second, how do you relate the destinate, effective, and explicit
> interpretants to the immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants?  It
> seems like you consider the destinate, effective, and explicit
> interpretants to be three different *actual *effects of a single sign on
> a single subject.  Is that correct?  For me, this would make them all
> *dynamical *interpretants, because I understand the immediate
> interpretant as the range of *possible *effects of the sign
> (feelings/exertions/si

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

I am glad to learn that I was successful in clarifying my position for
you.  Thanks for also spelling out yours, although I still have some
theoretical comments and questions before we can start trying to discuss
specific examples.

First, you describe the succession of the destinate, effective, and
explicit interpretants as a "process of interpretation."  To me, this
suggests a *temporal *sequence rather than a *logical *sequence, and thus
*efficient *causation rather than *final *causation.  In my view, when we
say that a sign "determines" a subject's mind "to a feeling, to an
exertion, or to a Sign" (CP 4.536, 1906), this is a *different *sense of
"determines" than when Peirce states that the sign itself "determines the
Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481, 1908).  Do you disagree?

Second, how do you relate the destinate, effective, and explicit
interpretants to the immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants?  It
seems like you consider the destinate, effective, and explicit
interpretants to be three different *actual *effects of a single sign on a
single subject.  Is that correct?  For me, this would make them all
*dynamical *interpretants, because I understand the immediate interpretant
as the range of *possible *effects of the sign (feelings/exertions/signs)
and the final interpretant as the conditionally *necessary* effect of the
sign (habit or habit-change).

Third, I am curious about the basis for your particular definitions of the
destinate, effective, and explicit interpretants.  Are they derived from
certain passages in Peirce's writings, developed from your own analyses
over the years, or a combination of these?  What is "destinate" about the
determination of each subject's mind by his/her perception of the sign as
his/her "abstract subjective theory"?  What is "explicit" about "the result
of this confrontation" as either retaining or modifying that theory?

Finally, please note that I *do not* "place the subject (someone) from the
beginning in ideal circumstances."  Again, I hold that the *final *interpretant
is the effect that the sign *would *have under ideal circumstances, which
may or may not ever be realized, rather than an effect that the sign
*does* have
on an individual subject on a particular occasion.  The latter is always a
*dynamical *interpretant, and it can be different for different subjects
who have different degrees of sign system acquaintance, different
collateral experience/observation, and different habits of interpretation.
Do you disagree with this distinction?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 9:29 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Thank you Jon Alan, this is really helpful and I thank you very much for
> making this extreme clarification effort. I could have written the first
> two paragraphs up to the number "729" and this is already a very important
> achievement.
>
> I can see the disagreement. To be sure, it is worth verifying that in the
> daily practice of signs the analyses that you and I would make would be as
> different as those that can be rationally prejudged when we express each
> other. That's why I'll make you a proposal at the end of the post.
>
> 1.  Before I would like to clearly act the theoretical
> disagreement:
>
> you place If (= "*what the sign itself would necessarily mean to someone
> in ideal circumstances, including the ultimate opinion after an infinite
> investigation by an infinite community"*) directly after S that would
> logically determine it. The sequel is self-evident because for you this If
> located just after S logically determines the last two..
>
> 2.  For me:
>
> ·*S* is perceived by existing subjects (interpreters)
> (or who have existed depending on the time of the analysis). S is the
> product of a coding  a priori made with the help of Oi and determined by
> Od. A process of interpretation takes place at the time of the "physiological"
> perception of this sign (the literature on visual signs is found in the
> notion of "retinex", a suitcase word put for "retina+ cortex" that
> illustrates my point).). The process is as follows:
>
>
>-*Id* is for each subject the determination of his mind by
>this perception. Id consists in  the reactivation of what the subject
>has actually internalized during his collateral experiments of the
>earlier/external uses of this sign S. It is in a way his abstract
>subjective *theory* in force in his mind at that very moment.
>-
>-*Ie:*  is determined by Id  itis the actualization of this
>prior internalization  *faced with* the current circumstances of the
>perception of the sign (the perception of the flag of the USSR today which
>does

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

Thank you so much for an absolutely perfect outline and analysis of
the hexadic semiosic process. 

Edwina
 On Wed 20/05/20 10:28 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
Thank you Jon Alan, this is really helpful and I thank you very much
for making this extreme clarification effort. I could have written the
first two paragraphs up to the number "729" and this is already a very
important achievement.

I can see the disagreement. To be sure, it is worth verifying that
in the daily practice of signs the analyses that you and I would make
would be as different as those that can be rationally prejudged when
we express each other. That's why I'll make you a proposal at the end
of the post.

1.  Before I would like to clearly act the
theoretical disagreement:

you place If (= "what the sign itself would necessarily mean to
someone in ideal circumstances, including the ultimate opinion after
an infinite investigation by an infinite community") directly after S
that would logically determine it. The sequel is self-evident because
for you this If located just after S logically determines the last
two..

 2.  For me:
·S is perceived by existing subjects
(interpreters) (or who have existed depending on the time of the
analysis). S is the product of a coding  a priori made with the help
of Oi and determined by Od. A process of interpretation takes place
at the time of the "physiological" perception of this sign (the
literature on visual signs is found in the notion of "retinex", a
suitcase word put for "retina+ cortex" that illustrates my point).).
The process is as follows:  
*Id is for each subject the determination of his mind by
this perception. Id consists in  the reactivation of what the subject
has actually internalized during his collateral experiments of the
earlier/external uses of this sign S. It is in a way his abstract
subjective theory in force in his mind at that very moment.
*
*Ie:  is determined by Id   itis the actualization of
this prior internalization  faced with the current circumstances of
the perception of the sign (the perception of the flag of the USSR
today which does not have the same effect as in 1950 and yet its
characteristics are the same) in the mind of the subject. In other
words, this is what the transmitter manages to create in the mind of
the interpretater by successively using the only possible channels: 
a prior coding followed by a percept .Any advertising sign is a
perfect illustration of my point and by extension I will go so far as
to say that all signs are signs of this nature from Roland Barthes'
"passionate roses" to Colin Powell's flour tube on February 5, 2003.
Efficient suits me very well because it reflects in a way the
"performance" of the sign with the interpreters he meets. For Roland
Barthes what the effects of red roses  offered to people to whom
another person wants to express his passion, for Colin Powell it was
the effects of his tube on the whole world that had to perceive the
dreaded anthrax. Juste a reminder:"By the way, the dynamical object
does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced
upon the mind in perception, but including more than perception
reveals. It is an object of actual Experience" (EP 478)
* Iex, explicit interpretant, is the result of this
confrontation. The subject is "forced" to either retain his
subjective theory, or modify it to take into account the experience
he has just done in particular circumstances. "But we must also note
that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call
the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be
decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter
were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached." (CP
8.184). In other words, it is the subject who decides the
sustainability of his subjective theory strengthened or modified in a
race towards his ultimate opinion that could be the current opinion. 
I come back to you: you place the subject (someone) from the
beginning in ideal circumstances where he would be the holder, at the
time of his perception of the sign, of the result of an infinite
investigation conducted by the community to which he belongs.  For me
it is clearly "a view of the mind". How can he access it? For this
result cannot be communicated to him by the creator of the sign whose
conceptions in this area are historically dated. Certainly the issuer
can imagine him as a member of this community; he may have the means
to do so, and I do not deny him that possibility. The receiver too.
It would clearly be a recourse to a collective imagination,  a
central concept of Jungian analytical psychology, also studied by
many sociologists, notably Cornelius Castoriadis and also
a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[robert marty]

Thank you Jon Alan, this is really helpful and I thank you very much for
making this extreme clarification effort. I could have written the first
two paragraphs up to the number "729" and this is already a very important
achievement.

I can see the disagreement. To be sure, it is worth verifying that in the
daily practice of signs the analyses that you and I would make would be as
different as those that can be rationally prejudged when we express each
other. That's why I'll make you a proposal at the end of the post.

1.  Before I would like to clearly act the theoretical
disagreement:

you place If (= "*what the sign itself would necessarily mean to someone in
ideal circumstances, including the ultimate opinion after an infinite
investigation by an infinite community"*) directly after S that would
logically determine it. The sequel is self-evident because for you this If
located just after S logically determines the last two..

2.  For me:

·*S* is perceived by existing subjects (interpreters)
(or who have existed depending on the time of the analysis). S is the
product of a coding  a priori made with the help of Oi and determined by
Od. A process of interpretation takes place at the time of the "physiological"
perception of this sign (the literature on visual signs is found in the
notion of "retinex", a suitcase word put for "retina+ cortex" that
illustrates my point).). The process is as follows:


   -*Id* is for each subject the determination of his mind by this
   perception. Id consists in  the reactivation of what the subject has
   actually internalized during his collateral experiments of the
   earlier/external uses of this sign S. It is in a way his abstract
   subjective *theory* in force in his mind at that very moment.
   -
   -*Ie:*  is determined by Id  itis the actualization of this
   prior internalization  *faced with* the current circumstances of the
   perception of the sign (the perception of the flag of the USSR today which
   does not have the same effect as in 1950 and yet its characteristics are
   the same) in the mind of the subject. In other words, this is what the
   transmitter manages to create in the mind of the interpretater by
   successively using the only possible channels:  a prior coding followed
   by a percept .Any advertising sign is a perfect illustration of my point
   and by extension I will go so far as to say that all signs are signs of
   this nature from Roland Barthes' "passionate roses" to Colin Powell's flour
   tube on February 5, 2003. Efficient suits me very well because it reflects
   in a way the *"performance"* of the sign with the interpreters he meets. For
   Roland Barthes what the effects of red roses  offered to people to whom
   another person wants to express his passion, for Colin Powell it was the
   effects of his tube on the whole world that had to perceive the dreaded
   anthrax. Juste a reminder:"*By the way, the dynamical object does not
   mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in
   perception, but including more than perception reveals. It is an object of
   actual Experience"* (EP 478)


   - *Iex*, explicit interpretant, is the result of this
   confrontation. The subject is* "forced"* to either retain his subjective
   theory, or modify it to take into account the experience he has just
   done in particular circumstances. "*But we must also note that there is
   certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final
   Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be decided to be the
   true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that
   an ultimate opinion were reached*." (CP 8.184). In other words, it is
   the subject who decides the sustainability of his subjective theory
strengthened
   or modified in a race towards his ultimate opinion that could be the
   current opinion.

I come back to you: you place the subject (someone) from the beginning in
ideal circumstances where he would be the holder, at the time of his
perception of the sign, of the result of an infinite investigation
conducted by the community to which he belongs.  For me it is clearly "a
view of the mind". How can he access it? For this result cannot be
communicated to him by the creator of the sign whose conceptions in this
area are historically dated. Certainly the issuer can imagine him as a
member of this community; he may have the means to do so, and I do not deny
him that possibility. The receiver too. It would clearly be a recourse
to a *collective
imagination,*  a central concept of Jungian analytical psychology, also
studied by many sociologists, notably Cornelius Castoriadis and also
anthropologists ... Everything would then happen in this collective
imagination and the confrontation would occur between their subjective
theories as both participants in community building. But now I may be
driving you into 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear JAS, list,



Thank you for all your work in collating.



*Now let us turn to the phaneron and see what we find in fact. (CP 1.299)*



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 9:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> Speculating is easy and sometimes even fun, but I suggest that the best
> way to ascertain what Peirce means by "predestinate" is carefully studying
> how else he uses the word and its close cognates in his writings (all bold
> added).
>
> CSP:  Because the only purpose of inquiry is the settlement of opinion, we
> have seen that everyone who investigates, that is, pursues an inquiry by
> the fourth method [that of science] assumes that that process will, if
> carried far enough, lead him to a certain conclusion, he knows not what
> beforehand, but which no further investigation will change. No matter what
> his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one
> *predestinated* belief. (CP 7.327, 1873)
>
> CSP:  Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but
> the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves
> to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are
> carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the
> operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no
> selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can
> enable a man to escape the *predestinate *opinion. This great hope is
> embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is
> fated* to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean
> by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That
> is the way I would explain reality.
> *Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be
> avoided. It is a superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are
> ever fated, and it is another to suppose that the word fate can never be
> freed from its superstitious taint. We are all fated to die. (CP 5.407, EP
> 1:138-139, 1878)
>
> CSP:  At the same time that this process of inference, or the spontaneous
> development of belief, is continually going on within us, fresh peripheral
> excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits. Thus, belief
> is partly determined by old beliefs and partly by new experience. Is there
> any law about the mode of the peripheral excitations? The logician
> maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that
> of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain *predestinate *conclusions
> which are the same for all men. This is the faith of the logician. This is
> the matter of fact, upon which all maxims of reasoning repose. In virtue of
> this fact, what is to be believed at last is independent of what has been
> believed hitherto, and therefore has the character of *reality*. Hence,
> if a given habit, considered as determining an inference, is of such a sort
> as to tend toward the final result, it is correct; otherwise not. Thus,
> inferences become divisible into the valid and the invalid; and thus logic
> takes its reason of existence. (CP 3.161, 1880)
>
> CSP:  [T]he only object to which inquiry seeks to make our opinion conform
> is itself something of the nature of thought; namely, it is the
> *predestined* ultimate idea, which is independent of what you, I, or any
> number of men may persist, for however long, in thinking, yet which remains
> thought, after all. (CP 8.101, c. 1900)
>
> CSP:  In the light of what has been said, what are we to say to that
> logical fatalism whose stock in trade is the argument that I have already
> indicated? I mean the argument that science is *predestined *to reach the
> truth, and that it can therefore make no difference whether she observes
> carefully or carelessly nor what sort of formulae she treats as reasons.
> The answer to it is that the only kind of *predestination *of the
> attainment of truth by science is an eventual *predestination*,--a 
> *predestination
> **aliquando denique*. Sooner or later it will attain the truth, nothing
> more. ... Let us remember, then, that the precise practical service of
> sound theory of logic is to abbreviate the time of waiting to know the
> truth, to expedite the *predestined *result. (CP 7.78, c. 1905-6)
>
> CSP:  I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so
> far as there is any "truth") to its being the *predestined *result to
> which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907)
>
>
> It is not that reality *itself *is predestined, but that reality is the 
> *object
> *of "the predestinate opinion," which is "the ultimate interpretant of
> every sign" (EP 2:304, 1904)--whatever *would *be believed by an infinite
> community after infinite inquiry.  Brute 2ns and spontaneous 1ns ensure
> that the necessities of the future are *conditional*, rather than actual;
> as Vincent Colapietro has put it, "It 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

Speculating is easy and sometimes even fun, but I suggest that the best way
to ascertain what Peirce means by "predestinate" is carefully studying how
else he uses the word and its close cognates in his writings (all bold
added).

CSP:  Because the only purpose of inquiry is the settlement of opinion, we
have seen that everyone who investigates, that is, pursues an inquiry by
the fourth method [that of science] assumes that that process will, if
carried far enough, lead him to a certain conclusion, he knows not what
beforehand, but which no further investigation will change. No matter what
his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one
*predestinated* belief. (CP 7.327, 1873)

CSP:  Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the
progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to
one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are
carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the
operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no
selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can
enable a man to escape the *predestinate *opinion. This great hope is
embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is
fated* to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean
by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That
is the way I would explain reality.
*Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be
avoided. It is a superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are
ever fated, and it is another to suppose that the word fate can never be
freed from its superstitious taint. We are all fated to die. (CP 5.407, EP
1:138-139, 1878)

CSP:  At the same time that this process of inference, or the spontaneous
development of belief, is continually going on within us, fresh peripheral
excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits. Thus, belief
is partly determined by old beliefs and partly by new experience. Is there
any law about the mode of the peripheral excitations? The logician
maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that
of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain *predestinate *conclusions
which are the same for all men. This is the faith of the logician. This is
the matter of fact, upon which all maxims of reasoning repose. In virtue of
this fact, what is to be believed at last is independent of what has been
believed hitherto, and therefore has the character of *reality*. Hence, if
a given habit, considered as determining an inference, is of such a sort as
to tend toward the final result, it is correct; otherwise not. Thus,
inferences become divisible into the valid and the invalid; and thus logic
takes its reason of existence. (CP 3.161, 1880)

CSP:  [T]he only object to which inquiry seeks to make our opinion conform
is itself something of the nature of thought; namely, it is the
*predestined* ultimate idea, which is independent of what you, I, or any
number of men may persist, for however long, in thinking, yet which remains
thought, after all. (CP 8.101, c. 1900)

CSP:  In the light of what has been said, what are we to say to that
logical fatalism whose stock in trade is the argument that I have already
indicated? I mean the argument that science is *predestined *to reach the
truth, and that it can therefore make no difference whether she observes
carefully or carelessly nor what sort of formulae she treats as reasons.
The answer to it is that the only kind of *predestination *of the
attainment of truth by science is an eventual *predestination*,--a
*predestination
**aliquando denique*. Sooner or later it will attain the truth, nothing
more. ... Let us remember, then, that the precise practical service of
sound theory of logic is to abbreviate the time of waiting to know the
truth, to expedite the *predestined *result. (CP 7.78, c. 1905-6)

CSP:  I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so
far as there is any "truth") to its being the *predestined *result to which
sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907)


It is not that reality *itself *is predestined, but that reality is the *object
*of "the predestinate opinion," which is "the ultimate interpretant of
every sign" (EP 2:304, 1904)--whatever *would *be believed by an infinite
community after infinite inquiry.  Brute 2ns and spontaneous 1ns ensure
that the necessities of the future are *conditional*, rather than actual;
as Vincent Colapietro has put it, "It means what *would *occur, not what
will inevitably despite all else occur."  There is no agency implied,
immaterial or otherwise.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply Li

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

I apologize for the apparent lack of clarity in my posts.  In this one, I
will try to limit myself to addressing your two specific requests as
directly as I can.

I have no objection whatsoever to the hexad sequence Od → Oi → S → Id →
Ie → Iex where Od = dynamoid object, Oi = immediate object, S = sign, Id =
destinate interpretant, Ie = effective interpretant, Iex = explicit
interpretant, and → = determines.  After all, this is exactly what Peirce
states at EP 2:481 (1908).

Right before this, he defines "determines" in what I call the *logical*
sense--"a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant
can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant."  In other words,
the universe to which any one correlate belongs *constrains *the
universe(s) to which the next correlate in the sequence can belong.  If the
dynamical object is a possible (1ns), then all the subsequent correlates
are likewise possibles (1ns).  If the explicit interpretant is a
necessitant (3ns), then all the previous correlates are likewise
necessitants (3ns).  If the sign itself is an existent (2ns), then the
destinate interpretant is either a possible (1ns) or an existent (2ns).
And so on, yielding 28 classes of signs rather than 729.

As far as I know, we agree that the dynamoid object is what Peirce
elsewhere calls the dynamical object, and that the effective interpretant
is what he elsewhere calls the dynamical interpretant.  Our disagreement
thus seems to be limited to the other two interpretants.  For reasons that
I have explained, I believe that the destinate interpretant is what Peirce
elsewhere calls the final interpretant, and that the explicit interpretant
is what he elsewhere calls the immediate interpretant.  Just as the genuine
(dynamical) object logically determines the degenerate (immediate) object,
the genuine (final) interpretant logically determines the degenerate
(dynamical) interpretant, which logically determines the doubly degenerate
(immediate) interpretant.  I define these three interpretants as follows.

   - The immediate (explicit) interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly
   could* signify to someone who possesses the requisite acquaintance with
   the system of signs to which it belongs.
   - The dynamical (effective) interpretant is whatever an individual sign
   token *actually does* signify to someone on an individual occasion.
   - The final (destinate) interpretant is whatever the sign itself
*necessarily
   would* signify to someone under ideal circumstances, including the
   ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.

Is that helpful?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:49 PM robert marty 
wrote:

> Jon Alan, Gary F., List
>
> I agree for only one place for "destinate" but none for "predestinate" ,
> otherwise I'm sure you would have found it and brandished it like a trophy
> ... 😉
>
>
>
> Now I have to admit that I can't figure out what you say is clear so much
> you're making little effort in the presentation to be precisely clear. You
> produce such a fog of quotations, sentences that say what a thing is mixed
> with what it is not, that a logical order in ideal circumstances is not
> chronological order in other circumstances, ... that I declare myself
> incapable in the current state of our exchanges to take a critical look at
> your statement. I would like to quote Jean-Jacques Rousseau:
>
>
>
> "*On pourrait, pour élaguer peu les tortillages et les amphigouris,
> obliger tout harangueur à énoncer au commencement de son discours la
> proposition qu'il veut faire".*(J.J. Rousseau, Le Gouvernement de
> Pologne.)
>
>
>
> a sentence with two old terms untranslatable but you guess criticisms that
> I like which means that it would "*require any speaker to state at the
> beginning of his speech the proposal he wishes to make*"...  It's an
> effort I made to look at what was behind your Sà(S-Od) à (S-If)  sequence
> and I think I made it clear, which took me a long time.
>
>
>
> Also I would be very obliged to expose you
>
>
> ·what sequence you object exactly to the sequence:
>
>Od à Oi à S à Id à Ie à Iex  (LW December 23 1908) ?
>
>(understanding that this sequence must be understood with the
> definitions I haveclearly stated for each of its elements including the
> arrows)
>
>
>
> ·and of course, for each of its elements, the exact definition
> you give of them, including the arrows.
>
>
>
> Otherwise we will leave it by force of things…
>
>
>
> In the meantime,
>
> Well cordially to you
>
> Robert
>

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