On Tue, Jun 10, 2003 at 11:53:48AM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
This fails the Monotonicity Criterion (MC)
On Wed, Jun 11, 2003 at 01:10:05AM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Doesn't this depend on (a) the order in which the votes are received,
No.
[I'm busy at the moment, but I'll try to
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:58:10PM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Oh, as a sponsor of the GR, I suppose I should clarify that I
am not going to accept this amendment; I consider it a bad one. This
Then shouldn't we be voting on it separately, according to
A.1.3 of the constitution?
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:58:10PM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Oh, as a sponsor of the GR, I suppose I should clarify that I
am not going to accept this amendment; I consider it a bad one. This
makes our vote method fail the monoticity criteria
On Wed, Jun 11, 2003 at 10:42:37PM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Well, I'm still confused.
Here is Manoj's example:
Consider the case where the quorum is 45, and there have been
44 votes -- 23 for, 21 against. (Only one option on the ballot). I am
opposed to the option.
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:58:10PM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Oh, as a sponsor of the GR, I suppose I should clarify that I
am not going to accept this amendment; I consider it a bad one. This
On Thu, Jun 12, 2003 at 12:25:08AM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Then shouldn't we be
On Wednesday, Jun 11, 2003, at 10:25 US/Eastern, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Then shouldn't we be voting on it separately, according to
A.1.3 of the constitution?
Only if it gets enough seconds.
--
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On Thu, Jun 12, 2003 at 12:48:13AM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
With the relative order or rating of the other
candidates unchanged, voting a candidate higher should
never cause the candidate to lose, nor should voting a
candidate
On Tue, Jun 10, 2003 at 11:53:48AM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
This fails the Monotonicity Criterion (MC)
On Wed, Jun 11, 2003 at 01:10:05AM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Doesn't this depend on (a) the order in which the votes are received,
No.
[I'm busy at the moment, but I'll try to
On Wed, 11 Jun 2003 22:42:37 +1000, Hamish Moffatt [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
On Tue, Jun 10, 2003 at 11:53:48AM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
This fails the Monotonicity Criterion (MC)
On Wed, Jun 11, 2003 at 01:10:05AM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Doesn't this depend on (a) the order in
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:58:10PM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Oh, as a sponsor of the GR, I suppose I should clarify that I
am not going to accept this amendment; I consider it a bad one. This
makes our vote method fail the monoticity criteria
On Wed, Jun 11, 2003 at 10:42:37PM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Well, I'm still confused.
Here is Manoj's example:
Consider the case where the quorum is 45, and there have been
44 votes -- 23 for, 21 against. (Only one option on the ballot). I am
opposed to the option.
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:58:10PM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Oh, as a sponsor of the GR, I suppose I should clarify that I
am not going to accept this amendment; I consider it a bad one. This
On Thu, Jun 12, 2003 at 12:25:08AM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Then shouldn't we be
On Wednesday, Jun 11, 2003, at 10:25 US/Eastern, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Then shouldn't we be voting on it separately, according to
A.1.3 of the constitution?
Only if it gets enough seconds.
On Thu, Jun 12, 2003 at 12:48:13AM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
With the relative order or rating of the other
candidates unchanged, voting a candidate higher should
never cause the candidate to lose, nor should voting a
candidate
On Thu, 12 Jun 2003 00:48:13 +1000, Hamish Moffatt [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
I have serious concerns about this ballot. John Robinson's proposed
amendment has been rejected by Manoj so according to the
constitution it should be voted on. Further it seems to address some
real problems in the
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:58:10PM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Scenario B:
Consider the case where the quorum is 45, and there have been
44 votes -- 23 for, 21 against. (Only one option on the ballot). I am
opposed to the option.
At this point; under my version; I can
This fails the Monotonicity Criterion (MC)
On Wed, Jun 11, 2003 at 01:10:05AM +1000, Hamish Moffatt wrote:
Doesn't this depend on (a) the order in which the votes are received,
No.
[I'm busy at the moment, but I'll try to answer your other questions
later, if no one else has by then.]
On Tue, May 20, 2003 at 05:58:10PM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Scenario B:
Consider the case where the quorum is 45, and there have been
44 votes -- 23 for, 21 against. (Only one option on the ballot). I am
opposed to the option.
At this point; under my version; I can
On Wed, May 28, 2003 at 04:33:05PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
On Tue, May 27, 2003 at 10:33:31AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
Which makes D win, rather than A, B or C.
Unfortunately, that doesn't mean this is not the best strategy.
Sure it does: if their sincere preferences were A,B,C D
On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 03:43:03PM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
your favourite option up (from 0 to 0.5 in this example above), but they
also increase the odds of the default option getting up (again, from 0 to
0.5). That's a gamble, not a strategy.
Tell that to a gambler.
Gamblers do it
On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 03:43:03PM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
your favourite option up (from 0 to 0.5 in this example above), but they
also increase the odds of the default option getting up (again, from 0 to
0.5). That's a gamble, not a strategy.
Tell that to a gambler.
Gamblers do it
On Wed, May 28, 2003 at 04:33:05PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
On Tue, May 27, 2003 at 10:33:31AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
Which makes D win, rather than A, B or C.
Unfortunately, that doesn't mean this is not the best strategy.
Sure it does: if their sincere preferences were A,B,C D
On Wed, May 28, 2003 at 04:59:17PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Now, the 6 BAD voters (teehee)
I appreciate your ability to find humor.
But the point is, that voting as a bloc might increase your chance of getting
your favourite option up (from 0 to 0.5 in this example above), but they
also
On Tue, May 27, 2003 at 10:33:31AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
Which makes D win, rather than A, B or C.
Unfortunately, that doesn't mean this is not the best strategy.
Sure it does: if their sincere preferences were A,B,C D in all cases,
(whatever their preferences amongst A, B and C) then
On Tue, May 27, 2003 at 10:18:18AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
sincere strategy by BAD
9 ABD 9 ABD
6 BAD 6 BDA
3 DAB 3 DAB
2 DBA 2 DBA
Condorcet+SSD A
On Tue, May 27, 2003 at 10:33:31AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
Which makes D win, rather than A, B or C.
Unfortunately, that doesn't mean this is not the best strategy.
Sure it does: if their sincere preferences were A,B,C D in all cases,
(whatever their preferences amongst A, B and C) then
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 10:44:09PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
the problem: our vote tallying method is doing double duty.
solution: split it out.
But as Anthony pointed out, the current proposal has nearly the
exact same properties as if it were split out. (The only exception
is that
A beats B 40:20
B beats C 40:20
A beats C 40:20
D beats A, B and C 40:20
Which makes D win, rather than A, B or C.
On Tue, May 27, 2003 at 10:33:31AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
Unfortunately, that doesn't mean this is not the best strategy. It
could be that the best strategy,
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 08:45:31PM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
I _think_ the same basic strategy applies: Rank the non-default
options sincerely, then insert the default option after your lesser
of evils option.
That doesn't work. Suppose there are three options, and everyone does this.
Anthony Towns wrote:
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 08:45:31PM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
I _think_ the same basic strategy applies: Rank the non-default
options sincerely, then insert the default option after your lesser
of evils option.
That doesn't work. Suppose there are three options,
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 10:44:09PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
so: the need to get seconds (normally, 5) is in no way, shape, or form a
reflection of the vote tallying method.
That's a non-sensical claim. The current system is exactly equivalent
to having a ballot that consists of any
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 10:44:09PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
the problem: our vote tallying method is doing double duty.
solution: split it out.
But as Anthony pointed out, the current proposal has nearly the
exact same properties as if it were split out. (The only exception
is that
Andrew == Andrew Pimlott [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Andrew ? As far as I can see, all you need is enough D voters
Andrew that B voters can cause D beats A.
But if B voters can cause D beats A, how is this not honest? If I'd
rather see B win or no decision made I rang A below D,
On Mon, 26 May 2003 13:42:03 +0200, Matthias Urlichs [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
Hi,
Guido Trotter wrote:
If we are sure that if 2*quorum people cast a vote there is no
problem with the proposed system, why not add to the current
proposal the fact that the votes cast, altogether, have to be at
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 02:18:53PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
A:C=69:31
Default option: A.
Quorum: 30.
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 03:18:44AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
Huh?
3. Any (non-default) option which does not
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 08:20:11PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
You wrote (25 May 2003):
C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
B and A are the only remaining options, and B defeats A.
B wins.
That's strange! The majority requirement makes the default
option lose.
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 12:14:55AM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
1. Approval voting has obvious incentives to strategic voting.
Yes, that's true. There are two responses to this: one is that the
benefits are worth the risks; the other is that (hopefully) the incentives
to vote honestly outweigh
Hi,
Andrew Pimlott wrote:
1. Approval voting has obvious incentives to strategic voting. The
electionmethods people consider it clearly inferior to Condorcet
voting, in part for this reason. Specifically, why don't you
think this is a problem with the proposed method?
With
Hi,
Markus Schulze wrote:
In short: The winner according to Manoj's May 15 proposal
can be cyclic even when the voters don't change their minds.
Wrong. Reason: The default option is never keep the current status, it's
further discussion. If we run a vote which results in action A, the vote
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 02:45:30PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
And, as I've already posted elsewhere, you'll note there's no problem
at all here if number of votes received is twice the quorum, which,
historically, it almost always is.
I haven't had time to follow all the long discussion,
Hi,
Guido Trotter wrote:
If we are sure that if 2*quorum people cast a vote there is no problem with
the proposed system, why not add to the current proposal the fact that the
votes cast, altogether, have to be at least 2*quorum? This will also ensure
that, before taking a vote into
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 12:48:32PM +0200, Guido Trotter wrote:
If we are sure that if 2*quorum people cast a vote there is no problem with
the proposed system, why not add to the current proposal the fact that the
votes cast, altogether, have to be at least 2*quorum?
Because that would have
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 08:20:33AM +0200, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
With Approval, there's no difference between strategic voting and expressing
your preference.
I don't know what you mean. The basic strategy for approval voting
(as on electionmethods.org) is to vote for the lesser of evils
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 07:54:44PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
breaking Condorcet isn't a meaningful thing to say. Adding quorum and
I think we all understand it to mean causing the system to violate the
Condorcet criterion.
That's fine, but that doesn't necessarily make the system broken.
Raul Miller wrote:
What Anthony is trying to point out, and what you're pretending to
ignore, is that what D wins means is no one wins, and the vote
is thrown out.
no, this is not the same. one is a legitimate, binding vote with a real
bona fide winner. the other is a nullification.
Since
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 10:25:38PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
Raul Miller wrote:
What Anthony is trying to point out, and what you're pretending to
ignore, is that what D wins means is no one wins, and the vote
is thrown out.
no, this is not the same. one is a legitimate, binding
Dear Nathanael,
Raul Miller wrote (25 May 2003):
Correct me if I'm wrong, but: what Manoj's May 15 proposal
implements logically equivalent to your suggestion?
I wrote (25 May 2003):
As far as I have understood Manoj's May 15 proposal correctly,
an option is dropped unless it _directly_
Dear Raul,
you wrote (25 May 2003):
Quorum of 10, ballot A, default (D), votes:
31 A D
28 D A
Here, A does not defeat D by 10, but still satisfies
the quorum requirement.
As far as I have understood Manoj's May 15 proposal
correctly, A defeats D by 31 in your example.
**
I wrote (25
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 11:52:46AM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
There is only one election.
This seems to contradict what you said in your 5/24 message:
Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose candidate E. In the next
elections, when candidate E is the default option, Manoj's
May 15
Dear Raul,
I wrote (25 May 2003):
There is only one election.
You wrote (25 May 2003):
This seems to contradict what you said in your 5/24 message:
Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose candidate E. In the next
elections, when candidate E is the default option, Manoj's
May 15
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 02:50:55PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
But --and this is what I have to criticize-- _if there was a second election_
then (simply because of the fact that in the first election the default
option has been changed from candidate C to candidate E)
Uh, no: if there were
Dear Raul,
here is a simpler example.
8 ABC
7 BCA
5 CAB
A:B=13:07
A:C=08:12
B:C=15:05
Suppose, that the quorum is 10 and the default
option is A. Then the winner according to
Manoj's May 15 proposal is C.
If there was a second election and the voters don't
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 02:50:55PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
There is only one election. In this election, 38 voters prefer E to C,
42 voters prefer D to E and 24 voters prefer D to C. Manoj's May 15
proposal would choose candidate E. My proposal would choose candidate D.
But --and this
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 03:34:32PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
here is a simpler example.
8 ABC
7 BCA
5 CAB
A:B=13:07
A:C=08:12
B:C=15:05
Suppose, that the quorum is 10 and the default
option is A. Then the winner according to
Manoj's May 15 proposal is
Dear Raul,
you wrote (25 May 2003):
On the other hand, if you could show that the May 15 mechanism
violates monotonicity, then I'd be opposed to it.
Situation 1:
40 ACB
32 BAC
28 CBA
A:B=40:60
A:C=72:28
B:C=32:68
Default option: A.
Quorum: 30.
B meets quorum.
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 06:21:13PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
37 ACB
32 BAC
28 CBA
03 CAB
A:B=40:60
A:C=69:31
B:C=32:68
Default option: A.
Quorum: 30.
B meets quorum.
C meets quorum.
C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
A:C=69:31
Default option: A.
Quorum: 30.
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 03:18:44AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
Huh?
--
Raul
you wrote (25 May 2003):
On the other hand, if you could show that the May 15 mechanism
violates monotonicity, then I'd be opposed to it.
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 06:21:13PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
Situation 1:
Default option: A,Quorum: 30.
40 ACB,32 BAC,28 CBA
Dear Anthony,
I wrote (25 May 2003):
37 ACB
32 BAC
28 CBA
03 CAB
A:B=40:60
A:C=69:31
B:C=32:68
Default option: A.
Quorum: 30.
B meets quorum.
C meets quorum.
Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose A.
You wrote (25 May 2003):
C fails to reach its
Anthony Towns wrote (25 May 2003):
C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
B and A are the only remaining options, and B defeats A.
B wins.
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 08:20:11PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
That's strange! The majority requirement makes the default
option
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 03:50:59PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:46:13PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
In my example local quorum causes the following problem:
dropping an irrelevant option changes which
relevant option wins the election.
Global quorum does not have
The reason is that condorcet has this problem,
even with no quorums whatsoever. Martin Schulze's post
http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2003/debian-vote-200305/msg00119.html
illustrates this principal.
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 11:39:06PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
Huh? Plain condorcet
On Thu, May 22, 2003 at 12:43:44PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
Condorcet: A wins
Proposed: D wins
Amended: no one wins, the vote is thrown out.
You mean D wins.
Cheers,
aj
--
Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:46:13PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
In my example local quorum causes the following problem:
dropping an irrelevant option changes which
relevant option wins the election.
Global quorum does not have this problem.
Uh, you've got that the wrong way round. If an option
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 06:36:27PM -0400, Sam Hartman wrote:
John == John H Robinson, IV [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I.E. when options are fairly close, a
minority finding a particular option unacceptable can change the
outcome of the election.
This doesn't come into play so much when options
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:27:51PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
Suppose that, for example, the default option is C
and the quorum is 207. Then the winner is candidate D.
For reference, we'd need over 19,000 developers to have a quorum of 207.
Can we please keep the examples simple and
Anthony Towns wrote:
On Thu, May 22, 2003 at 12:43:44PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
Condorcet: A wins
Proposed: D wins
Amended: no one wins, the vote is thrown out.
You mean D wins.
Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 04:40:49PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
correct me if i am wrong, but, isn't quorum suppoed to _prevent_
minority rule? now you are saying that minority rule is good, and
desired?
What do you mean?
i mean to point out a hypocrisy. on the
Anthony Towns wrote:
Proposed: D wins
Amended: no one wins, the vote is thrown out.
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 12:15:03AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
You mean D wins.
What Anthony is trying to point out, and what you're pretending to
John Robinson said:
another example: DPL election, two candidates, R=45
450x DAB
45x ADB
Condorcet: D wins
Proposed: A wins
Amended: D wins
You appear to be making the same mistake as Manoj did, which I noted in
a message to debian-devel.
Under the proposed system (Manoj's), B is
Hallo,
Situation 1:
04 ABCDEF
02 ABFDEC
04 AEBFCD
02 AEFBCD
02 BFACDE
02 CDBEFA
04 CDBFEA
12 DECABF
08 ECDBFA
10 FABCDE
06 FABDEC
04 FEDBCA
A:B=40:20
A:C=30:30
A:D=30:30
A:E=30:30
A:F=24:36
B:C=34:26
B:D=30:30
B:E=30:30
B:F=38:22
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 12:25:06AM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
I suggest that one should at first calculate the ranking of
the candidates according to the beat path method and then,
of those candidates whose beat path to the default option
meets the quorum, that candidate should be elected
breaking Condorcet isn't a meaningful thing to say. Adding quorum and
I think we all understand it to mean causing the system to violate the
Condorcet criterion.
supermajority obviously produce different outcomes to Cloneproof SSD --
if they didn't, there'd be no point adding them. They don't
Dear Raul,
you wrote (25 May 2003):
Markus Schulze wrote (25 May 2003):
I suggest that one should at first calculate the ranking of
the candidates according to the beat path method and then,
of those candidates whose beat path to the default option
meets the quorum, that candidate should
Correct me if I'm wrong, but: what Manoj's May 15 proposal
implements logically equivalent to your suggestion?
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 02:54:08AM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
As far as I have understood Manoj's May 15 proposal correctly,
an option is dropped unless it _directly_ defeats the
Raul wrote:
Correct me if I'm wrong, but: what Manoj's May 15 proposal
implements logically equivalent to your suggestion?
Markus Schulze wrote:
As far as I have understood Manoj's May 15 proposal correctly,
an option is dropped unless it _directly_ defeats the default
option with the required
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 12:54:50AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
I fully agree. But then the per-option quorum has this problem, too.
And here it is harder to understand (see my example) and more relevant
(can occur for votes with many voters) than in the case of global
quorum.
This problem is
Hi,
Anthony Towns wrote:
[ Analysis snipped ]
If only nine developers find A acceptable, well, it deserves to lose.
Thank you. I wrote two days ago that
Nick Phillips wrote:
If a winning option would be discarded due to quorum requirements, then
I think the vote should probably be considered
Hello,
On Thu, May 22, 2003 at 08:45:51PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
I'm going to focus only on your claim that this page shows an example
of the violation of monotonicity by Manoj's proposal.
Monotonicity (http://electionmethods.org/evaluation.html#MC) requires
With the relative order or
Hello,
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 02:45:30PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Ugh, that's an overcomplicated example. Here's a simpler one:
Did you read it carefully?
Three options, A, B and D (the default option). Quorum is 10. Votes are:
9 ABD
4 BDA
A defeauts B, 9:4; B defeats D,
Hi,
Jochen Voss wrote:
My example: The winner among the interesting options changes
because an uninteresting option fails quorum.
That is a property of any Condorcet conflict resolution system. You can't
avoid it unless you throw the entire vote out and start over.
The fact that few
Hallo,
it is necessary to distinguish between the participation
criterion and the monotonicity criterion.
The participation criterion says that a set of additional
voters who strictly prefer candidate A to candidate B must
not change the winner from candidate A to candidate B. The
Condorcet
Hallo,
here is an extreme violation of the participation criterion.
Situation 1:
A:B=206:94
A:C=160:140
A:D=161:139
A:E=162:138
A:F=96:204
B:C=202:98
B:D=163:137
B:E=164:136
B:F=205:95
C:D=203:97
C:E=93:207
C:F=165:135
D:E=228:72
D:F=166:134
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:49:04AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
Hello,
On Thu, May 22, 2003 at 08:45:51PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
I'm going to focus only on your claim that this page shows an example
of the violation of monotonicity by Manoj's proposal.
Monotonicity
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:54:32AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 02:45:30PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Ugh, that's an overcomplicated example. Here's a simpler one:
Did you read it carefully?
No, I didn't, and since it's so complicated I wouldn't expect to
understand it
Anthony Towns wrote:
Yes, that's why we're in favour of per-option quorums, which don't
introduce flawed incentives for little reason other than matching
tradition.
instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in favour of a
less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
R=15
10
On Fri, 2003-05-23 at 00:45, Anthony Towns wrote:
And, as I've already posted elsewhere, you'll note there's no problem
at all here if number of votes received is twice the quorum, which,
historically, it almost always is.
Not almost. Always. Quorum was calculated wrong in the old elections.
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 09:26:49AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in favour of a
less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
Exactly.
For example: Ballot contains A, B and default option D.
Quorum is 10.
Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Right. Leads to a lot of soul searching -- I no longer know
whether I am helping or hurting my candidate by expressing my true
preference.
I should not be put in this position.
worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
two
Hallo,
John wrote (23 May 2003):
instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in
favour of a less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
R=15
10 ABD
5 BDA
I suggest that one should at first calculate the ranking of
the candidates according to the beat path method and then,
Hello,
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 12:23:17AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:54:32AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
Did you read it carefully?
No, I didn't, and since it's so complicated I wouldn't expect to
understand it properly even if I had. I hate complicated examples.
I should not be put in this position.
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 10:49:08AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
two week discussion period resumes, or the amendment is withdrawn.
False.
With your proposal, the worst case
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:46:13PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
In my example local quorum causes the following problem:
dropping an irrelevant option changes which
relevant option wins the election.
Global quorum does not have this problem.
The way you've apparently defined your terms: Yes,
Hello Manoj,
On Wed, May 21, 2003 at 10:31:14AM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
On Tue, 20 May 2003 22:43:59 +0200, Matthias Urlichs [EMAIL PROTECTED]
said:
John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
- 2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
- than the default option which do not
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 09:29:36AM +0200, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
Hi,
Jochen Voss wrote:
My example: The winner among the interesting options changes
because an uninteresting option fails quorum.
That is a property of any Condorcet conflict resolution system. You can't
avoid it
Raul Miller wrote:
I should not be put in this position.
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 10:49:08AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
two week discussion period resumes, or the amendment is withdrawn.
False.
i was limiting
John == John H Robinson, IV [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
John we have two examples of where per-option quorum is flawed:
John Example 1:
John 2 options + default, R=15. 15 voters. 10 vote ABD, 5 vote
John BDA
John result: Condorcet would select option A Proposed would
Sam Hartman wrote:
Aj has made what seems to me to be a compelling argument that
1) local quorum is not flawed in this case
2) The Debian community wants B to win votes of this form.
What we are saying is that we are giving minorities the power in
certain limited cases to overrule the
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 04:40:49PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
Sam Hartman wrote:
Aj has made what seems to me to be a compelling argument that
1) local quorum is not flawed in this case
2) The Debian community wants B to win votes of this form.
What we are saying is
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 04:40:49PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
correct me if i am wrong, but, isn't quorum suppoed to _prevent_
minority rule? now you are saying that minority rule is good, and
desired?
What do you mean?
There are forms of minority rule which quorum prevents, and there
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