Hi Mike,
--- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit :
>I had several FBC-complying methods that I liked very much, with such names as
>MMC, MAMPO, MDDB, SR...etc.
>
>I haven't been able to find what MDDB and SR were. Or MAMPO either.
>
>Can anyone tell me, or tell me where I can look
Juho,
Truthfully my damning MMPO scenario is meant to show a Plurality failure, so the
last-preference rankings that Kristofer lists as equal are meant to be
truncated.
In other words, candidate C receives acknowledgement from TWO voters.
The appalling thing is not meant to be that the winner pr
Hi Mike,
Nice to see you back.
--- En date de : Ven 14.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit :
> Venzke's MMPO example
> A > B = C
> 1 A = C > B
> 1 B = C > A
> B > A = C
.
> and C wins. That seems quite counterintuitive.
.
.
Yes. C is the Condorcet loser.
But is Kevin sure that
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Mer 12.10.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
Maybe you should do sims first, emit flames second.
That's a fair criticism, and one I continue to violate in this message. I
wonder if Kevin Venzke has any sims which speak to this question.
Thanks for rememb
place their "approval cutoffs" potentially arbitrarily?
If so, I think that would still beat all the rank methods with strategic but
not-
knowledgeable voters. In that situation every ballot's first preference could
be nearly
arbitrary, because in IEVS strategic rank voters *always*
ir "exclusive" supporters, so that only two of the three candidates
can actually win on election day.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Toby,
--- En date de : Dim 25.9.11, Toby Pereira a écrit :
De: Toby Pereira
Objet: [EM] Viewable Interim results with permitted vote changing
À: "electorama list"
Date: Dimanche 25 septembre 2011, 12h13
This may well have been discussed before, and it wouldn't really be practical
for p
is serious business.
Everybody's right, basically.
I'd note though that I've never seen a simulation or estimation of
utility that attempted to incorporate any factor other than how happy
people were with the winner. So even if we agree with the primacy of
"BR" as an EM
e utility maximizer were 89% to
87%. Now it doesn't seem like that much of a difference, does it...?
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Er...
--- En date de : Mer 27.7.11, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> So the first one asks:
> 50% rated 3? 33.3% rated a 2+? 16.7% rated a 1+?
> four-slot ballot to mean 133.3%. So then I get:
> 66.7% rated 3? 50% rated 2? 33.3% rated 1+?
>
> I must not have this correct, because is
? What is an example where you win on the first
method but not the second?
Thanks.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
to distribute method source code so that
if I have implemented a method incorrectly (as in this case) it may be
spotted someday...
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
now if 1st and 4th is
>better or worse than 2nd and 3rd.
Yes, that's nice. There are Condorcet methods that use this data to
resolve cycles and deter certain strategies. But I don't know of a
method that uses this data, in an effective way, to elect candidates
who are somehow differe
t; that triggers
> it--say, if that focal voter votes A>B>X>C, then X
> wins, but if they vote
> A>X>B>C, then X loses. Whoever wins when X
> loses, manipulability pops up:
Yes, I don't disagree with that.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ld be worth it.
Real life isn't monotone. I don't imagine that all the prettier Yee
diagrams would really look like that if voters were using information
and strategy!
No time to say more...
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
scription in the post. I wonder if RB is
intended to mean "Random Ballot" ("RB") as the message subject would
almost make sense in that case.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
vote for both
>of these approval style and no-one else. That's the example set out
>without parties.
Ok. It sounds like you want to represent more "types" of voters. The
68% cannot have both seats because they're the same "type." If they were
different types then it would be OK.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
%, I'd argue that it was unfair in favour of the
smaller party.
[end quote]
Can you explain your position without saying "party"? Because if you
didn't see the parties, and only saw voters, it would be indefensible
to give a seat to the 32%. There would be nothing special about that
group.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
just to say that the main
sim, when during pure Approval, can't use "better than expectation.")
I put a tiny amount of "average utility of all candidates" into the
expectation just to try to avoid the situation where your favorite won
all the polls so therefore y
y
>so that party A would win both seats, and give what I would regard
>as the less fair result.
Ok, but it's not obvious that it is less fair. You are according a
privilege to the weaker party just because it is a different party.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
uld he be in the pair? Is that realistic? Does
it matter?
I also tried implementing the most obvious (I suppose) method: Take the
ratings and conduct simulated approval polling, either for some
determined or semi-random number of iterations, or until someone wins
twice in a row. This doesn't t
thod to choose the other finalist:
>
> Elect the candidate Y with the greatest value of p such
> that at least p percent of the ballots rate Y at p
> percent of the maxRange value or higher.
These are interesting methods.
I will have another post to discuss automated approval, which I&
ters (if B+L are to be
>believed).
You could. Actually, I can't prove that my rank version isn't actually
performed on a ratings ballot. I just assumed it wouldn't be done that
way.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Jeu 21.7.11, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> I *think* this is what you do, or can do:
>
> For each pair, find the best possible score this pair could
> have by
> moving the threshold. (So, for each pair you try every
> threshold. The
> best score ev
noticeable. Maybe one
could just look at U (like SC does).
In my example the threshold made no difference, as the same pair would
win. So, if I were just picking the pair which can get the best score
one way or another, I would dodge the question of how to break ties
between two thresholds.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
rovals or the mutual
disapprovals). Or perhaps their product.
[end quote]
Just to be clear, you're saying one selects the cutoff (which will
be uniform across all ballots) such that it maximizes/minimizes a
certain score for any pair of candidates. That's what makes sense to
me as I'm thinking about this. But let me know if it's wrong.
Thanks.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ction can agree to do.
> Another thought: make the single contest between the
> approval winner A and the candidate B with the
> most approval on the ballots that did not approve A.
> If B's total approval is less than the number of
> ballots on which A is approved without B,
to 50:50 pairwise votes, and elect the winner
of that? I think that this *would* tend to a select a halfway decent
contest, *unless* voters give you the full rankings, which is kind of
the point. I'm not going to vote "Gaddafi > Lenin" anywhere if I think
that might get picked.
Thanks.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
cky and picked the
best criterion on my first try, though.
Thanks to Forest (for getting me thinking about nonmonotone metrics)
and Markus (for the original idea that just because you have information
doesn't mean you ought to use it) and Juho (for his criticism of the
Smith set, which is quite r
MinAvt,
ELMDP, Appr, ELLDP, SC, WV.
Hopefully you or others find this interesting to look over.
That's it for now.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
l loser is set up to spoil the outcome.
On the other hand, in order to have a cycle, everybody must have
majority approval, which makes it very strange to think of there being
weak noise candidates as such... A candidate lacking majority approval
(who isn't the AW) has no effect. So it's
, or do you reserve the right to veto new
methods, or how does this work?
I looked at the link but it doesn't seem that this is an emphasized
feature of the site.
Thanks.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Forest,
So here's my summary using a 4-slot ballot and 3 candidates let's say.
The "pecking order" is the Range order. Assume no ties.
The "proximity" between two candidates is the smaller of 6 (3*2), and
the product of the two candidates' ratings, summed from each ballot.
When finding the
fter anyway: It inherently has this possibility of
creating a defeat against one candidate in order to take advantage of
the status of a completely different defeat.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
distance" wouldn't be a huge
practical problem. I might be wrong but it seems like an unintuitive
strategy to remove the approval distinction between your candidate and
the frontrunner who beats him pairwise. Even if you do it I wonder in
how many situations you would have reason to expect it
experimenting with CdlA is that the effect of one's
vote doesn't feel direct enough to me. Too many potential rounds, no
ability to retract conceded preferences. Seems like it's asking to be
gamed.
(I made wiki.electorama.com pages for QR, KH, and CdlA a few days ago.
I've held
Hi,
--- En date de : Jeu 14.7.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a
écrit :
> Nonmonotonicity could be considered an error even with
> honest voters. The argument would go something like: "Okay,
> if we raise X, then X goes from winner to loser. That means
> that the method is either wrong about who shou
--- En date de : Ven 8.7.11, Toby Pereira a écrit :
The thing about SODA is that it's harder to "get" than Approval Voting.
I haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but
I've looked at the page - http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/
Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I
rsuasive way to measure LNHarm or
FBC performance. There's certainly better and worse among methods that
fail.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ests won't work in the way it seems they should (i.e.
the winner cannot benefit) they, as information, shouldn't be taken at
face value.
If pressing a button gives me an orange, look to the orange and not the
label on the button to see what it means when I keep pressing it.
And if a C>B win means A is elected.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ne.
2. Start with the "minimize voters who will wish they had done something
different" (i.e. compromise) criterion. Notice that using this criterion
gives winning side voters incentive to lie in order to create the
appearance that they would regret a certain outcome. Fix this by already
cou
ou probably have to deliver it
to people lacking a lot of time and patience.
And I don't like a C win because there is a majority for B over C. If
C wins, then A and the A voters are being punished for their sincerity,
when this scenario has no need to make anybody regret.
> (maybe because C's great defeat by B is not because B is so
> great, but that C is Sarah Palin: gets a lot of hard-core
> supports but a lot more of us know that she's a total
> doofus.)
>
> so maybe instead of Ranked Pairs or MinMax with margins (i
> presume Schulze would also elect A), it should go to the
> candidate in the Smith Set with the greatest winning margin
> over any other in the Smith Set. but it still should
> be based on margins.
>
> but it *is* an interesting problem. Marcus, can you
> comment? Schulze beatpath method would also elect A,
> no? can you persuade us that A should win in this
> scenario?
When you use margins, Schulze, Tideman, River, or Minmax all pick A.
If you use WV with these, you get B.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, a margins proposal is DOA, from the moment anybody would point
out the 35 A>B 25 B 40 C scenario. Does anybody actually disagree with
that? One's EM postings will have to be very, very clever to persuade
the media, public, etc., that A should win that race.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
th the sincere Condorcet efficiency.
It is a bit ironic that, if we succeed in getting people to vote for
more than two candidates (FPP-style), it's hard not to expect that we
would see *more* spoiled elections than under FPP.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
your penalty in the 3c case would have
to be just a single candidate's first preferences.
I think I am probably right here. If you draw a triangle with ABC,
you have two cycle possibilities. In both cycles IRV elects the winner
between A and B. And in both cycles, that same candidate is beaten
by the "FPL" C.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Edit:
--- En date de : Mer 15.6.11, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> I am not sure I am able to follow this. In the first
> paragraph, if Y
> is the CW, you can't have an X>Y>Z>X cycle created
> by X voters.
I just realized you're not talking about a cycle but a score o
> Yet some Condorcet methods resist strategy better than
> others. In particular, certain nonmonotone methods seem to
> do so well. Maybe this involves the risk of the burial going
> badly - if it's chaotic (not monotone), the buriers won't
> know when it could backfire and
e
voters can correct errors of the first round. They can avert disasters.
But, again experimentally, they seem to have some of the worst
insincerity in the first round. While this might be acceptable on
balance, it makes me think that it is a waste to use methods of much
complexity there.
Kevin V
t; that since politicians try to become centrists
> there might
> >> be lots of clone like candidates around the centre
> point.
> >> Immunity of clones is a good think from nomination
> point of
> >> view. I guess real nominated clones are however
> rare. It is
> >> more typical that each party nominates just one
> candidate.
> >> or if two, then maybe two different kind of
> candidates.
> >
> > I am a little unsure whether it matters whether there
> technically are
> > ever any clones. It might though.
>
> The definition of the independence of clone criterion is
> very strict. Maybe no large real life election will ever
> have any clones according to that definition. But of course
> meeting that criterion quite typically (but not necessarily)
> means that the method treats also near clones nearly the
> same way.
Yes.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
the most ballots in the
> form A>C or B>C
> > respectively. Fun I think?
>
> These methods were already discussed in other mails. I just
> note that if A>C means that A supporters should rank C
> second in order to increase their chances to win in case of
> a top cycle, then things get quite tricky. Burial
> strategists probably ranked C second, and that could
> increase their chances of fooling the system.
Yes, the idea is that you need to vote for C to win, but if too many
people do it then C wins. I'm just trying to make it as explicit as
possible, in order to ask whether this method is still good enough to
use.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Y:Z win from the X voters. Then
measuring strength as FPs is fairly likely to correctly discard the win
of the least important candidate.
I guess that anything else that does something similar would have a
similar advantage.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
h candidate nominations. But I wonder
> whether there is any
> > room to use the clone concept to argue that clones are
> comparably "good"
> > to elect
>
> I don't know why clones would be better than others,
No no. I'm saying, can we propose that if candidate A is 86% "good" to
elect, then his clones are also about 86% good, and when Smith allows
us to satisfy clone independence, we are getting something good more
often than we are losing something?
The question is does clone independence give us *anything* other than
reduced nomination problems, and could this be enough to justify Smith.
> except
> that since politicians try to become centrists there might
> be lots of clone like candidates around the centre point.
> Immunity of clones is a good think from nomination point of
> view. I guess real nominated clones are however rare. It is
> more typical that each party nominates just one candidate.
> or if two, then maybe two different kind of candidates.
I am a little unsure whether it matters whether there technically are
ever any clones. It might though.
> (I also note that methods that use the pairwise matrix for
> deciding the winner and are strictly clone proof must
> sometimes make decisions as if there were clones although
> there are not (to make sure that the clone rule is not
> violated). That is because one can get equal matrix from
> ballots that have a clone and ballots that do not contain
> clone candidates (candidates that are always next to each
> others).)
Yes, that's true. But that just means that Smith *doesn't necessarily*
provide us with a clone-related benefit.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
dicate support to
> their
> >> favourites. The resulting risks (and the benefits)
> should
> >> not be high.
> >
> > Of course I think it depends, especially since we are
> talking about
> > burial in this last bit. Do you think it is impossible
> to p
irrational) part. The opinions
> are cyclic
> >> and there is no need to establish a linear order.
> Other
> >> criteria may work better, like e.g. the the
> opposition
> >> against the elected candidate. Another reason
> behind the
> >> popularity of Smith set is the interest to make a
> method
> >> clone proof. That is a positive target. But it may
> violate
> >> other criteria, like making the least
> controversial
> >> candidate win. In the case of MinMax and
> possibility of
> >> electing outside the top cycle, violation of the
> clone
> >> criterion is not very critical, i.e. the number
> of
> >> candidates that parties nominate may not change
> despite of
> >> not meeting this criterion 100%.)
> >
> > The question I have is, is the *only reason* that
> clone independence is
> > desirable, that it may prevent aberrations in the
> candidate nominations?
> > Maybe Smith has a justification here. I don't have an
> answer.
>
> My thinking is such that since we can not make a fault free
> system, it is possible that the ideal method for our needs
> (in some particular single case) may well be a method that
> violates numerous criteria, but each criterion is violated
> only so little that it does not have any practical meaning.
> As an end result the method with many marginal
> vulnerabilities may not have any major vulnerabilities, and
> in real life elections that could mean "fault free". In
> addition to this the method should also achieve the intended
> targets with sincere votes (and these targets may again be
> in conflict with other criteria).
>
> In this particular case I don't expect MinMax to violate
> clone independence so seriously that it would stop people
> nominating candidates (nor nominate numerous candidates).
> There are MinMax strategies that attack on known sets of
> clones, but also those strategies may be just theoretical
> threats, not practical ones.
Well, I see what you are saying, that Smith tends to be justified using
clone independence. And clone independence is normally justified due to
problems with candidate nominations. But I wonder whether there is any
room to use the clone concept to argue that clones are comparably "good"
to elect, and that if we use Smith to enforce this, we will be more
right than wrong.
I don't disagree that MinMax doesn't really need clone independence.
It wouldn't add much.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
t; consider compromising to avoid a risk.
> >>
> >> I'm afraid this information is already quite
> difficult to
> >> collect and may not be very accurate and
> reliable.
> >
> > This refers to the supporters of pawn candidates, so
> to my mind it is
> > almost just the inverse of who are the frontrunners.
>
> Ok, but I hope Condorcet is safe enough to allow supporters
> of yet unknown candidates to indicate support to their
> favourites. The resulting risks (and the benefits) should
> not be high.
Of course I think it depends, especially since we are talking about
burial in this last bit. Do you think it is impossible to propose a
Condorcet method that would just be bad? If I promise not to be grossly
nonmonotonic, stay deterministic, keep Majority Favorite, avoid big
clone problems: do you think I could come up with a bad one?
> > If the nature of burial is that nobody thinks to do it
> without some kind
> > of plan, then I am not nearly as worried about it. But
> since I myself
> > am not sure what I ought to do when I "can't" use
> defensive truncation
> > anymore, I am concerned.
>
> I'm living in the hope that once Condorcet methods will be
> used more than they have been so far, people will see that
> the risks of giving one's sincere opinions are low.
That sounds like around half of what one needs to realize though.
> (Actually the key point of the false poll strategy is to
> make the actual election strategy free. I'd be happier with
> sincere elections and inaccurate polls than with accurate
> polls and strategic ballots (reversed or truncated).)
Yes, that's a good goal.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
e votes are supposed to mean. This is a strategy
discussion.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ods that
> seem to encourage it
> > without voters even having a specific plan.
>
> I wonder where the accurate line goes on which Condorcet
> methods are vulnerable to burial and which ones are not :-).
I do not know, but I have an interest in the question.
> I'm afraid that in Condorcet methods there might be many
> voters that rank their worst competitor last in the (not
> very well founded) hope of improving the results from their
> point of view :-).
>
> More seriously, maybe some concrete written rules to voters
> on how to bury in Condorcet elections (on in some Condorcet
> version) would demonstrate that poll information can indeed
> be efficiently used by regular voters in some real
> elections. I tend to think that in many environments burial
> would not be a problem, and in line with this mail thread,
> maybe one could simply weaken the available poll information
> and education of the voters if strategies start appearing.
If the nature of burial is that nobody thinks to do it without some kind
of plan, then I am not nearly as worried about it. But since I myself
am not sure what I ought to do when I "can't" use defensive truncation
anymore, I am concerned.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
impact of this to the
> usefulness of the reduced poll information based defensive
> strategy would be. Could you clarify. Did you say that
> already very rough information on which candidates are the
> frontrunners would give sufficient information to the
> strategists to cast a working (=likely to bring more
> benefits than harm) strategic vote (in Condorcet methods in
> general or in some of them)?
The relevance is more to the question of defensive strategy under
Condorcet methods, than to your proposal.
I do believe that rough information on the frontrunners is enough to
tell you *who* to bury, if you were going to, and also who might
consider compromising to avoid a risk.
I am mostly concerned about burial in methods that seem to encourage it
without voters even having a specific plan.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
sure how to do that.
> (Actually I think the popularity of Smith set comes
> partially from the temptation of forcing the circular
> preferences to a linear order. In that case the natural
> position of the top cycle may appear to be ahead of the
> other candidates. This approach can however be considered
> irrational since it completely hides away the defeats within
> the cycle. Forcing cyclic preferences to linear ones is thus
> the dangerous (and irrational) part. The opinions are cyclic
> and there is no need to establish a linear order. Other
> criteria may work better, like e.g. the the opposition
> against the elected candidate. Another reason behind the
> popularity of Smith set is the interest to make a method
> clone proof. That is a positive target. But it may violate
> other criteria, like making the least controversial
> candidate win. In the case of MinMax and possibility of
> electing outside the top cycle, violation of the clone
> criterion is not very critical, i.e. the number of
> candidates that parties nominate may not change despite of
> not meeting this criterion 100%.)
The question I have is, is the *only reason* that clone independence is
desirable, that it may prevent aberrations in the candidate nominations?
Maybe Smith has a justification here. I don't have an answer.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ers who know they can't expect to gain anything
by voting sincerely, so they play it safe.
So I expect that methods with greater burial incentive will just have
more (voted) majority favorites, and candidate withdrawals, to avoid the
problem. (You still can't use Borda.)
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
tly had another way they could have voted to avert a spoiled
election. So I had the thought, why don't we directly measure that? The
resulting method tested a bit worse than WV though, I suppose because
voters now had an incentive to make themselves look anger-able even if
they shouldn't
arding your true favorite. So if SC succeeds in
dissuading people from casting equal rankings, the only way it could
satisfy FBC is by offering an even better guarantee.
I don't know about your modified criteria, either, but standard weak FBC
is very hard to satisfy.
Kevin Venzke
Elect
ly I'm pretty sure I explained to you recently why symmetrical
ballot completion makes the problem worse.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> > I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one,
> else elect the
> > candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the
> greatest number of ballots" is plenty simple, and is much
> > more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Lun 30.5.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
If ballot design considerations limited the number of ranks available for
Condorcet/Approval, one could still use equal ranking to approve an unlimited
number of candidates. I agree that an explicit "unapproved" ranking, though
Hi Kathy,
--- En date de : Lun 30.5.11, Kathy Dopp a écrit :
> Thanks Kevin, I like the simplicity of that plan --
> Condorcet/Approval.
>
> Have you thought about only counting the first two rank
> ballot choices
> of voters if the Approval step becomes necessary due to a
> Condorcet
> cycle?
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 29.5.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> This is
> why I suggest that
> > you had better force voters to rank everyone in a
> margins method.
>
> In som sense margins does this. Vote "B" gives the same
> result as half vote "B>A>C" and half vote
> "B>C>A" together. Or statis
Hi Kathy,
--- En date de : Dim 29.5.11, Kathy Dopp a écrit :
> > In the "easy to explain/solve but still Condorcet"
> category, I am okay
> > with Minmax(WV) but I think Condorcet//Approval (with
> implied approval)
> > is preferable because you don't need a defeat strength
> concept at all,
> >
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 29.5.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> > I agree with Kevin. Winning Votes is much better
> and easier to defend.
>
> Kevin Venzke referred to the number of disappointed voters
> on the winning side (that will be overruled in the case of a
> t
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> > Margins elects A here:
> > 35 A>B
> > 25 B
> > 40 C
> >
> > Is this going to be defensible when this method is
> proposed? Can you
> > argue a case for A without mindreading off of the
> blank areas of the
> > ballots?
>
> I guess
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:
>
> 1. Asset Voting
> 2. Approval
> 3. DYN
> 4. MCA
> 5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham
If by #5 you mean IBIFA, I can't take any credit for that.
I did make a
Hi Robert,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, robert bristow-johnson
a écrit :
> will minimax of margins decide differently than ranked
> pairs? if the cycle has only three candidates, it
> seems to me that it must be equivalent to ranked pairs.
It is the same with three.
> is there any good reas
A defeats B pairwise. In WV both
reversing the order to be B>A or compressing the top to be A=B have the same
effect
in reducing the magnitude of B's loss to A. But in margins reversal is twice as
effective
as compression.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Peter,
You are right. Your treatment has been discussed for, I suppose, 15+ years
on this list, and your reasoning for it is a major factor.
--- En date de : Jeu 26.5.11, Peter Zbornik a écrit :
Kevin Venzke wrote in his mail below (May 9th 2010):
35 A>B
25 B
40 C
A will win. This is o
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Mer 25.5.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> The main problem is determining (through the disinformation
> noise) who the front runners really are.
> Suppose the zero-information front runners to be candidates
> A and B, but that the media created front
> runners are C
lready have this situation with Plurality, if everyone
just votes for his favorite (and nobody drops out of the race to prevent
a disaster).
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ld the write-in restriction just be a kludge to prevent
total chaos?
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Lun 2.5.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> In liberal arts mathematics text
> books Arrow's impossibility theorem is usually
> quoted as saying that no election method can simultaneously
> satisfy (1)
> neutrality, (2) anonymity, (3) decisiveness (4) monotonicty
> (5) th
Hi Jameson,
(begin quote)
I wrote:
Anyway, the Asset methods stumped me somewhat because I couldn't come
up with a deterministic way to solve the method that doesn't seem to
be contrived. For instance, it's possible that two of the three candidates
are able to transfer. Who has initiative? How do
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Lun 21.3.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
2011/3/19 Kevin Venzke
Hi,
Jameson, I did most of what I looked into.
Wow, thanks.
No problem, I'm glad to look into areas of interest.
I didn't complete the Asset
methods though. I did come up with a good
n the -30/24/34 scenario,
it looks like most methods plummet to about 60% efficiency. The best
method is somehow DSC-er, at 73%. It elects A (-30) relatively often...
Not very good sincere Condorcet efficiency.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi,
Jameson, I did most of what I looked into. I didn't complete the Asset
methods though. I did come up with a good universal way to estimate the
candidates' utilities for each other though: Have the candidates read the
minds of the voters (the base quantities of each bloc), and multiply each
opi
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Ven 18.3.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
Great results.
I think it would help if you gave the SCWE of each method above the table, and
the SCWE of each line after that line. That way, we could see which strategies
were causing the problems with SCWE. Also, if you
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Ven 18.3.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
Great results.
I think it would help if you gave the SCWE of each method above the table, and
the SCWE of each line after that line. That way, we could see which strategies
were causing the problems with SCWE. Also, if you
licit, IRV
89+%: ICA, VBV (ER), Range, IBIFA, MAMPO, MMPO, Approval
85+%: WV, Antiplurality, DMC
74+%: margins, VBV (strict), margins (no ER), Borda, WV (no ER), minmax
(full rankings only), Coombs
50's%: DSC (ER), DSC, VDP/VFA, FPP
40%: "Consensus or Else"
20%: Random Ballot
If you want more stats or a certain scenario, let me know.
Thanks.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
B value of 16.9%. If it's below that then it must be
that some candidates are not getting the full top ratings/rankings they would
expect, most probably because their supporters view it as unhelpful to vote
for them.
Note that these figures are only gathered for the trials where the AI has
supposedly already learned how the method works. Practice polls and
hypothetical polls aren't included.
Also, I can already say that the rankings I got out of a random (non-spectrum-
based) scenario are not quite the same as the ones here. I'll have to talk
about that later.
Thanks for reading, and any thoughts.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Mar 8.3.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
I think that this kind of investigation of strategy in realistic monte-carlo
simulations is important. Two comments:
1. Do you plan to share your source code? I'd encourage you to do so,
preferably under some kind of open-sou
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mar 8.3.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a
écrit :
> > I'm working on another simulation. It is for
> 3-candidate elections and
> > allows these ballot types (if the method also allows
> them):
> > A (bullet vote)
> > A>B>C (strict)
> > A=B>C (tied at the top)
> > A|B>C
s that might pose a challenge to my
voters (such as perhaps deterministic methods that fail majority favorite;
I have very few of these), or methods that might actually be good...
Let me know if this rings any bells.
Thanks.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
reck outcomes due to gaming.
(I still want to study nomination strategy, but I'm really stuck on the
details. I want to approach strategy, without assumptions, on both the
nomination and voting sides. But then I need intelligence on both sides.
An intelligence that isn't based on my assu
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Ven 25.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a
écrit :
> FWIW, I dug up that old code and made a map of my own using
> Kendall tau distance between the different methods' output
> orderings. The ballot generator was a combination of IIC
> (every ordering equally likely) and
Hi Bob,
--- En date de : Jeu 24.2.11, Bob Crossley a
écrit :
The problem here in he UK is that in many seats we
do have 3 big parties, and in Scotland and Wales, where there are nationalist
parties included also, there are sometimes 4. (Northern Ireland has even
more!) In these cases not voti
thern method.
There are other scenarios that give certain results only in a certain
corner.
My next project, I think, is to see whether I can get an automated
description of strategies for each method and voting faction. To some
extent I already have this (in pass/fail form) but I'd li
Hi Jonathan,
--- En date de : Mar 22.2.11, Jonathan Lundell a écrit :
> > (Note: In case it's not clear, you are "supposed" to
> give the -1 to your
> > least favorite candidate.)
>
> In which case it's not burial.
Yes, that's why I put "supposed" in quotes.
I just want to make sure people see
Hi all,
> As Jonathan Lundell noted, "burial is a simple, intuitive
> and
> attractive strategy that can be easily employed by
> relatively naive
> voters", and it therefore ought to be allowed so that
> voters can try
> to bury their least favorite mainstream candidate.
>
> Burial ability is a g
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 21.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a
écrit :
> Then it tries to
> come up with a nice map
> > that minimizes inaccuracy.
>
> You could try using synthetic coordinate algorithms for
> mapping the distances to 2D. I did that for competing
> entries in a programming
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Lun 21.2.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
>If you knew your candidate was not A, though, you are guaranteed that your
>second-place votes will count, perhaps against your first-place one.
This is actually not different from Bucklin. Just replace "was not A"
with "will no
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 21.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a
écrit :
> > That seems possible. As clones are eliminated they
> would boost their
> > fellow clones in the order.
>
> On the other hand (now that I'm thinking about it), clone
> independence for a winner would not necessarily
in that the candidate used as a pawn accidentally wins. It's
also not great if a faction fears that another will use burial strategy,
and as a result defensively withholds a compromise choice.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
...
FP..
So as you might predict, K0 is less like WV than KH, but surprisingly
it's not very different from KH. The placement of the "Wr" method
101 - 200 of 562 matches
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