Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 4:08 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical matter. If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being, then separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it was still aware

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Yes, that makes sense. But the rovers are not conscious. Why not? Suppose they are. If you would say "yes to the doctor" then you must believe that AI is possible. I have no reason to suppose that AI is not possible. But the Mars rovers are u

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical matter. If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being, then separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it was still aware of its duplicate. If the answer is "No", t

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 3:14 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the du

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they hav

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9 August 2016 at 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions If that is what

Re: "We spent a long time trying to convince ourselves this wasn’t real"

On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 spudboy100 via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > ​ > What do you feel would be the reaction of our species if magically, it > gets determined that it is indeed Dyson builders? > ​It would be a very odd star system for the Evolution of Dyson builders

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 9:05 am, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptio

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 9:03 am, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: However, still no justification has been given for the assumption that the d

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly? Thi

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 4:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different percepti

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 12:39 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of "consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person. usually many relates it two consciou

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added > axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate > consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions. > This is exactly what you would predic

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote: > >On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >>However, still no justification has been given for the assumption > >>that the duplicated consciousness differentiates

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Aug 2016, at 22:32, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that consciousness is a computation, Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation. C

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker > wrote: On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so that its registe

Re: That stupid diary

On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 Telmo Menezes wrote: > > >> ​>​ >> Is this really that difficult to comprehend? If computationalism is true >> ​ ​ >> then the machine will be able to make 2 copies that are identical to >> each other in every way and will remain identical until the outside >> environment >>

Re: Holiday Exercise

I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions. This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that consciousness is a product of physical proc

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of "consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person. usually many relates it two consciousness and assumes that when the guy sa

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 07 Aug 2016, at 23:14, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that spacial

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 07 Aug 2016, at 22:32, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that consciousness is a computation, Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation. Consciousness is an 1p notion, and you canno

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized >>> so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill >>> defined. The finite speed of light means tha

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: However, still no justification has been given for the assumption that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is suppo

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > However, still no justification has been given for the assumption > that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different > inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is supposed to be > giving an account of. > Ob