Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
on 02.01.2011 08:47 silky said the following: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 4:43 PM, Brian Tennesontenn...@gmail.com wrote: We're talking about a mathematical theory about E. What relevance does this comment have? I would say that a model and reality are different things. Do you mean that they could be the same? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 7:05 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: on 02.01.2011 08:47 silky said the following: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 4:43 PM, Brian Tennesontenn...@gmail.com wrote: We're talking about a mathematical theory about E. What relevance does this comment have? I would say that a model and reality are different things. Do you mean that they could be the same? I'm feel the same as you! That was my comment to Brian; I have no idea what his response to me is meant to mean ... Evgenii -- silky http://dnoondt.wordpress.com/ (Noon Silk) | http://www.mirios.com.au:8081 Every morning when I wake up, I experience an exquisite joy — the joy of being this signature. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
Have you read the whole thread? silky wrote: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 4:43 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote: We're talking about a mathematical theory about E. What relevance does this comment have? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality. Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 08:47 silky said the following: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 4:43 PM, Brian Tennesontenn...@gmail.com wrote: We're talking about a mathematical theory about E. What relevance does this comment have? I would say that a model and reality are different things. Do you mean that they could be the same? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 8:31 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote: In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality. Okay, I won't reply further, this has become irrelevant noise. -- silky http://dnoondt.wordpress.com/ (Noon Silk) | http://www.mirios.com.au:8081 Every morning when I wake up, I experience an exquisite joy — the joy of being this signature. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
That's probably for the best. I think if you read the thread you'd understand what my point of view is, and answer your own questions towards me. You might want to look into the works of Max Tegmark for a place to start. http://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9704009 silky wrote: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 8:31 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote: In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality. Okay, I won't reply further, this has become irrelevant noise. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
I am new to this kind of thoughts, so my questions could be naive. Still, I would appreciate if you could help me to understand such a statement. In my understanding, people make models basically to become more competitive, in other words, to earn more money. From this viewpoint, the statement the model IS reality is a bit puzzling, as in this case the model brings actually nothing new. Say it is highly unlikely that it will help me to solve my personal problems (well, provided that I have free will whatever it means). Some time ago, I have read David Chalmers, The Matrix as Metaphysics http://consc.net/papers/matrix.pdf Let me make one citation Importantly, nothing about this Metaphysical Hypothesis is skeptical. The Metaphysical Hypothesis here tells us about the processes underlying our ordinary reality, but it does not entail that this reality does not exist. We still have bodies, and there are still chairs and tables: it’s just that their fundamental nature is a bit different from what we may have thought. In this manner, the Metaphysical Hypothesis is analogous to a physical hypothesis, such as one involving quantum mechanics. Both the physical hypothesis and the Metaphysical Hypothesis tell us about the processes underlying chairs. They do not entail that there are no chairs. Rather, they tell us what chairs are really like. Along this lines, I would paraphrase that TOE is just Metaphysics. Do you agree with this, or you mean something else? Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/08/computable-universes.html on 02.01.2011 10:31 Brian Tenneson said the following: In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality. Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 08:47 silky said the following: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 4:43 PM, Brian Tennesontenn...@gmail.com wrote: We're talking about a mathematical theory about E. What relevance does this comment have? I would say that a model and reality are different things. Do you mean that they could be the same? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I am new to this kind of thoughts, so my questions could be naive. Still, I would appreciate if you could help me to understand such a statement. In my understanding, people make models basically to become more competitive, in other words, to earn more money. From this viewpoint, the statement "the model IS reality" is a bit puzzling, as in this case the model brings actually nothing new. Say it is highly unlikely that it will help me to solve my personal problems (well, provided that I have free will whatever it means). The model is reality is something I'm following from the ultimate ensemble theory of everything in which physical existence is mathematical existence (see the M. Tegmark article I linked to in the previous post, it blew my mind). IF (big if) physical existence is mathematical existence then the model of reality is reality. It seems that people are not getting the thread in that I am trying to simplify this toe. Some time ago, I have read David Chalmers, The Matrix as Metaphysics http://consc.net/papers/matrix.pdf Let me make one citation "Importantly, nothing about this Metaphysical Hypothesis is skeptical. The Metaphysical Hypothesis here tells us about the processes underlying our ordinary reality, but it does not entail that this reality does not exist. We still have bodies, and there are still chairs and tables: it’s just that their fundamental nature is a bit different from what we may have thought. In this manner, the Metaphysical Hypothesis is analogous to a physical hypothesis, such as one involving quantum mechanics. Both the physical hypothesis and the Metaphysical Hypothesis tell us about the processes underlying chairs. They do not entail that there are no chairs. Rather, they tell us what chairs are really like." Along this lines, I would paraphrase that TOE is just Metaphysics. Do you agree with this, or you mean something else? I'm not exactly sure how I would define "metaphysics". In the hypothesis that mathematical existence is physical existence (which Tegmark puts into a -testable- theory in the paper I cited), chairs are mathematical structures which agrees with your quote. But Bruno is really the expert here. Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/08/computable-universes.html on 02.01.2011 10:31 Brian Tenneson said the following: In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality. Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 08:47 silky said the following: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 4:43 PM, Brian Tennesontenn...@gmail.com wrote: We're talking about a mathematical theory about E. What relevance does this comment have? I would say that a model and reality are different things. Do you mean that they could be the same? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
on 02.01.2011 12:07 Brian Tenneson said the following: Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Some time ago, I have read David Chalmers, The Matrix as Metaphysics http://consc.net/papers/matrix.pdf Let me make one citation Importantly, nothing about this Metaphysical Hypothesis is skeptical. The Metaphysical Hypothesis here tells us about the processes underlying our ordinary reality, but it does not entail that this reality does not exist. We still have bodies, and there are still chairs and tables: it’s just that their fundamental nature is a bit different from what we may have thought. In this manner, the Metaphysical Hypothesis is analogous to a physical hypothesis, such as one involving quantum mechanics. Both the physical hypothesis and the Metaphysical Hypothesis tell us about the processes underlying chairs. They do not entail that there are no chairs. Rather, they tell us what chairs are really like. Along this lines, I would paraphrase that TOE is just Metaphysics. Do you agree with this, or you mean something else? I'm not exactly sure how I would define metaphysics. In the hypothesis that mathematical existence is physical existence (which Tegmark puts into a -testable- theory in the paper I cited), chairs are mathematical structures which agrees with your quote. But Bruno is really the expert here. Thank you for your answers. We could say that the Universe is made of superstrings or we could say that the Universe is made of numbers. Chalmers shows that for a human being this basically makes no difference. Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/08/computable-universes.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 12:07 Brian Tenneson said the following: Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Some time ago, I have read David Chalmers, The Matrix as Metaphysics http://consc.net/papers/matrix.pdf Let me make one citation "Importantly, nothing about this Metaphysical Hypothesis is skeptical. The Metaphysical Hypothesis here tells us about the processes underlying our ordinary reality, but it does not entail that this reality does not exist. We still have bodies, and there are still chairs and tables: it’s just that their fundamental nature is a bit different from what we may have thought. In this manner, the Metaphysical Hypothesis is analogous to a physical hypothesis, such as one involving quantum mechanics. Both the physical hypothesis and the Metaphysical Hypothesis tell us about the processes underlying chairs. They do not entail that there are no chairs. Rather, they tell us what chairs are really like." Along this lines, I would paraphrase that TOE is just Metaphysics. Do you agree with this, or you mean something else? I'm not exactly sure how I would define "metaphysics". In the hypothesis that mathematical existence is physical existence (which Tegmark puts into a -testable- theory in the paper I cited), chairs are mathematical structures which agrees with your quote. But Bruno is really the expert here. Thank you for your answers. We could say that the Universe is made of superstrings or we could say that the Universe is made of numbers. Chalmers shows that for a human being this basically makes no difference. Would that be because superstrings are made of numbers? Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/08/computable-universes.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
on 02.01.2011 12:54 Brian Tenneson said the following: Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 12:07 Brian Tenneson said the following: Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Thank you for your answers. We could say that the Universe is made of superstrings or we could say that the Universe is made of numbers. Chalmers shows that for a human being this basically makes no difference. Would that be because superstrings are made of numbers? This could serve as an explanation as well. Yet, I guess Chalmers wanted to show this in the general case. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
On 02 Jan 2011, at 11:31, silky wrote: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 8:31 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote: In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality. Okay, I won't reply further, this has become irrelevant noise. I suspect the traditional confusion between model in the sense of physicists (where model = a theory, like a toy model), and model in the sense of the logician, where model = the reality studied (like a woman serving as model for a painter, or the mathematical structure (N, +, x) for PA or RA). Logicians and physicists use the word model in the complete opposite sense, and this leads often to complete deaf dialog. This makes even more problem with computationalism, where an observer accept that some theories/brains/finite-describable-objects fits the reality. When you say yes to the doctor, it is because you believe that the artificial brain does capture (locally, with respect to your current environment) the real thing (your conscious you). In that case *you* are a fixed point where a model-theory correspond to a model- reality, a bit like in Brouwer fixed point theorem, where a map of a territory is shown to have a point on it matching the real point in the territory, provided the map is not ripped in two disconnected parts, but only transformed continuously. The point is that in some contexts some overlap can exist between a theory and its (or one of its) model, between description and realities, like with the painting of a painting of a pipe (cf Magritte). Things get confusing also if, like Brian, (but also logicians in some circumstances) people makes a model (a reality) into a (non effective) theory. This can be justified for some technical reason, when working on super non effective structure, but is really out of topic, imo. Bruno -- silky http://dnoondt.wordpress.com/ (Noon Silk) | http://www.mirios.com.au:8081 Every morning when I wake up, I experience an exquisite joy — the joy of being this signature. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
On 02 Jan 2011, at 13:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 12:54 Brian Tenneson said the following: Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 12:07 Brian Tenneson said the following: Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Thank you for your answers. We could say that the Universe is made of superstrings or we could say that the Universe is made of numbers. Chalmers shows that for a human being this basically makes no difference. Would that be because superstrings are made of numbers? This could serve as an explanation as well. Yet, I guess Chalmers wanted to show this in the general case. Well, that is what I explained to Chalmers in my (public, poster) presentation (on UDA) at the second meeting of the ASSC (association for the scientific study of consciousness) in 2000 (I think). But this is true only locally. I cannot distinguish a virtual body, from a brain in a vat or from my real body, but with enough time I can find the difference, in principle. The deep point is that it does make a global difference. If the computationalist hypothesis is true, the laws of physics are non computational and have to be derived from the laws of numbers, and we can make a comparison. Chalmers, like most, still misses the first person indeterminacy, which make the matrix-and-only-matrix consequence of comp testable. Chalmers told me that after a WM duplication the first person is in both cities, which is correct *from a third person point of view on the first persons, but not from the first person points of view themselves, and that is the crucial point to understand that the laws of physics have to be secondary with respect to the laws of mind (computer science/mathematical logic/machine's theology). Also, the expression superstring are made of numbers is unclear. If computationalism is correct the expression made of has no sense. Things are not made of something, they are dreamed by (infinities) of computation. The physical worlds becomes the border of the matrix, that is a first person plural reality, a partially sharable dream. Those points are not simple, and that is why I propose a step by step reasoning. If computationalism is correct, then the laws of physics are generated in a very specific way, which makes the computationalist hypothesis testable, and already retrospectively tested. And by taking Gödel into account (and thus Löb, Solovay) not only the quanta get a purely mathematical origin, but the qualia too. Quanta appears indeed to be the sharable part of the qualia. Quanta are special qualia. Superstrings are turing universal, so we can use it as a theory of everything-physical, if we want, but it is a treachery with respect to comp, and it makes you miss the theory of qualia, and the whole theology. Remember that with comp, we can never know that we are awake. But we can always know that we are dreaming or sharing a dream. The experimental evidences (the quantum) are that we are indeed sharing a dream. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Jan 2011, at 11:31, silky wrote: On Sun, Jan 2, 2011 at 8:31 PM, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote: In the case of a TOE, the model IS reality. Okay, I won't reply further, this has become irrelevant noise. I suspect the traditional confusion between "model" in the sense of physicists (where model = a theory, like a toy model), and model in the sense of the logician, where model = the reality studied (like a woman serving as model for a painter, or the mathematical structure (N, +, x) for PA or RA). Logicians and physicists use the word "model" in the complete opposite sense, and this leads often to complete deaf dialog. This makes even more problem with computationalism, where an observer accept that some "theories/brains/finite-describable-objects" fits the reality. When you say "yes" to the doctor, it is because you believe that the artificial brain does capture (locally, with respect to your current environment) the real thing (your conscious you). In that case *you* are a fixed point where a model-theory correspond to a model-reality, a bit like in Brouwer fixed point theorem, where a map of a territory is shown to have a point on it matching the real point in the territory, provided the map is not ripped in two disconnected parts, but only transformed continuously. The point is that in some contexts some overlap can exist between a theory and its (or one of its) model, between description and realities, like with the painting of a painting of a pipe (cf Magritte). Things get confusing also if, like Brian, (but also logicians in some circumstances) people makes a model (a "reality") into a (non effective) theory. This can be justified for some technical reason, when working on super non effective structure, but is really out of topic, imo. Bruno What makes a theory effective? I'm going to be less precise given that my audience has changed in a way I do not know. Given a couple of assumptions, which are essentially that (1) reality is independent of humans (which will imply that a model (in the logical sense) can be a TOE as defined in this thread) and (2) a model every model can be embedded within endows that model with a universality that makes it a candidate for being reality. This is then a brief description of reality, though I couldn't hope to give all the details about reality. I am also working on the hypothesis that a TOE can be given in an finite/infinite presentation such as found in ZF with axioms and axiom schemata. Question: what is the theory with no assumptions? I know that in logic, the consequent closure of the empty set of statements is the set of tautologies, which is not really what I'd call an effective theory. But what about if we remove all assumptions? Sounds like chaos to me. This is connected to all this as I can explain. In fact, I can prove (1) on the grounds that there is no largest number. It took me a while to find this argument. -- silky http://dnoondt.wordpress.com/ (Noon Silk) | http://www.mirios.com.au:8081 "Every morning when I wake up, I experience an exquisite joy — the joy of being this signature." http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
Also, the _expression_ "superstring are made of numbers" is unclear. If computationalism is correct the _expression_ "made of" has no sense. Things are not made of something, they are dreamed by (infinities) of computation. The physical worlds becomes the border of the "matrix", that is a first person plural reality, a partially sharable dream. I know. I'm having to decide what my audience is. What I mean to suggest is Tegmark's hypothesis in his ultimate ensemble paper that physical existence is mathematical existence. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
On 2 January 2011 16:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Chalmers told me that after a WM duplication the first person is in both cities, which is correct *from a third person point of view on the first persons, but not from the first person points of view themselves, and that is the crucial point to understand that the laws of physics have to be secondary with respect to the laws of mind (computer science/mathematical logic/machine's theology). It occurs to me that there could be an ambiguity here, as it is indeed the case that, whereas there is only one first-person prior to the duplication, there will be two afterwards. Hence, as Chalmers says, there will indeed be a first-person in both cities. Both will be in a position to lay claim to the same antecedent memories, but one would expect their experience to diverge after duplication based on their individual locations. Does Chalmers rather claim some sort of ongoing superimposition of experience after duplication? If so, on what basis? Or is it possible that there was indeed some ambiguity of expression here? The whole issue of where will I find myself after duplication is in any case very curious. Deciding who I am and where I am can only be post-hoc on the basis of present experience in the context of memory. Were I in fact to make a prior bet on where I might find myself to be post-duplication, presumably of the two first persons who would eventuate, one would remember predicting correctly his destination, and the other incorrectly. The question then of why I might discover myself to be in the position of one of these first persons and not the other then seems to collapse into the general form why of all possibilities do I find myself to be occupying this particular observer moment?. Fortunately under ordinary circumstances the issue of two identical three-persons being in a position to lay claim to the same antecedent first-person memories does not generally arise, but the problem seems to be the same even without this. David On 02 Jan 2011, at 13:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 12:54 Brian Tenneson said the following: Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 02.01.2011 12:07 Brian Tenneson said the following: Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Thank you for your answers. We could say that the Universe is made of superstrings or we could say that the Universe is made of numbers. Chalmers shows that for a human being this basically makes no difference. Would that be because superstrings are made of numbers? This could serve as an explanation as well. Yet, I guess Chalmers wanted to show this in the general case. Well, that is what I explained to Chalmers in my (public, poster) presentation (on UDA) at the second meeting of the ASSC (association for the scientific study of consciousness) in 2000 (I think). But this is true only locally. I cannot distinguish a virtual body, from a brain in a vat or from my real body, but with enough time I can find the difference, in principle. The deep point is that it does make a global difference. If the computationalist hypothesis is true, the laws of physics are non computational and have to be derived from the laws of numbers, and we can make a comparison. Chalmers, like most, still misses the first person indeterminacy, which make the matrix-and-only-matrix consequence of comp testable. Chalmers told me that after a WM duplication the first person is in both cities, which is correct *from a third person point of view on the first persons, but not from the first person points of view themselves, and that is the crucial point to understand that the laws of physics have to be secondary with respect to the laws of mind (computer science/mathematical logic/machine's theology). Also, the expression superstring are made of numbers is unclear. If computationalism is correct the expression made of has no sense. Things are not made of something, they are dreamed by (infinities) of computation. The physical worlds becomes the border of the matrix, that is a first person plural reality, a partially sharable dream. Those points are not simple, and that is why I propose a step by step reasoning. If computationalism is correct, then the laws of physics are generated in a very specific way, which makes the computationalist hypothesis testable, and already retrospectively tested. And by taking Gödel into account (and thus Löb, Solovay) not only the quanta get a purely mathematical origin, but the qualia too. Quanta appears indeed to be the sharable part of the qualia. Quanta are special qualia. Superstrings are turing universal, so we can use it as a theory of everything-physical, if we want, but it is a treachery with respect to comp, and it makes you miss the theory of qualia, and the whole theology. Remember that with comp, we can never know that we are awake. But we can always know that we are dreaming or sharing a dream. The experimental evidences (the
Re: Remarks on the form of a TOE
On 03/01/2011, at 11:39 AM, David Nyman wrote: The whole issue of where will I find myself after duplication is in any case very curious. Deciding who I am and where I am can only be post-hoc on the basis of present experience in the context of memory. It's even worse (better?) than that. If I read Bruno correctly, he is saying that the mere fact that every morning when you wake up you believe you are the same I you were before you went to sleep is a contingent observation. It may be that one does not have to step into a teleportation device to be duplicated. Kim Jones -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
