On 2 January 2011 16:29, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > Chalmers told me that after a WM duplication the first person is in both > cities, which is correct *from a third person point of view on the first > persons", but not from the first person points of view themselves, and that > is the crucial point to understand that the laws of physics have to be > secondary with respect to the laws of mind (computer science/mathematical > logic/machine's theology).
It occurs to me that there could be an ambiguity here, as it is indeed the case that, whereas there is only one first-person prior to the duplication, there will be two afterwards. Hence, as Chalmers says, there will indeed be a first-person in both cities. Both will be in a position to lay claim to the same antecedent memories, but one would expect their experience to diverge after duplication based on their individual locations. Does Chalmers rather claim some sort of ongoing superimposition of experience after duplication? If so, on what basis? Or is it possible that there was indeed some ambiguity of expression here? The whole issue of "where will I find myself" after duplication is in any case very curious. Deciding "who I am" and "where I am" can only be post-hoc on the basis of present experience in the context of memory. Were I in fact to make a prior bet on where "I" might find myself to be post-duplication, presumably of the two first persons who would eventuate, one would remember predicting correctly his destination, and the other incorrectly. The question then of why "I" might discover myself to be in the position of one of these first persons and not the other then seems to collapse into the general form "why of all possibilities do I find myself to be occupying this particular observer moment?". Fortunately under ordinary circumstances the issue of two identical three-persons being in a position to lay claim to the same antecedent first-person memories does not generally arise, but the problem seems to be the same even without this. David > > On 02 Jan 2011, at 13:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > >> on 02.01.2011 12:54 Brian Tenneson said the following: >>> >>> Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >>>> >>>> on 02.01.2011 12:07 Brian Tenneson said the following: >>>>> >>>>> Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >>>> >>>> ... >> >>>> Thank you for your answers. We could say that the Universe is made >>>> of superstrings or we could say that the Universe is made of >>>> numbers. Chalmers shows that for a human being this basically makes >>>> no difference. >>> >>> Would that be because superstrings are made of numbers? >> >> This could serve as an explanation as well. Yet, I guess Chalmers wanted >> to show this in the general case. > > Well, that is what I explained to Chalmers in my (public, poster) > presentation (on UDA) at the second meeting of the ASSC (association for the > scientific study of consciousness) in 2000 (I think). > > But this is true only locally. I cannot distinguish a virtual body, from a > brain in a vat or from my "real" body, but with enough time I can find the > difference, in principle. The deep point is that it does make a global > difference. If the computationalist hypothesis is true, the laws of physics > are non computational and have to be derived from the laws of numbers, and > we can make a comparison. Chalmers, like most, still misses the first person > indeterminacy, which make the "matrix-and-only-matrix" consequence of comp > testable. > Chalmers told me that after a WM duplication the first person is in both > cities, which is correct *from a third person point of view on the first > persons", but not from the first person points of view themselves, and that > is the crucial point to understand that the laws of physics have to be > secondary with respect to the laws of mind (computer science/mathematical > logic/machine's theology). > > Also, the expression "superstring are made of numbers" is unclear. If > computationalism is correct the expression "made of" has no sense. Things > are not made of something, they are dreamed by (infinities) of computation. > The physical worlds becomes the border of the "matrix", that is a first > person plural reality, a partially sharable dream. > > Those points are not simple, and that is why I propose a step by step > reasoning. If computationalism is correct, then the laws of physics are > generated in a very specific way, which makes the computationalist > hypothesis testable, and already retrospectively tested. > > And by taking Gödel into account (and thus Löb, Solovay) not only the quanta > get a purely mathematical origin, but the qualia too. Quanta appears indeed > to be the sharable part of the qualia. Quanta are special qualia. > Superstrings are turing universal, so we can use it as a theory of > everything-physical, if we want, but it is a treachery with respect to comp, > and it makes you miss the theory of qualia, and the whole theology. > > Remember that with comp, we can never know that we are awake. But we can > always know that we are dreaming or sharing a dream. The experimental > evidences (the quantum) are that we are indeed sharing a dream. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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