Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:39, acw wrote: On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote: But the 1p view of this is to be conscious *of something*, which you describe as the computation seen from the inside. What is it about these threads through different states that makes them an equivalence class with respect to the computation seen from the inside? If they happen to be implementing some particular machine being in some particular state. The problem is that the machine can be self- modifiable (or that the environment can change it), and the machine won't know of this and not always recognize the change. This seems like a highly non-trivial problem to me. Yes. That's why I think we have to extract the equivalence class structure from the ability of the machine to refer to itself at the right level. It is not constructive, from the machine's point of view, but this does not change the correct view of the correct machine, in the correct situation, despite no one can define that correctness. It is not trivial at all, but the contrary would have been astonishing. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable. But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it? The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD. OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree. If you can prove that. I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to emulate bigger and bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are only defined in the limit, being unaware of the UD-delays. Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable sense. Hmm... Interesting question. I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your decimals, of your prediction might take a very long time to stabilize. I dunno. But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states. Why is there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of consciousness? If you say yes to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily accurate, the current state is the encoding of the universal number + data that he got from the scanning. Basically, it is what is sent through the teleportation. From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is you here and now at the moment of the scanning (done very quickly for the sake of the argument). There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant decoding, are generated infinitely often in the UD*, with different continuations, leading to your current self-indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people in W and M before they open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation. Oops, I see that I wrote my current states, with a s. So it means I was talking about the 3p computational states in the UD* corresponding on my (unique) current consciousness state. That exists, in the comp theory. Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not. Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your theory. But then I am not clear on the relation of this unique current state to the many non-equivalent states at a lower, e.g. quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical level. Is the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states? Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy. Usually I invoke the rule Y = II. That is, two equivalent computations (equivalent in the sense that it leads to the same conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at some point, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM, there is a need for possible distinction in principle. Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2. My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is 1/2. But I am not sure of this. What do you think? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 01 Mar 2012, at 22:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Mar 1, 7:34 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 23:29, Craig Weinberg wrote: There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock doesn't know what time it is. A clock has no self-referential ability. How do you know? By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a universal machine. Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference. That's what I said, and it makes my point. The difference between a clock knowing what time it is, Google knowing what you mean when you search for it, and an AI bot knowing how to have a conversation with someone is a matter of degree. If comp claims that certain kinds of processes have 1p experiences associated with them it has to explain why that should be the case. Because they have the ability to refer to themselves and understand the difference between 1p, 3p, the mind-body problem, etc. That some numbers have the ability to refer to themselves is proved in computer science textbook. A clock lacks it. A computer has it. This sentence refers to 'itself' too. I see no reason why any number or computer would have any more of a 1p experience than that. A sentence is not a program. By comp it should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of the clock. ? If the Chinese Room is intelligent, then why not gears? The chinese room is not intelligent. I agree. The person which supervene on the some computation done by the chinese room might be intelligent. Like a metaphysical 'person' that arises out of the computation ? It is more like prime numbers arising from + and *. Or like a chess player arising from some program, except that prime number and chess player have (today) no universal self-referential abilities. By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they know it yet. Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby clock. Level confusion. A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines evolving in the first place? They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal numbers. Relative Evolution exists in higher level description of those relation. Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly. Genetics is already digital relatively to QM. My question though was how many watches does it take to make an intelligent watch? Difficult question. One hundred might be enough, but a good engineers might be able to optimize it. I would not be so much astonished that one clock is enough, to implement a very simple (and inefficacious) universal system, but then you have to rearrange all the parts of that clock. The misapprehensions of comp are even clearer to me imagining a universal system in clockwork mechanisms. Electronic computers sort of mesmerize us because electricity seems magical to us, but having a warehouse full of brass gears manually clattering together and assuming that there is a conscious entity experiencing something there is hard to seriously consider. It's like Leibniz' Windmill. Or like Ned block chinese people computer. This is not convincing. It is just helpful to understand that consciousness relies on logical informational patterns that on matter. That problem is not a problem for comp, but for theories without notion of first person. It breaks down when you can apply a theory of knowledge, which is the case for machine, thanks to incompleteness. Consciousness is in the true fixed point of self-reference. It is not easy to explain this shortly and it relies on Gödel and Tarski works. There will be opportunities to come back on this. If you were able to make a living zygote large enough to walk into, it wouldn't be like that. Structures would emerge spontaneously out of circulating fluid and molecules acting spontaneously and simultaneously, not just in chain reaction. It doesn't really make sense to me if comp were true that there would be anything other than QM. ? Why would there be any other 'levels'? So you assume QM in your theory. I do not. No matter how complicated a computer program is, it doesn't need to form some kind of
Re: The Relativity of Existence
On 3/1/2012 7:37 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 7:14 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/1/2012 9:27 AM, Bob Zannelli wrote: The Relativity of Existence Authors: Stuart Heinrich http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Heinrich_S/0/1/0/all/0/1 Subjects: History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph); General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology (gr-qc); Quantum Physics (quant-ph) Despite the success of physics in formulating mathematical theories that can predict the outcome of experiments, we have made remarkably little progress towards answering some of the most basic questions about our existence, such as: why does the universe exist? Why is the universe apparently fine-tuned to be able to support life? Why are the laws of physics so elegant? Why do we have three dimensions of space and one of time? How is it that the universe can be non-local and non-causal at the quantum scale, and why is there quantum randomness? In this paper, it is shown that all of these questions are answered if existence is relative, and moreover, it seems that we are logically bound to accept it. http://arxiv.org/pdf/1202.4545.pdf To be clear, the idea that our universe is really just a computer simulation is highly controversial and not supported by this paper. Of course there's no sense in which reality can be a computer simulation EXCEPT if there is a Great Programmer who can fiddle with the program. Otherwise the simulation and the reality are the same thing. By the principle of explosion, in any system that contains a single contradiction, it becomes possible to prove the truth of any other statement no matter how nonsensical[34, p.18]. There is clearly a distinction between truth and falsehood in our reality, which means that the principle of explosion does not apply to our reality. In other words, we can be certain that our reality is consistent. Hmm? I'd never heard ex falso quodlibet referred to as the principle of explosion before. But in any case there are ways for preventing a contradiction from implying everything, c.f. Graham Priest's In Contradiction. Contradictions are between propositions. Heinrich is saying that the lack of contradictions in our propositions describing the world implies the world is consistent. But at the same time he adopts a MWI which implies that contrary events happen all the time. In fact, there are an infinite number of ways to modify an axiomatic system while keeping any particular theorem intact. This is true if the axioms *and rules of inference* are strong enough to satisfy Godel's incompleteness theorem, something with a rule of finite induction (isn't that technically a schema for an infinite set of axioms?). Then you are guaranteed infinitely many true propositions which are not provable from your axioms, and each of those can be added as an axiom. Otherwise I think you only get to add infinitely many axioms by creating arbitrary names, like aa and ab... From the perspective of any self-aware being, something is real if it is true, A very Platonic and dubious proposition. True applies to propositions not things. 2+2=4 is true, but that doesn't imply anything is real. Holmes friend was Watson is true too. Recognizing this, the ultimate answer to the question of why our reality exists becomes trivial: because self-awareness can be represented axiomatically, any axiomatic system that can derive self-awareness will be perceived as being real without the need for an objective manifestation. This is what Bruno Marchal refers to a Lobianity, the provability within a system that there are unprovable true propositions. Marchal formulated this idea before Tegmark and has filled it out and made it more precise (and perhaps testable) by confining it to computation by a univeral dovetailer - not just any mathematics. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html If you join the everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com , he will explain it to you. Not many things can be proven objectively true, because any proof relying on axioms is not objective without proving that the axioms are also objectively true. This is confusion bordering on sophistry. He has introduced a new, undefined concept objective and stated that any objectively true statement has an objective proof. Proof is well defined since it means following from the axioms by the rules of inference. Proving something from no axioms just requires more powerful rules of inference. There's no
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Mar 1, 8:12 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You do assume, though, that brain function can't be replicated by a machine. No, I presume that consciousness is not limited to what we consider to be brain function. Brain function, as we understand it now, is already a machine. That has no firmer basis than a claim that kidney function cannot be replicated by a machine. After all, brains and kidneys are made out of the same stuff. The difference is that I am not my kidneys, but the same cannot be said about my brain. It doesn't matter to me if my kidneys aren't aware, as long as they keep me alive. The brain is a completely different story. Keeping my body alive is of no concern to anyone unless I am able to participate and participate directly in the life of that body. If a replicated brain has no awareness, or if its awareness is not 'me', then it is no better than a kidney grafted onto a spinal cord. You could bite the bullet and declare yourself a vitalist. I'm not though. I'm a panexperientialist. I only point out that there is a difference between the experience of a kidney, a brain, and an array of transistors. You can't make a jellyfish out of clocks or a glass of water out of sand. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Mar 2, 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Mar 2012, at 22:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock doesn't know what time it is. A clock has no self-referential ability. How do you know? By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a universal machine. Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference. That's what I said, and it makes my point. The difference between a clock knowing what time it is, Google knowing what you mean when you search for it, and an AI bot knowing how to have a conversation with someone is a matter of degree. If comp claims that certain kinds of processes have 1p experiences associated with them it has to explain why that should be the case. Because they have the ability to refer to themselves and understand the difference between 1p, 3p, the mind-body problem, etc. That some numbers have the ability to refer to themselves is proved in computer science textbook. A clock lacks it. A computer has it. This sentence refers to 'itself' too. I see no reason why any number or computer would have any more of a 1p experience than that. A sentence is not a program. Okay, WHILE program 0 DO program. Program = Program + 1. END WHILE Does running that program (or one like it) create a 1p experience? By comp it should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of the clock. ? If the Chinese Room is intelligent, then why not gears? The chinese room is not intelligent. I agree. The person which supervene on the some computation done by the chinese room might be intelligent. Like a metaphysical 'person' that arises out of the computation ? It is more like prime numbers arising from + and *. Or like a chess player arising from some program, except that prime number and chess player have (today) no universal self-referential abilities. That sounds like what I said. By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they know it yet. Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby clock. Level confusion. A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines evolving in the first place? They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal numbers. Relative Evolution exists in higher level description of those relation. Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly. Genetics is already digital relatively to QM. My question though was how many watches does it take to make an intelligent watch? Difficult question. One hundred might be enough, but a good engineers might be able to optimize it. I would not be so much astonished that one clock is enough, to implement a very simple (and inefficacious) universal system, but then you have to rearrange all the parts of that clock. The misapprehensions of comp are even clearer to me imagining a universal system in clockwork mechanisms. Electronic computers sort of mesmerize us because electricity seems magical to us, but having a warehouse full of brass gears manually clattering together and assuming that there is a conscious entity experiencing something there is hard to seriously consider. It's like Leibniz' Windmill. Or like Ned block chinese people computer. This is not convincing. Why not? Because our brain can be broken down into components also and we assume that we are the function of our brain? If so, that objection evaporates when we use a symmetrical form content model rather than a cause effect model of brain-mind. It is just helpful to understand that consciousness relies on logical informational patterns that on matter. That problem is not a problem for comp, but for theories without notion of first person. It breaks down when you can apply a theory of knowledge, which is the case for machine, thanks to incompleteness. Consciousness is in the true fixed point of self-reference. It is not easy to explain this shortly and it relies on Gödel and Tarski works. There will be opportunities to come back on this. All of that sounds still like the easy problem of consciousness. Arithmetic can show
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 3/2/2012 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable. But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it? The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD. OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree. If you can prove that. I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to emulate bigger and bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are only defined in the limit, being unaware of the UD-delays. Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable sense. Hmm... Interesting question. I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your decimals, of your prediction might take a very long time to stabilize. I dunno. But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states. Why is there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of consciousness? If you say yes to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily accurate, the current state is the encoding of the universal number + data that he got from the scanning. Basically, it is what is sent through the teleportation. From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is you here and now at the moment of the scanning (done very quickly for the sake of the argument). There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant decoding, are generated infinitely often in the UD*, with different continuations, leading to your current self-indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people in W and M before they open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation. Oops, I see that I wrote my current states, with a s. So it means I was talking about the 3p computational states in the UD* corresponding on my (unique) current consciousness state. That exists, in the comp theory. Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not. Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your theory. But then I am not clear on the relation of this unique current state to the many non-equivalent states at a lower, e.g. quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical level. Is the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states? Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy. Usually I invoke the rule Y = II. That is, two equivalent computations (equivalent in the sense that it leads to the same conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at some point, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM, there is a need for possible distinction in principle. Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2. My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is 1/2. But I am not sure of this. What do you think? I think there's a typo and the second 1/2 was intended to be 2/3. I wonder though why we should consider an hypothesis like in exactly the same environment (to the quantum level?) which is nomologically impossible. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 02 Mar 2012, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Mar 2, 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Mar 2012, at 22:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock doesn't know what time it is. A clock has no self-referential ability. How do you know? By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a universal machine. Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference. That's what I said, and it makes my point. The difference between a clock knowing what time it is, Google knowing what you mean when you search for it, and an AI bot knowing how to have a conversation with someone is a matter of degree. If comp claims that certain kinds of processes have 1p experiences associated with them it has to explain why that should be the case. Because they have the ability to refer to themselves and understand the difference between 1p, 3p, the mind-body problem, etc. That some numbers have the ability to refer to themselves is proved in computer science textbook. A clock lacks it. A computer has it. This sentence refers to 'itself' too. I see no reason why any number or computer would have any more of a 1p experience than that. A sentence is not a program. Okay, WHILE program 0 DO program. Program = Program + 1. END WHILE Does running that program (or one like it) create a 1p experience? Very plausibly not. It lacks self-reference and universality. By comp it should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of the clock. ? If the Chinese Room is intelligent, then why not gears? The chinese room is not intelligent. I agree. The person which supervene on the some computation done by the chinese room might be intelligent. Like a metaphysical 'person' that arises out of the computation ? It is more like prime numbers arising from + and *. Or like a chess player arising from some program, except that prime number and chess player have (today) no universal self-referential abilities. That sounds like what I said. By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they know it yet. Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby clock. Level confusion. A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines evolving in the first place? They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal numbers. Relative Evolution exists in higher level description of those relation. Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly. Genetics is already digital relatively to QM. My question though was how many watches does it take to make an intelligent watch? Difficult question. One hundred might be enough, but a good engineers might be able to optimize it. I would not be so much astonished that one clock is enough, to implement a very simple (and inefficacious) universal system, but then you have to rearrange all the parts of that clock. The misapprehensions of comp are even clearer to me imagining a universal system in clockwork mechanisms. Electronic computers sort of mesmerize us because electricity seems magical to us, but having a warehouse full of brass gears manually clattering together and assuming that there is a conscious entity experiencing something there is hard to seriously consider. It's like Leibniz' Windmill. Or like Ned block chinese people computer. This is not convincing. Why not? Because our brain can be broken down into components also and we assume that we are the function of our brain? We are relatively manifested by the function of our brain. we are not function. If so, that objection evaporates when we use a symmetrical form content model rather than a cause effect model of brain-mind. Form and content are not symmetrical. The dependence of content to form requires at least universal machine. It is just helpful to understand that consciousness relies on logical informational patterns that on matter. That problem is not a problem for comp, but for theories without notion of first person. It breaks down when you can apply a theory of knowledge, which is the case for machine, thanks to incompleteness. Consciousness is in the true fixed point of self-reference.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 02 Mar 2012, at 19:17, meekerdb wrote: On 3/2/2012 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable. But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it? The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD. OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree. If you can prove that. I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to emulate bigger and bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are only defined in the limit, being unaware of the UD-delays. Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable sense. Hmm... Interesting question. I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your decimals, of your prediction might take a very long time to stabilize. I dunno. But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states. Why is there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of consciousness? If you say yes to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily accurate, the current state is the encoding of the universal number + data that he got from the scanning. Basically, it is what is sent through the teleportation. From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is you here and now at the moment of the scanning (done very quickly for the sake of the argument). There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant decoding, are generated infinitely often in the UD*, with different continuations, leading to your current self- indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people in W and M before they open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation. Oops, I see that I wrote my current states, with a s. So it means I was talking about the 3p computational states in the UD* corresponding on my (unique) current consciousness state. That exists, in the comp theory. Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not. Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your theory. But then I am not clear on the relation of this unique current state to the many non-equivalent states at a lower, e.g. quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical level. Is the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states? Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy. Usually I invoke the rule Y = II. That is, two equivalent computations (equivalent in the sense that it leads to the same conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at some point, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM, there is a need for possible distinction in principle. Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2. My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is 1/2. But I am not sure of this. What do you think? I think there's a typo and the second 1/2 was intended to be 2/3. Oops. I wonder though why we should consider an hypothesis like in exactly the same environment (to the quantum level?) which is nomologically impossible. I meant, an environment sufficiently similar so that the first person experiences are identical. It is more easy to use virtual environment, so that we can use the comp subst level to make sure (thanks to the comp determinacy!) that the processing of the two brains will be exactly identical. (exactly identical is what we told the cleaning service, hoping they will not put some flowers, or anything different in the two rooms which could make the experience diverging!) So 1/2 or 2/3? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: COMP theology
On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The question is If I throw a coin, what is the probability that I see it becoming a flying pig. In front of the UD, that question is not trivial. In this thought experiment the meaning of the word I is not obvious and in fact the entire point of the exercise is supposed to be to make clear exactly what I means, and yet you throw out the word as if the meaning is already clear. In one sense there is zero probability because if you became a flying pig you would not be Bruno Marchal anymore. And in some sense there is zero probability the Helsinki man will be the Moscow man because the Moscow experiences is what transformed the Helsinki man into the Moscow man so that although he may remembers being him he is not the Helsinki man anymore. So the answer to the question If I change what is the probability I will remain the same? is zero. And that's why I think this first person indeterminacy stuff is just silly. Comp is just I can survive with a digital brain. It is about me, my consciousness, my body Fine, but then how does that square with your comment Comp makes arithmetic a theory of everything. Consciousness is not everything. comp makes matter into an appearance in the mind of universal numbers only. Comp can certainly make a mind that through virtual reality can experience matter that does not in fact exist, but even if the rock the mind feels like he is holding does not exist other matter does in the form of the computer that is simulating the rock, and the mind too. You claim you have proven that a computer made of matter is not necessary to do a simulation like this but I'll be damned if I can see where you did this. In Aristotle's metaphysics the potential and the actual are somehow one, but is this really true? I don't know. OK. So you see that there is a 1p- indetermination. I don't even think 1p- indetermination has a clear meaning except if you change then you are not the same; well yes I can see that, it's true but not very profound. the question does not bear on where he will be, but on where he will feels to be. If I receive sense inputs from Washington I will feel like I'm in Washington if I receive sights and sounds from Moscow I will feel like I'm in Moscow. You may ask why are you the Moscow man and not the Washington man?, and my answer is because I received inputs from Moscow not Washington. So a legitimate question and a proper use of probabilities would be What is the probability I will receive sights and sound from Moscow but not Washington?. Unlike your question this one is perfectly clear and is well suited for statistical analysis, but I don't see what deep philosophical insights can be gained from it. he know that he will be in W and in M, but he knows that whatever he will feel to be, it will be in only one place, because he knows that he will not feel to be in two place at once. Even that is not a given. This is virtual reality after all, it's the point of your dovetail machine, so there is no reason you couldn't have the White House in the middle of the Kremlin and the Washington Monument right next to St. Basil's Cathedral. he is aware that he cannot predict which one among the many he he will feel to be. That is true ONLY if he does not know if he will receive signals from Washington or Moscow, if he knew that, and there is no reason in theory he could not, then he could make such a prediction. That is the 1-indeterminacy, which is crucial for the rest of the reasoning. I know it's crucial, and so if that fails, and it does, then the entire proof falls apart. Don't misunderstand me, I'm not saying your conclusions about numbers are wrong and in fact my hunch is that they are probably right or close to it, but I don't think you've proved it and I'm certain this 1p indeterminate stuff is a dead end. There is no difficulty. Just the discovery of how to explain a objective account of a feeling of subjective indeterminacy in the mechanist framework. The explanation is not difficult, you never know what's coming next. Forest Gump had a similar explanation that was every bit as deep, Life is like a box of chocolates...you never know what you're gonna get. Non-comp may not be contradictory but all the human practitioners of non-comp most certainly are, every single one, no exceptions. Many are, but why all, and why necessarily? All non-comp fans say that knowing what someone or something does is not enough to determine if it is conscious, you need to know HOW they do what they do; and yet until very recently nobody had the slightest idea how the brain worked and yet they still firmly believed that their fellow human beings were conscious when they acted as if they were, that is to say when they were not sleeping or dead. Even today 99.9% of the human population thinks that how the brain works is so unimportant that they have not bothered to learn the first thing
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Mar 2, 2:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Mar 2012, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock doesn't know what time it is. A clock has no self-referential ability. How do you know? By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a universal machine. Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference. That's what I said, and it makes my point. The difference between a clock knowing what time it is, Google knowing what you mean when you search for it, and an AI bot knowing how to have a conversation with someone is a matter of degree. If comp claims that certain kinds of processes have 1p experiences associated with them it has to explain why that should be the case. Because they have the ability to refer to themselves and understand the difference between 1p, 3p, the mind-body problem, etc. That some numbers have the ability to refer to themselves is proved in computer science textbook. A clock lacks it. A computer has it. This sentence refers to 'itself' too. I see no reason why any number or computer would have any more of a 1p experience than that. A sentence is not a program. Okay, WHILE program 0 DO program. Program = Program + 1. END WHILE Does running that program (or one like it) create a 1p experience? Very plausibly not. It lacks self-reference and universality. Why isn't a WHILE loop self-referential? By comp it should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of the clock. ? If the Chinese Room is intelligent, then why not gears? The chinese room is not intelligent. I agree. The person which supervene on the some computation done by the chinese room might be intelligent. Like a metaphysical 'person' that arises out of the computation ? It is more like prime numbers arising from + and *. Or like a chess player arising from some program, except that prime number and chess player have (today) no universal self-referential abilities. That sounds like what I said. By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they know it yet. Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby clock. Level confusion. A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines evolving in the first place? They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal numbers. Relative Evolution exists in higher level description of those relation. Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly. Genetics is already digital relatively to QM. My question though was how many watches does it take to make an intelligent watch? Difficult question. One hundred might be enough, but a good engineers might be able to optimize it. I would not be so much astonished that one clock is enough, to implement a very simple (and inefficacious) universal system, but then you have to rearrange all the parts of that clock. The misapprehensions of comp are even clearer to me imagining a universal system in clockwork mechanisms. Electronic computers sort of mesmerize us because electricity seems magical to us, but having a warehouse full of brass gears manually clattering together and assuming that there is a conscious entity experiencing something there is hard to seriously consider. It's like Leibniz' Windmill. Or like Ned block chinese people computer. This is not convincing. Why not? Because our brain can be broken down into components also and we assume that we are the function of our brain? We are relatively manifested by the function of our brain. we are not function. That seems to make 'functionalism' a misnomer. If so, that objection evaporates when we use a symmetrical form content model rather than a cause effect model of brain-mind. Form and content are not symmetrical. The dependence of content to form requires at least universal machine. What if content is not dependent on form and requires nothing except being real? I think that content and form are anomalous symmetries inherent in all real things. It is only our perspective, as human
Re: Entropy and information
On 2/28/2012 8:20 PM, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
Dear Stephen,
A thing that I often ask myself concerning MMH is the question about
what is mathematical and what is not?. The set of real numbers is a
mathematical structure, but also the set of real numbers plus the
point (1,1) in the plane is. The set of randomly chosen numbers { 1,4
3,4,.34, 3} is because it can be described with the same descriptive
language of math. But the first of these structures have properties
and the others do not. The first can be infinite but can be described
with a single equation while the last must be described
extensively. . At least some random universes (the finite ones) can be
described extensively, with the tools of mathematics but they don愒
count in the intuitive sense as mathematical.
Dear Alberto,
I distinguish between the existential and the essential aspects
such that this question is not problematic. Let me elaborate. By
Existence I mean the necessary possibility of the entity. By Essence I
mean the collection of properties that are its identity. Existence is
only contingent on whether or not said existence is self-consistent, in
other words, if an entity's essence is such that it contradicts the
possibility of its existence, then it cannot exist; otherwise entities
exist, but nothing beyond the tautological laws of identity - A is A
and Unicity http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Unicity - can be said to
follow from that bare existence and we only consider those laws only
after we reach the stage of epistemology.
Essence, in the sense of properties seems to require a spectrum of
stratification wherein properties can be associated and categories,
modalities and aspects defined for such. It is this latter case of
Essence that you seem to be considering in your discussion of the
difference between the set of Real numbers and some set of random chosen
numbers, since the former is defined as a complete whole by the set (or
Category) theoretical definition of the Reals while the latter is
contigent on a discription that must capture some particular collection,
hence it is Unicity that matters, i.e. the wholeness of the set.
I would venture to guess that the latter case of your examples
always involves particular members of an example of the former case,
e.g. the set of randomly chosen numbers that you mentioned is a subset
of the set of Real numbers. Do there exist set (or Categories) that are
whole that require the specification of every one of its members
separately such that no finite description can capture its essence? I am
not sure, thus I am only guessing here. One thing that we need to recall
is that we are, by appearances, finite and can only apprehend finite
details and properties. Is this limitation the result of necessity or
contingency?
Whatever the case it is, we should be careful not to draw
conclusions about the inherent aspects of mathematical objects that
follow from our individual ability to conceive of them. For example, I
have a form of dyslexia that makes the mental manipulation of symbolic
reasoning extremely difficult, I make up for this by reasoning in terms
of more visual and proprioceptive senses and thus can understand
mathematical entities very well. Given this disability, I might make
claims that since I cannot understand the particular symbolic
representations that I am a bit dubious of their existence or
meaningfulness. Of course this is a rather absurd example, but I have
often found that many claims by even eminent mathematicians boils down
to a similar situation. Many of the claims against the existence of
infinities can fall under this situation.
What is usually considered genuinely mathematical is any structure,
that can be described briefly. Also it must have good properties ,
operations, symmetries or isomorphisms with other structures so the
structure can be navigated and related with other structures and the
knowledge can be reused. These structures have a low kolmogorov
complexity, so they can be navigated with low computing resources.
So you are saying that finite describability is a prerequisite for
an entity to be mathematical? What is the lowest upper bound on this
limit and what would necessitate it? Does this imply that mathematics is
constrained to some set of objects that only sapient entities can
manipulate in a way that such manipulations are describable exactly in
terms of a finite list or algorithm? Does this not seem a bit
anthropocentric? But my question is more about the general direction and
implication of your reasoning and not meant to imply anything in
particular. I have often wondered about many of the debates that go on
between mathematicians and wonder if we are all missing something deeper
in our quest.
For example, why is it that there are multiple and different set
theories that have as axioms concepts that are so radically different.
Witness the way that a set
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 3:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Mar 1, 8:12 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You do assume, though, that brain function can't be replicated by a machine. No, I presume that consciousness is not limited to what we consider to be brain function. Brain function, as we understand it now, is already a machine. You've moved on since I discussed this with you a few months ago, since then you claimed that brain function (i.e. observable function or behaviour) could not be replicated by machine. If you now accept this, the further argument is that it is not possible to replicate brain function without also replicating consciousness. This is valid even if it isn't actually possible to replicate brain function. We've discussed this before and I don't think you understand it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2. My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is [2/3]. Why is that? But I am not sure of this. What do you think? My intuition is that the probability should be 2/3 in either case. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Mar 2, 7:46 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 3:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Mar 1, 8:12 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You do assume, though, that brain function can't be replicated by a machine. No, I presume that consciousness is not limited to what we consider to be brain function. Brain function, as we understand it now, is already a machine. You've moved on since I discussed this with you a few months ago, since then you claimed that brain function (i.e. observable function or behaviour) could not be replicated by machine. No, there's no change. Brain function consists of physiological processes, but physiology is too broad and generic to resolve subtle anthropological processes. Eventually any machine replication will be exposed to some human observer. This is because the idea of 'observable function or behavior' presumes a universal observer or absolute frame of reference, which I have no reason to entertain as legitimate. Are these words made of English letters or black pixels or RGB pixels...colorless electrons..? A machine can produce the electrons, the pixels, the letters, but not the cadence, the ideas, the fluid presence of a singular voice over time. These are subtle kinds of considerations but they make a difference over time. Machines repeat themselves in an unnatural way. They are tone deaf and socially awkward. They have no charisma. It shows. Brains have no charisma either, so reproducing their function does not reproduce that. It is the character which drives the brain function, not the other way around. If you now accept this, the further argument is that it is not possible to replicate brain function without also replicating consciousness. No, you're missing my argument now as you have in the past. This is valid even if it isn't actually possible to replicate brain function. We've discussed this before and I don't think you understand it. I understand your argument from the very beginning. I debate people about it all week long with the same view exactly. It's by far the most popular position I have encountered online. It is the conventional wisdom wisdom position. There is nothing remotely new or difficult to understand about it. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 8:55 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Mar 2, 7:46 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 3:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Mar 1, 8:12 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: You do assume, though, that brain function can't be replicated by a machine. No, I presume that consciousness is not limited to what we consider to be brain function. Brain function, as we understand it now, is already a machine. You've moved on since I discussed this with you a few months ago, since then you claimed that brain function (i.e. observable function or behaviour) could not be replicated by machine. No, there's no change. Brain function consists of physiological processes, but physiology is too broad and generic to resolve subtle anthropological processes. Eventually any machine replication will be exposed to some human observer. This is because the idea of 'observable function or behavior' presumes a universal observer or absolute frame of reference, which I have no reason to entertain as legitimate. Are these words made of English letters or black pixels or RGB pixels...colorless electrons..? A machine can produce the electrons, the pixels, the letters, but not the cadence, the ideas, the fluid presence of a singular voice over time. These are subtle kinds of considerations but they make a difference over time. Machines repeat themselves in an unnatural way. They are tone deaf and socially awkward. They have no charisma. It shows. Brains have no charisma either, so reproducing their function does not reproduce that. It is the character which drives the brain function, not the other way around. If you now accept this, the further argument is that it is not possible to replicate brain function without also replicating consciousness. No, you're missing my argument now as you have in the past. This is valid even if it isn't actually possible to replicate brain function. We've discussed this before and I don't think you understand it. I understand your argument from the very beginning. I debate people about it all week long with the same view exactly. It's by far the most popular position I have encountered online. It is the conventional wisdom wisdom position. There is nothing remotely new or difficult to understand about it. Craig Or, maybe it's ... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning-Kruger -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Mar 2, 9:41 pm, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Or, maybe it's ...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning-Kruger Or this... http://www.alternet.org/health/154225/would_we_have_drugged_up_einstein_how_anti-authoritarianism_is_deemed_a_mental_health_problem -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 2/29/2012 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 13:50, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. Hi Quentin, OK, but could you elaborate on this statement? It means an hypothetical you after mind uploading would feel as conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all... Hi Quentin, We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if there is no you, as Brent wrote yesterday, what is that which is invariant with respect to substitution? As I said, Brent made a sort of pedagogical mistake, but a big one, which is often done, and which explains perhaps why some materialist becomes person eliminativist. The you is a construct of the brain. It is abstract. You can see it as an information pattern, but a real stable one which can exist in many representations. And you can build it for any machine by using Kleene's second diagonalization construction. It is the key of the whole thing. So let me explain again. You can certainly construct a program D capable of doing some simple duplication of an arbitrary object x and apply any transformation T that you want on that duplicated object, perhaps with some parameters: Dx gives T(, xx, ), Then applying D to itself, that is substituting x for D, leads to a self-referential program: DD gives T(, DD, ...). You might add quotes to prevent an infinite loop: Dx gives T(...'xx' ...) so that DD gives T(... 'DD'...). This is the trick used by Gödel, Kleene, Turing, Church, Post, ... in all incompleteness and insolubility result, but also, in abstract biology (see my paper amoeba, planaria, and dreaming machine. That define a relative you, trivially relative to you. It is the I of computer science. It allows you to write a program referring to its entire code/body in the course of its execution. In some programming language, like the object oriented Smalltalk, for example, it is a build in control structure called SELF. This gives, unfortunately only a third person notion of self. It is more my body than my soul, and that if why, to do the math, we have to use the conjunction of truth, with belief, to get a notion of first person. By the non definability of truth, this I cannot be defined by the machine concerned, but it still exist, even if doubly immaterial---because it is abstract, and in relation with the non definable (by the machine) truth. Both are invariant, by definition, when the comp substitution is done at the right level. It means that the reconstituted person will behave the same, and feel to be the same. Dear Bruno, Forgive the obvious question, but what you wrote here should be the blue print for creating an AI, no? All that needs to be done is to create a special purpose physical machine that can implement a program with this structure, such that it is implemented fast enough to be able to interact in our world at our level. Is the differentiation that one _might_ feel, given the wrong substitution level, different from what _might_ occur if a digital uploading procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete continuity? It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of continuity... it's not binary outcome. At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a fine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to nail down the details of this idea. The details are in the mathematics of self-reference. Where? How is the degree of resolution or scope of a computation coded in a computation? It seems that this is assumed in the notion of computer grammars and semantics but has this question been address directly in literature? Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, IMHO. Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong... AFAIK, it would only prevent
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 3/2/2012 10:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Mar 2, 9:41 pm, Terren Suydamterren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Or, maybe it's ...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning-Kruger Or this... http://www.alternet.org/health/154225/would_we_have_drugged_up_einstein_how_anti-authoritarianism_is_deemed_a_mental_health_problem Hear Hear! Drug us into compliance, please! Ever read Brave New World http://www.huxley.net/bnw/? I have seen first hand the effects of anti-ADD drugs... Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I understand your argument from the very beginning. I debate people about it all week long with the same view exactly. It's by far the most popular position I have encountered online. It is the conventional wisdom wisdom position. There is nothing remotely new or difficult to understand about it. I know that you understand the claim, but what you don't understand is the reasoning behind it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
