On 02 Mar 2012, at 19:17, meekerdb wrote:

## Advertising

On 3/2/2012 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physicalprocesses not completely Turing emulable.But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctorwho proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is madeof matter) with a Turing emulation of it?The doctor does not need to emulate the "matter" of my brain.This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only(apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digitaltruncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the1p indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reachingmy current states in arithmetic/UD.OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulablebecause there are infinitely many computations at the finegrained level reaching your current state. But it is simulableto an arbitrary degree.If you can prove that.I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You haveto emulate bigger and bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-vieware only defined in the limit, being unaware of the UD-delays.Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable sense.Hmm... Interesting question.I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Yourdecimals, of your prediction might take a very long time tostabilize. I dunno.But I'm still unclear on what constitutes "my current states".Why is there more than one? Is it a set of states ofcomputations that constitutes a single state of consciousness?If you say "yes" to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckilyaccurate, the "current state" is the encoding of the "universalnumber + data" that he got from the scanning. Basically, it iswhat is sent through the teleportation.From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is "you <hereand now>" at the moment of the scanning (done very quickly forthe sake of the argument).There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevantdecoding, are generated infinitely often in the UD*, withdifferent continuations, leading to your current self-indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people inW and M before they open the teletransporter box, just beforedifferentiation.Oops, I see that I wrote "my current states", with a "s". So itmeans I was talking about the 3p computational states in the UD*corresponding on my (unique) current consciousness state. Thatexists, in the comp theory.Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied yourtheory. But then I am not clear on the relation of this unique"current state" to the many non-equivalent states at a lower, e.g.quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical level.Is the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states?Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy.Usually I invoke the rule Y = II. That is, two equivalentcomputations (equivalent in the sense that it leads to the sameconscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at somepoint, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM,there is a need for possible distinction in principle.Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication,starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstitutedin two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is theprobability, asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3or to 1/2.My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if thetwo computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is1/2. But I am not sure of this. What do you think?I think there's a typo and the second 1/2 was intended to be 2/3.

Oops.

I wonder though why we should consider an hypothesis like "inexactly the same environment" (to the quantum level?) which isnomologically impossible.

`I meant, an environment sufficiently similar so that the first person`

`experiences are identical. It is more easy to use virtual environment,`

`so that we can use the comp subst level to make sure (thanks to the`

`comp determinacy!) that the processing of the two brains will be`

`exactly identical.`

`("exactly identical" is what we told the cleaning service, hoping they`

`will not put some flowers, or anything different in the two rooms`

`which could make the experience diverging!)`

So 1/2 or 2/3? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.