On 28 Mar 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my
symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the
third person point of view then it seems
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Identical bodies have identical minds,
Yes.
but identical minds can have different bodies.
Who cares? It's consciousness I'm interested in.
The universe does not know you are John Clark. You do.
In my symmetrical room example
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory.
Many Worlds is deterministic but I don't know about comp because comp
is a homemade term never completely defined and used on this list and
nowhere else. I don't even know if I agree with
On 29 Mar 2012, at 18:31, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Identical bodies have identical minds,
Yes.
but identical minds can have different bodies.
Who cares? It's consciousness I'm interested in.
We discuss only on the consequence of the
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the hairsplitting about that YOU, that you are using here, so
as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first
person experience displayed in the WM duplication
On 29 Mar 2012, at 18:46, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory.
Many Worlds is deterministic but I don't know about comp because
comp is a homemade term never completely defined and used on this
list
On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the hairsplitting about that YOU, that you
are using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes
indeed the indeterminacy about the first
On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the hairsplitting about that YOU, that you are using here, so
as to convince me and others that it refutes
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to create a
process
On 3/29/2012 6:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience is a process then it is
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience is a process then it is
On 3/29/2012 7:37 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
On 3/29/2012 11:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 7:37 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a
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