On 28 Mar 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that there are really 2 and not just one mind involved.

> We agree on this since the beginning.

Then why why why do you keep talking about things being the same from the "3-view" but not from the "1-view".

You confuse F(x) = F(y) => x = y, with
F(x) = x.
Identical bodies have identical minds, but identical minds can have different bodies.

> It seems to me that you are playing with words.

Words are the only means we have to communicate with and I need to know what they mean and that is not always obvious in very extreme and unusual (but not illogical) situations.

>> But you can see there are 2 bodies of Bruno Marchal just as well as the outside observer, and you can not tell which one is you any better than the outside observer can!

> No. The outsider can see both necks for example. The insider cannot be sure that he is not in front of some mirror, according to your own analysis.

No, you can touch the other fellow and he does not feel like a glass mirror, you can shake his hand, punch him in the jaw, do whatever 2 people can do when they meet each other, but if I instantly exchanged the position of the 2 bodies you would not notice the slightest difference, not from the 1-view or 2-view or 3-view or any view, the very universe itself would notice no difference. If subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference then call me crazy but I say it makes no difference.

> So you fail to distinguish the 1-view and the 3-view.

Yes, the universe itself can't distinguish between them and I'm not better than the universe.

The universe does not know you are John Clark. You do.

It seems you are eliminating the 1-view, which contradicts your agreement on the existence of consciousness. Consciousness is not part of any 3p description of the universe, yet it exists. I begin to think your problem is not with comp, but with the general issue of the mind- body problem. Your acknowledged difficulties to see Nagel points on the bat corroborates this. The difference between the 1-view and the 3-view is as big as the difference between the diary of the W-man, and the diary of the M-man.

> OK. So what is new with comp is a form of indeterminacy which even in theory we cannot predict, and which does not rely on physical experimentation and extrapolation, nor on the same anti- diagonalization used by Gödel or Turing.

So in this hypothetical non quantum mechanical non Godel-Turing universe I could know at least in theory with 100% certainty that I will see Washington provided the universe was also simple enough for me to know the initial conditions and simple enough for me to calculate with them to obtain a outcome. And because I'd know I would see Washington I would know with 100% certainty that I will be the Washington man. I ask again what is new or deep here?

You are just wrong. If you predict that you will feel to see Washington with 100% chance, the guy in Moscow will have all the memories of that prediction, and will have to admit he was wrong.

> Never say "cannot be proven" without adding "by a specific machine M"

There are true statements that cannot be proven by a machine that is both consistent and complete, and any machine powerful enough to do arithmetic can not be complete.

>> You want to know what is the probability you will become the Moscow man, but the only way that can happen is if you see images of Moscow, that's what being the Moscow man means.

> You can apply that argument to the throwing of a coin. That contradicts the statement above that you can use probability for the coin, so why can't you use it for the probability of feeling to be the Moscow man?

In common usage when you say "what is the probability I will see heads when I flip this coin?" there is not a 100% chance I will see heads as there is in the thought experiment with the cities, but even more important in everyday use it is not needed to make what might seem like hairsplitting distinctions on who "I" is, but such exactitude is needed if duplicating chambers are thrown into the mix.

I gave you the precise definition, with the diaries and their owners. But you are the one saying that this was hairsplitting and ask me to not come back with the diary stuff.

You seem unable to put yourself at the place of any of the resulting copies. The 1-I of those copies is the usual 1-I, like in "can you touch your nose". A third person can ask them where they are, or which movies they saw, and get definite answers. If you make a definite specific prediction of which movie you will see in the movie- multiplication experience, only one among the 2^<many> will assess it, and 2^<many> will agree having been false. By comp, they are all genuine survivors and so have to be all listened. And comp explains why the guy making the specific claims is compelled in his delusion.

And if there is any mystery and indeterminacy in this thing you call "first person indeterminacy" it quickly reduces out to types of indeterminacy we've already known about, some for many thousands of years and others for only about 80.

You keep saying this, but don't reply to the many debunking of that idea that I have provided (and others too).

> Given that the probability concerns the 1-views (that is the 1- view from the 1-person Pov), saying 100% for Moscow and 100% for Washington entails that you predict that you will *feel* to be in the two places at once.

"You" would feel to be in two places at once ...

You believe in some form of telepathy. No one can *feel* to be in two places at once with comp and the protocol of those thought experiences. It is just nonsense.

...except for one thing, "you" has been duplicated.

Indeed. So, if you take this into account, you get the 1- indeterminacy. It is different from all previous indeterminacy because it does not invoke ignorance of initial conditions (because the copies are numerically identical at the relevant substitution level), nor quantum superposition, nor anti-diagonalization trick.

It is also a much stronger form of indeterminacy, because the previous one can be eliminated.

The classical one can be eliminated with the given of the initial conditions, and the quantum one can be eliminated with non local hidden variables (à-la Bohm). Nothing can do that for the indeterminacy brought by self-duplication (like in comp and Everett), so those indeterminacies have different reason and nature, as you might suspect better by studying the reasoning, and seeing where the 1- comp indeterminacy leads us, as opposed to the other forms.

The comp-1-indeterminacy is also different from the unsolvability issue, which does not bring any form of indeterminacy, given that a "little god" like arithmetical truth, or just P1-complete oracle, can determine the outcome. The comp-1-indeterminacy is, I think, the first form of indeterminacy that no notion of Gods nor Oracle or hidden variables can be used to eliminate it. People having no notion in either mathematical logic, classical physics, chaos or quantum mechanics can grasp it without problem once they got the simple approximate definition of 1-view and 3-view through the diaries.

You keep saying that you can predict which movie you will see in the movie-multiplication experiment, notably by saying that you will saw all of them, which is directly contradicts by the interview of the vast majority of the copies, and which by definition of the 1-you, are the one we have to listen to.

In conclusion: you have failed to convince me of any reason to stop at step 3.

If any one else can help you to sort out your misunderstanding, I encourage them to do so, because you repeat yourself a lot, by avoiding systematically the rather obvious definition of 1-view and 3- view I have given. As I said, John Clark seems to avoid the listening to the copies: they know that nothing can help them to predict their specific future, and this in a situation which is 100% deterministic from a 3p pov.



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