On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you are using here, so
as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first
person experience displayed in the WM duplication thought experience (UDA step 3).
Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and given that you are
the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome, I will ask to give us an
algorithm predicting the result of the future self-localization experience.
The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM is deterministic. And it has the same
problems being given a probabilistic interpretation as EQM. If you duplicated a coin in
the transporter experiment the question, "Where will you expect to find the coin." has the
same problems as "Where do you expect to find yourself". The implication is that "self"
is not a unique 'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to be) but is process that can
be realized in different media.
Brent
Please, don't answer me again "W and M", because we already know that a machine cannot
perceive a distant environment, and that she will describe, as a result of
self-localization, after the duplication and when opening the box, a precise city.
Bruno
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