On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you are using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first person experience displayed in the WM duplication thought experience (UDA step 3).

Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and given that you are the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome, I will ask to give us an algorithm predicting the result of the future self-localization experience.

The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM is deterministic. And it has the same problems being given a probabilistic interpretation as EQM. If you duplicated a coin in the transporter experiment the question, "Where will you expect to find the coin." has the same problems as "Where do you expect to find yourself". The implication is that "self" is not a unique 'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to be) but is process that can be realized in different media.


Please, don't answer me again "W and M", because we already know that a machine cannot perceive a distant environment, and that she will describe, as a result of self-localization, after the duplication and when opening the box, a precise city.


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