On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > Identical bodies have identical minds, >
Yes. >but identical minds can have different bodies. > Who cares? It's consciousness I'm interested in. > The universe does not know you are John Clark. You do. > In my symmetrical room example I know who John Clark is but I don't know which body is John Clark nor do I need to know because if even the universe does not know or care then I don't see why I should. > I begin to think your problem is not with comp, but with the general > issue of the mind-body problem. Your acknowledged difficulties to see > Nagel points on the bat corroborates this. > To foolish people nonsense makes perfect sense, and to fail to understand incorrect ideas is a virtue not a vice. Nagel demands to know not what it would be like if he was a bat but what it is like for a bat to be a bat; the reason the "mind-body problem" has made so little progress is that to a disturbingly large number of people Nagel's question, and ones like it, makes perfect sense. I'm proud to say it does not make one particle of sense to me. > I gave you the precise definition, with the diaries and their owners. But > you are the one saying that this was hairsplitting and ask me to not come > back with the diary stuff. > My complaint was not that you were doing too much hairsplitting but that you were doing too little, hairsplitting is vital if you're using duplicating chambers. My complaint is that the diaries add nothing, it's obvious that if the diaries the people remember writing are identical then the people are too, and if they aren't then the people aren't either. > You seem unable to put yourself at the place of any of the resulting > copies. > I believe it's you that can't imagine yourself as a copy, even if you were identical you think you would somehow feel different. I don't. And to add to the confusion sometimes you admit that they would feel the same, but then in your next breath you start talking about how it's identical in the "3-view" but not the "1-view". > The 1-I of those copies is the usual 1-I, like in "can you touch your > nose". A third person can ask them where they are, or which movies they > saw, and get definite answers. > And both will give synchronized Identical answers. The third party does not know which one is you and you don't know either. > And if there is any mystery and indeterminacy in this thing you call >> "first person indeterminacy" it quickly reduces out to types of >> indeterminacy we've already known about, some for many thousands of years >> and others for only about 80. >> > > You keep saying this, but don't reply to the many debunking of that idea > that I have provided > Here we go again. Even after dozens of messages and I don't know how many thousands of words in reply to your posts there is supposed to be a killer point that you made in some post long ago in a galaxy far far away (that you don't bother to repeat) that would prove you right and me wrong and is so absolutely brilliant that my only possible strategy to deal with it is to simply ignore it. BULLSHIT! >You believe in some form of telepathy. > BULLSHIT! > No one can *feel* to be in two places at once > True, no "ONE" can feel to be in TWO places at once, but TWO can feel to be in TWO places at once. And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
