On 29 Mar 2012, at 18:31, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Mar 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Identical bodies have identical minds,


>but identical minds can have different bodies.

Who cares? It's consciousness I'm interested in.

We discuss only on the consequence of the comp hypothesis in cognitive science. It concerns the mind body problem, which involves consciousness and bodies.

> The universe does not know you are John Clark. You do.

In my symmetrical room example I know who John Clark is but I don't know which body is John Clark nor do I need to know because if even the universe does not know or care then I don't see why I should.

You should care to be able to answer the simple question: "what do you expect to feel in the multiplication-movie experience", which can help you to get the point of step 3.

> I gave you the precise definition, with the diaries and their owners. But you are the one saying that this was hairsplitting and ask me to not come back with the diary stuff.

My complaint was not that you were doing too much hairsplitting but that you were doing too little,

Then do it.
Technically, you are the one throwing out the nuances I made precise.

hairsplitting is vital if you're using duplicating chambers.

You said you favor Everett's QM. You did not answer Quentin when he commented that with Everett the Universe is a "duplicating chamber", so that your charge again the coimp-1-indeterminacy applies to Everett QM too.

My complaint is that the diaries add nothing, it's obvious that if the diaries the people remember writing are identical then the people are too, and if they aren't then the people aren't either.

But the you contradict your statement that both the guy in W and in M have the right to say that they are the guy who was at Helsinki, which makes indeed sense with comp.

> You seem unable to put yourself at the place of any of the resulting copies.

I believe it's you that can't imagine yourself as a copy, even if you were identical you think you would somehow feel different.

You keep attributing to me something I have never said.

I don't.

Me neither? I challenge you to quote me having said the contrary. You probably misunderstood a paragraph.

And to add to the confusion sometimes you admit that they would feel the same, but then in your next breath you start talking about how it's identical in the "3-view" but not the "1-view".

Could you quote me and be more precise.

> The 1-I of those copies is the usual 1-I, like in "can you touch your nose". A third person can ask them where they are, or which movies they saw, and get definite answers.

And both will give synchronized Identical answers.

In the step three experience we are talking about, they will give quite different answer. You are mixing different thought experiences.

The third party does not know which one is you and you don't know either.

The W guy know that he is a the guy in Helsinki, now instantiated in W.
The M guy know that he is a the guy in Helsinki, now instantiated in M.
They both know that they are not the guy in the other city.
They can both acknowledge the first person indeterminacy: they could not know in advance the city in which they feel now having been reconstituted. If the guy in Helsinki has enough cognitive ability todo the thought experience (like AUDA suggests that all Löbian can do, and like they can do in somemore technical term), he will conclude without doing the experience that would that experience be done, he would not be able to predict that he will end up in M, (resp in W), although he can predict that he will end up with certainty in M or W. This shows also that when you duplicate yourself you get one bit of information. That bit of information is part of both first person experience 1p. On the contrary the 3p view does not create, or receive, one bit of information.

> No one can *feel* to be in two places at once

True, no "ONE" can feel to be in TWO places at once, but TWO can feel to be in TWO places at once.

And 7 billions human beings can feel to be at 7 billions different places.

Why not, except that usually a collection of person is not perceive as a person, especially when isolated and distant.


I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you are using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first person experience displayed in the WM duplication thought experience (UDA step 3).

Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and given that you are the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome, I will ask to give us an algorithm predicting the result of the future self-localization experience.

Please, don't answer me again "W and M", because we already know that a machine cannot perceive a distant environment, and that she will describe, as a result of self-localization, after the duplication and when opening the box, a precise city.



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