On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 10:17 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
Stathis, I am afraid you took the easy way out.
Let me interject in ITALICS into your post-text below
JohnM
On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 9:41 AM,
Hi Bruno Marchal
.
IMHO, which you don't have to agree with, 3p is completely differnt from 1p
Here's how I see the whole picture:
1p = physical input signal from outside world into brain - (2p = the
mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing) ---
--- 3p = physical
The Black Box Consciousness Model [Objective Brain/Body-Subjective
Mind/Mental-Objective Brain/Body].
Here's how I now see the whole mindbrain consciousness complex:
I (physical input signal, brain/body, objective) --- II (Consciousness
[nonphysical black box signal processing] ,
On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 10:08 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/29/2012 12:32 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
In french we say popularly that about taste and color we don't argue.
(Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
That's because Francophones have no taste,
Hi Jason Resch
Yes, that I am reading this proves to me that I am conscious,
but not to you, which is what I mean by proof.
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/30/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Jason
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy
Dewey has always fascinated me because of the sweeping power
of his ideas, his blunt originality, and his emphasis on doing.
But his relativism is nowadays a bit too much for me (IMHO),
in my conservative old age. He might be called the father of
progressivism, so I
On 29 Dec 2012, at 20:51, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Why not take the categories of all categories (besides that Lawyere
tried that without to much success, except rediscovering
Grothendieck topoi).
I'm more interested in the smallest mathematical object in which all
mathematical
On 29 Dec 2012, at 21:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/29/2012 4:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 6:12 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
It's possible to prove that computers can be conscious if it can be
proved that the physical movement of the parts of the
On 29 Dec 2012, at 21:32, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
Hi Bruno,
On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:
The classic example
3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain
Hmm.. this is the idea, except that
On 29 Dec 2012, at 22:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/29/2012 12:32 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
In french we say popularly that about taste and color we don't
argue. (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell
the
On 30 Dec 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
.
IMHO, which you don't have to agree with, 3p is completely differnt
from 1p
Better not agreeing, as this limit the interest of conversing.
Here's how I see the whole picture:
1p = physical input signal from outside
A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1)
The Black Box theory of Mind as given below suggests that the mind/body problem
may be expressed analogously as a system theory in which mental consciousness
or subjectivity
is the time activity of the physical brain expressed in
Is there a physical object that exists physically which is not isomorphic
to a mathematical object, having mathematical existence?
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On Sunday, December 30, 2012 12:41:33 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1)
The Black Box theory of Mind as given below suggests that the mind/body
problem
may be expressed analogously as a system theory in which mental
consciousness or
On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 4:36 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote:
St: --Are you unsure if you're conscious?--
*No, I am human, so I THINK I am sure. That is no evidence. See my note
to your next * *remark:*
-
St: --Do you deny that there is even an APPEARANCE of an
Bruno:
thanks for the TITLE of your post including the * N O * .
John Mikes
(*Subject:* Re: Can the physical brain possibly store our memories ? No.)
)
On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Dec 2012, at 12:16, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
On 12/30/2012 3:36 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, December 30, 2012 12:41:33 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1)
The Black Box theory of Mind as given below suggests that the
mind/body problem
may be expressed analogously
On 12/30/2012 11:23 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Is there a physical object that exists physically which is not isomorphic to a
mathematical object, having mathematical existence?
If it exists physically then it has at least one attribute that no mathematical
object has.
Brent
--
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