Re: Indeterminism
Le 21-mars-06, à 02:50, Johnathan Corgan a écrit : Still, there is a certain appeal to shifting the question from Why are we conscious? to Consciousness doesn't exist, so why do we so firmly believe that it does? What would it mean that consciousness doesn't exist? It is not just hard to figure out what this would mean for me here and now; but it seems to me that such an idea could lead to some philosophy promoting the negation of the (first) person. I can doubt there is a God, I can doubt there is a Universe, I can doubt there is a universal wave function, I can doubt they are numbers, I can doubt that something interesting about consciousness can be said, and I can doubt that I am typing on a keyboard right now, but then I can hardly doubt I am *dreaming* ---at least--- that I am typing on a keyboard right now, and that what I am writing make sense even I fail to convey it, which actually I can doubt too (because for all practical purposes I don't doubt at all that if am conscious you are too). Consciousness is just a peculiar inescapable believe in a reality whatever that reality could be. It is that thing without which there would be no inquiries, nor interrogations. I suspect it arises in relatively self-moving entities, in part to avoid the possible collisions or to handle them. Bruno PS Formidable meeting at London. Otto Roessler coined the idea of consciousness as a form of prison which is coherent with the many world interpretation of QM and/or comp. Roessler shares with me a common and unfortunately rare understanding of Descartes mainly about the necessary relation imposed by his Mechanism between rationality and humanism. You can look here (but it is in German): http://www.suppose.de/texte/roessler.html http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
Le 25-mars-06, à 00:51, George Levy a écrit : Dear members of the list, Bruno and those who understand G. I have read or rather tried to read Smullyan's book. His examples are totally fabricated. I will never meet the white knight in the island of liars and truthtellers. Nor will any Lobian machines. The knight/knave Island is just a trick for having simple self-referential statements. I think you miss the heart of the matter section and the godelized universe. Not your fault and despite my love of Smullyan I am quasi willing to say Smullyan miss it too. The missing piece is Church thesis. And then with comp we can understand that lobian machines live in a Godelized Universe. I will come back on this. I need examples which are relevant to life, at least the way I understand it in the context of the many-worlds. OK, OK, I work on this since many years. Modal logics and Solovay's theorems provides a tools for progressing, but this need some understanding of computer science and mathematical logic. Einstein (or maybe someone writing about relativity) came up with the paradox of the travelling aging twin. Schroedinger came up with his cat's paradox. Tegmark came up with the quantum suicide experiment. Actually I came up before but this is anecdotical. But I have elaborated it in the comp frame. It is the UDA. You have acknowledge understanding it years ago. The interview of the lobian machine just illustrate how we can already interview of universal machine on the UDA question, and extract the logic of the physical propositions. Granted, I will never travel near the speed of light; I will never put a cat in a box equipped with a random and automatized killing device; and I will not attempt suicide; my wife would just kill me. However, these examples fired up my imagination: travelling near the speed of light, existing in a superposition of state, surviving a nuclear bomb under your chair. Smullyan's white knigth had the mission to teach me about the logic of G and G*. Sorry, he failed. All right, but this is just because he miss Church Thesis and Comp. His purpose actually is just to introduce you to Godel and Lob theorems, not to computer science. The heart of the matter is that mathematical systems (machines, angels, whatever) cannot escape the diagonalisation lemma, and so life for them is like the life of those reasoners travelling on fairy knight Knave island with curious self-referential question. With comp *we* cannot escape those diagonal propositions. The white knight does not fire up my imagination. I don't care about his island and about his questions. However I do care about life, death and immortality. The many-world does seem to guarantee a form of immortality, at least according to some interpretations. I consider this issue to be very relevant since sooner or later each one of us will be facing the issue of death or of non-death. I thought you did understand that comp entails different forms of immortality. The interveiw of the lobian machine makes it possible to get more precise consequences, including testable one (some already tested). I would like someone to come up with an extreme adventure story like the travelling twin, Schroedinger's cat, or Tegmark's suicide experiment to illustrate G and G*. For example this story would describe a close brush with death.. It would create a paradox by juxtaposing 1) classical or common sense logic assuming a single world, UDA shows rather directly the impossibility of single world. 2) classical or common sense logic assuming the many-world, ? and 3) G/G* logic assuming the many-world. Assuming comp, the third person worlds are the computational histories. An history is a computations as seen by from some internal point of view. the fact that correct self-referential propositions obeys G and G* makes it possible to describe those histories What would the white knight do if he were living in the many-world? What kind of situations would highlight his talent to think in G. Would his behavior appear to be paradoxical from our logical point of view? The white knight, (well actually any Knight on the Knight Knave Island!) are not even reasoners. None types of reasoner applies including G. The intuitive explanation why physics emerges from numbers and numbers' dream is already given in the UDA. Smullyan just introduce the logics of self-reference (the provable one, G, and the true one, G*). The relation with our field is the content of one half of my posts (the other half being UDA itself). I think you miss the diagonalization notion. I will work on that. I will give you real examples, but don't throw out FU to quickly. He makes something hard easy, but indeed don't give to much motivations, except some allusions to AI here and there. Bruno PS. I will answer other posts asap. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: I believe in relative measure and I think this is a key to resolve HP universes problem (I quote problem because I don't see why it is one after all). Saying **that** measure emerges from a purely mathematical multiverse theory is very different from being able to say **how**. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: [...] I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Cela est faux. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: [...] I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Cela est faux. As seen from your viewpoint I guess it seems so. Prejudices are things that bias our jugement while making us believe that it is not biased. This is exactly what does our experience. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 24-mars-06, à 19:36, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 16:40, 1Z a écrit :
No, I am not *spatially** inside a universe, becaue space is
physics,.
not maths ! The number 2 that features in the set {1,2,3} is exactly
the same as the number 2 in the set {2,3,4}. It has no way of knowing
which
set it is in! Mathematical sets are **not** spatial regions! You are
thinking
about maths in a physical way, not in a mathematical way!
You're playing with the language... I'll try to make another mail
longer to
explain what I mean. Please just recall that I said that You (at
time t) is
part of the *infinite* set of computations which goes throught your
state at
that time. That means Yes *2* cannot distinguish in which set... So
for two
times now you try to put word in my mouth which aren't.
That only makes the issue of my not experiencing HP universes worse...
Sure. It is because you are lead to the whiote rabbit problem. But it
is not because a problem appears to be worse that the problem does
not admit a solution, and you are free to study the one I derived from
few assumptions (comp, which is just yes doctor + church thesis +
arithmetical realism. The yes doctor can then be eliminated through
the listening of the discourse made by self-referentially correct
universal machine.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 25-mars-06, à 17:10, 1Z a écrit : Saying **that** measure emerges from a purely mathematical multiverse theory is very different from being able to say **how**. The UDA reasoning shows why, if comp or weaker is true, such measure must exist. The interview of the lobian machine explains in minute details how to extract it from theoretical computer science. See my url for some papers which explainsthis in details. I am very concise about here. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 24-mars-06, à 20:49, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 20:38, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: A quick point still : You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it due to HP world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical monism, but a consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose mathematical monism or not. Everett many world theory is not mathematical monism, still it support HP world. Physically MW theories are inherently more constrained than mathematical MW theories. You are not going to get water flowing uphill in a physical MW theory, because it contradicts the consevation of energy. Quantum theory predict that there is a very tiny chance that a broken cup of coffee restructured itself... yet in everett mw theory as all choices are made, there exists branches where this happen all the time. Yet as I'll quote you it is not observed... but that does not mean anything against everett mw. The fact that a theory is makes predictions that are not observed is always against it. I agree with this. It is an easy exercice to show that comp rules out classical physics or more generally any single universe physical theory. It predicts that if we look at ourself including our most probable environment close enough (= at a lower level than our substitution level) then we must be confronted with a notion of first person (plural) indeterminacy. many weirdness of QM are easily explained, although not yet all, to be sure. Plus physical theories have more resources available to explain why wrlds are separate and non-interacting. What resources ? space, time, causality. This is what we are trying to explain without putting the mind-body problem under the rug. Comp illustrates (to say the least) the non-obviousness of such notion. It is hard to take them fro granted. Especially where simpler explanations arise from computer science and self-reference. Finally, there is no particular reason why I have to support physical MW theories either! That's the whole point where you wanted to get till the beginning, you simply refuse any many world theories. I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. As Quentin said, the theory (comp and /or Everett) explained exactly why it is hard to have the experience of many world. A fist person cannot be first person aware of any of its third person duplication. Only intellectually can she imagine it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 24-mars-06, à 17:19, 1Z a écrit : A materialist cannot possible be worse off in explaining mind that a Mathematical Monist, sice he has at least one extra ingredient to play with. He is not obliged to deny that mind has anythign to do with computation, but when he hits problems he can appeal to matter itself -- for instance hypothesising that something about the specific physics/chemistry of the brain explains qualia. But physics/chemistry are turing emulable, and by UDA, cannot solve the problems. At least comp explmain why anything turing emulable can know non turing-emulable truth about herself. Comp gives a big role to the uncomputable, given that the first person must predict its experience on some limit of all computational process, and that limit can be shown to be non turing emulable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 24-mars-06, à 16:31, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 20-mars-06, à 00:04, John M a écrit : A Turing machine does nothing (by itself). Don't take the power for granted. Something has to OPERATE it to do anything. Why? How could a digital machine distinguish reality, virtual reality, arithmetical reality, etc. The question is about what computers are , form a 3rd-person perspective, not about what a machine would see from its own 1st person perspective. We know we have a 1st person perspecitve, and we have 3rd person knowledge of computers. That is the perspective of John's question. You question is from a machine's 1st person perspective. We don't even know that digitial computers have a 1st-person perspective. It is our assumption. I am conscious and I am turing emulable. So some machine can think. Your question might not even be valid. It is enough that the reasoning be valid. If we get a contradiction, we will abandon comp. Bruno: let me draw your attention to one little phrasing in Hal's (and everybody else's, I presume, as I read these posts)- text: If we assume... And if we do not? You will miss the consequences of the assumption. All science is based on implicit or explicit assumption, related to (non definable) world-views. Almost all science is based on the implicit assumption of a stuffy world view. No. This is a simplifying methodological assumption, but there is no evidence it is necessary. Few physicists use it. Except the week-end when they doesn't want to be copnfronted with tricky foundational problems. True, the idea that there is a stuffy universe, and that real = what we measure, is in vogue since Aristotle, but it is incompatible with comp (this has been proved, I am not speculating. I can prove it to you if you are interested). Therefore, the burden of proof is on those who seek to deny it. As I just said the proof already exists. See my url). (Not all realises this, and I don't insist because I like the idea of others finding it by themselves). But see my url or ask me. I don't pretend it is simple, but unless denying the 1-3 difference people who study it understand it, in general. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 24-mars-06, à 15:40, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Of course, we can't be sure when we close ourselves in from any explanation that is meaningless. We can run but we cannot hide from the fact that we will always have to make assumptions that are without basis. Even when we close ourselves in from any explanation that is not based on what we can grasp with our brains, that step itself is ultimately unsupported. This is what I've called rationalism *in a closed system*. Rationalism in a closed system, the supposed path to autonomy from the transcendent, itself requires faith. Rationalism itself requires faith, and so can be open. Only total form of rationalism are closed, but then non universal, as surely number theory of computer science are when they are not identified with such and such machine or formal theory. This explains why machines cannot not evolve. The openness is a consequence of the closure of the comp realm for the diagonalization procedure, what smullyan explains much to quickly in FU. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Fwd: Posting error: Everything List
I will comment asap, but first resend you message as you ask me to do. John wrote: Début du message réexpédié : De: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: 21 mars 2006 23:41:38 GMT+01:00 À: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]> Objet: Réexp : Posting error: Everything List Répondre à: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Dear Bruno, I sent the text below to the list and got it back as being kicked out from the list. The reason: I asked to validate my [EMAIL PROTECTED]> new, second address as well, so I can send posts from both mailboxes. Boring. May I ask you to post my text now, exceptionally, until I will straighten out the situation? Merci beaucoup votre John Mikes === --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Posting error: Everything List Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 22:32:20 + You do not have permission to post to group everything-list. You may need to join the group before being allowed to post, or this group may not be open to posting. Visit http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/about to join or learn more about who is allowed to post to the group. Help on using Google Groups is also available at: http://groups.google.com/support> Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 14:32:16 -0800 (PST) = From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Numbers - Evolution To: everything-list@googlegroups.com --- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Le 20-mars-06, à 17:31, Georges Quénot wrotet : I think that modern physics and the synthetic theory of evolution provide a resonable (though partial) account for the technical capabilities of the human mind. I want add something. Evolution provides an explanation of the technical ability of the human mind. But those technical ability are generally limited to third person describable phenomena. It does not explain the first person feature (including consciousness). The UDA at least shows that evolution, if you base it on physics, will lose the first person feature. That is why so much physicalists are tempted to just eliminate consciousness, either literally or under the label epiphenomena, or just uninteresting!. But I believe more in consciousness than in anything else, and any one understanding the sentence headache are annoying do, so elimination of consciousness is really like omitting data. But then, unless the UDA reasoning is wrong, eventually the comp-or-weaker hypothesis leads to an elimination of stuffy or primary matter. It is easier, after all to explain the dreamy *appearance* of matter from a consciousness theory, than to explain the disappearance of the lived consciousness from a theory of matter! * 2 points to that from my earlier positions: * EVOLUTION. I concluded after much speculation that in my narrative I will call evolution the history of this universe from its origination to its re-dissipation into the infinite dynamic invariance (what I call 'plenitude'). As for its mechanism I find it reasonable to ASSUME (yes, Bruno, I use this word) that in the wholistic total interconnectedness of everything (pertinent to THIS universe, of course) ANY (and all) changes occur by effects we register or not. In our narrow terrestrial view SOME are applicable for further changes, some not. These are the dead ends 'evolutionary science' does not even talk about - or call them 'extinct'. So 'evolution' does not 'provide explanations'. It happens and we partially observe the happenings. We have no idea at which stage 'evolution' stands now: close to the beginning or the end. CONSCIOUSNESS: which 'kind' are you talking about? The noumenon is unrestrictedly applied to the needs and taste of all researchers involved with such domains. My variation was deemed a 'functional' type, vs the awareness. neurological etc. types. I extended 'MY' Ccness ID into the entire (universe-al) inventory by saying: it is Acknowledgement of - and response to - information Information in this sense is any absorbed/obsderved difference by anything/anybody. Memory is response (mental or what some call: material built-in memory). Just my thoughts, from more than a decade ago. Info may include an ion-reaction or the Magna Charta. It is like Hal's 'first description' from the same time vs his recent position: I am changing my views as well. Bruno John http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: [...] I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Cela est faux. As seen from your viewpoint I guess it seems so. Prejudices are things that bias our jugement while making us believe that it is not biased. This is exactly what does our experience. Georges. what makes you immune ? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 25-mars-06, à 03:39, Brent Meeker a écrit : I believe in relative measure and I think this is a key to resolve HP universes problem (I quote problem because I don't see why it is one after all). What's relative measure? Do you mean the Born Rule. To retain it as an axiom vitiates the explanatory power of MW. But all attempts to derive it seem to have fallen into cicularity. I am not sure they are all circular (in the QM literature). Anyway I think Quantin was talking on the measure in general, of any set of observer-moment consistent continuations. But I would say there is a problem here. Even a mathematical one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 24-mars-06, à 17:19, 1Z a écrit : A materialist cannot possible be worse off in explaining mind that a Mathematical Monist, sice he has at least one extra ingredient to play with. He is not obliged to deny that mind has anythign to do with computation, but when he hits problems he can appeal to matter itself -- for instance hypothesising that something about the specific physics/chemistry of the brain explains qualia. But physics/chemistry are turing emulable, that is debatable. and by UDA, cannot solve the problems. Arguments form computer science can only be relevant to physics or chemistry if you regard them as mathematical abstractions. The Searlian point is that there is something about the actual, concrete non-abstract existence/occurence of real physical processes that explains the hard problems (IOW, physics in the sense of territory, not map). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 24-mars-06, à 16:31, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 20-mars-06, à 00:04, John M a écrit : A Turing machine does nothing (by itself). Don't take the power for granted. Something has to OPERATE it to do anything. Why? How could a digital machine distinguish reality, virtual reality, arithmetical reality, etc. The question is about what computers are , form a 3rd-person perspective, not about what a machine would see from its own 1st person perspective. We know we have a 1st person perspecitve, and we have 3rd person knowledge of computers. That is the perspective of John's question. You question is from a machine's 1st person perspective. We don't even know that digitial computers have a 1st-person perspective. It is our assumption. I am conscious and I am turing emulable. So some machine can think. That doesn't follow. An emulation of you must have some kind of functional equaivalence or isomomrphism, but that leaves it as a map, not as a territory. You can no more guarantee that your functional equivalent is conscious (not a Zombie) than you can guarantee that you can gor potatoes in the map of a farm. Bruno: let me draw your attention to one little phrasing in Hal's (and everybody else's, I presume, as I read these posts)- text: If we assume... And if we do not? You will miss the consequences of the assumption. All science is based on implicit or explicit assumption, related to (non definable) world-views. Almost all science is based on the implicit assumption of a stuffy world view. No. This is a simplifying methodological assumption, but there is no evidence it is necessary. Few physicists use it. I can assure you that real-life physicsists do use it. If you get your information about physics from new-age books, that is another matter. Except the week-end when they doesn't want to be copnfronted with tricky foundational problems. True, the idea that there is a stuffy universe, and that real = what we measure, is in vogue since Aristotle, but it is incompatible with comp (this has been proved, I am not speculating. I can prove it to you if you are interested). So much for comp. I wasn't very convinced by it anyway. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 25-mars-06, à 19:10, 1Z a écrit : The Searlian point is that there is something about the actual, concrete non-abstract existence/occurence of real physical processes that explains the hard problems (IOW, physics in the sense of territory, not map). Searles is notoriously invalid in his conclusions, as I tend to think Hofstadter and Dennett Made clear. (And then the UDA is far more devastating than their argument). When you say yes to the doctor you already believed that a piece of the (mind) territory is relatively captured by a map. An artificial brain is not just a model, in that perspective. Comp does not explain everything, but it makes many problem at least formulable, and then partial solution arise. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 25-mars-06, à 19:17, 1Z a écrit : That doesn't follow. An emulation of you must have some kind of functional equaivalence or isomomrphism, but that leaves it as a map, not as a territory. You can no more guarantee that your functional equivalent is conscious (not a Zombie) than you can guarantee that you can gor potatoes in the map of a farm. Right! That is why comp needs a non trivial act of faith. I can assure you that real-life physicsists do use it. Give reference please. If you get your information about physics from new-age books, that is another matter. I don't follow you. Give explicit references. I never put people in any category. Your remark just makes no sense for me. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: peterdjones wrote: [...] I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Cela est faux. As seen from your viewpoint I guess it seems so. Prejudices are things that bias our judgement while making us believe that it is not biased. This is exactly what does our experience. what makes you immune ? You must have misunderstood me. I do not feel immune. I do not even feel better placed than anybody else. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 25-mars-06, à 19:17, 1Z a écrit : You will miss the consequences of the assumption. All science is based on implicit or explicit assumption, related to (non definable) world-views. Almost all science is based on the implicit assumption of a stuffy world view. No. This is a simplifying methodological assumption, but there is no evidence it is necessary. Few physicists use it. I can assure you that real-life physicsists do use it. Give reference please. Typing physics matter into google produces 108,000,000 hits... http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=enq=physics+matterbtnG=Google+Searchmeta= ...happy reading. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
