Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 22:40, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>>Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>>Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 22:08, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>>
No, the hypothetical was stronger than that: it was that I knew exactly
how your brain worked to the degree tha
On Thu, Jul 20, 2006 at 04:07:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Surely there is much more to Chalmers than this. What you call
> "anti-chalmerites" here, are those naturalist who just don't get the
> understanding of the mind/body problem. They are numerous since about
> 500 after JC. So th
Apologies for being out of touch with the list, I can only dip a toe
in occasionally these days.
Stathis wrote:
> It seems to me trivially obvious that any sufficiently complex physical
> system implements any finite computation, just as any sufficiently
> large block of marble contains every ma
Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 22:40, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 22:08, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> >>No, the hypothetical was stronger than that: it was that I knew exactly
> >> how your brain worked to the degree that I could make one.
> >
> > You c
Dear Bruno, please, don't even read this:
(This is not a personal attack on you or YOUR theory, it is a common belief
and I question its usability - not by opposing, just curious to find a way
to accept it and experience the happiness of the mathematicians).
It is a retardating barrier for me
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 22:08, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>>No, the hypothetical was stronger than that: it was that I knew exactly how
>>your brain worked to the degree that I could make one.
>
>
> You could know everything on how my brain works without being ever
Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 22:08, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> No, the hypothetical was stronger than that: it was that I knew exactly how
> your brain worked to the degree that I could make one.
You could know everything on how my brain works without being ever able
feeling being me... And I rep
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi Brent,
>
> Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 17:52, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>>That's simply an assumption. When we know how to make a conscious brain we
>>may find that we do have a good idea of what it experiences - as evidenced
>>by its self-reports and other behavoir.
Jesse;
while I fully support your objection to 1Z's
"natural laws are the same in all naturally possible worlds."
and
"Well, it's hard to imagine pain being anything other
than painful!"
I question your restrictions in:
>any world that does not contain a logical or mathematical
> impossibility
Stathis,
Sorry, but I expected better from you. "Not denying" is
not "believing" or "entertaining"..
Besides you address an example smack from this (our)
universe even from this solar system, where we, humans,
evolved upon these given conditions, while I definitely pointed to
'possibiliti
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent:
>some give rise to mind, >while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't
>this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a >computer could
>never be conscious because even if it exact
Hi Brent,
Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 17:52, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> That's simply an assumption. When we know how to make a conscious brain we
> may find that we do have a good idea of what it experiences - as evidenced
> by its self-reports and other behavoir.
>
> >On the other hand,
> > if y
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
>
>
>>> A lot of the stuff criticising Chalmer's thesis is quite strident, at least
>>> by the usual
>>> academic> > standards. It's not quite as severe as the reaction to Roger
>>> Penrose's theories
>>> on the mind, but> > almost
This is not the roadmap. I think aloud in case it helps (me or someone
else).
Le 21-juil.-06, à 15:01, I wrote
> This can be made precise with the logics G&Co, but for this I should
> explain before the roadmap George has suggested (asap).
My problem. How much should I rely on Plotinus?
W
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what I > meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for deciding > when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated physically, > with each instantiation contributing to th
Le 21-juil.-06, à 00:26, 1Z wrote (to Jesse)
> If you can't even express qualia mathemtically how
> can you have a mathemtically necessary psychophysical law ?
Mmmm I smell a pre-godelian conception of mathematics. No rich part
of math can be self-sufficient.
But that absence of self-suff
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> > A lot of the stuff criticising Chalmer's thesis is quite strident, at least by the usual academic> > standards. It's not quite as severe as the reaction to Roger Penrose's theories on the mind, but> > almost. Many cognitive scientists seem to take anything
Le 20-juil.-06, à 18:07, John M a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
I appreciate your efforts to 'enlighten' me (and maybe others as well). my case there is more ignorance interfering with the explanations and I will re-re-read your post before I come to a conclusion.
As I tried to tell, when you "matter-of-fa
Le 20-juil.-06, à 22:38, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
>>
>> OK, but my feeling is that you need to abandon comp to be able to cut
>> down such form of reasoning. Or you should perhaps point on some
>> precise step you judge not convincing.
>
> Can you repost that link to the steps of your argument in o
Le 20-juil.-06, à 22:38, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
> So, do you think that the idea of "psychophysical laws" whose sole
> purpose
> is to decide if larger computations contain instantiations of smaller
> ones,
> and therefore contribute to their overall measure, violates
> "computationalism" as yo
Then if you take your theory seriously enough you will be lead to
Chalmers or Penrose sort of theory which needs actual non Turing
emulable stuff to make singular your experience or even "local nature".
Why not? I find this a bit speculative, and I am interested more in the
consequence of the
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