RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
John Mikes writes: > Stathis: > would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at > the * I plant into your text? > The words: "in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our > interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the > 'world'." OK, I could accept the inclusion of that clause. > That would underline your subsequent sentence - if you kindly stop > denigrating the term 'metaphysics' - a pejoration of the same 'carried away' > physicists. I guess those physicists and philosophers in the Empiricist tradition have poisoned my mind against theology and metaphysics. Sorry, can't help it. > The word 'prediction' also sends the chill alongside my spine: how can a > model based on a model predict events subject to impact from 'beyond model' > changes? > The many results of science-technology should not lead us into a generalized > acceptance of the model-based thinking. This list is a good example. Prediction in science is not like prediction by oracles and prophets. If you take your umbrella with you when you see that the sky is cloudy, you are implicitly making a scientific prediction based on a meteorological model. Science is really just common sense writ large. Stathis Papaioannou > John Mikes > > - Original Message - > From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 8:54 PM > Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' > > > > As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make > predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and say > "this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" then they > are > talking metaphysics, not physics. > > Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Words like "real", "physical" "material" needs to be (re)defined or at > least clarify in front of the UDA. They don't need apriori, rationalist clarity, since they can be defended by the empiricist-Johnsoinian approach. > > Proponents of the argument need to show that the causality > > and dynamism are inessential (that there is no relevant difference > > between process and programme) before you can have consciousness > > implemented Platonically. > > > I would say there is no relevant difference, from the first person > point of view, between a process in a "real universe" and a relative > computation in Platonia. If Platonia is not real in any sense, it cannot contain observers, persons, appearances, etc. > > To exist Platonically is to exist eternally and necessarily. There is > > no time or changein Plato's heave. > > > All partial recursive solutions of Schroedinger or Dirac equation > exists in Platonia, and define through that "block description" notion > of internal time quite analogous to Everett subjective probabilities. The A-series cannot be reduced to the B-series. > > Therefore, to "gain entry", a > > computational mind will have to be translated from a running process > > into something static and acausal. > > > > One route is to replace the process with a programme. After all, the > > programme does specify all the possible counterfactual behaviour, and > > it is basically a string of 1's and 0's, and therefore a suitabale > > occupant of Plato's heaven. But a specification of counterfactual > > behaviour is not actual counterfactual behaviour. The information is > > the same, but they are not the same thing. > > > A program is basically the same as a number. No it isn't. You don't know which programme is specified by a number without knowing how the number is to be interpreted, ie what hardware it is running on. > A process or a computation > is a finite or infinite sequence of numbers (possibly branching, and > defined relatively to a universal numbers). It is not just a sequence, because a sequence does not specify counterfactuals. > The UD build all such (branching) sequences. If it exists. > > Physical many-world theories have resources to keep counterfactuals > > unobserved that immaterial MW-theories lack (including the simple > > of one that many mathematical possibilities do not > > exist physically). What does not exist cannot be observed. That is the Somethingist solution to White Rabbits. > > Consciousness is a problem for all forms of materialism and physicalism > > to some extent, but it is possible to discern where the problem is > > particularly acute. There is no great problem with the idea that matter > > considered as a bare substrate can have mental properities. > > > Panpsychism ? That's "*can* have mental properties". Implying also "can *not* have mental properties". Property dualism, not contra panpsychism. > An electron would be conscious? Why do you think there > are neurons in brains? > Why do you think there are genes in cells? Do you think they are only > amplifiers of particle's mind. > Note that this would not a priori contradict comp per se, it would only > make the substitution level very low. (Unlikely imo, but that is not > relevant for our discussion). > > Any > > inability to have mental properties would itself be a property and > > therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate. The > > "subjectivity" of conscious states, often treated as "inherent" boils > > down to a problem of communicating one's qualia -- how one feels, how > > things seem. Thus it is not truly inherent but depends on the means of > > communication being used. Feelings and seemings can be more readily > > communicated in artistic, poetic language, and least readily in > > scientific, technical language. Since the harder, more technical a > > science is, the more mathematical it is, the communication problem is > > at its most acute in a purely mathematical langauge. Thus the problem > > with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare substrate) but > > its other posit, that all properties are physical. Since physics is > > mathematical, that amounts to the claim that all properties are > > mathematical (or at least mathematically describable). In making the > > transition from a physicalist world-view to a mathematical one, the > > concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was never a > > problem for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties > > becomes, which is a problem for consciousness becomes extreme. > > > Why? Because in a mathematics-only universe, qualia have to be identified with, or reduced to, mathematical structures. http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/diagrams/matter_substrate.jpg > > > > > > The interesting thing is that these two problems can be used to solve > > each other to some extent. if we allow extra-mathemtical properties > > into our universe,
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Russell Standish wrote: > . The UD is > quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of where > Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious > processes. *Know* --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Russell Standish wrote: > Supervenience requires a token, or object in the physical world, that > consciousness supervenes. All I'm saying is that this token must > really implement all the counterfactual situations, ie exist in a > Multiverse. Multiverses don't implement counterfactuals as COUNTERfactuals, they implement them as "factuals" which are not happening "here". Single universes allow for factuals that are the single set of actual facts. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >>As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make >>predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and >>say >>"this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" then they >>are >>talking metaphysics, not physics. >> >>Stathis Papaioannou >> > > > The archaic usage of the word metaphysics, which became a pejorative > somewhere around the time of Kant, is no longer viable or productive. The > modern usage of the term Meta = about... far more productive. > > meta-chemistry example...table of elements > meta-data ... computer science term > meta-mathematics ... 'about' a mathematics I agree, let's write it meta-physics. > > I'd like to eliminate the older usage of the term. It doesn't work as a > descriptor, especially in physics! > > You're right about the physicists, though... they are the most > 'model-bound' in all science. Their beliefs about what they do...in effect > a theology of mathematical models... is worst in cosmology. To continue to > believe in the intractability of any formulation of an underlying reality > in spite of glaring evidence to the contrary...and that it is deserved of > a pejorative label is. You have a formulation of an underlying reality which is not only tractable, but for which you have glaring evidence of its tractability? Is it also correct? I'd like to see it. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Russell Standish writes: > > > Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness, > > but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you? > > > > The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not > > equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that > > recordings aren't conscious. > > Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice > that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel > branches > in the multiverse suddenly vanished? Yes. If all the following are true: 1) we, as conscious beings, are computations 2) computations require counterfactuals. 3) Multiple branches implement countefactuals. > > The Maudlin/movie-graph argument relies upon the equivalence *in fact* > > of recordings and computations in a single universe. Hence the focus > > on *counter fact*. > > These arguments seem to take it as axiomatic that consciousness requires the > handling of counterfactuals. Perhaps the origin of this idea is the reasonable > observation that intelligent entities worthy of the name must be able to > adjust > to changes in the environment. The origin is computationalism. You could abadon it, but you would need to find another route to Platonism. > However, the effect of intelligent beings who > interact in surprising ways with their environment could be created by a > sufficiently > complex computer program or model universe, like a cellular automaton, with > fixed > rules + initial conditions, playing out the same way however many times it > was run. Fixed rules+initial conditions can be reduced to fixed output, which is no-one's idea of computation.. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Various people write: > > > blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah > > But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in > a recording at the moment? The question is why you don't regard the recordings in your video cabinet as conscious. Well, if you do, you have probably murdered some people by taping over them. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Russell Standish wrote: > On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 01:18:06PM -, 1Z wrote: > > > > That is an interesting point. However, a computation would have to be > > associated > > with all related branches in order to bring all the counterfactuals (or > > rather > > conditionals) into a single computation. > > > > (IOW treating branches individually would fall back into the problems > > of the Movie approach) > > > > If a computation is associated with all branches, consciousness will > > also be > > according to computationalism. That will bring on a White Rabbit > > problem with a vengeance. > > Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one > branch, Why ? > but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious > experience at all. I don't see why. According to computationalism, consciousness supervenes on a computation, or multiple computations. According to the "many worlds" answer to the counterfactual problem, one comuputation corrsponds to many branches. So consciousness must correspond to multiple branches. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 23-août-06, à 14:39, Russell Standish a écrit : > > > > > On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >> > >>> Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete > >>> primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption. > >> > >> > >> This depends entirely of what you mean by physical. If > >> "physical-supervenience" alludes to the comp-physics, then ok. If this > >> alludes to physics as understood by a aristotelian-matter physicist, > >> then physical supervenience need it. > >> Maudlin talk only about supervenience. For him it is just obvious that > >> comp makes it physical. Of course he is wrong there (or UDA contains > >> an > >> error, but this remains to be shown). > >> I have coined the term "physical supervenience", with "physical" > >> having > >> its standard aristotelian sense just to distinguish it with the > >> comp-supervenience idea that mind relies on the immaterial > >> computations > >> (an infinity of them to be precise). > >> > >> > >> Bruno > >> > >> > >> > >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > >> > > > > > > Then this probably explains the confusion. Supervenience is merely > > the statement that the physical tokens of a consciousness cannot be > > identical for two different consciousnesses. The is independent of > > whether those "physical tokens" are "stuffy" or not - remember I have > > already bought your reversal of physical and mental explanations. > > > Thanks for acknowledging. > > > > > > Since you have already used "physical" to refer to this appearance of > > an objective universe, I merely thought you meant this classical > > supervenience when contraposed against computational supervenience. > > > I should perhaps use more systematically the expression "comp-physical". > > > > > > My point is that this classical supervenience is another way of > > stating the anthropic principle, and it is essential to avoid the > > whole idealist programme spiralling down the plughole of solipsism. > > > > So what your really saying when you've shown COMP => - PHYS SUP is > > that stuffy materialism is contradicted?? > > > Not really contradicted. Only that stuffy materialism cannot attach the > first person to material stuff. Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate. If it were impossible to attach a class of properties to a substrate, that would constitute a property of the substrate, and so it would not be bare > The notion of stuff loose its ability > to explain the behavior of matter (which emerges from a measure on an > infinity of computations). It does not loose its ability to explain > mind because, well, it has never succeed on that question to begin > with. Bare substrate is compatible with qualia. Nothing-but-numbers is not. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 23-août-06, à 13:32, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) wrote (in different posts) : > > > > > There are many interpretations of the box and diamond. > > Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based > > on provability (or provability within a system). But there are, > > and always were, ideas of necessity based on truth rather than > > provability. > > > I agree (so what?) So all mathematical staments are still necesary-qua-proof even if they are possible-qua-provability. So contingent truths -- like "matter doesn't exist" -- don't belong in Platonia. > >> Since the failure of logicism, by Godel's theorem, we can argue that > >> numbers does not necessarily exist. Numbers does not come from logic > >> alone. If you want them, > > > > to exist > > > >> you have to do a ontological commitment. > > > > ..and if you want to play with them as a formal > > system, you don't. > > > I am not sure I follow you (terminological) nuance between "wanting > something" and "wanting something to exist". All you have to assume or adopt in order to *do* arithmetic -- beyond logic -- is additional axioms. > The move toward formalism does not work for any theory of formal > system. This is a consequence of Godel's incompleteness. GIT means there are theorems which cannot be proven within *a* formal system. It does not mean there are theorems which cannot be proven with *any* formal systems. Every mathmetical proof procedes from axioms and rulesof inference. A claim to have peeked into Plato's heaven doesn not count as proof. > I don't believe the formalistic philosophical position can even make > sense of notion like "yes doctor". That depends on what you mean by "yes doctor". As far as most people are concerned , "yes Doctor" is about the ability of silicon to emulate organic matter. Most people woul not assent to being killed here, in the sublunar wolrd, on the basis that they would still survive in Plato's heaven. > Still less about arithmetical truth, > unless you formalize all this in second order arithmetic or in set > theory, but then you need to rely on informal intuition at that level. "Informal intuition" still doens't require Platonic objects. There are several non-Platonic theoires, formalism is not the only one. > > Hence the need for a metaphysical account of > > matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the > > physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. > > > I have not the slightest idea of what could be > "matter-as-bare-substance". > Does "matter-as-bare-substance" possess a mass? Not necessarily. > Does "matter-as-bare substance" violate Bell's inequality? Not necessarily. > Does such questions make sense, when you add that such bare matter has > no property of its own? > Especially when you put some consciousness in it. If I put consciounsess on it, it is no longer bare. However, there is no *contradiction* in the idea -- and hence no *hard* problem. > It seems to me that > you are trying to use a "metaphysical notion" just to put in there all > remaining unsolved fundamental questions. So are you: the difference is that I know I am, and I know I must. No amount of mathematics will dodge the metaphyiscal question. If I am in Plato's heaven, then Plato's heaven must exist in the same way that I exist , whatever that is. That is the metaphysical quesiton which has not been addressed. > > For a formalist, there is nothing to numbers except definitions (axoms, > > etc),. The numbers themselves do not have to exist. So there is > > still no necessary ontological commitment in CT. > > > OK. In that sense comp does not make any ontological commitment at all. That is what I have been saying all along! > "as if" will always be enough, even for the comp-electrons and protons. > Are you formalist? Could you develop your notion of bare matter in a > formalistic theory of physics? If I am formalist about mathematics, that doesn not mean I have to be formalist about physics. Prima-facie, there is a difference between maths and physics. In physics, you have to *look* -- in maths, you don't. > What about the "interpretation" of such a theory. > Note that formalist have no problem with the lobian interview, which > can indeed be seen as the formal counterpart of the UDA reasoning, but > I am not sure any mind/body questions addressed in that enterprise > could make sense to a formalist philosopher. > I agree with Girard (french logician, discoverer of linear logic) that > "formalism" in logic is just bureaucracy: it is more harmful than > useless, imo. I am nor exaclty a formalist. I am using formalism as an example of a non-Platonic approach . There are others. The important point is that nothing is ontologically guaranteed by comp or CT or AR -- but, for your conclusions, something needs to be. > >> I said something along such line some times ago. I can provide a > >> (short) explanation. The reason is the Hilbert-Polya conjecture > >> according to which the
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Stathis: > would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at > the * I plant into your text? > The words: "in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our > interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the > 'world'." > That would underline your subsequent sentence - if you kindly stop > denigrating the term 'metaphysics' - a pejoration of the same 'carried away' > physicists. > > The word 'prediction' also sends the chill alongside my spine: how can a > model based on a model predict events subject to impact from 'beyond model' > changes? If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because there is grey doesn't mean there is no black and white. > The many results of science-technology should not lead us into a generalized > acceptance of the model-based thinking. Should we then resort mystical thinking or armchair philosophizing or theological revelation? >This list is a good example. Can you do some other kind of thinking? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make > predictions about how the world works. If physists get carried away and say > "this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" then they are > talking metaphysics, not physics. Yes. That is the problem. (Apart from the "nothing exists" approach...) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy). > > > > > > True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. > > > > Hence the need for a metaphysical account of > > matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the > > physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. > That would be like theology. Theology uses the vocabulary of traditional metaphysics, but not all traditional metaphysics is theology --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
On Thu, Aug 24, 2006 at 09:04:26PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
> that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel
> branches
> in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
>
I think this question is ill-posed, but I'll try to answer another
question that may have some bearing on what your trying to get at.
The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not
think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there
is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD is
quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of where
Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
processes.
This is what I believe Maudlin's argument is telling us.
So am I computationalist? On the most obvious level, no. However,
considering the above perhaps I am Bruno's sort of computationalist
with a very deep level of replacement (ie switching entire realities).
Confused? That would make two of us.
Cheers
--
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is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
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email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
> > As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make > predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and > say > "this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" then they > are > talking metaphysics, not physics. > > Stathis Papaioannou > The archaic usage of the word metaphysics, which became a pejorative somewhere around the time of Kant, is no longer viable or productive. The modern usage of the term Meta = about... far more productive. meta-chemistry example...table of elements meta-data ... computer science term meta-mathematics ... 'about' a mathematics I'd like to eliminate the older usage of the term. It doesn't work as a descriptor, especially in physics! You're right about the physicists, though... they are the most 'model-bound' in all science. Their beliefs about what they do...in effect a theology of mathematical models... is worst in cosmology. To continue to believe in the intractability of any formulation of an underlying reality in spite of glaring evidence to the contrary...and that it is deserved of a pejorative label is. .. theology A much better pejorative! cheers, Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 24-août-06, à 08:51, Tom Caylor a écrit : > I agree with the importance of recursion theory. By the way I got the > book by Cutland. Nice. It is a very good book. I recommend it heartily to all those who want to dig a bit the math behind the comp. hyp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Le 24-août-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >> I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable* >> conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience "with the >> right >> (relative) probabilities" > > It may as a matter of fact be the case that our consciousness is > spread across > multiple branches, but I don't see how this would confer stability. > When people > pray for something, they are actually asking God to prune the > multiverse branches > in which undesirable outcomes occur. If God complies, in the extreme > case leaving > only a single branch intact, their future conscious experience will be > very stable > indeed. OK. You also ask this to Russell: > Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or > notice > that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the > parallel branches > in the multiverse suddenly vanished? I think we would. Suppose you put coffee in a cup. One second after you drink it. Now, both with the comp hyp., or with just the quantum hypothesis, you know there are quantum or comp continuations in which the coffee will be transformed into tea (or white rabbits ...). Suppose God prunes all the branches where the coffee does not change, then, during that second, the probability of drinking coffee, relatively to tour experience of having put coffee in the cup, will be zero. I guess you will noticed the difference. Recall the seventh step of the UDA (in the SANE version of UDA with 8 steps). You drop a pen, and you evaluate the probability that the pen hits the ground (if that is english). By the comp first person indetermincacy, the comp-exact first plural calculus, in principle, consists in considering *all* computations in UD* (i.e. generated by the UD in Platonia where we are supposed to be infinitely patient) going through your "actual state" (i.e. the one when you will just bring the cup to your mouth), and to see what is going on (from some third person pov) in each of the consistent computational continuations. If some "comp Goddess" was able to prune, the way she wants, the computation or their continuations she could change arbitrarily your local physical laws, and unless she decides to revised your memory (and thus your actual states) you would notice. All right? This should answer your questions. About your question "could a recording be conscious?" Well, let me quote you: > But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in > a recording at the moment? True, I am surprised by my experiences > and believe I could have acted differently had I wanted to, but that > might all be part of the script to which I am not privy, so that things > could only have been different if the recording had been different. I think I mainly agree with you, but I have some reason to discard expression like "a recording can be conscious". If it is a recording of a (genuine) *computation* (unlike just a program), you can *associate* consciousness to not really to the recording, but to the "person" having that piece of computation recorded. That is, I think only "person" can think. I don't believe a brain can think, nor any piece of local "comp-matter". Only persons think, and only first persons are aware of thinking. Giving your other posts, I think this could just be a terminological nuance, but it helps to separate persons and their many relative third person (or first plural) incarnations/implementations. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Stathis:
would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at
the * I plant into your text?
The words: "in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our
interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the
'world'."
That would underline your subsequent sentence - if you kindly stop
denigrating the term 'metaphysics' - a pejoration of the same 'carried away'
physicists.
The word 'prediction' also sends the chill alongside my spine: how can a
model based on a model predict events subject to impact from 'beyond model'
changes?
The many results of science-technology should not lead us into a generalized
acceptance of the model-based thinking. This list is a good example.
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 8:54 PM
Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and say
"this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" then they
are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
Stathis Papaioannou
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
> Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2006 11:51:07 -0400
>
>
> Stathis,
>
> you touched the 'truth' (a word I put into "-" because I don't believe
it).
> Matter
> cannot be an "is" - actually or virtually. Rutherford's empty atom shows
the
> dichotomy between 'effects' ('affects'?) and 'explanation' (more than just
> words).
> The figment 'matter' is a product of 'mental evolution' in this universe,
to
> catch imputes we cannot handle. 'We' is here the mental evolution of the
> universe. It was not man, or the old ape who decided "let there be matter
in
> our thinking" - it was a zillion-stepwise development to cope with
'affects'
> we experienced without better explanation. So we (humans and animals)
> nowadays (~1b years?) accept the notion that 'there IS matter' and we can
> interact with it. Physics is a product in this development of reductionist
> efforts to 'organize' our world for ourselves.
> And then came the other sciences as well, in the same reductionism.
>
> We better do not chase a figment, as long as we are living IN IT - accept
> its use and the uncertainty of whatever we talk about. It looks like a
basic
> tenet in our "percept of reality" - the "what we see is what we live with"
> from which I TRY to get to a better understanding (not yet achieved, of
> course). All our life, the base knowledge, the technology, the mental
> construct, is a product of this figment.
>
> Yes, matter is not matterly, just believed so. Energy is a cop-out - a
> 'name' for something we cannot put our finger on (mentally). And so are
> numbers.
>
> The theories you decry, or promote, all of them, are in the same circle.
>
> Regards
>
> John Mikes
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "1Z"
> Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 5:11 AM
> Subject: RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
>
>
>
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > > I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
> >
> > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
>
> True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At
> the turn of last century Rutherford showed that atoms were mostly
> empty space. Tables and chairs did not suddenly become less solid as
> a result, but it became clear that their apparent solidity was not
> actually evidence that atoms are solid all the way through. In a similar
> fashion, the apparent solidity of matter is not actually evidence that it
> isn't just fluff all the way down, or part of a computer simulation. Our
> physical theories describe the behaviour of matter without formally
> addressing this question at all, despite what prejudices and working
> assumptions physicists may have about the true basis of physical reality.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
> _
> Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
>
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>
>
>
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RE: computationalism and supervenience
Bruno Marchal writes: > > On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 08:32:04PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> > >> Russell Standish writes: > >> > >>> Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one > >>> branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious > >>> experience at all. > >> > >> What does this mean? > >> > >> Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable* > conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience "with the right > (relative) probabilities" It may as a matter of fact be the case that our consciousness is spread across multiple branches, but I don't see how this would confer stability. When people pray for something, they are actually asking God to prune the multiverse branches in which undesirable outcomes occur. If God complies, in the extreme case leaving only a single branch intact, their future conscious experience will be very stable indeed. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Are First Person prime?
Brent Meeker writes: > > In a deterministic universe, saying that things could have turned out > > differently had initial > > conditions or physical laws been different is analogous to saying the sound > > coming out of the > > speakers could have been different if the grooves on the record or the > > equalisation in the > > preamp stage had been different. > > That still sounds like a cheat to me. If it's recording of the universe it's > an > inputless program, since there is no "environment" outside the universe. But > when > you invoke the analogy of the record, you conceive the grooves and the > initial > conditions as input. The fundamental constants and physical laws could be taken as "input". There are of course various theories as to how these values have been set, ranging from "God made it that way" to multiverse theories in which every possibility is realised but only some lead to conscious observers. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Russell Standish writes:
> Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
> but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?
>
> The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
> equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that
> recordings aren't conscious.
Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel
branches
in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
> The Maudlin/movie-graph argument relies upon the equivalence *in fact*
> of recordings and computations in a single universe. Hence the focus
> on *counter fact*.
These arguments seem to take it as axiomatic that consciousness requires the
handling of counterfactuals. Perhaps the origin of this idea is the reasonable
observation that intelligent entities worthy of the name must be able to adjust
to changes in the environment. However, the effect of intelligent beings who
interact in surprising ways with their environment could be created by a
sufficiently
complex computer program or model universe, like a cellular automaton, with
fixed
rules + initial conditions, playing out the same way however many times it was
run.
Maybe this isn't the type of world we actually live in, but the evidence for
that
comes from eg. quantum physics experiments, not from the fact that we
experience
consciousness and believe we have free will.
> Cheers
>
> BTW - I'm travelling to Melbourne next Wednesday on business - I'm not sure
> of my schedule yet, but maybe there's a chance of getting a coffee
> together if you're around and handy to the CBD.
Possibly around lunchtime, let me know.
Stathis Papaioannou
> On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 09:13:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > Various people write:
> >
> > > blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
> >
> > But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
> > a recording at the moment? True, I am surprised by my experiences
> > and believe I could have acted differently had I wanted to, but that
> > might all be part of the script to which I am not privy, so that things
> > could only have been different if the recording had been different.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> > _
> > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
> > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d
> >
> --
> *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
> is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
> virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
> email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
> may safely ignore this attachment.
>
>
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
> Mathematics 0425 253119 (")
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
>
>
>
> >
_
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Re: computationalism and supervenience
> On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 08:32:04PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> Russell Standish writes: >> >>> Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one >>> branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious >>> experience at all. >> >> What does this mean? >> >> Stathis Papaioannou I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable* conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience "with the right (relative) probabilities" OK Russell? OK Stathis? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Le 23-août-06, à 17:58, Brent Meeker a écrit : > I take this to be what is needed to be "self-conscious". But is that > the same as > having an inner narrative? Is it the same as passing the mirror test? > Is my dog > conscious - or must he first do arithmetic? I would bet dogs are conscious. I would bet that they have even reflexive consciousness, like most sufficiently big mammals. "inner narrative" is asking too much imo. No need of arithmetic done by dogs for dogs being (even reflexively) conscious. I guess the mirror test can be used (Cat and dogs go through it, isn't it?). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Le 23-août-06, à 14:39, Russell Standish a écrit : > > On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >>> Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete >>> primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption. >> >> >> This depends entirely of what you mean by physical. If >> "physical-supervenience" alludes to the comp-physics, then ok. If this >> alludes to physics as understood by a aristotelian-matter physicist, >> then physical supervenience need it. >> Maudlin talk only about supervenience. For him it is just obvious that >> comp makes it physical. Of course he is wrong there (or UDA contains >> an >> error, but this remains to be shown). >> I have coined the term "physical supervenience", with "physical" >> having >> its standard aristotelian sense just to distinguish it with the >> comp-supervenience idea that mind relies on the immaterial >> computations >> (an infinity of them to be precise). >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> > > > Then this probably explains the confusion. Supervenience is merely > the statement that the physical tokens of a consciousness cannot be > identical for two different consciousnesses. The is independent of > whether those "physical tokens" are "stuffy" or not - remember I have > already bought your reversal of physical and mental explanations. Thanks for acknowledging. > > Since you have already used "physical" to refer to this appearance of > an objective universe, I merely thought you meant this classical > supervenience when contraposed against computational supervenience. I should perhaps use more systematically the expression "comp-physical". > My point is that this classical supervenience is another way of > stating the anthropic principle, and it is essential to avoid the > whole idealist programme spiralling down the plughole of solipsism. > > So what your really saying when you've shown COMP => - PHYS SUP is > that stuffy materialism is contradicted?? Not really contradicted. Only that stuffy materialism cannot attach the first person to material stuff. The notion of stuff loose its ability to explain the behavior of matter (which emerges from a measure on an infinity of computations). It does not loose its ability to explain mind because, well, it has never succeed on that question to begin with. > That unfortunately is not > how I've read the movie-graph argument - it is more like COMP => > supervenience on multiple universes. I guess you mean immaterial universe or computation (giving what you say above). OK then. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
John, Le 23-août-06, à 22:24, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > As I 'believe': anything recognized by our 'senses' are our mental > interpretations of the unattainable 'reality' (if we condone its > validity). "My world" is a posteriori. This is almost my favorite way to explain Plato in one sentence. Now with "pythagorean-plato" (discussed in Plato, but even more by the neoplatonists), the question is open that the "ultimate reality" is the reality of the numbers law. Note that after Godel-Turing-Post-Church... , betting on our own consistency, we know, at least, why and how such an ultimate reality (numbers) is forever unattainable (contrary to the pregodelian, leibnizian old belief that "number" are easy to get through. I mean "natural number" (real numbers or complex numbers are terrible simplification tools, unless you define the trigonometric function which reintroduce the natural numbers in the "real" or "complex" picture. Best regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Le 23-août-06, à 13:32, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) wrote (in different posts) : > > There are many interpretations of the box and diamond. > Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based > on provability (or provability within a system). But there are, > and always were, ideas of necessity based on truth rather than > provability. I agree (so what?) >> Since the failure of logicism, by Godel's theorem, we can argue that >> numbers does not necessarily exist. Numbers does not come from logic >> alone. If you want them, > > to exist > >> you have to do a ontological commitment. > > ..and if you want to play with them as a formal > system, you don't. I am not sure I follow you (terminological) nuance between "wanting something" and "wanting something to exist". The move toward formalism does not work for any theory of formal system. This is a consequence of Godel's incompleteness. I don't believe the formalistic philosophical position can even make sense of notion like "yes doctor". Still less about arithmetical truth, unless you formalize all this in second order arithmetic or in set theory, but then you need to rely on informal intuition at that level. > Hence the need for a metaphysical account of > matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the > physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour. I have not the slightest idea of what could be "matter-as-bare-substance". Does "matter-as-bare-substance" possess a mass? Does "matter-as-bare substance" violate Bell's inequality? Does such questions make sense, when you add that such bare matter has no property of its own? Especially when you put some consciousness in it. It seems to me that you are trying to use a "metaphysical notion" just to put in there all remaining unsolved fundamental questions. > For a formalist, there is nothing to numbers except definitions (axoms, > etc),. The numbers themselves do not have to exist. So there is > still no necessary ontological commitment in CT. OK. In that sense comp does not make any ontological commitment at all. "as if" will always be enough, even for the comp-electrons and protons. Are you formalist? Could you develop your notion of bare matter in a formalistic theory of physics? What about the "interpretation" of such a theory. Note that formalist have no problem with the lobian interview, which can indeed be seen as the formal counterpart of the UDA reasoning, but I am not sure any mind/body questions addressed in that enterprise could make sense to a formalist philosopher. I agree with Girard (french logician, discoverer of linear logic) that "formalism" in logic is just bureaucracy: it is more harmful than useless, imo. >> I said something along such line some times ago. I can provide a >> (short) explanation. The reason is the Hilbert-Polya conjecture >> according to which the non trivial zero of the complex Riemann Zeta >> function could perhaps be shown to stay on the complex line 1/2 + gt, >> if it was the case that those zero describe the spectrum of some >> quantum operator. > > The *spectrum* of a quantum operator is not observer-dependent. > What is observer-dependent, according to some, is the particular > value on the spectrum that is actually observed. Sorry I was (much too much short). We can come back latter on this difficult subject. It is a bit out of topics for now. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 21-août-06, à 19:48, Tom Caylor a écrit : > > > > > I'd rather go with Pascal. ;) > > > Comp has its own "Pascal wag", when the doctor said that either you > will die soon or you accept an artificial brain. Some people will > believe an artificial brain could be a last chance to ... see their > grand grand children married, or to follow the next soccer > championship, or whatever. > > > > > >> As I remember it, my interpretation/expansion of the "Yes Doctor" > >> assumption is that 1) there is a (finite of course) level of (digital) > >> substitution (called the "correct level of substitution") that is > >> sufficient to represent "all that I am", and "all that I could be if I > >> hadn't undergone a substitution", and 2) we (including the doctor) > >> cannot know what the correct level of substitution is, therefore we > >> have to gamble that the doctor will get it right when we say "Yes > >> Doctor". > >> > >> Suppose that the level of substitution actually *performed* by the > >> Doctor is S_p. Denote the *correct* level of substitution S_c. S_p > >> can be expressed by a finite number, since the substitution itself can > >> be expressed by a finite number (whatever is written on the tape/CD or > >> other storage/transmitting device). We know what S_p is and it is a > >> *fixed* finite number. But since S_c (*correct* level) is totally > >> unknowable, all we "know" about it is our assumption that it is > >> finite. > >> The next *obvious* step in the logical process is that the > >> probability > >> that S_p >= S_c is infinitesimal. > >> I.e. the probability that the doctor > >> got it right is zilch. This is because most numbers are bigger than > >> any fixed finite number S_p. > > > Why? If the level is high it could be that even a drunk doctor will > always choose it correctly. Your inference does not seem valid. > I think your and my "levels" are inversely proportional to each other, hence the confusion. My "level of substitution" is directly proportional to the number of digits/bits/whatever needed to encode the substitution. So a finer substitution I am calling "high", like using a high number of subintervals in a numerical integration to get a better approximation. I image the Doctor having a dial that he cranks up to "HIGH" if you pay him more money. You need to (temporarily) use this definition to follow through my argument above, even though your use of the term "low level" is probably more sophisticated. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
