On 3/29/2012 11:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 7:37 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a br
On 3/29/2012 7:37 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to
On 3/29/2012 6:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb wrote:
> You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
> experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
> conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to create a
> process that is aware of be
On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you are using here, so
as to convince me and others that it refute
On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you
are using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes
indeed the indeterminacy about the first
On 29 Mar 2012, at 18:46, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory.
Many Worlds is deterministic but I don't know about "comp" because
"comp" is a homemade term never completely defined and used on this
list
Comp is "jus
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you are using here, so
as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first
person experience displayed in the WM duplicat
On 29 Mar 2012, at 18:31, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Identical bodies have identical minds,
Yes.
>but identical minds can have different bodies.
Who cares? It's consciousness I'm interested in.
We discuss only on the consequence of the comp hypothesis
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory.
>
Many Worlds is deterministic but I don't know about "comp" because "comp"
is a homemade term never completely defined and used on this list and
nowhere else. I don't even know if I agree with "comp". I wil
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Identical bodies have identical minds,
>
Yes.
>but identical minds can have different bodies.
>
Who cares? It's consciousness I'm interested in.
> The universe does not know you are John Clark. You do.
>
In my symmetrical room example I know who J
On 28 Mar 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>> If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my
symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the
third person point of view then it seems pointless to insist
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